L [ B RAHY 
OF  THE 

U N I V EL  R.S  ITY 
Of  ILLINOIS 

B 

CC.19-^ 

1899 

V.  I _ 

RPMOTE  STORAq 


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AMERICAN  STATESMEN 

EDITED  BY 

JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 

IN  THIRTY-TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.  XIX. 


DOMESTIC  POLITICS:  THE  TARIFF 
AND  SLAVERY 


HENRY  CLAY 


FEB  1 " 1847  HILDEBRANDT 


8 

0^19  A, 
VI 


REMOTE  STORAGE 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


A WORD  should  be  said  in  explanation  of  the 
fact  that  this  life  of  Clay  fills  two  volumes,  be- 
cause, if  unexplained,  this  might  seem  to  imply  an 
exaggerated  opinion  of  the  importance  of  Clay  in 
comparison  with  those  other  statesmen  to  each  of 
whom  only  one  volume  is  allotted.  It  was  not  by 
original  intention  that  this  distinction  was  made  ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  was  permitted  with  some  reluc- 
tance and  under  peculiar  pressure  ; nor  would  it 
even  thus  have  seemed  permissible  had  there  not 
been  a fundamental  reason  for  it.  Clay’s  career 
in  public  life  was  not  only  very  long,  but  the 
historian  finds  it  singular  in  one  respect.  Other 
statesmen  are  allied  with  parties  and  represent 
policies  in  such  a manner  that  a certain  unity 
runs  through  their  actions : in  such  cases  the 
writer  fulfills  his  duty  by  telling  what  were  their 
political  beliefs,  what  measures  they  promoted,  and 
what  obstruction  they  encountered  in  forwarding 
these  beliefs ; he  gives  their  philosophy,  and  seeks 
to  show  wherein  and  why  it  sometimes  achieved 
successes  and  sometimes  met  with  failures.  But 
Clay’s  life  cannot  be  thus  written ; for  he  man- 


VI 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


aged  to  get  upon  both  sides  of  pretty  much  every 
great  question  which  arose  in  his  day,  and  it 
would  be  difficult  to  say  that  he  had  any  other  or 
more  profound  philosophy  in  statesmanship  than 
temporarily  to  heal  dissensions.  Thus  it  is  in  a 
way  inevitable  that  it  should  require  almost  twice 
the  usual  space  in  order  to  narrate  a story  which 
requires  that  the  policies,  politics,  and  views  of 
two  parties  should  be  presented  instead  of  the  poli- 
cies, politics,  and  views  of  only  one  party.  So, 
when  this  life  of  Clay  was  offered  for  editorial 
consideration,  it  appeared,  perhaps  by  a certain 
inherent  necessity  rather  than  by  design,  to  have 
taken  the  shape  almost  of  a history  of  the  United 
States  during  that  middle  term  of  years  which 
intervened  between  the  downfall  of  Federalism 
and  the  exclusive  predominance  of  the  slavery 
question.  Yet  this  seemed  such  a very  useful 
element  in  the  series  that  the  book  was  accepted 
in  spite  of  its  trait  of  disproportion. 

Clay’s  character  and  reputation  present  an  inter- 
esting study.  From  the  beginning  nothing  seems 
to  occur  as,  by  logic,  it  ought  to  occur.  A man  of 
fiery,  impetuous,  emotional  temperament  would  be 
expected  to  prove  a strenuous  partisan ; but  so  far 
was  Clay  from  being  a partisan  that,  although  he 
ranks  as  a Whig,  it  is  not  easy  to  attribute  to  him 
any  clear  and  stable  convictions  upon  any  great 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


vii 


question  of  political  principle.  He  dashed  into 
public  life  with  a great  whirl  when  the  difficulties 
with  Great  Britain  were  leading  to  the  war  of 
1812.  Reckless,  hot-headed,  and  at  that  time 
utterly  inexperienced  and  ignorant,  he  caused  as 
much  mischief  as  could  be  caused  by  the  blunders 
of  so  young  a politician.  Yet  the  splendid  vehe- 
mence of  his  patriotism  prevented  his  suffering  the 
punishment  which  might  have  followed  him  had  he 
been  an  older  and  more  trusted  leader.  It  was  his 
first  and  last  error  in  the  direction  of  extremism 
in  politics.  At  Ghent,  in  the  negotiations  for 
peace,  he  proved  a poor  diplomatist ; yet  again 
good  luck  saved  his  prestige  ; for  an  unexpectedly 
good  treaty  was  secured,  and  the  people  did  not 
accurately  distribute  the  respective  contributions 
of  the  negotiators. 

Having  escaped  so  fortunately  the  natural  re- 
sults of  early  mistakes,  Clay  became  for  the  future 
a statesman  of  moderation.  It  is  a curious  spec- 
tacle that  he  presents  in  this  character,  which,  a 
priori , would  be  supposed  so  anti-pathetic  for  him. 
Concerning  the  tariff,  he  was  at  once  everywhere 
and  nowhere,  so  to  speak  ; and  concerning  slavery 
he  was  much  worse.  He  was  intense  and  extreme 
only  in  one  matter,  and  that  was  hatred  of  Andrew 
Jackson.  In  all  else  his  panacea,  his  watchword, 
his  purpose,  was  always  Compromise.  Yet  what 


viii 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


he  called  compromises  were  in  fact  only  temporary 
makeshifts.  He  seemed  to  think  that  a real  end 
had  been  achieved  when  a congressional  majority 
had  been  secured  for  some  bill  which  most  of  those 
who  voted  for  it  disliked  and  intended  to  replace 
in  due  time.  He  seemed  to  think  that  protection- 
ists and  free-traders  could  be  brought  to  perma- 
nent agreement,  and  that  this  agreement  could  be 
produced  by  or  based  upon  a scheme  which  each 
regarded  as  bad,  or  at  least  as  very  imperfect. 
He  seemed  to  think  that  pro-slavery  men  and  anti- 
slavery men,  North  and  South,  could  be  kept  con- 
tented when  each  section  earnestly  believed  itself 
to  be  sacrificing  its  worldly  interests  and  moral 
convictions.  All  this  sort  of  thing  is  now  clearly 
seen  to  be  the  most  shallow  and  transitory  states- 
manship. Compromises  between  deep,  honest,  an- 
tagonistic faiths  are  absurdities.  Yet  the  states- 
man who  advocated  these  tame  as  well  as  useless 
methods  was  a man  of  hot  spirit  and  high  ambi- 
tion and  no  small  intellectual  force.  He  could 
advocate  a compromise  with  a fire  and  brilliancy 
of  oratory  which  generally  belong  only  to  the 
extreme  ardor  of  partisan  faith.  He  presented 
the  views  of  few  persons  ; he  asked  sacrifices  of 
opinion  and  belief,  political  or  moral,  from  nearly 
every  thinking  man  among  the  people  ; one  would 
not  think  that  this  would  prove  the  road  to  popu- 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


IX 


larity ; yet,  instead  of  finding  only  a limited  and 
lukewarm  following,  he  was  for  a long  time  the 
most  popular  man  in  public  life.  His  private 
morals  were  notoriously  bad,  even  scandalously 
so,  yet  a nation  which  plumed  itself  almost  phari- 
saically on  the  strictness  of  its  morality  forgave 
him  without  a moment’s  hesitation.  Why,  then, 
did  he  never  succeed  in  becoming  president  ? How 
he  craved  that  office  ! Of  all  the  men  who  have 
fallen  victims  to  the  ruinous  desire  for  it,  no  one 
has  had  that  wretched  political  disease  longer  or 
more  severely  than  did  Clay.  Proud  as  he  was, 
he  sometimes  truckled  for  this  end ; honest  as  he 
was  in  a political  way,  it  was  with  difficulty  that 
he  succeeded  — though  to  his  honor  it  is  to  be  said 
that  he  did  succeed  — in  refraining  from  sacri- 
ficing his  personal  honesty  to  the  temptations  of 
apparent  opportunism.  His  candidacy  was  con- 
stantly recurring,  so  that  he  was  a sort  of  perma- 
nent candidate ; and  it  must  often  have  been  the 
case  that,  if  the  country  had  been  polled  to  answer 
the  simple  question,  “ Who  is  your  personal  choice 
for  the  presidency  ? ” the  replies  would  have  shown 
an  ample  majority  for  Clay.  It  was  one  of  the 
many  contradictions,  in  which  his  story  abounds, 
that  all  this  long-enduring  popular  backing  never 
produced  the  result  which  seemed  natural  and 
logical. 


X 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


It  is  a very  difficult  thing  to  know  how  to  value 
Clay  as  a statesman.  Upon  the  one  hand,  his 
influence  during  a long  series  of  years  was  very 
great.  Yet  it  was  an  influence  which  has  failed 
to  leave  any  permanent  trace  ; it  was  an  influence 
which  did  not  impel  the  people  in  any  direction 
which  was  long  held,  which  did  not  in  any  appre- 
ciable degree  lead  the  nation  towards  the  destina- 
tion which  history  now  shows  was  before  it.  Clay 
did  not  train  any  intellects  to  believe  in  slavery 
or  in  anti-slavery ; and  though  he  ranks  as  a pro- 
tectionist, yet  hardly  more  did  he  construct  any 
fundamental,  consistent,  and  wide-reaching  doc- 
trine of  protection.  He  contented  himself  always 
with  steering  the  ship  of  state  from  day  to  day ; 
he  undertook  to  lay  out  no  long  voyage,  no  definite 
course  in  any  direction ; he  was  satisfied  to  glide 
around  perils,  to  weather  storms,  as  those  came ; 
achievements  most  necessary,  without  doubt,  yet 
hardly  rounding  out  the  full  duty  of  such  a states- 
man as  Clay  aspired  to  be.  * These  volumes  show, 
in  my  opinion,  a man  whose  motives  one  often 
approves ; whose  conscientiousness  one  often  re- 
spects ; whose  brilliance  one  nearly  always  ad- 
mires ; whose  patriotism,  gallantry,  sincerity,  one 
praises;  and  yet  one  fails  to  discern  the  picture 
of  a man  who  had  a guiding  faith  in  any  definite 
principle,  or  who  cherished  any  distinct  ideal  in 


EDITOR’S  PREFACE  xi 

the  moralities,  or  even  in  the  business  of  the  na- 
tional statesmanship.  None  the  less,  he  has  left 
behind  him  a name  and  reputation  which  stand 
high  among  the  best  in  our  country. 

JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 

September,  1898. 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  Youth 1 

II.  The  Kentucky  Lawyer 13 

III.  Beginnings  in  Politics 27 

IV.  Beginnings  in  Legislation  ....  38 

V.  The  War  of  1812 67 

VI.  Ghent  and  London 102 

VII.  In  the  House  of  Representatives  . . . 126 

VIII.  The  Missouri  Compromise  ....  172 

IX.  Candidate  for  the  Presidency  . . . 203 

X.  President-Maker 236 

XI.  Secretary  of  State 258 

XII.  The  Party  Chiefs 312 

XIII.  The  Campaign  of  1832  . 351 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Henry  Clay Frontispiece 

From  a daguerreotype  in  the  possession  of  the  Cen- 
tury Company. 

Autograph  from  a MS.  in  the  archives  of  the  State 
Department  at  Washington. 

The  vignette  of  Mr.  Clay’s  birthplace,  Hanover  County, 

Va.,  is  after  a cut  in  “ Homes  of  American  Statesmen,” 
published  by  Alfred  W.  Putnam,  New  York,  N.  Y.  Page 

Francis  P.  Blair facing  236 

From  a photograph  by  Brady  in  the  Library  of  the 
State  Department  at  Washington. 

Autograph  from  a MS.  in  the  archives  of  the  State 
Department. 

Richard  Rush fating  258 

After  an  engraving  by  John  Sartain. 

Autograph  from  the  Chamberlain  collection,  Boston 
Public  Library. 

John  M.  Clayton  facing  378 

From  a painting  by  Garrett  in  the  Clayton  House, 
Wilmington,  Del. 

Autograph  from  Comegys’  “ Life  of  John  M.  Clayton.” 


HENRY  CLAY 


CHAPTER  I 
YOUTH 

Few  public  characters  in  American  history  have 
been  the  subjects  of  more  heated  controversy  than 
Henry  Clay.  There  was  no  measure  of  detraction 
and  obloquy  to  which,  during  his  lifetime,  his 
opponents  would  not  resort,  and  there  seemed  to 
be  no  limit  to  the  admiration  and  attachment  of 
his  friends.  While  his  enemies  denounced  him  as 
a pretender  and  selfish  intriguer  in  politics  and  an 
abandoned  profligate  in  private  life,  his  supporters 
unhesitatingly  placed  him  first  among  the  sages  of 
the  period,  and,  by  way  of  defense,  sometimes 
even  among  its  saints.  The  animosities  against 
him  have,  naturally,  long  ago  disappeared;  but 
even  now,  more  than  thirty  years  after  his  death, 
we  may  hear  old  men,  who  knew  him  in  the  days 
of  his  strength,  speak  of  him  with  an  enthusiasm 
and  affection  so  warm  and  fresh  as  to  convince  us 
that  the  recollection  of  having  followed  his  leader- 
ship is  among  the  dearest  treasures  of  their  mem- 


2 


HENRY  CLAY 


ory.  The  remarkable  fascination  he  exercised 
seems  to  have  reached  even  beyond  his  living  exist- 
ence. It  is,  therefore,  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
his  biographers,  most  of  whom  were  his  personal 
friends,  should  have  given  us  an  abundance  of 
rhapsodic  eulogy,  instead  of  a clear  account  of 
what  their  hero  thought  on  matters  of  public  in- 
terest, of  what  he  did  and  advised  others  to  do,  of 
his  successes  and  his  failures,  and  of  the  influence 
he  exercised  in  shaping  the  development  of  this 
republic.  This,  indeed,  is  not  an  easy  task,  for 
Henry  Clay  had,  during  the  long  period  of  his 
public  life,  covering  nearly  half  a century,  a larger 
share  in  national  legislation  than  any  other  con- 
temporary statesman, — not,  indeed,  as  an  origi- 
nator of  v ideas  and  systems,  but  as  an  arranger  of 
measures,  and  as  a leader  of  political  forces.  His 
public  life  may  therefore  be  said  to  be  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  national  history. 

Efforts  have  been  made  by  enthusiastic  admirers 
to  find  for  him  a noble  ancestry  in  England,  but 
with  questionable  success.  We  may  content  our- 
selves with  saying  that  the  greatness  of  his  name 
rests  entirely  upon  his  own  merit.  The  family 
from  which  he  sprang  emigrated  from  England 
not  long  after  the  establishment  of  the  colony  of 
Virginia,  and  settled  on  the  southern  side  of  the 
James  River.  His  biographers,  some  of  whom 
wrote  under  his  own  supervision,  agree  in  the 
statement  that  Henry  Clay  was  born  on  April  12, 
1777,  in  Hanover  County,  Virginia,  in  a neigh- 


YOUTH 


3 


borhood  called  the  “Slashes.”  His  father,  John 
Clay,  was  a Baptist  clergyman,  of  sterling  charac- 
ter, of  great  dignity  of  deportment,  much  esteemed 
by  all  who  knew  him,  and  “remarkable  for  his 
fine  voice  and  delivery.”  The  pastor’s  flock  con- 
sisted of  poor  people.  A rock  in  South  Anna 
River  has  long  been  pointed  out  as  a spot  “from 
which  he  used  at  times  to  address  his  congrega- 
tion.” Henry  Clay’s  mother  was  a daughter  of 
George  Hudson  of  Hanover  County.  She  is  said 
to  have  been  a woman  of  exemplary  qualities  as  a 
wife  and  a mother,  and  of  much  patriotic  spirit. 

The  Reverend  John  Clay  died  in  1781,  when 
Henry  was  only  four  years  old,  and  there  is  a 
tradition  in  the  family  that,  while  the  dead  body 
was  still  lying  in  the  house,  Colonel  Tarleton, 
commanding  a cavalry  force  under  Lord  Cornwal- 
lis, passed  through  Hanover  County  on  a raid, 
and  left  a handful  of  gold  and  silver  on  Mrs. 
Clay’s  table  as  a compensation  for  some  property 
taken  or  destroyed  by  his  soldiers;  but  that  the 
spirited  woman,  as  soon  as  Tarleton  was  gone, 
swept  the  money  into  her  apron  and  threw  it  into 
the  fireplace.  It  would  have  been  in  no  sense 
improper,  and  more  prudent,  had  she  kept  it, 
notwithstanding  her  patriotic  indignation ; for  she 
was  left  a widow  with  seven  children,  and  there 
was  only  a very  small  estate  to  support  the  family. 

Under  such  circumstances  Henry,  the  fifth  of 
the  seven  children  of  the  widow,  received  no  better 
schooling  than  other  poor  boys  of  the  neighbor- 


4 


HENRY  CLAY 


hood.  The  schoolhouse  of  the  “ Slashes”  was  a 
small  log-cabin  with  the  hard  earth  for  a floor, 
and  the  schoolmaster  an  Englishman  who  passed 
under  the  name  of  Peter  Deacon,  — a man  of  an 
uncertain  past  and  somewhat  given  to  hard  drink- 
ing, but  possessing  ability  enough  to  teach  the 
children  confided  to  him  reading,  writing,  and 
elementary  arithmetic.  When  not  at  school  Henry 
had  to  work  for  the  support  of  the  family,  and  he 
was  often  seen  walking  barefooted  behind  the 
plough,  or  riding  on  a pony  to  Daricott’s  mill  on 
the  Pamunkey  River,  using  a rope  for  a bridle 
and  a bag  filled  with  wheat  or  corn  or  flour  as  a 
saddle.  Thus  he  earned  the  nickname  of  “the 
mill -boy  of  the  Slashes,”  which  subsequently,  in 
his  campaigns  for  the  presidency,  was  thought  to 
be  worth  a good  many  votes. 

A few  years  after  her  first  husband’s  death,  the 
widow  Clay  married  Captain  Henry  Watkins,  a 
resident  of  Richmond,  who  seems  to  have  been 
a worthy  man  and  a good  stepfather  to  his  wife’s 
children.  To  start  young  Henry  in  life  Captain 
Watkins  placed  him  as  a “boy  behind  the  counter  ” 
in  the  retail  store  kept  by  Richard  Denny  in  the 
city  of  Richmond.  Henry,  who  was  then  fourteen 
years  old,  devoted  himself  for  about  a year  with 
laudable  diligence  and  fidelity  to  the  duty  of  draw- 
ing molasses  and  measuring  tape,  giving  his  lei- 
sure hours  to  the  reading  of  such  books  as  hap- 
pened to  fall  into  his  hands.  But  it  occurred  to 
Captain  Watkins  that  his  stepson,  the  brightness 


YOUTH 


5 


and  activity  of  whose  mind  were  noticed  by  him 
as  well  as  others,  might  be  found  fit  for  a more 
promising  career.  He  contrived  through  the  in- 
fluence of  his  friend  Colonel  Tinsley,  a member 
of  the  House  of  Burgesses,  to  obtain  for  young 
Henry  a place  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the 
High  Court  of  Chancery,  that  clerk  being  Mr. 
Peter  Tinsley,  the  colonel’s  brother.  There  was 
really  no  vacancy,  but  the  colonel’s  patronizing 
zeal  proved  irresistible,  and  Henry  was  appointed 
as  a supernumerary. 

To  Roland  Thomas,  the  senior  clerk  of  the  of- 
fice, who  lived  to  see  and  admire  Henry  Clay  in 
his  greatness,  we  are  indebted  for  an  account  of 
the  impression  produced  by  the  lad  as  he  appeared 
in  his  new  surroundings.  He  was  a rawboned, 
lank,  awkward  youth,  with  a countenance  by  no 
means  handsome,  yet  not  unpleasing.  His  gar- 
ments, of  gray  “figinny”  cloth,  were  home-made 
and  ill-fitting;  and  his  linen,  which  the  good 
mother  had  starched  for  the  occasion  to  unusual 
stiffness,  made  him  look  peculiarly  strange  and 
uncomfortable.  With  great  uneasiness  of  manner 
he  took  his  place  at  the  desk  where  he  was  to 
begin  copying  papers,  while  his  new  companions 
could  not  refrain  from  tittering  at  his  uncouth 
appearance  and  his  blushing  confusion.  But  they 
soon  learned  to  respect  and  also  to  like  him.  It 
turned  out  that  he  could  talk  uncommonly  well 
when  he  ventured  to  talk  freely,  and  presently  he 
proved  himself  the  brightest  and  also  the  most 


6 


HENRY  CLAY 


studious  young  man  among  them.  He  continued 
to  “read  books”  when  the  hours  of  work  were 
over,  while  most  of  his  companions  gave  themselves 
up  to  the  pleasures  of  the  town. 

Then  the  fortunate  accident  arrived  which  is 
so  frequently  found  in  the  lives  of  young  men  of 
uncommon  quality  and  promise.  He  began  to 
attract  the  attention  of  persons  of  superior  merit. 
George  Wythe,  the  chancellor  of  the  High  Court 
of  Chancery,  who  often  had  occasion  to  visit  Peter 
Tinsley’s  office,  noticed  the  new-comer,  and  se- 
lected him  from  among  the  employees  there  to  act 
as  an  amanuensis  in  writing  out  and  recording  the 
decisions  of  the  court.  This  became  young  Clay’s 
principal  occupation  for  four  years,  during  which 
his  intercourse  with  the  learned  and  venerable 
judge  grew  constantly  more  intimate  and  elevating. 
As  he  had  to  write  much  from  the  chancellor’s 
dictation,  the  subject-matter  of  his  writing,  which 
at  first  was  a profound  mystery  to  him,  gradually 
became  a matter  of  intelligent  interest.  The  chan- 
cellor, whose  friendly  feeling  for  the  bright  youth 
grew  warmer  as  their  relations  became  more  confi- 
dential, began  to  direct  his  reading,  at  first  turn- 
ing him  to  grammatical  studies,  and  then  gradually 
opening  to  him  a wider  range  of  legal  and  histori- 
cal literature.  But  — what  was  equally  if  not 
more  important  — in  the  pauses  of  their  work,  and 
in  hours  of  leisure,  the  chancellor  conversed  with 
his  young  secretary  upon  grave  subjects,  and  thus 
did  much  to  direct  his  thoughts  and  to  form  his 
principles. 


YOUTH 


7 


Henry  Clay  could  not  have  found  a wiser  and 
nobler  mentor.  George  Wythe  was  one  of  the 
most  honorably  distinguished  men  of  a period 
abounding  in  great  names.  Born  in  1726,  he  re- 
ceived his  education  at  William  and  Mary  Col- 
lege. At  the  age  of  thirty  he  devoted  himself  to 
the  study  and  practice  of  the  law,  and  rose  quickly 
to  eminence  in  the  profession.  In  1758  he  repre- 
sented the  college  in  the  House  of  Burgesses.  In 
1764  he  drew  up  a remonstrance  against  the  Stamp 
Act,  addressed  to  the  British  Parliament.  As  a 
member  of  the  Congress  of  1776  he  was  one  of  the 
signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  For 
ten  years  he  taught  jurisprudence  at  William  and 
Mary.  He  aided  Jefferson  in  revising  the  laws  of 
Virginia.  In  1777  he  was  appointed  a judge  of 
the  High  Court  of  Chancery,  and  in  1786  became 
chancellor.  He  was  a member  of  the  convention 
which  framed  the  federal  Constitution,  and  one  of 
its  warmest  advocates  in  the  Virginia  Convention 
which  ratified  it.  But  he  achieved  a more  pe- 
culiar distinction  by  practically  demonstrating  the 
sincerity  of  his  faith  in  the  humane  philosophy  of 
the  age.  In  his  lifetime  he  emancipated  all  his 
slaves  and  made  a liberal  provision  for  their  sub- 
sistence. There  were  few  men  in  his  day  of  larger 
information  and  experience,  and  scarcely  any  of 
higher  principle.  Nor  was  Henry  Clay  the  only 
one  of  his  pupils  who  afterward  won  a great  name, 
for  Thomas  Jefferson  and  John  Marshall  had  been 
students  of  law  in  George  Wythe’s  office. 


8 


HENRY  CLAY 


When  young  Clay  had  served  four  years  as  the 
chancellor’s  amanuensis,  his  mind  was  made  up 
that  he  would  become  a lawyer.  He  entered  the 
office  of  Robert  Brooke,  the  attorney-general  of 
Virginia,  as  a regular  law  student,  spent  about  a 
year  with  him,  and  then  obtained  from  the  judges 
of  the  Court  of  Appeals  a license  to  practice  the 
profession.  This  was  quick  studying,  or  the  li- 
cense must  have  been  cheap,  unless  we  assume  that 
the  foundations  of  his  legal  knowledge  were  amply 
laid  in  his  intercourse  with  Chancellor  Wythe. 

But  in  the  mean  time  he  had  also  been  intro- 
duced in  society.  Richmond  at  that  time  possessed 
less  than  5000  inhabitants,  but  it  was  the  most 
important  city  in  the  State,  — the  political  capital 
as  well  as  the  social  centre  of  Virginia.  The  char- 
acter of  Virginian  society  had  become  greatly 
changed  during  the  Revolutionary  war.  The  glo- 
ries of  Williamsburg,  the  colonial  capital,  with  its 
“palace,”  its  Raleigh  Tavern,  its  Apollo  Hall,  its 
gay  and  magnificent  gatherings  of  the  planter 
magnates,  were  gone  never  to  return.  Many  of 
the  “ first  families”  had  become  much  reduced  in 
their  circumstances.  Moreover,  the  system  of 
primogeniture  and  entail  had  been  abolished  by 
legal  enactments  moved  by  Jefferson,  and  thus  the 
legal  foundation  upon  which  alone  a permanent 
landed  aristocracy  can  maintain  itself  had  disap- 
peared. Although  much  of  the  old  spirit  still 
remained  alive,  yet  the  general  current  was  de- 
cidedly democratic,  and  the  distance  between  the 


YOUTH 


9 


blooded  gentry  and  less  u well-born”  people  was 
materially  lessened.  Thus  the  “ mill-boy  of  the 
Slashes,”  having  become  known  as  a young  man 
of  uncommon  intellectual  brightness,  high  spirits, 
and  good  character,  and  being,  besides,  well  in- 
troduced through  his  friendship  with  Chancellor 
Wythe,  found  it  possible  to  come  into  friendly 
contact  with  persons  of  social  pretensions  far  above 
his  own.  He  succeeded  even  in  organizing  a 
‘‘rhetorical  society,”  or  debating  club,  among 
whose  members  there  were  not  a few  young  men 
who  subsequently  became  distinguished.  It  was 
on  this  field  that  he  first  achieved  something  like 
leadership,  while  his  quick  intelligence  and  his 
sympathetic  qualities  made  him  a favorite  in  a 
much  larger  circle.  According  to  all  accounts, 
Henry  Clay,  at  that  period  of  his  life,  was  un- 
touched by  vice  or  bad  habit,  and  could  in  every 
respect  be  esteemed  as  an  irreproachable  and  very 
promising  young  man. 

But  he  soon  discovered  that  all  these  things 
would  not  give  him  a paying  practice  as  an  attor- 
ney in  Richmond  so  quickly  as  he  desired;  and  as 
his  mother  and  stepfather  had  removed  to  Ken- 
tucky in  1792,  he  resolved  to  follow  them  to  the 
Western  wilds,  and  there  to  “grow  up  with  the 
country.”  He  was  in  his  twenty-first  year  when 
he  left  Richmond,  with  his  license  to  practice  as 
an  attorney,  but  with  little  else,  in  his  pocket. 

This  was  the  end  of  Henry  Clay’s  regular  school- 
ing. Thenceforth  he  did  not  again  in  his  life  find 


10 


HENRY  CLAY 


a period  of  leisure  to  Re  quietly  and  exclusively 
devoted  to  study.  What  he  had  learned  was  little 
enough.  In  Peter  Deacon’s  schoolhouse  he  had 
received  nothing  but  the  first  elementary  instruc- 
tion. The  year  he  spent  behind  the  counter  of 
Denny’s  store  could  not  have  added  much  to  his 
stock  of  knowledge.  In  Peter  Tinsley’s  office  he 
had  cultivated  a neat  and  regular  handwriting,  of 
which  a folio  volume  of  Chancellor  Wythe’s  deci- 
sions, once  in  the  possession  of  Jefferson,  now  in 
the  library  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  gives  ample  testimony.  Under  Chancellor 
Wythe’s  guidance  he  had  read  Harris’s  Homer, 
Tooke’s  Diversions  of  Purley,  Bishop  Lowth’s 
Grammar,  Plutarch’s  Lives,  some  elementary  law- 
books, and  a few  works  on  history.  Further,  the 
chancellor’s  conversation  had  undoubtedly  been  in 
a high  degree  instructive  and  morally  elevating. 
But  all  these  things  did  not  constitute  a well-or- 
dered education.  His  only  more  or  less  systematic 
training  he  received  during  the  short  year  he  spent 
as  a law  student  in  the  office  of  Attorney-General 
Brooke,  and  that  can  scarcely  have  gone  far  be- 
yond the  elementary  principles  of  law  and  the  or- 
dinary routine  of  practice  in  court.  On  the  whole, 
he  had  depended  upon  the  occasional  gathering 
of  miscellaneous  information.  He  could  thus, 
at  best,  have  acquired  only  a slender  equipment 
for  the  tasks  before  him.  This,  however,  would 
have  been  of  comparatively  slight  importance  had 
he,  in  learning  what  little  he  knew,  cultivated 


YOUTH 


11 


thorough  methods  of  inquiry,  and  the  habit  of 
reasoning  out  questions,  and  of  not  being  satisfied 
until  the  subject  in  hand  was  well  understood  in 
all  its  aspects.  The  habit  he  really  had  cultivated 
was  that  of  rapidly  skimming  over  the  surface  of 
the  subjects  of  his  study,  in  order  to  gather  what 
knowledge  was  needed  for  immediate  employment; 
and,  as  his  oratorical  genius  was  developed  early 
and  well,  he  possessed  the  faculty  of  turning  every 
bit  of  information  to  such  advantage  as  to  produce 
upon  his  hearers  the  impression  that  he  possessed 
rich  accumulations  behind  the  actual  display. 
Sometimes  he  may  have  thus  satisfied  and  deceived 
even  himself.  This  superficiality  remained  one  of 
his  weak  points  through  life.  No  doubt  he  went 
on  learning,  but  he  learned  rather  from  experience 
than  from  study ; and  though  experience  is  a good 
school,  yet  it  is  apt  to  be  irregular  and  fragmen- 
tary in  its  teachings. 

Some  of  Henry  Clay’s  biographers  have  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  scantiness  and  irregu- 
larity of  instruction  he  received,  without  the  aid 
of  academy  or  college,  were  calculated  to  quicken 
his  self-reliance,  and  thereby  to  become  an  element 
of  strength  in  his  character  especially  qualifying 
him  for  political  leadership.  It  is  quite  possible 
that,  had  he  in  his  youth  acquired  the  inclination 
and  faculty  for  methodical  inquiry  and  thus  the 
habit  of  examining  both  sides  of  every  question 
with  equal  interest,  he  would  have  been  less  quick 
in  forming  final  conclusions  from  first  impressions, 


12 


HENRY  CLAY 


less  easily  persuaded  of  the  absolute  correctness  of 
his  own  opinions,  less  positive  and  commanding  in 
the  promulgation  of  them,  and  less  successful  in 
inspiring  his  followers  with  a ready  belief  in  his 
infallibility.  But  that  he  might  have  avoided 
grave  errors  as  a statesman  had  his  early  training 
been  such  as  to  form  his  mind  for  more  thorough 
thinking,  and  thus  to  lay  a larger  basis  for  his 
later  development,  he  himself  seemed  now  and 
then  to  feel.  It  was  with  melancholy  regret  that 
he  sometimes  spoke  of  his  “ neglected  education, 
improved  by  his  own  irregular  efforts,  without  the 
benefit  of  systematic  instruction.” 

When  he  settled  down  in  Kentucky  his  new 
surroundings  were  by  no  means  such  as  to  remedy 
this  defect.  Active  life  in  a new  country  stimu- 
lates many  energies,  but  it  is  not  favorable  to  the 
development  of  studious  habits.  In  this  respect 
Kentucky  was  far  from  forming  an  exception. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 

At  the  time  when  Henry  Clay  left  Richmond  to 
seek  his  fortune  in  Kentucky,  the  valley  of  the 
Ohio  was  the  “Far  West”  of  the  country,  attract- 
ing two  distinct  classes  of  adventurous  and  enter- 
prising spirits.  Only  nine  years  before,  in  1788, 
the  Ohio  River  had  floated  down  the  flatboats 
carrying  the  pioneers  who  founded  the  first  settle- 
ments on  the  northern  bank  at  Marietta  and  on 
the  present  site  of  Cincinnati;  but  forthwith  a 
steady  stream  had  poured  in,  which  in  twelve 
years  had  swelled  the  population  of  the  territory 
destined  to  become  the  State  of  Ohio  to  45,000 
souls.  They  came  mainly  from  New  England, 
New  York,  and  Pennsylvania.  Emigrants  from 
the  slave  States,  too,  in  considerable  number, 
sought  new  homes  in  the  southern  portion  of  the 
Northwest  Territory,  but  they  formed  only  a mi- 
nority. The  settlement  of  Kentucky  was  of  an 
older  date,  and  its  population  of  a different  char- 
acter. Daniel  Boone  entered  the  “dark  and  bloody 
ground”  in  1769,  seven  years  before  the  colonies 
declared  themselves  independent.  Other  hardy 
and  intrepid  spirits  soon  followed  him,  to  dispute 


14 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  possession  of  the  land  with  the  Indians.  They 
were  hunters  and  pioneer  farmers,  not  intent  upon 
founding  large  industrial  communities,  but  fond 
of  the  wild,  adventurous,  lonesome,  unrestrained 
life  of  the  frontiersman.  Ten  years  after  Daniel 
Boone’s  first  settlement,  Kentucky  was  said  to 
contain  less  than  two  hundred  white  inhabitants. 
But  then  immigration  began  to  flow  in  rapidly, 
so  that  in  1790,  when  the  first  federal  census  was 
taken,  Kentucky  had  a population  of  73,600, — 
of  whom  61,000  were  white.  About  one  half  of 
the  whites  and  three  fourths  of  the  slaves  had 
come  from  Virginia,  the  rest  mostly  from  North 
Carolina  and  Maryland,  with  a sprinkling  of 
Pennsylvanians.  At  the  period  when  Henry  Clay 
arrived  in  Kentucky,  in  1797,  the  population  ex- 
ceeded 180,000,  about  one  fifth  of  whom  were 
slaves,  — the  later  immigrants  having  come  from 
the  same  quarter  as  the  earlier. 

The  original  stock  consisted  of  the  hardiest  race 
of  backwoodsmen.  The  forests  of  Kentucky  were 
literally  wrested  from  the  Indians  by  constant 
fighting.  The  question  whether  the  aborigines 
had  any  right  to  the  soil  seems  to  have  been  ut- 
terly foreign  to  the  pioneer’s  mind.  He  wanted 
the  land,  and  to  him  it  was  a matter  of  course  that 
the  Indian  must  leave  it.  The  first  settlements 
planted  in  the  virgin  forest  were  fortified  with 
stockades  and  blockhouses,  which  the  inmates,  not 
seldom  for  months  at  a time,  could  not  leave  with- 
out danger  of  falling  into  an  Indian  ambush  and 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


15 


being  scalped.  No  part  of  the  country  has  there- 
fore more  stories  and  traditions  of  perilous  adven- 
tures, bloody  fights,  and  hairbreadth  escapes.  For 
a generation  or  more  the  hunting-shirt,  leggings, 
and  moccasins  of  deerskin  more  or  less  gaudily 
ornamented,  and  the  long  rifle,  powder-horn,  and 
hunting-knife  formed  the  regular  “outfit”  of  a 
very  large  proportion  of  the  male  Kentuckians. 
We  are  told  of  some  of  the  old  pioneers  who,  many 
years  after  populous  towns  had  grown  up  on  the 
sites  of  the  old  stockades,  still  continued  the  habit 
of  walking  about  in  their  hunter’s  garb,  with  rifle 
and  powder-horn,  although  the  deer  had  become 
scarce  and  the  Indian  had  long  ago  disappeared 
from  the  neighborhood.  They  were  loath  to  make 
up  their  minds  to  the  fact  that  the  old  wild  life 
was  over.  Thus  the  reminiscences  and  the  charac- 
teristic spirit  and  habits  left  behind  by  that  wild 
life  were  still  fresh  among  the  people  of  Kentucky 
at  the  period  of  which  we  speak.  They  were  an 
uncommonly  sturdy  race  of  men,  most  of  them 
fully  as  fond  of  hunting,  and  perhaps  also  of  fight- 
ing, as  of  farming;  brave  and  generous,  rough 
and  reckless,  hospitable  and  much  given  to  bois- 
terous carousals,  full  of  a fierce  love  of  independ- 
ence, and  of  a keen  taste  for  the  confused  and 
turbulent  contests  of  frontier  politics.  Slavery 
exercised  its  peculiar  despotic  influence  there  as 
elsewhere,  although  the  number  of  slaves  in  Ken- 
tucky was  comparatively  small.  But  among  free- 
men a strongly  democratic  spirit  prevailed.  There 


16 


HENRY  CLAY 


was  as  yet  little  of  tliat  relation  of  superior  and 
inferior  between  the  large  planter  and  the  small 
tenant  or  farmer  which  had  existed,  and  was  still 
to  some  extent  existing,  in  Virginia.  As  to  the 
white  population,  society  started  on  the  plane  of 
practical  equality. 

Where  the  city  of  Lexington  now  stands,  the 
first  blockhouse  was  built  in  April,  1775,  by  Rob- 
ert Patterson,  “an  early  and  meritorious  adven- 
turer, much  engaged  in  the  defense  of  the  country/’ 
A settlement  soon  formed  under  its  protection, 
which  was  called  Lexington,  in  honor  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary battle  then  just  fought  in  Massachusetts. 
The  first  settlers  had  to  maintain  themselves  in 
many  an  Indian  fight  on  that  “finest  garden  spot 
in  all  Kentucky,”  as  the  Blue  Grass  region  was 
justly  called.  In  an  early  day  it  attracted  “some 
people  of  culture”  from  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
and  Pennsylvania.  In  1780  the  first  school  was 
built  in  the  fort,  and  the  same  year  the  Virginia 
legislature  — for  Kentucky  was  at  that  time  still 
a part  of  Virginia  — chartered  the  Transylvania 
Seminary  to  be  established  there.  In  1787  Mr. 
Isaac  Wilson,  of  the  Philadelphia  College,  opened 
the  “Lexington  Grammar  School,”  for  the  teach- 
ing of  Latin,  Greek,  “and  the  different  branches 
of  science.”  The  same  year  saw  the  organization 
of  a “society  for  promoting  useful  knowledge,” 
and  the  establishment  of  the  first  newspaper.  A 
year  later,  in  1788,  the  ambition  of  social  refine- 
ment wanted  and  got  a dancing-school,  and  also 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


17 


the  Transylvania  Seminary  was  fairly  ready  to 
receive  students:  “ Tuition  five  pounds  a year,  one 
half  in  cash,  the  other  in  property;  boarding  nine 
pounds  a year,  in  property,  pork,  corn,  tobacco, 
etc.”  In  ten  years  more  the  seminary,  having 
absorbed  the  Kentucky  Academy  established  by 
the  Presbyterians,  expanded  into  the  “Transyl- 
vania University,”  with  first  an  academical  depart- 
ment, and  the  following  year  adding  one  of  medi- 
cine and  another  of  law.  Thus  Lexington,  although 
still  a small  town,  became  what  was  then  called 
“the  literary  and  intellectual  centre  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,”  and  a point  of  great  attraction  to 
people  of  means  and  of  social  wants  and  preten- 
sions. It  would,  however,  be  a mistake  to  suppose 
that  it  was  a quiet  and  sedate  college  town  like 
those  of  New  England.  Many  years  later,  in 
1814,  a young  Massachusetts  Yankee,  Amos  Ken- 
dall, who  had  drifted  to  Lexington  in  pursuit  of 
profitable  employment,  and  was  then  a private 
teacher  in  Henry  Clay’s  family,  wrote  in  his  diary: 
“I  have,  I think,  learned  the  way  to  be  popular 
in  Kentucky,  but  do  not,  as  yet,  put  it  in  practice. 
Drink  whiskey  and  talk  loud,  with  the  fullest  con- 
fidence, and  you  will  hardly  fail  of  being  called  a 
clever  fellow.”  This  was  not  the  only  “way  to 
be  popular,”  but  was  certainly  one  of  the  ways. 
When  the  Lexington  of  1797,  the  year  of  Clay’s 
arrival  there,  is  spoken  of  as  a “literary  and  intel- 
lectual centre,”  the  meaning  is  that  it  was  an  out- 
post of  civilization  still  surrounded,  and  to  a great 


18 


HENRY  CLAY 


extent  permeated,  by  the  spirit  of  border  life. 
The  hunter  in  his  fringed  buckskin  suit,  with  long 
rifle  and  powder-horn,  was  still  a familiar  figure 
on  the  streets  of  the  town.  The  boisterous  hilarity 
of  the  barroom  and  the  excitement  of  the  card 
table  accorded  with  the  prevailing  taste  better  than 
a lecture  on  ancient  history;  and  a racing  horse 
was  to  a large  majority  of  Lexingtonians  an  object 
of  far  greater  interest  than  a professor  of  Greek. 
But,  compared  with  other  Western  towns  of  the 
time,  Lexington  did  possess  an  uncommon  propor- 
tion of  educated  people;  and  there  were  circles 
wherein  the  social  life  displayed,  together  with  the 
freedom  of  tone  characteristic  of  a new  country, 
a liberal  dash  of  culture. 

This  was  the  place  where  Henry  Clay  cast  an- 
chor in  1797.  The  society  he  found  there  was 
congenial  to  him,  and  he  was  congenial  to  it.  A 
young  man  of  rare  brightness  of  intellect,  of  fasci- 
nating address,  without  effort  making  the  little  he 
knew  pass  for  much  more,  of  high  spirits,  warm 
sympathies,  a cheery  nature,  and  sociable  tastes, 
he  easily  became  a favorite  with  the  educated  as  a 
person  of  striking  ability,  and  with  the  many  as 
a good  companion,  who,  notwithstanding  a certain 
distinguished  air,  enjoyed  himself  as  they  did.  It 
was  again  as  a speaker  that  he  first  made  his  mark. 
Shortly  after  his  arrival  at  Lexington,  before  he 
had  begun  to  practice  law,  he  joined  a debating 
club,  in  several  meetings  of  which  he  participated 
only  as  a silent  listener.  One  evening,  when,  after 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


19 


a long  discussion,  the  vote  upon  the  question  be- 
fore the  society  was  about  to  be  taken,  he  whis- 
pered to  a friend,  loudly  enough  to  be  overheard, 
that  to  him  the  debate  did  not  seem  to  have  ex- 
hausted the  subject.  Somebody  remarked  that 
Mr.  Clay  desired  to  speak,  and  he  was  called 
upon.  Finding  himself  unexpectedly  confronting 
the  audience,  he  was  struck  with  embarrassment, 
and,  as  he  had  done  frequently  in  imaginary  ap- 
peals in  court,  he  began:  “ Gentlemen  of  the 
jury!”  A titter  running  through  the  audience 
increased  his  confusion,  and  the  awkward  words 
came  out  once  more.  But  then  he  gathered  him- 
self up ; his  nerves  became  steady,  and  he  poured 
out  a flow  of  reasoning  so  lucid,  and  at  the  same 
time  so  impassioned,  that  his  hearers  were  over- 
come with  astonishment.  Some  of  his  friends  who 
had  been  present  said,  in  later  years,  that  they 
had  never  heard  him  make  a better  speech.  This 
was,  no  doubt,  an  exaggeration  of  the  first  impres- 
sion, but  at  any  rate  that  speech  stamped  him  at 
once  as  a remarkable  man  in  the  community,  and 
laid  open  before  him  the  road  to  success. 

He  had  not  come  to  Lexington  with  extravagant 
expectations.  As  an  old  man,  looking  back  upon 
those  days,  he  said : “ I remember  how  comfortable 
I thought  I should  be  if  I could  make  one  hundred 
pounds  a year,  Virginia  money,  and  with  what 
delight  I received  the  first  fifteen  shillings  fee.” 
He  approached  with  a certain  awe  the  competition 
with  what  he  called  “ a bar  uncommonly  distin- 


20 


HENRY  CLAY 


guished  by  eminent  members.”  But  he  did  not 
find  it  difficult  to  make  his  way  among  them.  His 
practice  was,  indeed,  at  first  mostly  in  criminal 
cases,  and  many  are  the  stories  told  of  the  marvel- 
ous effects  produced  by  his  eloquence  upon  the 
simple-minded  Kentucky  jurymen,  and  of  the  cul- 
prits saved  by  him  from  a well-merited  fate.  In 
one  of  those  cases,  — that  of  a Mrs.  Phelps,  a 
respectable  farmer’s  wife,  who  in  a fit  of  angry 
passion  had  killed  her  sister-in-law  with  a musket, 
— he  used  “ temporary  delirium”  as  a ground  of 
defense,  and  thus  became,  if  not  the  inventor,  at 
least  one  of  the  earliest  advocates,  of  that  theory 
of  emotional  insanity  which  has  served  so  much  to 
befog  people’s  notions  about  the  responsibility  of 
criminals.  But  in  the  case  of  Mrs.  Phelps  the 
jury,  with  characteristic  confusion  of  judgment, 
found  that  the  accused  was  just  insane  enough  not 
to  be  hanged,  but  not  insane  enough  to  be  let  off 
without  a term  in  jail. 

There  is  one  very  curious  exploit  on  record,  ex- 
hibiting in  a strong  light  Clay’s  remarkable  power, 
not  only  as  a speaker,  but  as  an  actor.  A man 
named  Willis  was  tried  for  a murder  of  peculiar 
atrocity.  In  the  very  teeth  of  the  evidence,  which 
seemed  to  be  absolutely  conclusive,  Clay,  defend- 
ing him,  succeeded  in  dividing  the  jury  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  crime  committed.  The  jurors  having 
been  unable  to  agree,  the  public  prosecutor  moved 
for  a new  trial,  which  motion  Clay  did  not  oppose. 
But  when,  at  the  new  trial,  his  turn  came  to  ad- 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


21 


dress  the  jury,  he  argued  that,  whatever  opinion 
the  jury  might  form  from  the  testimony  as  to  the 
guilt  of  the  accused,  they  could  not  now  convict 
him,  as  he  had  already  been  once  tried,  and  it  was 
the  law  of  the  land  that  no  man  should  be  put 
twice  in  jeopardy  of  his  life  for  the  same  offense. 
The  court,  having,  of  course,  never  heard  that 
doctrine  so  applied,  at  once  peremptorily  forbade 
Clay  to  go  on  with  such  a line  of  argument. 
Whereupon  the  young  attorney  solemnly  arose, 
and  with  an  air  of  indignant  astonishment  declared 
that,  if  the  court  would  not  permit  him  to  defend, 
in  such  manner  as  his  duty  commanded  him  to 
adopt,  a man  in  the  awful  presence  of  death,  he 
found  himself  forced  to  abandon  the  case.  Then 
he  gathered  up  his  papers,  bowed  grandly,  and 
stalked  out  of  the  room.  The  bench,  whom  Clay 
had  impressed  with  the  belief  that  he  was  pro- 
foundly convinced  of  being  right  in  the  position 
he  had  taken,  and  upon  whom  he  had  in  such  sol- 
emn tones  thrown  the  responsibility  for  denying 
his  rights  to  a man  on  trial  for  his  life,  was  star- 
tled and  confused.  A messenger  was  dispatched 
to  invite  Clay  in  the  name  of  the  court  to  return 
and  continue  his  argument.  Clay  graciously  came 
back,  and  found  it  easy  work  to  persuade  the  jury 
that  the  result  of  the  first  trial  was  equivalent  to 
an  acquittal,  and  that  the  prisoner,  as  under  the 
law  he  could  not  be  put  in  peril  of  life  twice  for 
the  same  offense,  was  clearly  entitled  to  his  dis- 
charge. The  jury  readily  agreed  upon  a verdict 
of  “not  guilty.” 


22 


HENRY  CLAY 


It  is  said  that  no  murderer  defended  by  Henry 
Clay  ever  was  sentenced  to  death ; and  very  early 
in  his  professional  career  he  acquired  the  reputa- 
tion of  being  able  to  insure  the  life  of  any  criminal 
intrusted  to  his  care,  whatever  the  degree  of  guilt. 
That  his  success  in  saving  murderers  from  the 
gallows  did  not  benefit  the  tone  and  character  of 
Kentucky  society,  Clay  himself  seemed  to  feel. 
“Ah,  Willis,  poor  fellow,”  he  said  once  to  the 
man  whose  acquittal  he  had  obtained  by  so  auda- 
cious a dramatic  coup,  “I  fear  I have  saved  too 
many  like  you,  who  ought  to  be  hanged.” 

But  he  was  equally  successful  in  the  opposite 
direction  when  acting  as  public  prosecutor.  He 
had  frequently  been  asked  to  accept  the  office  of 
attorney  for  the  commonwealth,  but  had  always 
declined.  At  last  he  was  prevailed  upon  to  take 
it  temporarily,  until  he  could  obtain  the  appoint- 
ment of  a friend,  who,  he  thought,  ought  to  have 
the  place.  The  first  criminal  case  falling  into  his 
hands  was  one  of  peculiar  interest.  A slave,  who 
was  highly  valued  by  his  master  on  account  of  his 
intelligence,  industry,  and  self-respect,  was,  in 
the  absence  of  the  owner,  treated  very  unjustly 
and  harshly  by  an  overseer,  a white  man.  Once 
the  slave,  defending  himself  against  the  blows 
aimed  at  him,  seized  an  axe  and  killed  his  assail- 
ant. Clay,  as  public  prosecutor,  argued  that,  had 
the  deed  been  done  by  a free  man,  considering  that 
it  was  done  in  self-defense,  it  would  have  been 
justifiable  homicide,  or,  at  worst,  manslaughter. 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


23 


But  having  been  done  by  a slave,  who  was  in  duty 
bound  to  submit  to  chastisement,  it  was  murder, 
and  must  be  punished  as  such.  It  was  so  pun- 
ished. The  slave  was  hanged;  but  his  self-con- 
tained and  heroic  conduct  in  the  presence  of  death 
extorted  admiration  from  all  who  witnessed  it; 
and  this  occurrence  made  so  deep  and  painful  an 
impression  upon  Clay  himself  that  he  resigned  his 
place  as  soon  as  possible,  and  never  failed  to  ex- 
press his  sorrow  at  the  part  he  had  played  in  this 
case  whenever  it  was  mentioned. 

It  was  not  long,  however,  that  he  remained  con- 
fined to  criminal  cases.  Soon  he  distinguished 
himself  by  the  management  of  civil  suits  also,  es- 
pecially suits  growing  out  of  the  peculiar  land  laws 
of  Virginia  and  Kentucky.  In  this  way  he  rap- 
idly acquired  a lucrative  practice  and  a prominent 
place  at  the  bar  of  his  State.  That  with  all  his 
brilliant  abilities  he  never  worked  his  way  into  the 
front  rank  of  the  great  lawyers  of  the  country  was 
due  to  his  characteristic  failing.  He  studied  only 
for  the  occasion,  as  far  as  his  immediate  need 
went.  His  studies  were  never  wide  and  profound. 
His  time  was  too  much  occupied  by  other  things, 
— not  only  by  his  political  activity,  which  grad- 
ually grew  more  and  more  exacting,  but  also  by 
pleasure.  He  was  fond  of  company,  and  in  that 
period  of  his  life  not  always  careful  in  selecting 
his  comrades ; a passion  for  cards  grew  upon  him, 
so  much  so,  indeed,  that  he  never  completely  suc- 
ceeded in  overcoming  it;  and  these  tastes  robbed 


24 


HENRY  CLAY 


him  of  the  hours  and  of  the  temper  of  mind  with- 
out which  the  calm  gathering  of  thought  required 
for  the  mastery  of  a science  is  not  possible.  More- 
over, it  is  not  improbable  that  his  remarkable  gift 
of  speaking,  which  enabled  him  to  make  little  tell 
for  much,  and  to  outshine  men  of  vastly  greater 
learning,  deceived  him  as  to  the  necessity  for  labo- 
rious study.  The  value  of  this  faculty  he  appre- 
ciated well.  He  knew  that  oratory  is  an  art,  and 
in  this  art  he  trained  himself  with  judgment  and 
perseverance.  For  many  years,  as  a young  man, 
he  made  it  a rule  to  read,  if  possible  every  day, 
in  some  historical  or  scientific  book,  and  then  to 
repeat  what  he  had  read  in  free,  offhand  speech, 
“ sometimes  in  a cornfield,  at  others  in  the  forest, 
and  not  unfrequently  in  a distant  barn  with  the 
horse  and  ox  for  auditors.”  Thus  he  cultivated 
that  facility  and  affluence  of  phrase,  that  resonance 
of  language,  as  well  as  that  freedom  of  gesture, 
which,  aided  by  a voice  of  rare  power  and  musical 
beauty,  gave  his  oratory,  even  to  the  days  of  de- 
clining old  age,  so  peculiar  a charm. 

Only  a year  and  a half  after  his  arrival  at  Lex- 
ington, in  April,  1799,  he  had  achieved  a position 
sufficiently  respected  and  secure  to  ask  for  and  to 
obtain  the  hand  of  Lucretia  Hart,  the  daughter  of 
a man  of  high  character  and  prominent  standing 
in  the  State.  She  was  not  a brilliant  but  a very 
estimable  woman,  and  a most  devoted  wife  to  him. 
She  became  the  mother  of  eleven  children.  His 
prosperity  increased  rapidly ; so  that  soon  he  was 


THE  KENTUCKY  LAWYER 


25 


able  to  purchase  Ashland,  an  estate  of  some  six 
hundred  acres,  near  Lexington,  which  afterward 
became  famous  as  Henry  Clay’s  home. 

Together  with  the  accumulation  of  worldly  goods 
he  laid  up  a valuable  stock  of  popularity.  Indeed, 
few  men  ever  possessed  in  greater  abundance  and 
completeness  those  qualities  which  attract  popular 
regard  and  affection.  A tall  stature;  not  a hand- 
some face,  but  a pleasing,  winning  expression;  a 
voice  of  which  some  of  his  contemporaries  say  that 
it  was  the  finest  musical  instrument  they  ever 
heard;  an  eloquence  always  melodious  and  in  turn 
majestic,  fierce,  playful,  insinuating,  irresistibly 
appealing  to  all  the  feelings  of  human  nature, 
aided  by  a gesticulation  at  the  same  time  natural, 
vivid,  large,  and  powerful;  a certain  magnificent 
grandeur  of  bearing  in  public  action,  and  an  easy 
familiarity,  a never-failing  natural  courtesy  in 
private,  which,  even  in  his  intercourse  with  the 
lowliest,  had  nothing  of  haughty  condescension  in 
it;  a noble  generous  heart  making  him  always 
ready  to  volunteer  his  professional  services  to  poor 
widows  and  orphans  who  needed  aid,  to  slaves 
whom  he  thought  entitled  to  their  freedom,  to  free 
negroes  who  were  in  danger  of  being  illegally  re- 
turned to  bondage,  and  to  persons  who  were  per- 
secuted by  the  powerful  and  lawless,  in  serving 
whom  he  sometimes  endangered  his  own  safety;  a 
cheery  sympathetic  nature,  withal,  of  exuberant 
vitality,  gay,  spirited,  always  ready  to  enjoy,  and 
always  glad  to  see  others  enjoy  themselves,  — his 


26 


HENRY  CLAY 


very  faults  being  those  of  what  was  considered 
good  fellowship  in  his  Kentuckian  surroundings; 
a superior  person,  appearing,  indeed,  immensely 
superior  at  times,  but  making  his  neighbors  feel 
that  he  was  one  of  them,  — such  a man  was  born 
to  be  popular.  It  has  frequently  been  said  that 
later  in  life  he  cultivated  his  popularity  by  clever 
acting,  and  that  his  universal  courtesy  became 
somewhat  artificial.  If  so,  then  he  acted  his  own 
character  as  it  originally  was.  It  is  an  important 
fact  that  his  popularity  at  home,  among  his  neigh- 
bors, indeed  in  the  whole  State,  constantly  grew 
stronger  as  he  grew  older,  and  that  the  people  of 
Kentucky  clung  to  him  with  unbounded  affection. 


CHAPTER  III 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 

Henry  Clay’s  first  participation  in  politics  was 
highly  honorable  to  him.  The  people  of  Kentucky 
were  dissatisfied  with  those  clauses  in  their  Con- 
stitution which  provided  for  the  election  of  the 
governor  and  of  the  state  senators  through  the  me- 
dium of  electors.  They  voted  that  a convention 
be  called  to  revise  the  fundamental  law.  This  con- 
vention was  to  meet  in  1799.  Some  public-spirited 
men  thought  this  a favorable  opportunity  for  an 
attempt  to  rid  the  State  of  slavery.  An  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  was  prepared  providing 
for  general  emancipation,  and  among  its  advocates, 
in  the  popular  discussions  which  preceded  the 
meeting  of  the  convention,  Clay  was  one  of  the 
most  ardent.  It  was  to  this  cause  that  he  devoted 
his  first  essays  as  a writer  for  the  press,  and  his 
first  political  speeches  in  popular  assemblies.  But 
the  support  which  that  cause  found  among  the 
farmers  and  traders  of  Kentucky  was  discourag- 
ingly  slender. 

The  philosophical  anti-slavery  movement  which 
accompanied  the  American  Revolution  had  by  this 
time  very  nearly  spent  its  force.  In  fact,  its  prac- 


28 


HENRY  CLAY 


tical  effects  had  been  mainly  confined  to  the  North, 
where  slavery  was  of  little  economic  consequence, 
and  where,  moreover,  the  masses  of  the  population 
were  more  accessible  to  the  currents  of  opinion  and 
sentiment  prevailing  among  men  of  thought  and 
culture.  There  slavery  was  abolished.  Further, 
by  the  Ordinance  of  1787,  slavery  was  excluded 
from  the  territory  northwest  of  the  Ohio.  But 
nothing  was  accomplished  in  the  South  except  the 
passage  of  a law  by  the  Virginia  legislature,  in 
1778,  prohibiting  the  further  introduction  of  slaves 
from  abroad,  and  the  repeal,  in  1782,  of  the  old 
colonial  statute  which  forbade  the  emancipation 
of  slaves  except  for  meritorious  services.  Mary- 
land followed  the  example  of  Virginia,  but  then 
Virginia,  ten  years  after  the  repeal,  put  a stop  to 
individual  emancipation  by  reenacting  the  old  co- 
lonial statute.  The  convention  framing  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  did  nothing  but  open 
the  way  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  at 
some  future  time.  On  the  whole,  as  soon  as  the 
philosophical  anti-slavery  movement  threatened  to 
become  practical  in  the  South,  it  stirred  up  a very 
determined  opposition,  and  the  reaction  began. 
Indeed,  the  hostility  to  slavery  on  the  part  of  some 
of  the  Southern  Revolutionary  leaders  was  never 
of  a very  practical  kind.  Very  characteristic  in 
this  respect  was  a confession  Patrick  Henry  made 
concerning  the  state  of  his  own  mind  as  early  as 
1773,  in  a letter  to  a Quaker:  — 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 


29 


“ Is  it  not  amazing  that,  at  a time  when  the  rights  of 
humanity  are  defined  and  understood  with  precision,  in 
a country  above  all  others  fond  of  liberty,  in  such  an 
age,  we  find  men  professing  a religion  the  most  humane, 
mild,  meek,  gentle,  and  generous,  adopting  a principle 
as  repugnant  to  humanity  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
Bible,  and  destructive  of  liberty  ? Every  thinking,  hon- 
est man  rejects  it  in  speculation,  but  how  few  in  prac- 
tice, from  conscientious  motives  ! Would  any  one  believe 
that  I am  a master  of  slaves  of  my  own  purchase  ? I 
am  drawn  along  by  the  general  inconvenience  of  living 
without  them.  I will  not,  I cannot  justify  it ; however 
culpable  my  conduct,  I will  so  far  pay  my  devoir  to  vir- 
tue as  to  own  the  excellence  and  rectitude  of  her  pre- 
cepts, and  lament  my  want  of  conformity  to  them.” 

This  merely  theoretical  kind  of  anti-slavery  spirit 
lost  all  aggressive  force,  as  those  whose  pecuniary 
interests  and  domestic  habits  were  identified  with 
slavery  grew  more  defiant  and  exacting.  In  1785 
Washington  complained  in  a letter  to  Lafayette 
that  “ petitions  for  the  abolition  of  slavery,  pre- 
sented to  the  Virginia  legislature,  could  scarcely 
obtain  a hearing.”  While  the  prohibition  of  sla- 
very northwest  of  the  Ohio  by  the  Ordinance  of 
1787  proceeded  from  Southern  statesmen,  the 
slaveholding  interest  kept  all  the  land  south  of 
the  Ohio  firmly  in  its  grasp. 

At  the  period  of  the  elections  for  the  convention 
called  to  revise  the  Constitution  of  Kentucky,  the 
philosophical  anti -slavery  spirit  of  the  Revolution 
survived  in  that  State  only  in  a comparatively 


30 


HENRY  CLAY 


feeble  flicker  among  the  educated  men  who  had 
come  there  from  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania.  It 
had  never  touched  the  rough  pioneers  of  Kentucky 
with  any  force.  The  number  of  slaves  held  in  the 
State  was,  indeed,  small  enough  to  render  easy 
the  gradual  abolition  of  the  system.  But  the  Ken- 
tucky farmer  could  not  understand  why,  if  he  had 
money  to  buy  negroes,  he  should  not  have  them 
to  work  for  him  in  raising  his  crops  of  corn,  and 
hemp,  and  tobacco,  and  in  watching  his  cattle  and 
swine  in  the  forest.  His  opposition  to  emancipa- 
tion in  any  form  was,  therefore,  vehement  and 
overwhelming.  The  cause  so  fervently  advocated 
by  Clay,  following  his  own  generous  impulses,  as 
well  as  the  teachings  of  his  noble  mentor,  Chan- 
cellor Wythe,  and  by  a small  band  of  men  of  the 
same  way  of  thinking,  was,  therefore,  desperate 
from  the  beginning.  But  they  deserve  the  more 
credit  for  their  courageous  fidelity  to  their  convic- 
tions. Clay  was  then  a promising  young  man  just 
attracting  public  attention.  At  the  very  start  he 
boldly  took  the  unpopular  side,  thus  exposing  him- 
self to  the  displeasure  of  a power  which,  in  the 
South,  was  then  already  very  strong,  and  threat- 
ened to  become  unforgiving  and  merciless.  Nor 
did  he  ever  express  regret  at  this  first  venture  in 
his  public  career.  On  the  contrary,  all  his  life  he 
continued  to  look  back  upon  it  with  pride.  In  a 
speech  he  delivered  at  Frankfort,  the  political 
capital  of  Kentucky,  in  1829,  he  said : — 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 


31 


“ More  than  thirty  years  ago,  an  attempt  was  made, 
in  this  commonwealth,  to  adopt  a system  of  gradual 
emancipation,  similar  to  that  which  the  illustrious  Frank- 
lin had  mainly  contributed  to  introduce  in  1780,  in  the 
State  founded  by  the  benevolent  Penn.  And  among  the 
acts  of  my  life  which  I look  hack  to  with  most  satisfac- 
tion is  that  of  my  having  cooperated,  with  other  zealous 
and  intelligent  friends,  to  procure  the  establishment  of 
that  system  in  this  State.  We  were  overpowered  by 
numbers,  but  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the  majority 
with  that  grace  which  the  minority  in  a republic  should 
ever  yield  to  that  decision.  I have,  nevertheless,  never 
ceased,  and  shall  never  cease,  to  regret  a decision,  the 
effects  of  which  have  been  to  place  us  in  the  rear  of  our 
neighbors,  who  are  exempt  from  slavery,  in  the  state  of 
agriculture,  the  progress  of  manufactures,  the  advance 
of  improvements,  and  the  general  progress  of  society.,, 

His  early  advocacy  of  that  cause  no  doubt  dis- 
pleased the  people  of  Kentucky ; but  what  helped 
him  promptly  to  overcome  that  displeasure  was  the 
excitement  caused  by  another  topic  of  great  public 
interest,  on  which  he  was  in  thorough  accord  with 
them,  — the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws,  that  tremen- 
dous blunder  of  the  Federalists  in  the  last  days  of 
their  power.  The  conduct  of  the  French  govern- 
ment toward  the  United  States,  and  especially  the 
corrupt  attempts  of  its  agents,  revealed  by  the 
famous  X Y Z correspondence,  had  greatly  weak- 
ened that  sympathy  with  the  French  Revolution 
which  was  one  of  the  most  efficacious  means  of 
agitation  in  the  hands  of  the  American  Democrats. 


32 


HENRY  CLAY 


The  tide  of  popular  sentiment  turned  so  strongly 
in  favor  of  the  Federalists  that  they  might  easily, 
by  prudent  conduct,  have  attracted  to  themselves  a 
large  portion  of  the  Republican  rank  and  file,  thus 
severely  crippling  the  opposition  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  John  Adams.  But  to  push  an  advan- 
tage too  far  is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  errors 
a political  party  can  commit ; and  this  is  what  the 
Federalists  did  in  giving  themselves  the  appear- 
ance of  trying  to  silence  their  opponents  by  the 
force  of  law.  Nothing  could  have  been  better 
calculated  not  only  to  alarm  the  masses,  but  also 
to  repel  thinking  men  not  blinded  by  party  spirit, 
than  an  attempt  upon  the  freedom  of  speech  and 
of  the  press,  wholly  unwarranted  by  any  urgency 
of  public  danger.  The  result  was  as  might  have 
been  foreseen.  The  leaders  of  the  opposition,  with 
Jefferson  at  their  head,  were  not  slow  in  taking 
advantage  of  this  stupendous  folly.  Their  appeals 
to  the  democratic  instincts  of  the  people,  who  felt 
themselves  threatened  in  their  dearest  rights,  could 
not  fail  to  meet  with  an  overwhelming  response. 
That  response  was  especially  strong  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  where  Federalism  had  never  grown 
as  an  indigenous  plant,  but  existed  only  as  an 
exotic.  In  the  young  communities  of  Kentucky 
the  excitement  was  intense,  and  Clay,  fresh  from 
the  Virginia  school  of  democracy,  threw  himself 
into  the  current  with  all  the  fiery  spirit  of  youth. 
Of  the  speeches  he  then  delivered  in  popular  gath- 
erings, none  are  preserved  even  in  outline.  But 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 


33 


it  is  known  that  his  resonant  declamation  produced 
a prodigious  impression  upon  his  hearers,  and  that 
after  one  of  the  large  field  meetings  held  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Lexington,  where  he  had  spoken 
after  George  Nicholas,  a man  noted  for  his  elo- 
quence, he  and  Nicholas  were  put  in  a carriage 
and  drawn  by  the  people  through  the  streets  of 
the  town  amid  great  shouting  and  huzzaing. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  four  years  afterward, 
in  1803,  that  he  was  elected  to  a seat  in  the  legis- 
lature of  the  State,  having  been  brought  forward 
as  a candidate  without  his  own  solicitation.  The 
sessions  in  which  he  participated  were  not  marked 
by  any  discussions  or  enactments  of  great  impor- 
tance; but  Clay,  who  had  so  far  been  only  the 
remarkable  man  of  Lexington  and  vicinity,  soon 
was  recognized  as  the  remarkable  man  of  the 
State.  In  such  debates  as  occurred,  he  measured 
swords  with  the  “big  men  ” of  the  legislature  who 
thus  far  had  been  considered  unsurpassed;  and 
the  attention  attracted  by  his  eloquence  was  such 
that  the  benches  of  the  Senate  became  empty  when 
he  spoke  in  the  House. 

At  this  time,  too,  he  paid  his  first  tribute  to 
what  is  euphoniously  called  the  spirit  of  chivalry. 
A Mr.  Bush,  a tavern-keeper  at  Frankfort,  was 
assaulted  by  one  of  the  magnates  of  Kentucky, 
Colonel  Joseph  Hamilton  Daviess,  then  district 
attorney  of  the  United  States.  The  colonel’s  in- 
fluence was  so  powerful  that  no  attorney  at  Frank- 
fort would  institute  an  action  against  him  for  Mr. 


34 


HENRY  CLAY 


Bush.  Clay,  seeing  a man  in  need  of  help,  volun- 
teered. In  the  argument  on  the  preliminary  ques- 
tion he  expressed  his  opinion  of  Daviess’s  conduct 
with  some  freedom,  whereupon  the  redoubtable 
colonel  sent  him  a note  informing  him  that  he  was 
not  in  the  habit  of  permitting  himself  to  be  spoken 
of  in  that  way  and  warning  him  to  desist.  Clay 
promptly  replied  that  he,  on  his  part,  permitted 
nobody  to  dictate  to  him  as  to  the  performance  of 
his  duty,  and  that  he  “held  himself  responsible,” 
etc.  The  colonel  sent  him  a challenge,  which 
Clay  without  delay  accepted.  The  hostile  parties 
had  already  arrived  at  the  place  agreed  upon,  when 
common  friends  interposed  and  brought  about  an 
accommodation . 

He  soon  met  Colonel  Daviess  again  in  connec- 
tion with  an  affair  of  greater  importance.  In  the 
latter  part  of  1806,  Aaron  Burr  passed  through 
Kentucky  on  his  journey  to  the  Southwest,  enlist- 
ing, recruits  and  making  other  preparations  for  his 
mysterious  expedition,  the  object  of  which  was 
either  to  take  possession  of  Mexico  and  to  unite 
with  it  the  Western  States  of  the  Union,  the  whole 
to  be  governed  by  him,  or,  according  to  other 
reports,  to  form  a large  settlement  on  the  Washita 
River.  A newspaper  published  at  Frankfort,  the 
“Western  World,”  denounced  the  scheme  as  a 
treasonable  one,  and  on  November  3 Colonel  Da- 
viess, as  district  attorney  of  the  United  States, 
moved  in  court  that  Aaron  Burr  be  compelled 
to  attend,  in  order  to  answer  a charge  of  being 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 


35 


engaged  in  an  unlawful  enterprise  designed  to  in- 
jure a power  with  which  the  United  States  were 
at  peace.  Burr  applied  to  Henry  Clay  for  profes- 
sional aid.  Colonel  Daviess,  the  district  attorney, 
being  a Federalist,  the  attempted  prosecution  of 
Burr  was  at  once  looked  upon  by  the  people  as  a 
stroke  of  partisan  vindictiveness;  popular  sympa- 
thy, therefore,  ran  strongly  on  Burr’s  side.  Clay, 
no  doubt,  was  moved  by  a similar  feeling ; he,  too, 
considered  it  something  like  a duty  of  hospitality 
to  aid  a distinguished  man  arraigned  on  a grave 
charge  far  away  from  his  home,  and  for  this  reason 
he  never  accepted  the  fee  offered  to  him  by  his 
client.  Yet  he  had  some  misgivings  as  to  Burr’s 
schemes,  and  requested  from  him  assurances  of 
their  lawful  character.  Burr  was  profuse  in  plau- 
sibilities, and  Clay  consented  to  appear  for  him. 
During  the  pendency  of  the  proceedings,  which 
finally  resulted  in  Burr’s  discharge  for  want  of 
proof,  Clay  was  appointed  to  represent  Kentucky 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  the  place  of 
General  Adair,  who  had  resigned.  Thereupon, 
feeling  a greater  weight  of  public  responsibility 
upon  him,  he  deemed  it  necessary  to  ask  from 
Burr  a statement  in  writing  concerning  the  nature 
of  his  doings  and  intentions.  This  request  did 
not  seem  to  embarrass  Burr  in  the  least.  In  a 
letter  addressed  to  Clay  he  said  that  he  had  no 
design,  nor  had  he  taken  any  measure,  to  promote 
the  dissolution  of  the  Union  or  the  separation  of 
any  State  from  it;  that  he  had  no  intention  to 


36 


HENRY  CLAY 


meddle  with  the  government  or  disturb  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  United  States;  that  he  had  neither 
issued,  nor  signed,  nor  promised  any  commission 
to  any  one  for  any  purpose;  that  he  did  not  own 
any  kind  of  military  stores,  and  that  nobody  else 
did  by  his  authority ; that  his  views  had  been  fully 
explained  to  several  officers  of  the  government  and 
were  approved  by  them ; that  he  believed  his  pur- 
poses were  well  understood  by  the  administration, 
and  that  they  were  such  as  every  man  of  honor 
and  every  good  citizen  must  approve.  “ Consider- 
ing the  high  station  you  now  fill  in  our  national 
councils,”  the  letter  concluded,  “I  have  thought 
these  explanations  proper,  as  well  to  counteract 
the  chimerical  tales  which  malevolent  persons  have 
so  industriously  circulated,  as  to  satisfy  you  that 
you  have  not  espoused  the  cause  of  a man  in  any 
way  unfriendly  to  the  laws  or  the  interests  of  the 
country.” 

Clay  did  not  know  the  man  he  was  dealing  with. 
He  knew  only  that  Burr  had  been  vice-president 
of  the  United  States;  that  he  was  a prominent 
Republican;  that  the  Federalists  hated  him;  that 
the  stories  told  about  his  schemes  were  almost  too 
adventurous  to  be  true.  Burr’s  letter  seemed  to 
be  straightforward,  such  as  an  innocent  man  would 
write.  If  the  administration,  at  the  head  of  which 
stood  Jefferson  himself,  knew  and  approved  of 
Burr’s  plans,  they  could  not  but  be  honorable. 
This  is  what  Clay  believed,  and  so  he  defended 
Burr  faithfully  and  conscientiously.  Nothing  could 


BEGINNINGS  IN  POLITICS 


37 


be  more  absurd  than  the  attempt  made  at  the  time, 
and  repeated  at  a later  period,  to  hold  him  in  part 
responsible  for  Burr’s  schemes,  the  true  nature  of 
which  he  discovered  only  when  he  had  his  first 
interview  with  President  Jefferson  at  Washington. 
Then  his  mortification  was  great.  “It  seems,”  he 
wrote  to  Thomas  Hart  of  Lexington,  “that  we 
have  been  much  mistaken  in  Burr.  When  I left 
Kentucky,  I believed  him  both  an  innocent  and 
• persecuted  man.  In  the  course  of  my  journey  to 
this  place,  still  entertaining  that  opinion,  I ex- 
pressed myself  without  reserve,  and  it  seems,  owing 
to  the  freedom  of  my  sentiments  at  Chillicothe, 
I have  exposed  myself  to  the  strictures  of  some 
anonymous  writer  at  that  place.  They  give  me  no 
uneasiness,  as  I am  sensible  that  all  my  friends 
and  acquaintances  know  me  incapable  of  entering 
into  the  views  of  Burr.”  The  letter  by  which 
Burr  had  deceived  him,  he  delivered  into  the  Pre- 
sident’s hands.  Nine  years  later  he  accidentally 
met  Burr  again  in  New  York,  where,  after  aimless 
wanderings  abroad,  the  adventurer  had  stealthily 
returned.  Burr  advanced  to  salute  him,  but  Clay 
refused  his  hand. 


CHAPTER  IV 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 

Clay  took  his  seat  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  on  December  29,  1806.  When  a man  at 
so  early  an  age  is  chosen  for  so  high  a place,  a 
place,  in  fact,  reserved  for  the  seniors  in  politics, 
be  it  even  to  “ serve  out  an  unexpired  term,”  it 
shows  that  he  is  considered  by  those  who  send  him 
there  a person  forming  an  exception  to  ordinary 
rules.  But  it  is  a more  remarkable  circumstance 
that  Clay,  when  he  entered  the  Senate,  was  not 
yet  constitutionally  eligible  to  that  body,  and  that 
this  fact  was  not  noticed  at  the  time.  According 
to  the  biographers  whose  dates  were  verified  by 
him,  he  was  born  on  April  12,  1777.  On  Decem- 
ber 29,  1806,  when  he  entered  the  Senate,  he 
therefore  lacked  three  months  and  seventeen  days 
of  the  age  of  thirty  years,  which  the  Constitution 
prescribes  as  a condition  of  eligibility  to  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States.  The  records  of  the  Senate 
show  no  trace  of  a question  having  been  raised 
upon  this  ground  when  Clay  was  sworn.  It  does 
not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  any  member  of  that 
body  that  the  man  who  stood  before  them  might 
not  be  old  enough  to  be  a senator.  In  all  proba- 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


39 


bility  Clay  himself  did  not  think  of  it.  He  was 
sworn  in  as  a matter  of  course,  and,  without  the 
bashful  hesitation  generally  expected  of  young 
senators,  he  plunged  at  once  into  the  current  of 
proceedings  as  if  he  had  been  there  all  his  life. 
On  the  fourth  day  after  he  had  taken  his  seat,  we 
find  him  offering  a resolution  concerning  the  circuit 
courts  of  the  United  States;  a few  days  later,  an- 
other concerning  an  appropriation  of  land  for  the 
improvement  of  the  Ohio  rapids;  then  another 
touching  Indian  depredations ; and  another  propos- 
ing an  amendment  to  the  federal  Constitution  con- 
cerning the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States. 
We  find  the  young  man  on  a variety  of  committees, 
sometimes  as  chairman,  charged  with  the  consider- 
ation of  important  subjects,  and  making  reports  to 
the  Senate.  We  find  him  taking  part  in  debate 
writh  the  utmost  freedom,  and  on  one  occasion  as- 
tonishing with  a piece  of  very  pungent  sarcasm  an 
old  senator,  who  was  accustomed  to  subdue  with 
lofty  assumptions  of  superior  wisdom  such  younger 
colleagues  as  ventured  to  differ  from  him. 

In  one  important  respect  Clay’s  first  beginnings 
in  national  legislation  were  characteristic  of  the 
natural  bent  of  his  mind  and  the  character  of  his 
future  statesmanship.  His  first  speech  was  in 
advocacy  of  a bill  providing  for  building  a bridge 
across  the  Potomac;  and  the  measure  to  which  he 
mainly  devoted  himself  during  his  first  short  term 
in  the  Senate  was  an  appropriation  of  land  “to- 
ward the  opening  of  the  canal  proposed  to  be  cut 


40 


HENRY  CLAY 


at  the  rapids  of  the  Ohio,  on  the  Kentucky  shore.” 
This  was  in  the  line  of  the  policy  of  “ internal  im- 
provements.” Those  claim  too  much  "for  Henry 
Clay  who  call  him  the  inventor,  the  “ father,”  of 
that  policy.  It  was  thought  of  by  others  before 
him,  and  all  he  did  was  to  make  himself,  in  this 
as  in  other  cases,  so  prominent  a champion,  so  in- 
fluential and  commanding  a leader  in  the  advocacy 
of  it,  that  presently  the  policy  itself  began  to  pass 
as  his  own.  In  fact  it  was  only  his  child  by  adop- 
tion, not  by  birth.  But  at  the  time  of  Clay’s  first 
appearance  in  the  Senate  there  were  two  things 
giving  that  policy  an  especial  impulse.  One  was 
a revenue  beyond  the  current  needs  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  other  was  the  material  growth  of 
the  country. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States  a period  of  more  general  content- 
ment and  cheerfulness  of  feeling  than  the  first  and 
the  early  part  of  the  second  term  of  Jefferson ’s 
presidency.  Never  before,  since  the  establishment 
of  the  government,  had  the  country  been  so  free 
from  harassing  foreign  complications.  The  differ- 
ence with  Great  Britain  about  the  matter  of  im- 
pressments had  not  yet  taken  its  threatening  form ; 
and  the  Indians,  under  the  influence  of  humane 
treatment,  were  for  a time  leaving  the  frontier 
settlements  in  peace.  The  American  people,  also, 
for  the  first  time  became  fully  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  the  government  really  belonged  to  them, 
and  not  to  a limited  circle  of  important  gentlemen. 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


41 


Jefferson’s  conciliatory  policy,  proclaimed  in  the 
famous  words,  “We  are  all  Republicans,  we  are 
all  Federalists,”  produced  the  desired  effect  of 
withdrawing  from  the  Federalist  leaders  a large 
portion  of  the  rank  and  file,  and  of  greatly  miti- 
gating the  acerbity  of  party  contests,  which  under 
the  preceding  administration  had  been  immoder- 
ately violent.  The  Republican  majority  in  Con- 
gress and  in  the  country  grew  so  large  that  the 
struggle  of  the  minority  against  it  ceased  to  be 
very  exciting.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Federalists 
had  left  the  machinery  of  the  government  on  the 
whole  in  so  good  a condition  that  the  party  coming 
into  power,  although  critically  disposed,  found  not 
much  to  change.  Those  at  the  head  of  the  gov- 
ernment professed  to  be  intent  upon  carrying  on 
public  affairs  in  the  simplest  and  most  economical 
style.  Under  such  circumstances  the  popular  mind 
could  give  itself  without  restraint  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  country  in  the  material  sense.  The 
disturbed  state  of  Europe  having  thrown  a large 
proportion  of  the  carrying  trade  on  the  ocean  into 
the  hands  of  the  American  merchant  marine,  the 
foreign  commerce  of  the  seaboard  cities  expanded 
largely.  Agriculture,  too,  was  remarkably  pro- 
sperous; cotton  was  rapidly  becoming  the  great 
staple  of  the  South,  and  other  crops  in  increasing 
variety  were  greatly  augmented  by  the  breaking 
of  virgin  soils.  Manufacturing  industry  began  to 
take  possession  of  the  abundant  water-powers  of 
the  country,  and  to  produce  a constantly  growing 


42 


HENRY  CLAY 


volume  and  variety  of  articles.  All  these  fields 
of  activity  were  enlivened  by  a cheerful  spirit  of 
enterprise. 

But  beyond  all  this,  new  perspectives  of  territo- 
rial grandeur  and  national  power  had  opened  them- 
selves to  the  American  people,  which  raised  their 
self-esteem  and  stimulated  their  ambition.  The 
United  States  had  ceased  to  be  a mere  string  of 
settlements  along  the  seaboard,  with  a few  inland 
outposts.  The  “great  West”  had  risen  above  the 
horizon  as  a living  reality.  The  idea  of  a “bound- 
less empire  ” belonging  to  the  American  people 
seized  upon  the  popular  imagination,  and  every- 
thing connected  with  the  country  and  its  govern- 
ment began  to  assume  a larger  aspect.  The  young 
democracy  felt  its  sap,  and  stretched  its  limbs. 
By  the  Louisiana  purchase  the  Mississippi  had 
become  from  an  outer  boundary  an  American  in- 
land river  from  source  to  mouth,  — the  ramifica- 
tion of  the  sea  through  American  territory.  The 
acquisition  of  the  whole  of  Florida  was  only  a 
question  of  time.  The  immense  country  beyond 
the  Mississippi  was  still  a vast  mystery,  but  steps 
were  taking  to  explore  that  grand  national  domain. 
In  the  message  sent  to  Congress  at  the  opening  of 
the  very  session  during  which  Henry  Clay  entered 
the  Senate,  President  Jefferson  announced  that 
“the  expedition  of  Messrs.  Lewis  and  Clarke,  for 
exploring  the  river  Missouri,  and  the  best  commu- 
nication from  that  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  had  had 
all  the  success  which  could  have  been  expected,” 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


43 


and  that  they  had  “ traced  the  Missouri  nearly  to 
its  source,  descended  the  Columbia  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  and  ascertained  with  accuracy  the  geogra- 
phy of  that  interesting  communication  across  Our 
Continent.” 

While  only  a few  daring  explorers  and  adven- 
turous hunters  penetrated  the  immense  wilderness 
beyond  the  Mississippi,  a steady  stream  of  emigra- 
tion from  the  Atlantic  States,  reinforced  by  new- 
comers from  the  old  world,  poured  into  the  fertile 
region  stretching  from  the  Appalachian  Mountains 
to  the  great  river.  They  found  their  way  either 
through  Pennsylvania  across  the  mountain  ridges 
to  Pittsburgh,  and  then  by  flat  or  keel  boat  down 
the  Ohio,  or  through  northern  New  York  to  the 
Great  Lakes,  and  then  on  by  water.  The  build- 
ing of  the  famous  Cumberland  Road  farther  south 
had  then  only  been  just  begun.  Great  were  the 
difficulties  and  hardships  of  the  journey.  While 
the  swift  stage-coach  reached  Pittsburgh  in  six 
days  from  Philadelphia,  the  heavy  carrier  cart,  or 
the  emigrant  wagon,  had  a jolt  of  three  weeks  to 
traverse  the  same  distance.  The  roads  were  inde- 
scribable, and  the  traveler  on  the  river  found  his 
course  impeded  by  snags,  sand-bars,  and  danger- 
ous rapids.  It  was,  therefore,  not  enough  to  have 
the  great  country;  it  must  be  made  accessible. 
Nothing  could  have  been  more  natural  than  that, 
as  the  West  hove  in  sight  larger  and  richer,  the 
cry  for  better  means  of  communication  between  the 
East  and  the  West  should  have  grown  louder  and 
more  incessant. 


44 


HENRY  CLAY 


At  the  same  time  the  commercial  spirit  of  the 
East  was  busy,  planning  improved  roads  and  water- 
ways from  the  interior  to  the  seaports,  and  from 
one  part  of  the  coast  to  the  other.  Canal  projects 
in  great  variety,  large  and  small,  were  discussed 
with  great  ardor.  While  some  of  these,  like  the 
New  York  and  Erie  Canal,  which  then  as  a scheme 
began  to  assume  a definite  shape,  were  designed 
to  be  taken  in  hand  by  single  States,  the  general 
government  was  looked  to  for  aid  with  regard  to 
others.  The  consciousness  of  common  interests 
grew  rapidly  among  the  people  of  different  States 
and  sections,  and  with  it  the  feeling  that  the  gen- 
eral government  was  the  proper  instrumentality 
by  which  those  common  interests  should  be  served, 
and  that  it  was  its  legitimate  business  to  aid  in 
making  the  different  parts  of  this  great  common 
domain  approachable  and  useful  to  the  people. 

This  feeling  was  the  source  from  which  the  pol- 
icy of  “internal  improvements”  sprang.  There 
was  scarcely  any  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
statesmen  of  the  time  on  the  question  whether  it 
was  desirable  that  the  general  government  should 
aid  in  the  construction  of  roads  and  canals,  and 
the  improvement  of  navigable  rivers.  The  only 
trouble  in  the  minds  of  those  who  construed  the 
Constitution  strictly  was,  that  they  could  not  find 
in  it  any  grant  of  power  to  appropriate  public 
funds  to  such  objects.  But  the  objects  themselves 
seemed  to  most  of  them  so  commendable  that  they 
suggested  the  submission  to  the  state  legislatures 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


45 


of  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  expressly 
granting  this  power.  This  was  the  advice  of  Jef- 
ferson. While  in  his  private  correspondence  he 
frequently  expressed  the  apprehension  that  the 
appropriation  of  public  money  to  such  works  as 
roads  and  canals,  and  the  improvement  of  rivers, 
would  lead  to  endless  jobbery  and  all  sorts  of  de- 
moralizing practices,  he  found  the  current  of  popu- 
lar sentiment  in  favor  of  these  things  too  strong 
for  his  scruples.  In  his  message  of  December, 
1806,  he  therefore  suggested  the  adoption  of  a 
constitutional  amendment  to  enable  Congress  to 
apply  the  surplus  revenue  “to  the  great  purposes 
of  the  public  education,  roads,  rivers,  canals,  and 
such  other  objects  of  public  improvement  as  may 
be  thought  proper,”  etc.  “By  these  operations,” 
he  said,  “new  channels  of  communication  will  be 
opened  between  the  States;  the  lines  of  separation 
will  disappear;  their  interests  will  be  identified, 
and  their  union  cemented  by  new  and  indissoluble 
ties.”  This  certainly  looked  to  an  extensive  sys- 
tem of  public  works.  No  amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution was  passed ; but  even  J efferson  was  found 
willing  to  employ  now  and  then  some  convenient 
reason  for  doing  without  the  expressed  power; 
such  as,  in  the  case  of  the  Cumberland  Road,  the 
consent  of  the  States  within  which  the  work  was  to 
be  executed. 

Clay  took  up  the  advocacy  of  this  policy  with 
all  his  natural  vigor.  He  was  a Western  man. 
He  had  witnessed  the  toil  and  trouble  with  which 


46 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  emigrant  coming  from  the  East  worked  his 
way  to  the  fertile  Western  fields.  The  necessity 
of  making  the  navigation  of  the  Ohio  safe  and 
easy  came  home  to  his  neighbors  and  constituents. 
But  he  did  not  confine  his  efforts  to  that  one  mea- 
sure. He  earnestly  supported  the  project  of  gov- 
ernment aid  for  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal, 
which,  in  the  language  of  the  report,  was  to  serve 
“as  the  basis  of  a vast  scheme  of  interior  navi- 
gation, connecting  the  waters  of  the  Lakes  with 
those  of  the  most  southern  States;  ” and  if  he  was 
not,  as  some  of  his  biographers  assert,  the  mover, 
— for  as  such  the  annals  of  Congress  name  Sen- 
ator Worthington  from  Ohio, — he  was  at  least 
the  zealous  advocate  of  a resolution,  “that  the 
secretary  of  the  treasury  be  directed  to  prepare  and 
report  to  the  Senate  at  their  next  session  a plan 
for  the  application  of  such  means  as  are  within 
the  power  of  Congress  to  the  purposes  of  opening 
roads  and  making  canals,  together  with  a state- 
ment of  undertakings  of  that  nature,  which,  as 
objects  of  public  improvement,  may  require  and 
deserve  the  aid  of  government,”  etc.,  a direction 
to  which  Gallatin,  then  secretary  of  the  treasury, 
responded  in  an  elaborate  report.  Thus  Clay 
marched  in  large  company,  but  ahead  of  a part  of 
it;  for  while  Jefferson  and  his  immediate  follow- 
ers, admitting  the  desirability  of  a large  system  of 
public  improvements,  asserted  the  necessity  of  a 
constitutional  amendment  to  give  the  government 
the  appropriate  power,  Clay  became  the  recognized 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


47 


leader  of  those  who  insisted  upon  the  existence  of 
that  power  under  the  Constitution  as  it  was. 

The  senatorial  term,  for  a fraction  of  which 
Clay  had  been  appointed,  ended  on  March  4, 
1807.  He  had  enjoyed  it  heartily.  “My  recep- 
tion in  this  place,”  he  wrote  to  Colonel  Hart  on 
February  1,  “has  been  equal,  nay,  superior  to  my 
expectations.  I have  experienced  the  civility  and 
attention  of  all  I was  desirous  of  obtaining.  Those 
who  are  disposed  to  flatter  me  say  that  I have  ac- 
quitted myself  with  great  credit  in  several  debates 
in  the  Senate.  But  after  all  that  I have  seen, 
Kentucky  is  still  my  favorite  country.  There 
amidst  my  dear  family  I shall  find  happiness  in 
a degree  to  be  met  with  nowhere  else.”  We  have, 
also,  contemporaneous  testimony,  showing  how 
others  saw  him  at  that  period.  William  Plumer, 
a senator  from  New  Hampshire,  a Federalist, 
wrote  in  his  diary : — 

“ December  29,  1806.  This  day  Henry  Clay,  the  suc- 
cessor of  John  Adair,  was  qualified,  and  took  his  seat 
in  the  Senate.  He  is  a young  lawyer.  His  stature  is 
tall  and  slender.  I had  much  conversation  with  him, 
and  it  afforded  me  much  pleasure.  He  is  intelligent 
and  appears  frank  and  candid.  His  address  is  good, 
and  his  manners  easy.” 

And  later : — 

“ Mr.  Clay  is  a young  lawyer  of  considerable  emi- 
nence. He  came  here  as  senator  for  this  session  only. 
His  clients,  who  have  suits  depending  in  the  Supreme 


48 


HENRY  CLAY 


Court,  gave  him  a purse  of  three  thousand  dollars  to 
attend  to  their  suits  here.  He  would  not  be  a candidate 
for  the  next  Congress,  as  it  would  materially  injure  his 
business.  On  the  second  reading  of  the  bill  to  erect  a 
bridge  over  the  Potomac,  Henry  Clay  made  an  eloquent 
and  forcible  speech  against  the  postponement.  He  an- 
imadverted with  great  severity  on  Tracy’s  observations. 
As  a speaker  Clay  is  animated,  his  language  bold  and 
flowery.  He  is  prompt  and  ready  at  reply,  but  he  does 
not  reason  with  the  force  and  precision  of  Bayard.” 

And  finally : — 

“ February  13.  Henry  Clay  is  a man  of  pleasure  ; 
fond  of  amusements.  He  is  a great  favorite  with  the 
ladies ; is  in  all  parties  of  pleasure  ; out  almost  every 
evening ; reads  but  little  ; indeed,  he  said  he  meant  this 
session  should  be  a tour  of  pleasure.  He  is  a man  of 
talents  ; is  eloquent;  but  not  nice  or  accurate  in  his  dis- 
tinctions. He  declaims  more  than  he  reasons.  He  is  a 
gentlemanly  and  pleasant  companion  ; a man  of  honor 
and  integrity.” 

The  reports  of  Clay’s  speeches  delivered  at  this 
session,  which  have  been  preserved,  do  not  bear 
out  Mr.  Plumer’s  description  of  them.  His  ora- 
tory seldom  was  what  might  properly  be  called 
“flowery.”  While  his  appeals  rose  not  unfre- 
quently  to  somewhat  lofty  flights  of  rhetoric,  he 
used  figurative  language  sparingly.  His  speeches, 
occasional  passages  excepted,  consisted  of  argu- 
mentative reasoning,  which,  in  print,  appears  not 
seldom  somewhat  dry  and  heavy.  But  the  dra- 
matic fire  of  delivery  peculiar  to  him  gave  that 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


49 


reasoning  a vivacity  to  which  the  Senate,  then  a 
very  small  and  quiet  body,  was  not  accustomed, 
and  which  the  good  Mr.  Plumer  probably  consid- 
ered too  dashing  for  the  place  and  the  occasion. 

Clay  had  scarcely  returned  to  Kentucky  when 
the  citizens  of  his  county  sent  him  again  to  the 
state  legislature  as  their  representative,  and  he 
was  elected  speaker  of  the  Assembly.  The  debates 
which  occurred  gave  him  welcome  opportunity  for 
taking  position  on  the  questions  of  the  time.  The 
comfortable,  calm,  and  joyous  prosperity  of  the 
country,  which  had  prevailed  under  Jefferson’s 
first  and  at  the  beginning  of  his  second  adminis- 
tration, had  meanwhile  been  darkly  overclouded  by 
foreign  complications.  The  tremendous  struggle 
between  Napoleonic  France  and  the  rest  of  Europe, 
led  by  England,  was  raging  more  furiously  than 
ever.  The  profitable  neutral  trade  of  the  Ameri- 
can merchant  marine  was  rudely  interrupted  by 
arbitrary  measures  adopted  by  the  belligerents  to 
cripple  each  other,  in  utter  disregard  of  neutral 
rights.  The  impressment  and  blockade  policy  of 
Great  Britain  struck  the  American . mind  as  par- 
ticularly offensive.  Of  this  more  hereafter.  The 
old  animosity  against  England,  which  had  some- 
what cooled  during  the  short  period  of  repose  and 
general  cheerfulness,  was  fanned  again  into  flame. 
Especially  in  the  South  and  West  it  burst  out  in 
angry  manifestations.  In  the  Kentucky  legisla- 
ture its  explosion  was  highly  characteristic  of  the 
lingering  backwoods  spirit.  It  was  moved  that  in 


50 


HENRY  CLAY 


no  court  of  Kentucky  should  any  decision  of  a 
British  court,  or  any  British  elementary  work  on 
law,  be  read  as  an  authority.  The  proposition 
was  immensely  popular  among  the  members  of  the 
Assembly.  More  than  four  fifths  of  them  declared 
their  determination  to  vote  for  it.  Clay  was  as 
fiery  a patriot  as  any  of  them,  but  he  would  not 
permit  his  State  to  make  itself  ridiculous  by  a 
puerile  and  barbarous  demonstration.  He  was 
young  and  ambitious,  but  he  would  not  seek  popu- 
larity by  joining,  or  even  acquiescing,  in  a cry 
which  offended  his  good  sense.  Without  hesita- 
tion he  left  the  speaker’s  chair  to  arrest  this  ab- 
surd clamor.  He  began  by  moving  as  an  amend- 
ment that  the  exclusion  of  British  decisions  and 
opinions  from  the  courts  of  Kentucky  should  apply 
only  to  those  which  had  been  promulgated  after 
July  4,  1776,  as  before  that  date  the  American 
colonies  were  a part  of  the  British  dominion,  and 
Americans  and  English  were  virtually  one  nation, 
living  substantially  under  the  same  laws.  Then 
he  launched  into  a splendid  panegyric  upon  the 
English  common  law,  and  an  impassioned  attack 
upon  the  barbarous  spirit  which  would  “ wantonly 
make  wreck  of  a system  fraught  with  the  intellec- 
tual wealth  of  centuries.”  His  speech  was  not 
reported,  but  it  was  described  in  the  press  of  the 
time  as  one  of  extraordinary  power  and  beauty, 
and  it  succeeded  in  saving  for  Kentucky  the  trea- 
sures of  English  jurisprudence. 

Other  demonstrations  of  patriotism  on  his  part 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


51 


were  not  wanting.  In  December,  1808,  when  the 
cloud  had  grown  darker  still,  he  introduced  a series 
of  resolutions  expressing  approval  of  the  embargo, 
denouncing  the  British  Orders  in  Council  by  which 
the  rights  of  neutral  ships  were  arbitrarily  over- 
ruled, pledging  to  the  general  government  the  ac- 
tive aid  of  Kentucky  in  anything  it  might  deter- 
mine upon  to  resist  British  exactions,  and  declaring 
that  President  Jefferson  was  entitled  to  the  grati- 
tude of  the  country  “for  the  ability,  uprightness, 
and  intelligence  which  he  had  displayed  in  the 
management  both  of  our  foreign  relations  and 
domestic  concerns.”  This  brought  to  his  feet  the 
Federalist  Humphrey  Marshall,  a man  of  ability 
and  standing,  — he  had  been  a senator  of  the 
United  States, — but  who  was  also  noted  for  the 
bitterness  of  his  animosities  and  the  violence  of 
his  temper.  Looking  down  upon  Clay  as  a young 
upstart,  he  opposed  the  resolutions  with  extraordi- 
nary virulence,  but  commanded  only  his  own  vote 
against  them. 

Clay  then  offered  another  resolution,  recommend- 
ing that  the  members  of  the  legislature  should  wear 
only  such  clothes  as  were  the  product  of  domestic 
manufacture.  The  avowed  object  was  the  encour- 
agement of  home  industry,  to  the  end  of  making 
the  country  industrially  independent  of  a hated 
foreign  power.  This  was  Henry  Clay’s  first  effort 
in  favor  of  a protective  policy,  evidently  designed 
to  be  a mere  demonstration.  Humphrey  Marshall 
at  once  denounced  the  resolution  as  the  claptrap 


of  III,  Lib.j  Galesburg 


52 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  a demagogue.  A fierce  altercation  followed, 
and  then  came  the  customary  challenge  and  the 
“hostile  encounter,”  in  which  both  combatants 
were  slightly  wounded,  whereupon  the  seconds  in- 
terfered to  prevent  more  serious  mischief.  Henry 
Clay  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  have  fought  and 
bled  for  the  cause  of  protection  when  he  first 
championed  it,  by  a demonstration  in  favor  of 
home  manufactures  as  against  those  of  a foreign 
enemy. 

In  the  winter  of  1809-10  Clay  was  again  sent 
to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  to  fill  an  unex- 
pired term  of  two  years,  Mr.  Buckner  Thurston 
having  resigned  his  seat.  In  April,  1810,  he 
found  an  opportunity  for  expressing  his  opinions 
on  the  “encouragement  of  home  industry”  in  a 
more  tangible  and  elaborate  form.  To  a bill  ap- 
propriating money  for  procuring  munitions  of  war 
and  for  other  purposes,  an  amendment  was  moved 
instructing  the  secretary  of  the  navy  to  purchase 
supplies  of  hemp,  cordage,  sail-cloth,  etc.,  and  to 
give  preference  to  articles  raised  or  manufactured 
on  American  soil.  The  discussion  ranged  over 
the  general  policy  of  encouraging  home  manufac- 
tures. Clay’s  line  of  argument  was  remarkable. 
A large  conception  of  industrial  development  as 
the  result  of  a systematic  tariff  policy  was  entirely 
foreign  to  his  mind.  He  looked  at  the  whole  sub- 
ject from  the  point  of  view  of  a Kentucky  farmer, 
who  found  it  most  economical  to  clothe  himself 
and  his  family  in  homespun,  and  who  desired  to 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


53 


secure  a sure  and  profitable  market  for  his  hemp. 
Besides  this,  he  thought  it  wise  that  the  American 
people  should,  in  case  of  war,  not  be  dependent 
upon  any  foreign  country  for  the  things  necessary 
to  their  sustenance  and  defense.  “A  judicious 
American  farmer,”  said  he,  “in  his  household  way 
manufactures  whatever  is  requisite  for  his  family. 
He  squanders  but  little  in  the  gewgaws  of  Europe. 
He  presents,  in  epitome,  what  the  nation  ought  to 
be  in  extenso.  Their  manufactories  should  bear 
the  same  proportion,  and  effect  the  same  object  in 
relation  to  the  whole  community,  which  the  part 
of  his  household  employed  in  domestic  manufactur- 
ing bears  to  the  whole  family.  It  is  certainly  de- 
sirable that  the  exports  of  the  country  should  con- 
tinue to  be  the  surplus  production  of  tillage,  and 
not  become  those  of  manufacturing  establishments. 
But  it  is  important  to  diminish  our  imports;  to 
furnish  ourselves  with  clothing  made  by  our  own 
industry;  and  to  cease  to  be  dependent,  for  the 
very  coats  we  wear,  upon  a foreign,  and  perhaps 
inimical,  country.  The  nation  that  imports  its 
clothing  from  abroad  is  but  little  less  dependent 
than  if  it  imported  its  bread.” 

He  was  especially  anxious  not  to  be  understood 
as  favoring  a large  development  of  manufacturing 
industries  with  a numerous  population  of  opera- 
tives. Referring  to  the  indigence  and  wretched- 
ness which  had  been  reported  to  prevail  among 
the  laboring  people  of  Manchester  and  Birming- 
ham, he  said:  “Were  we  to  become  the  manufac- 


54 


HENRY  CLAY 


turers  of  other  countries,  effects  of  the  same  kind 
might  result.  But  if  we  limit  our  efforts  by  our 
own  wants,  the  evils  apprehended  would  be  found 
to  be  chimerical.”  He  had  no  doubt  “that  the 
domestic  manufactories  of  the  United  States,  fos- 
tered by  government,  and  aided  by  household  ex- 
ertions, were  fully  competent  to  supply  us  with  at 
least  every  necessary  article  of  clothing.”  He 
was,  therefore,  “in  favor  of  encouraging  them, 
not  to  the  extent  to  which  they  are  carried  in 
Europe,  but  to  such  an  extent  as  will  redeem  us 
entirely  from  all  dependence  on  foreign  countries.” 
And,  aside  from  clothing,  he  did  not  forget  to 
mention  that  “our  maritime  operations  ought  not 
to  depend  upon  the  casualties  of  foreign  supply;” 
that  “with  very  little  encouragement  from  govern- 
ment he  believed  we  should  not  want  a pound  of 
Russia  hemp;”  that  “the  increase  of  the  article 
in  Kentucky  had  been  rapidly  great,”  there  having 
been  but  two  rope  manufactories  in  Kentucky  ten 
years  ago,  and  there  being  about  twenty  now,  and 
about  ten  or  fifteen  of  cotton -bagging. 

Thus  what  he  had  in  view  at  that  time  was  not 
the  building  up  of  large  industries  by  a protective 
system,  but  just  a little  manufacturing  to  run 
along  with  agriculture,  enough  to  keep  the  people 
in  clothes  and  the  navy  well  supplied  with  hemp, 
and  so  to  relieve  the  country  of  its  dependence  on 
foreign  countries  in  case  of  war.  For  this  home 
industry  he  wanted  encouragement.  What  kind 
of  encouragement?  In  his  speech  he  briefly  re- 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


55 


ferred  to  two  means  of  encouraging  manufactures: 
bounties,  against  which,  as  he  was  aware,  it  was 
urged  that  the  whole  community  was  taxed  for 
the  benefit  of  only  a part  of  it;  and  protective 
duties,  in  opposition  to  which  it  was,  as  he  said, 
“alleged  that  you  make  the  interest  of  one  part, 
the  consumer,  bend  to  the  interest  of  the  other 
part,  the  manufacturer.”  He  merely  stated  these 
points,  together  with  the  “not  always  admitted” 
answer  that  “the  sacrifice  is  only  temporary,  being 
ultimately  compensated  by  the  greater  abundance 
and  superiority  of  the  article  produced  by  the 
stimulus.”  He  did  not,  however,  commit  himself 
clearly  in  favor  of  either  proposition.  But  he 
thought  of  all  “ practical  forms  of  encouragement,” 
the  one  under  discussion,  providing  merely  for  a 
preference  to  be  given  to  home  products  in  the 
purchase  of  naval  supplies,  whenever  it  could  be 
done  without  material  detriment  to  the  service, 
was  certainly  innocent  enough  and  should  escape 
opposition.  He  was  also  in  favor  of  making  ad- 
vances, under  proper  security,  to  manufacturers 
undertaking  government  contracts,  believing  “that 
this  kind  of  assistance,  bestowed  with  prudence, 
will  be  productive  of  the  best  results.” 

A few  days  after  Clay  had  made  this  speech, 
Albert  Gallatin,  secretary  of  the  treasury,  pre- 
sented to  Congress  a report  on  the  manufacturing 
industries  of  the  United  States,  in  which  he  showed 
that  several  of  them  were  already  “adequate  to 
the  consumption  of  the  country,”  — among  them 


56 


HENRY  CLAY 


manufactures  of  wood,  leather  and  manufactures 
of  leather,  soap,  and  candles,  etc., — and  that 
others  were  supplying  either  the  greater,  or  at 
least  a considerable,  part  of  the  consumption  of 
the  country,  such  as  iron  and  manufactures  of 
iron ; manufactures  of  cotton,  wool,  and  flax ; hats, 
paper,  several  manufactures  of  hemp,  gunpowder, 
window  glass,  several  manufactures  of  lead,  etc. 
Home  industry  was,  therefore,  practically  not  far 
from  the  point  of  development  indicated  by  Clay 
as  the  goal  to  be  reached.  In  response  to  the 
request  of  Congress,  to  suggest  methods  by  which 
the  manufacturing  industries  might  be  encouraged, 
Gallatin  suggested  that  “occasional  premiums 
might  be  beneficial;  ” that  “a  general  system  of 
bounties  was  more  applicable  to  articles  exported 
than  to  those  manufactured  for  home  consump- 
tion;” that  prohibitory  duties  were  “liable  to  the 
treble  objection  of  destroying  competition,  of  tax- 
ing the  consumer,  and  of  diverting  capital  and  in- 
dustry into  channels  generally  less  profitable  than 
those  which  would  have  naturally  been  pursued  by 
individual  interest  left  to  itself.”  A moderate 
increase  of  duties  would  be  less  dangerous,  he 
thought;  but,  if  adopted,  it  should  be  continued 
during  a certain  period  to  avoid  the  injury  to  busi- 
ness arising  from  frequent  change.  But,  he  added, 
“since  the  comparative  want  of  capital  is  the  prin- 
cipal obstacle  to  the  introduction  and  advancement 
of  manufactures,”  and  since  the  banks  were  not 
able  to  give  sufficient  assistance,  “the  United 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


57 


States  might  create  a circulating  stock  bearing  a 
low  rate  of  interest,  and  lend  it  at  par  to  manu- 
facturers.” 

It  will  strike  any  reader  conversant  with  the 
history  of  that  period,  that  Clay’s  argument,  if 
taken  as  a plea  for  protection,  was  far  less  decided 
in  tone  and  strong  in  reasoning  than  many  speeches 
which  had  been  made  in  Congress  on  that  side  of 
the  question  before;  and  also  that  the  methods  of 
encouraging  manufacturing  industries  suggested 
by  him  were,  although  less  clearly  stated,  not 
materially  different  from  those  suggested  by  Galla- 
tin, who  was  on  principle  a free  trader. 

This  topic  was,  in  fact,  only  one  of  a great  va- 
riety of  subjects  to  which  he  devoted  his  attention. 
He  evidently  endeavored  to  become  not  only  a 
brilliant  speaker,  but  a useful,  working  legislator. 
During  the  same  session  he  made  a report  on  a 
bill  granting  a right  of  preemption  to  settlers  on 
public  land  in  certain  cases,  which  was  passed 
without  amendment.  Indian  affairs,  too,  received 
his  intelligent  attention.  A bill  supplementary  to 
“an  act  to  regulate  trade  and  intercourse  with 
the  Indian  tribes  and  to  preserve  peace  on  the 
frontier,”  was  introduced  by  him  and  referred  to 
a committee  of  which  he  was  made  chairman ; and 
his  report  displayed  sentiments  as  wise  as  they 
were  humane.  More  conspicuous  and  important 
was  the  part  he  took  during  the  session  of  1810-11 
in  the  debates  on  the  occupation  of  West  Florida, 
and  on  a bill  to  renew  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States. 


58 


HENRY  CLAY 


The  West  Florida  case  gave  him  his  first  intro- 
duction to  the  field  of  foreign  affairs,  and  at  once 
he  struck  the  keynote  of  that  national  feeling 
which  carried  the  American  people  into  the  war 
of  1812.  Florida  was  at  that  time  in  the  posses- 
sion of  Spain.  The  boundaries  of  Louisiana,  as 
that  territory  had  passed  from  France  to  the 
United  States  in  1803,  were  ill  defined.  Accord- 
ing to  a plausible  construction  the  Louisiana  pur- 
chase included  that  part  of  Florida  to  the  west  of 
the  Perdido  River,  which  was  commonly  called 
West  Florida.  But  the  United  States  had  failed 
to  occupy  it,  leaving  the  Spanish  garrisons  quietly 
in  possession  of  their  posts.  Negotiations  for  the 
purchase  of  the  whole  of  Florida  from  Spain  had 
meanwhile  been  carried  on,  but  without  success. 
When  Napoleon  invaded  Spain  and  that  kingdom 
appeared  doomed  to  fall  into  his  hands,  insurrec- 
tionary movements  broke  out  in  several  of  the 
Spanish  American  provinces.  West  Florida,  too, 
was  violently  agitated.  The  revolutionists  there, 
among  whom  were  many  persons  of  English  and 
of  American  birth,  set  up  an  independent  govern- 
ment and  applied  for  recognition  by  the  United 
States.  There  were  rumors  of  British  intrigues 
for  the  object  of  getting  West  Florida  into  the 
hands  of  England.  The  revolutionary  excitement 
in  the  territory  moreover  threatened  seriously  to 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  frontier.  President  Madi- 
son thought  this  an  opportune  moment  to  settle 
the  boundary  question.  He  issued  a proclamation 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


59 


on  October  27,  1810,  asserting  the  claim  of  the 
United  States  to  West  Florida,  the  delay  in  the 
occupation  of  which  “was  not  the  result  of  any 
distrust  of  their  title,  but  was  occasioned  by  their 
conciliatory  views,”  and  announcing  that  “ posses- 
sion should  be  taken  of  the  said  territory  in  the 
name  and  behalf  of  the  United  States.”  A bill 
was  then  introduced  in  the  Senate  December  18, 
1810,  providing  that  the  Territory  of  Orleans,  one 
of  the  two  territories  into  which  Louisiana  was 
divided,  “ shall  be  deemed,  and  is  hereby  declared, 
to  extend  to  the  river  Perdido,”  and  that  the  laws 
in  force  in  the  Territory  of  Orleans  should  extend 
over  the  district  in  question. 

The  Federalists,  who  always  had  a deep-seated 
jealousy  of  the  growing  West,  attacked  the  steps 
taken  by  President  Madison  as  acts  of  spoliation 
perpetrated  upon  an  unoffending  and  at  the  time 
helpless  power,  and  their  spokesmen  in  the  Senate, 
Timothy  Pickering  of  Massachusetts  and  Horsey 
of  Delaware  strenuously  denied  that  the  United 
States  had  any  title  to  West  Florida.  Clay  took 
up  the  gauntlet  as  the  champion  not  merely  of  the 
administration,  but  of  his  country.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  Senate  he  put  forth  the  fullness  of  his 
peculiar  power.  “ Allow  me,  sir,”  said  he,  with 

severe  irony,  “to  express  my  admiration  at  the 
more  than  Aristidean  justice  which,  in  a question 
of  territorial  title  between  the  United  States  and 
a foreign  nation,  induces  certain  gentlemen  to  es- 
pouse the  pretensions  of  the  foreign  nation.  Doubt- 


60 


HENRY  CLAY 


less,  in  any  future  negotiations,  she  will  have  too 
much  magnanimity  to  avail  herself  of  these  spon- 
taneous concessions  in  her  favor,  made  on  the  floor 
of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.”  He  then 
went  into  an  elaborate  historical  examination  of 
the  question,  giving  evidence  of  much  research, 
and  set  forth  with  great  clearness  and  force  of 
statement.  The  case  he  made  out  for  the  Ameri- 
can claim  was  indeed  plausible.  Accepting  his 
patriotic  assumptions,  his  defense  of  the  Presi- 
dent’s conduct  seemed  complete.  The  plea  that 
the  Spanish  government  was  sorely  pressed  and 
helpless  furnished  him  only  an  opportunity  for 
holding  up  his  opponents  as  the  sympathizers  of 
kings.  “I  shall  leave  the  honorable  gentleman 
from  Delaware,”  he  exclaimed,  “to  mourn  over 
the  fortunes  of  the  fallen  Charles.  I have  no 
commiseration  for  princes.  My  sympathies  are 
reserved  for  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  and  I 
own  that  the  people  of  Spain  have  them  most 
sincerely.”  But  he  had  a still  sharper  arrow  in 
his  quiver.  Mr.  Horsey  had  been  so  unfortunate 
as  to  speak  of  the  displeasure  which  the  steps  taken 
by  the  President  might  give  to  Great  Britain. 
Clay  turned  upon  him  with  an  outburst  which 
resounded  through  the  whole  country : — 

“ The  gentleman  reminds  us  that  Great  Britain,  the 
ally  of  Spain,  may  be  obliged,  by  her  connection  with 
that  country,  to  take  part  with  her  against  us,  and  to 
consider  this  measure  of  the  President  as  justifying  an 
appeal  to  arms.  Sir,  is  the  time  never  to  arrive,  when 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


61 


we  may  manage  oar  own  affairs  without  the  fear  of 
insulting  his  Britannic  majesty  ? Is  the  rod  of  the 
British  power  to  be  forever  suspended  over  our  heads  ? 
Does  Congress  put  an  embargo  to  shelter  our  rightful 
commerce  against  the  piratical  depredations  committed 
upon  it  on  the  ocean  ? We  are  immediately  warned  of 
the  indignation  of  offended  England.  Is  a law  of  non- 
intercourse proposed  ? The  whole  navy  of  the  haughty 
mistress  of  the  seas  is  made  to  thunder  into  our  ears. 
Does  the  President  refuse  to  continue  a correspondence 
with  a minister  who  violates  the  decorum  belonging  to 
his  diplomatic  character,  by  giving  and  repeating  a de- 
liberate affront  to  the  whole  nation  ? We  are  instantly 
menaced  with  the  chastisement  which  English  pride  will 
not  fail  to  inflict.  Whether  we  assert  our  rights  by  sea, 
or  attempt  their  maintenance  by  land,  — whithersoever 
we  turn  ourselves,  this  phantom  incessantly  pursues  us. 
Already  it  has  too  much  influence  on  the  councils  of  the 
nation.  Mr.  President,  I most  sincerely  desire  peace 
and  amity  with  England  ; I even  prefer  an  adjustment 
of  differences  with  her  before  one  with  any  other  nation. 
But  if  she  persists  in  a denial  of  justice  to  us,  or  if  she 
avails  herself  of  the  occupation  of  West  Florida  to  com- 
mence war  upon  us,  I trust  and  hope  that  all  hearts  will 
unite  in  a bold  and  vigorous  vindication  of  our  rights.” 

This  was  an  appeal  to  that  national  pride  which 
he  himself  of  all  the  statesmen  of  his  time  felt  most 
strongly,  and  therefore  represented  most  effectively. 
Although  he  was  the  youngest  man  in  the  Senate, 
he  had  already  acquired  a position  of  leadership 
among  the  members  of  the  Republican  majority. 
He  won  it  in  his  characteristic  fashion ; that  is  to 


62 


HENRY  CLAY 


say,  he  straightway  seized  it,  and  in  deference  to 
his  boldness  and  ability  it  was  conceded  to  him. 
In  the  debate  on  the  West  Florida  question  he 
was  decidedly  the  most  conspicuous  and  important 
figure ; and  when  the  veteran  Timothy  Pickering, 
in  a speech  in  reply  to  Clay,  quoted  a document 
which  years  before  had  been  communicated  to  the 
Senate  in  confidence,  it  was  the  young  Kentuckian 
who  promptly  stepped  forward  as  the  leader  of  the 
majority,  offering  a resolution  to  censure  Pickering 
for  having  committed  a breach  of  the  rules,  and 
the  majority  obediently  followed. 

From  this  debate  he  came  forth  the  most  strik- 
ing embodiment  of  the  rising  spirit  of  Young 
America.  But  the  manner  in  which  he  opposed 
the  re-charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
was  calculated  to  bring  serious  embarrassment 
upon  him  in  his  subsequent  career;  for  he  fur- 
nished arguments  to  his  bitterest  enemy.  The 
first  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  chartered  by 
Congress  in  1791,  the  charter  to  run  for  twenty 
years.  Its  establishment  formed  an  important  part 
of  Hamilton’s  scheme  of  national  finance.  It  was 
to  aid  in  the  collection  of  the  revenue ; to  secure 
to  the  country  a safe  and  uniform  currency;  to 
serve  as  a trustworthy  depository  of  public  funds ; 
to  facilitate  the  transmission  of  money  from  one 
part  of  the  country  to  another ; to  assist  the  gov- 
ernment in  making  loans,  funding  bond  issues, 
and  other  financial  operations.  These  offices  it 
had  on  the  whole  so  well  performed  that  the  secre- 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


63 


tary  of  the  treasury,  Gallatin,  although  belonging 
to  the  political  school  which  had  originally  op- 
posed the  Bank,  strongly  favored  the  renewal  of 
its  charter.  He  was  especially  anxious  to  preserve 
the  powerful  working  force  of  this  financial  agency 
in  view  of  necessities  which  the  impending  war 
with  Great  Britain  would  inevitably  bring  upon 
the  government. 

The  opposition  which  the  re-charter  met  in  Con- 
gress sprang  from  a variety  of  sources.  Although 
for  twenty  years  the  constitutionality  of  the  charter 
had  been  practically  recognized  by  every  depart- 
ment of  the  government,  the  constitutional  ques- 
tion was  raised  again.  As  the  Bank  had  been 
organized  while  the  Federalists  were  in  power, 
and  many  of  its  officers  and  directors  belonged  to 
that  party,  its  management  was  accused  of  politi- 
cal partiality  in  the  distribution  of  its  favors  and 
accommodations.  Some  of  its  stock  was  owned 
by  British  subjects;  hence  the  charge  that  its 
operations  were  conducted  under  too  strong  a for- 
eign influence.  All  these  things  were  used  to 
inflame  the  popular  mind,  and  the  opponents  of 
the  Bank  actually  succeeded  in  creating  so  strong 
a current  of  feeling  against  it,  that  several  state 
legislatures  passed  resolves  calling  upon  members 
of  Congress  to  refuse  the  renewal  of  the  charter. 

Gallatin,  the  ablest  public  financier  of  his  time, 
and  indeed  one  of  the  few  great  finance  ministers 
in  our  history,  ranking  second  only  to  Hamilton, 
knew  the  importance  of  the  Bank  as  a fiscal  agent 


64 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  the  government  at  that  time  too  well  not  to  make 
every  honorable  effort  to  sustain  it.  Without 
difficulty  he  refuted  the  charges  with  which  it  was 
assailed.  But  his  very  solicitude  told  against  the 
measure  he  advocated.  A very  influential  coterie, 
represented  in  the  cabinet  by  the  secretary  of  the 
navy,  Smith,  and  especially  strong  in  the  Senate, 
entertained  a deadly  hostility  to  the  secretary  of 
the  treasury,  and  sought  to  drive  him  out  of  the 
administration  by  defeating  everything  he  thought 
important  to  his  success  as  a public  financier. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suspect  that  Clay  was  a 
party  to  this  political  intrigue.  Nevertheless,  he 
espoused  the  anti-Bank  cause  with  the  whole  fervor 
of  his  nature.  One  reason  was  that  the  legislature 
of  his  State  had  instructed  him  to  do  so.  But  he 
did  not  rest  his  opposition  upon  that  ground.  He 
sincerely  believed  in  many  of  the  accusations  that 
had  been  brought  against  the  Bank ; to  his  imagi- 
nation it  appeared  as  the  embodiment  of  a great 
money  power  that  might  become  dangerous  to  free 
institutions.  But  his  principal  objection  was  the 
unconstitutionality  of  the  Bank,  and  this  he  urged 
with  arguments  drawn  so  deeply  from  his  concep- 
tion of  the  nature  of  the  federal  government,  and 
in  language  so  emphatic,  as  to  make  it  seem  im- 
possible for  him  ever  to  escape  from  the  principles 
then  laid  down. 

“ What  is  the  nature  of  this  government  ? (he  said.) 
It  is  emphatically  federal,  vested  with  an  aggregate  of 
specified  powers  for  general  purposes,  conceded  by  ex- 


BEGINNINGS  IN  LEGISLATION 


65 


isting  sovereignties,  who  have  themselves  retained  what 
is  not  so  conceded.  It  is  said  there  are  cases  in  which 
it  must  act  on  implied  powers.  This  is  not  contro- 
verted, but  the  implication  must  be  necessary,  and  ob- 
viously flow  from  the  enumerated  power  with  which  it  is 
allied.  The  power  to  charter  companies  is  not  specified 
in  the  grant,  and  I contend  it  is  not  transferable  by 
mere  implication.  It  is  one  of  the  most  exalted  attri- 
butes of  sovereignty.  In  the  exercise  of  this  gigantic 
power  we  have  seen  an  East  India  Company  created, 
which  is  in  itself  a sovereignty,  which  has  subverted 
empires  and  set  up  new  dynasties,  and  has  not  only 
made  war,  but  war  against  its  legitimate  sovereign ! 
Under  the  influence  of  this  power  we  have  seen  arise  a 
South  Sea  Company,  and  a Mississippi  Company,  that 
distracted  and  convulsed  all  Europe,  and  menaced  a 
total  overthrow  of  all  credit  and  confidence,  and  uni- 
versal bankruptcy ! Is  it  to  be  imagined  that  a power 
so  vast  would  have  been  left  by  the  wisdom  of  the 
Constitution  to  doubtful  inference  ? In  all  cases  where 
incidental  powers  are  acted  upon,  the  principal  and 
incidental  ought  to  be  congenial  with  each  other,  and 
partake  of  a common  nature.  The  incidental  power 
ought  to  be  strictly  subordinate  and  limited  to  the  end 
proposed  to  be  attained  by  the  specific  power.  In  other 
words,  under  the  name  of  accomplishing  one  object 
which  is  specified,  the  power  implied  ought  not  to  be 
made  to  embrace  other  objects  which  are  not  specified 
in  the  Constitution.  If,  then,  you  could  establish  a 
bank  to  collect  and  distribute  the  revenue,  it  ought  to 
be  expressly  restricted  to  the  purpose  of  such  collec- 
tion and  distribution.  It  is  mockery  worse  than  usur- 
pation to  establish  it  for  a lawful  object,  and  then  to 


66 


HENRY  CLAY 


extend  it  to  other  objects  which  are  not  lawful.  In  de- 
ducing the  power  to  create  corporations,  such  as  I have 
described  it,  from  the  power  to  collect  taxes,  the  relation 
and  condition  of  principal  and  incidental  are  prostrated 
and  destroyed.  The  accessory  is  exalted  above  the 
principal.” 

The  strictest  of  strict  constructionists  could  not 
have  put  the  matter  more  strongly.  The  reader 
should  remember  this  argument,  to  compare  it 
with  the  reasons  given  by  Henry  Clay  a few  years 
later  for  his  vote  in  favor  of  chartering  a new 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  illustrating  the  change 
which  was  taking  place  not  only  in  his,  but  also 
in  other  men’s  minds  as  to  the  constitutional  func- 
tions of  the  government. 

The  bill  to  re-charter  the  Bank  was  defeated  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  by  a majority  of 
one,  and  in  the  Senate  by  the  casting  vote  of  the 
Vice-President.  It  is  not  unfair  to  assume  that, 
had  Clay  cast  his  vote  in  the  Senate,  and  also 
employed  his  influence  with  his  friends  in  the 
House  in  favor  of  the  bill,  he  would  have  saved  it, 
and  that,  in  this  sense,  his  opposition  made  him 
responsible  for  its  defeat. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 

Upon  the  expiration  of  his  term  in  the  Senate, 
Henry  Clay  was  elected  a member  of  the  national 
House  of  Representatives  for  the  Lexington  dis- 
trict, and  took  his  seat  on  November  4,  1811.  To 
him  this  was  a welcome  change.  He  “ preferred 
the  turbulence  of  the  House  to  the  solemn  stillness 
of  the  Senate.”  Naturally  it  was  a more  congen- 
ial theatre  of  action  to  the  fiery  young  statesman. 
The  House  was  then  much  less  under  the  domina- 
tion of  its  committees  than  it  is  at  present.  It 
was  not  yet  muzzled  by  rules  permitting  only  now 
and  then  a free  exchange  of  opinions.  It  still 
possessed  the  character  of  a debating  body  in  the 
best  sense  of  the  phrase.  The  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives then  was  what  the  Senate  afterwards 
became,  — the  platform  to  which  the  people  looked 
for  the  most  thorough  discussion  of  their  interests, 
and  from  which  a statesman  could  most  effectively 
impress  his  views  upon  the  public  mind.  More- 
over, it  was  in  the  House  that  the  Young  America 
of  the  time  gathered  in  force  to  make  their  strength 
and  spirit  tell  — the  young  Republicans  who  had 
grown  somewhat  impatient  at  the  timidity  and  the 


68 


HENRY  CLAY 


over  anxious  considerations  of  economy  and  peace 
with  which  the  old  statesmen  of  their  own  party, 
in  their  opinion,  constantly  hampered  the  national 
ambition  and  energy.  Of  all  political  elements 
this  was  to  Clay  the  most  congenial;  he  was  its 
natural  leader,  and  no  sooner  had  he  appeared  in 
the  House  than  he  was  elected  speaker  by  a very 
large  majority.  It  was  well  understood  that  the 
duties  of  this  position  would  not  exclude  him  from 
participation  in  debate.  On  almost  every  occa- 
sion of  importance  he  availed  himself  of  the  com- 
mittee of  the  whole  to  proclaim  his  opinions,  and 
for  this  the  stirring  events  of  the  time  furnished 
ample  opportunity.  It  may  be  said  without  exag- 
geration that  it  was  his  leadership  in  the  House 
which  hastened  the  war  of  1812. 

Of  the  events  which  figured  as  the  immediate 
cause  of  that  war  only  a short  summary  can  find 
room  here.  The  profitable  maritime  trade  which 
the  great  struggle  between  France  and  England 
had,  from  its  beginning,  thrown  into  the  hands  of 
American  merchants,  could  be  preserved  only  so 
long  as  the  United  States  remained  neutral  and 
as  their  neutral  rights  were  respected.  President 
Jefferson  earnestly  endeavored  to  remain  at  peace 
with  both  belligerents,  hoping  that  each  would  be 
anxious  to  propitiate,  or  at  least  not  to  offend  this 
republic,  from  fear  of  driving  it  into  an  active 
alliance  with  the  other.  In  this  he  was  disap- 
pointed. They  both  looked  upon  the  United  States 
as  a weak  neutral,  whose  interests  could  be  injured, 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


69 


and  whose  feelings  could  be  outraged,  with  im- 
punity. 

England  and  France  sought  to  destroy  one  an- 
other not  only  by  arms,  but  by  commercial  restric- 
tions. In  1804  Great  Britain  declared  the  French 
coast  from  Ostend  to  the  Seine  in  a state  of  block- 
ade. In  1806  the  blockade  was  extended  from 
the  Elbe  to  Brest.  It  thus  became  in  part  a mere 
“ paper  blockade.”  Napoleon  answered  by  the 
Berlin  Decree  of  November  21,  1806,  establishing 
the  “ continental  system,”  designed  to  stop  all 
trade  between  Great  Britain  and  the  European 
continent.  Thereupon  came  from  the  British  side 
the  “Orders  in  Council”  of  January  7 and  No- 
vember 11,  1807,  declaring  the  blockade  of  all 
places  and  ports  belonging  to  France  and  her 
allies,  from  which  the  British  flag  was  excluded, 
also  all  their  colonies ; prohibiting  all  trade  in  the 
produce  or  manufactures  of  those  countries  and 
colonies,  and  making  subject  to  capture  and  con- 
demnation all  vessels  trading  with  and  from  them, 
and  all  merchandise  on  board  such  vessels.  The 
return  shot  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  was  the  Milan 
Decree  of  December  17,  1807,  declaring  that  every 
ship,  of  whatever  nation,  and  whatever  the  nature 
of  its  cargo,  sailing  from  the  ports  of  England  or 
her  colonies,  or  of  countries  occupied  by  English 
troops,  and  every  ship  which  had  made  any  voyage 
to  England,  or  paid  any  tax  to  that  government, 
or  submitted  to  search  by  an  English  ship,  should 
be  lawful  prize. 


70 


HENRY  CLAY 


Between  these  decrees  and  counter-decrees,  which 
were  utterly  unwarranted  by  international  law, 
the  trade  of  neutrals  was  crushed  as  between  two 
millstones.  Indeed,  these  measures  were  pur- 
posely directed  by  the  two  great  belligerents  as 
much  against  neutral  trade  as  against  one  another. 
Great  Britain  would  not  let  her  maritime  com- 
merce slip  out  of  her  grasp  to  build  up  a commer- 
cial rival  sailing  under  a neutral  flag.  She  would 
therefore  permit  no  trading  at  all  except  on  con- 
dition that  it  should  go  through  her  hands,  or 
“ through  British  ports  where  a transit  duty  was 
levied  for  the  British  treasury.”  Napoleon,  on 
the  other  hand,  desired  to  constrain  the  neutrals, 
especially  the  United  States,  to  become  his  active 
allies,  by  forcing  upon  them  the  alternative : either 
allies  or  enemies.  There  must  be  no  neutrals,  or 
if  there  were,  they  must  have  no  rights.  Thus 
American  ships  were  taken  and  condemned  by 
both  parties  in  great  numbers,  and  American 
maritime  trade  was  suffering  terribly.  But  this 
was  not  all.  British  men-of-war  stopped  Ameri- 
can vessels  on  the  high  seas,  and  even  in  American 
waters,  to  search  them  for  British  subjects  or  for 
men  they  chose  to  consider  as  such,  whom  they 
pressed  into  the  British  naval  service.  A large 
number  of  these  were  Americans,  not  a few  of 
whom  refused  to  serve  under  the  British  flag,  and 
horrible  stories  were  told  of  the  dungeons  into 
which  they  were  thrown,  and  of  the  cruelties  they 
had  to  suffer. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


71 


The  steps  taken  by  the  United  States  to  protect 
their  neutral  rights  were  those  of  a peace-loving 
power  not  overconfident  of  its  own  strength. 
Madison,  President  Jefferson’s  secretary  of  state, 
made  an  appeal  to  the  sense  of  right  and  fairness 
of  the  British  government.  That  innocent  effort 
having  proved  fruitless,  commercial  restrictions 
were  resorted  to,  — first,  the  Non-importation  Act 
of  1806,  prohibiting  the  importation  of  certain 
articles  of  British  production.  At  the  same  time 
negotiation  was  tried,  and  a treaty  was  actually 
agreed  upon  by  the  American  envoys,  Monroe  and 
Pinkney,  and  the  British  government;  but  as  it 
contained  no  abandonment  by  Great  Britain  of 
the  right  of  search  for  the  purpose  of  impressment, 
President  Jefferson  did  not  submit  it  to  the  Sen- 
ate. An  attempt  at  further  negotiation  failed. 
In  June,  1807,  the  British  man-of-war  Leopard 
fired  into  the  United  States  frigate  Chesapeake, 
and  overhauled  her  for  British  deserters,  some  of 
whom  claimed  to  be  American  citizens,  an  outrage 
which  created  intense  excitement  and  indignation 
all  over  the  country.  An  explanation  was  de- 
manded, which  it  took  four  years  to  obtain.  In 
the  autumn  of  1807,  Jefferson  called  an  extra  ses- 
sion of  Congress,  and  the  famous  embargo  was 
resolved  upon,  forbidding  the  departure,  unless  by 
special  direction  of  the  President,  of  any  Amer- 
ican vessel  from  any  port  of  the  United  States 
bound  to  any  foreign  country,  — a very  curious 
measure,  intended  to  defend  the  foreign  commerce 


72 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  the  country  by  killing  that  commerce  at  one 
blow.  The  effect  was  not,  as  had  been  hoped,  to 
compel  the  belligerents  by  commercial  inconven- 
ience at  once  to  respect  the  rights  of  neutrals ; but 
on  the  other  hand  great  dissatisfaction  was  created 
in  the  shipping  towns  of  the  United  States;  for 
most  of  the  shipowners  and  merchants  would 
rather  take  what  little  chance  of  trade  the  restric- 
tive measures  of  the  belligerents  still  left  them, 
than  let  their  ships  rot  at  the  wharves  and  thus 
accept  financial  ruin  from  the  hands  of  their  own 
government. 

The  embargo  would  indeed  have  been  proper 
enough  as  a measure  preparatory  for  immediate 
war.  But  Jefferson  was  a man  of  peace  by  tem- 
perament as  well  as  philosophy.  His  favorite  gun- 
boat policy  appears  like  mere  boyish  dabbling  in 
warlike  contrivance.  His  nature  shrank  from  the 
conflict  of  material  forces.  The  very  thought  of 
war,  with  its  brutal  exigencies  and  sudden  vicissi- 
tudes, distressed  and  bewildered  his  mind.  His 
whole  political  philosophy  contemplated  lasting 
peace  with  the  outside  world.  War,  as  a reign  of 
force,  was  utterly  hostile  to  the  realization  of  his 
political  ideals.  When  he  saw  that  the  comfort- 
able repose  and  the  general  cheerfulness  which 
prevailed  during  his  first  term  were  overclouded 
by  foreign  complications,  and  that  the  things  he 
feared  most  were  almost  sure  to  come,  he  greeted 
the  election  of  his  successor,  which  took  place  in 
1808,  as  a deliverance;  and  without  waiting  for 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


73 


Madison’s  inauguration,  virtually  dropped  the  reins 
of  government,  leaving  all  further  responsibility 
to  Congress  and  to  the  next  president. 

In  February,  1809,  Congress  resolved  to  raise 
the  embargo,  and  to  substitute  for  it  commercial 
non-intercourse  with  England  and  France  until 
i the  obnoxious  orders  and  decrees  should  be  re- 
voked. A gleam  of  sunshine  seemed  to  break 
through  the  clouds  when,  in  April,  a provisional 
arrangement,  looking  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Orders  in  Council  in  case  of  the  reopening  of 
commercial  intercourse,  and  to  an  atonement  for 
the  Chesapeake  outrage,  was  agreed  upon  by  the 
secretary  of  state  and  Mr.  Erskine,  the  British 
minister.  President  Madison  at  once  issued  a 
proclamation  declaring  commercial  intercourse  with 
Great  Britain  restored.  But  the  ships  had  hardly 
left  their  harbors,  when  the  general  rejoicing  was 
rudely  interrupted.  It  turned  out  that  Erskine, 
a well-meaning  and  somewhat  enthusiastic  young 
man,  had  gone  beyond  his  instructions.  He  was 
sternly  disavowed  and  recalled  by  the  British  gov- 
ernment. A new  minister,  Mr.  Jackson,  was  sent 
in  his  place,  who,  in  discussing  the  transactions 
between  Erskine  and  the  secretary  of  state,  made 
himself  so  offensive  that  further  communication 
with  him  was  declined.  The  situation  was  darker 
than  ever.  Non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain 
was  resumed ; but  a partial  change  of  ministry  in 
England  — the  Marquis  of  Wellesley  succeeding 
Mr.  Canning  in  the  Foreign  Office  — seemed  to 


74 


HENRY  CLAY 


open  a new  chance  for  negotiation.  To  aid  this, 
Congress  on  May  1,  1810,  passed  an  act  providing 
that  commercial  non-intercourse  with  the  belliger- 
ent powers  should  cease  with  the  end  of  the  session, 
only  armed  ships  being  excluded  from  American 
ports;  and  further,  that,  in  case  either  of  them 
should  recall  its  obnoxious  orders  or  decrees,  the 
President  should  announce  the  fact  by  proclama- 
tion, and  if  the  other  did  not  do  the  same  within 
three  months,  the  non-intercourse  act  should  be 
revived  against  that  one,  — a measure  adopted 
only  because  Congress,  in  its  helplessness,  did  not 
know  what  else  to  do. 

The  conduct  of  France  had  meanwhile  been  no 
less  offensive  than  that  of  Great  Britain.  On  all 
sorts  of  pretexts  American  ships  were  seized  in  the 
harbors  and  waters  controlled  by  French  power. 
A spirited  remonstrance  on  the  part  of  Armstrong, 
the  American  minister,  was  answered  by  the  issue 
of  the  Rambouillet  Decree  in  May,  1810,  ordering 
the  sale  of  American  ships  and  cargoes  seized,  and 
directing  like  confiscation  of  all  American  vessels 
entering  any  ports  under  the  control  of  France. 
This  decree  was  designed  to  stop  the  surreptitious 
trade  that  was  still  being  carried  on  between 
England  and  the  continent  in  American  bottoms. 
When  it  failed  in  accomplishing  that  end,  Napo- 
leon instructed  his  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
Champagny,  to  inform  the  American  minister  that 
the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  were  revoked,  and 
would  cease  to  have  effect  on  November  1,  1810, 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


75 


if  the  English  would  revoke  their  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil, and  recall  their  new  principles  of  blockade,  or 
if  the  United  States  would  “ cause  their  rights  to 
be  respected  by  the  English,”  — in  the  first  place 
restore  the  Non-intercourse  Act  as  to  Great  Brit- 
ain. This  declaration  was  made  by  Champagny 
to  the  American  representative  on  August  5.  The 
British  government,  being  notified  of  this  by  the 
American  minister,  declared  on  September  29, 
that  Great  Britain  would  recall  the  Orders  in 
Council  when  the  revocation  of  the  French  decrees 
should  have  actually  taken  effect,  and  the  com- 
merce of  neutrals  should  have  been  restored.  Thus  - 
France  would  effectually  withdraw  her  decrees 
when  Great  Britain  had  withdrawn  her  Orders  in 
Council;  and  Great  Britain  would  withdraw  her 
Orders  in  Council  when  France  had  effectually 
withdrawn  her  decrees. 

Madison,  however,  leaning  toward  France,  as 
was  traditional  with  the  Republican  party,  and 
glad  to  grasp  even  at  the  semblance  of  an  advan- 
tage, chose  to  regard  the  withdrawal  of  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  Decrees  as  actual  and  done  in  good 
faith,  and  announced  it  as  a matter  of  fact  on 
November  1,  1810.  French  armed  ships  were  no 
longer  excluded  from  American  ports.  On  Febru- 
ary 2,  1811,  the  Non-importation  Act  was  revived 
as  to  Great  Britain.  In  May  the  British  Court 
of  Admiralty  delivered  an  opinion  that  no  evidence 
existed  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
Decrees,  which  resulted  in  the  condemnation  of  a 


76 


HENRY  CLAY 


number  of  American  vessels  and  their  cargoes. 
Additional  irritation  was  caused  by  the  capture, 
off  Sandy  Hook,  of  an  American  vessel  bound  to 
France,  by  some  fresh  cases  of  search  and  impress- 
ment, and  by  an  encounter  between  the  American 
frigate  President  and  the  British  sloop  Little  Belt, 
which  fired  into  one  another,  the  British  vessel 
suffering  most. 

But  was  American  commerce  safe  in  French 
ports?  By  no  means.  The  French  Council  of 
Prize  had  continued  to  condemn  American  vessels, 
as  if  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  were  in  undi- 
minished force;  outrages  on  American  ships  by 
French  men -of -war  and  privateers  went  on  as  be- 
fore, and  Napoleon  refused  reparation  for  the 
confiscations  under  the  Rambouillet  Decree.  The 
pretended  French  concession  was,  therefore,  a mere 
farce. 

Truly,  there  were  American  grievances  enough. 
Over  nine  hundred  American  ships  had  been  seized 
by  the  British,  and  more  than  five  hundred  and 
fifty  by  the  French.  The  number  of  American 
citizens  impressed  as  British  seamen,  or  kept  in 
prison  if  they  refused  to  serve,  was  reported  to 
exceed  six  thousand,  and  it  was  estimated  that 
there  were  as  many  more  of  whom  no  informa- 
tion had  been  obtained.  The  remonstrances  of 
the  American  government  had  been  treated  with 
haughty  disdain.  By  both  belligerents  the  United 
States  had  been  kicked  and  cuffed  like  a mere 
interloper  among  the  nations  of  the  earth,  who 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


77 


had  no  rights  entitled  to  respectful  consideration. 
Their  insolence  seemed  to  have  been  increased  by 
the  irresolution  of  the  American  government,  the 
distraction  of  counsel  in  Congress,  and  the  divi- 
sion of  sentiment  among  the  people,  resulting  in  a 
shifting,  aimless  policy,  which  made  the  attitude 
of  the  republic  appear  weak,  if  not  cowardly,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  European  powers. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  when  Henry 
Clay  entered  the  House  of  Representatives  and 
was  made  its  speaker.  In  his  annual  message 
Madison  held  fast  to  the  fiction  that  France  had 
withdrawn  the  offensive  decrees,  while  at  the  same 
time  he  complained  that  the  French  government 
had  not  shown  any  intention  to  make  reparation 
for  the  injuries  inflicted,  and  he  hinted  at  a re- 
vival of  non -intercourse.  But  the  sting  of  the 
message  was  directed  against  Great  Britain,  who 
had  refused  to  withdraw  the  Orders  in  Council, 
and  continued  to  do  things  “not  less  derogatory  to 
the  dearest  of  our  national  rights  than  vexatious 
to  our  trade,”  virtually  amounting  to  “war  on  our 
lawful  commerce.”  Madison  therefore  advised 
that  the  United  States  be  put  “into  an  armor  and 
attitude  demanded  by  the  crisis,  and  correspond- 
ing with  the  national  spirit  and  expectations.” 
This  had  a warlike  sound,  while,  in  fact,  Madison 
was  an  exceedingly  unwarlike  man.  He  ardently 
wished,  and  still  hoped,  to  prevent  an  armed  con- 
flict. To  make  him  adopt  a war  policy  required 
pushing. 


78 


HENRY  CLAY 


But  the  young  Republican  leaders  came  to  the 
front  to  interpret  the  “ national  spirit  and  expec- 
tation.” They  totally  eclipsed  the  old  chiefs  by 
their  dash  and  brilliancy.  Foremost  among  them 
stood  Henry  Clay;  then  John  C.  Calhoun,  Wil- 
liam Lowndes,  Felix  Grundy,  Langdon  Cheves, 
and  others.  They  believed  that,  if  the  American 
republic  was  to  maintain  anything  like  the  dignity 
of  an  independent  power,  and  to  preserve,  or  rather 
regain,  the  respect  of  mankind  in  any  degree,  — 
ay,  its  self-respect,  — it  must  cease  to  submit  to 
humiliation  and  contemptuous  treatment;  it  must 
fight,  — fight  somebody  who  had  wronged  or  in- 
sulted it. 

The  Republicans,  having  always  a tender  side 
for  France,  and  the  fiction  of  French  concessions 
being  accepted,  the  theory  of  the  war  party  was 
that,  of  the  two  belligerents,  England  had  more 
insolently  maltreated  the  United  States.  Rumors 
were  spread  that  an  Indian  war  then  going  on, 
and  resulting  in  the  battle  of  Tippecanoe  on  No- 
vember 7,  1811,  was  owing  to  English  intrigues. 
Adding  this  to  the  old  Revolutionary  reminiscences 
of  British  oppression,  it  was  not  unnatural  that 
the  national  wrath  should  generally  turn  against 
Great  Britain. 

Madison  was  all  his  life,  even  in  his  youth, 
somewhat  like  a timid  old  man.  He  did  not  desire 
war ; neither  did  he  venture  to  resist  the  warlike 
current.  He  was  quite  willing  to  have  Congress 
make  a policy  for  him,  and  to  follow  its  lead.  In 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


79 


this  respect  he  could  not  have  found  a man  more 
willing  to  urge,  or  drive,  or  lead  him,  than  Henry 
Clay,  who  at  once  so  composed  the  important 
committees  of  the  House  as  to  put  them  under  the 
control  of  the  war  party.  Then  early  in  the  ses- 
sion he  took  the  floor  in  favor  of  putting  at  the 
disposal  of  the  President  a much  larger  army  than 
the  President  himself  had  recommended.  Every 
word  of  his  speech  breathed  war.  He  spoke  of 
war  not  as  an  uncertain  event,  but  as  something 
sure  to  come.  As  to  the  reason  for  it,  he  pointed 
out  that  “ the  real  cause  of  British  aggression  was 
not  to  distress  an  enemy,  but  to  destroy  a rival.” 
To  that  end,  “not  content  with  seizing  upon  all 
our  property  which  falls  within  her  rapacious 
grasp,  the  personal  rights  of  our  countrymen  — 
rights  which  forever  must  be  sacred  — are  tram- 
pled upon  and  violated”  through  the  “impress- 
ment of  our  seamen.”  Was  the  question  asked: 
“What  are  we  to  gain  by  war?”  With  ringing 
emphasis  he  replied:  “What  are  we  not  to  lose 
by  peace?  Commerce,  character,  a nation’s  best 
treasure,  honor!”  With  such  words  of  fire  he 
stirred  the  House  and  the  people.  The  character 
and  result  of  the  war,  too,  were  predetermined  in 
his  imagination.  It  was  to  be  an  aggressive  war, 
a war  of  glorious  conquest.  He  saw  the  battalions 
of  the  republic  marching  victoriously  through 
Canada  and  laying  siege  to  doomed  Quebec.  His 
dream  was  of  a peace  dictated  at  Halifax. 

Not  only  the  regular  army  was  increased,  but 


80 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  President  was  authorized  to  accept  and  employ 
50,000  volunteers.  Then  a bill  was  introduced 
providing  for  the  building  of  ten  new  frigates, 
which  gave  Clay  an  opportunity  for  expressing 
his  views  as  to  what  the  American  navy  should  be. 
A large  portion  of  the  war  party,  Western  and 
Southern  men,  insisted  upon  confining  the  conflict 
with  England  to  operations  on  land.  The  navy 
was  not  popular  with  them.  They  denounced  na- 
vies generally  as  curses  to  the  countries  which 
possessed  them;  as  very  dangerous  to  popular 
liberty;  as  sources  of  endless  expense  without  cor- 
responding benefit;  as  nurseries  of  debt,  corrup- 
tion, demoralization,  and  ruin.  Especially  in  the 
war  then  in  prospect  a navy  would  be  absolutely 
useless,  — a curious  prediction  in  the  light  of  sub- 
sequent events.  Cheves  and  Lowndes  spoke  with 
ability  in  favor  of  a maritime  armament,  but 
Clay’s  speech  took  a wider  sweep.  He  easily  dis- 
posed of  the  assertion  that  a navy  was  as  danger- 
ous to  free  institutions  as  a standing  army,  and 
then  laid  down  his  theory  upon  which  the  naval 
force  of  the  United  States  should  be  organized. 
It  should  not  be  such  “ a force  as  would  be  capable 
of  contending  with  that  which  any  other  nation  is 
able  to  bring  on  the  ocean,  — a force  that,  boldly 
scouring  every  sea,  would  challenge  to  combat  the 
fleets  of  other  powers,  however  great.”  To  build 
up  so  extensive  an  establishment,  he  admitted,  was 
impossible  at  the  time,  and  would  probably  never 
be  desirable.  The  next  species  of  naval  power, 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


81 


which,  “ without  adventuring  into  distant  seas, 
and  keeping  generally  on  our  coasts,  would  be 
competent  to  beat  off  any  squadron  which  might 
be  attempted  to  be  permanently  stationed  in  our 
waters,”  he  did  deem  desirable.  Twelve  ships  of 
the  line  and  fifteen  to  twenty  frigates,  he  thought, 
would  be  sufficient ; and  if  the  present  state  of  the 
finances  forbade  so  large  an  outlay,  he  was  at  least 
in  favor  of  beginning  the  enlargement  of  the  navy 
with  such  an  end  in  view.  But  what  he  would 
absolutely  insist  upon  was  the  building  up  of  a 
force  “competent  to  punish  any  single  ship  or 
small  naval  expedition”  attempting  to  “endanger 
our  coasting  trade,  to  block  up  our  harbors,  or  to 
lay  under  contribution  our  cities,”  such  a force 
being  “entirely  within  the  compass  of  our  means” 
at  the  time.  “Because  we  cannot  provide  against 
every  danger,”  he  asked,  “shall  we  provide  against 
none?” 

This  was  a sensible  theory,  in  its  main  principles 
applicable  now  as  well  as  then:  to  keep  a force 
not  so  expensive  as  to  embarrass  the  country  finan- 
cially, not  so  large  as  to  tempt  the  government 
into  unnecessary  quarrels,  but  sufficient  for  doing 
such  duty  of  high  police  as  might  be  necessary  to 
protect  our  harbors  and  coasts  against  casual  at- 
tack and  annoyance,  and  to  “show  the  flag,”  and 
serve  as  a sign  of  the  national  power  in  foreign 
parts,  where  American  citizens  or  American  pro- 
perty might  occasionally  need  protection.  With 
great  adroitness  Clay  enlisted  also  the  sympathies 


82 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  the  Western  members  in  behalf  of  the  navy,  by 
showing  them  the  importance  of  protecting  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  the  only  outlet  for  the 
products  of  the  Western  country. 

The  war  spirit  in  the  country  gradually  rose, 
and  manifested  itself  noisily  in  public  meetings, 
passing  resolutions,  and  memorializing  Congress. 
It  was  increased  in  intensity  by  a sensational  “ex- 
posure,” a batch  of  papers  laid  before  Congress 
by  the  President  in  March,  1812.  They  had  been 
sold  to  the  government  by  John  Henry,  an  Irish 
adventurer,  and  disclosed  a confidential  mission  to 
New  England,  undertaken  by  Henry  in  1809  at 
the  request  of  Sir  James  Craig,  the  governor  of 
Canada,  to  encourage  a disunion  movement  in  the 
Eastern  States.  This  was  the  story.  Whatever 
its  foundation,  it  was  believed,  and  greatly  in- 
creased popular  excitement.  Yet  the  administra- 
tion seemed  to  be  still  halting,  and  the  war  party 
felt  obliged  to  push  it  forward.  Their  programme 
was  in  the  first  place  a short  embargo  of  thirty 
days,  upon  which  Clay,  as  their  leader,  had  a 
conference  with  the  President.  Madison  agreed 
to  recommend  an  embargo  of  sixty  days  to  Con- 
gress, and  this  he  did  in  a confidential  message 
on  April  1.  The  House  passed  a corresponding 
bill  the  same  day;  the  Senate  the  next  day  in- 
creased the  time  of  the  embargo  to  ninety  days, 
i which  the  House  accepted,  and  on  April  4 the  bill 
became  a law.  The  moderate  Republicans  and 
the  Federalists  had  procured  the  extension  of  the 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


83 


time,  still  hoping  for  a pacific  turn  of  negotiation. 
But  Clay  vehemently  declared  that  the  embargo 
meant  war  and  nothing  but  war.  When  he  was 
reminded  of  the  danger  of  such  a contest,  and  of 
the  circumstance  that  the  conduct  of  France  fur- 
nished cause  of  war  equally  grave,  he  burst  out 
in  thundering  appeals  to  American  courage  and 
honor.  “Weak  as  we  are,”  he  exclaimed,  “we 
could  fight  France  too,  if  necessary,  in  a good 
cause, — the  cause  of  honor  and  independence.” 
We  had  complete  proof,  he  added,  “that  Great 
Britain  would  do  everything  to  destroy  us.  Reso- 
lution and  spirit  were  our  only  security.  War, 
after  all,  was  not  so  terrible  a thing.  There  was 
no  terror  in  it  except  its  novelty.  Such  gentle- 
men as  chose  to  call  these  sentiments  quixotic, 
he  pitied  for  their  deficient  sense  of  honor.” 

All  over  the  country  the  embargo  was  under- 
stood as  meaning  an  immediate  preparation  for 
war.  In  the  South  and  the  West  and  in  Pennsyl- 
vania enthusiastic  demonstrations  expressed  and 
further  excited  the  popular  feeling.  It  was  a 
remarkable  circumstance  that  the  war  spirit  was 
strongest  where  the  people  were  least  touched  in 
their  immediate  interests  by  the  British  Orders  in 
Council  and  the  impressment  of  seamen,  while  the 
population  engaged  in  maritime  commerce,  who 
had  suffered  most  and  who  feared  a total  annihi- 
lation of  their  trade  by  the  war,  were  in  favor  of 
pacific  measures,  and  under  the  lead  of  the  Fed- 
eralists violently  denounced  the  measures  of  the 
government  and  the  war  party. 


84 


HENRY  CLAY 


In  May,  1812,  President  Madison  was  nomi- 
nated for  reelection  by  the  congressional  caucus. 
It  has  been  said  that  he  was  dragooned  into  the 
war  policy  by  Clay  and  his  followers  with  the 
threat  that,  unless  he  yielded  to  their  views,  an- 
other candidate  for  the  presidency  would  be  chosen. 
This  Clay  denied,  and  there  was  no  evidence  to 
discredit  his  denial.  Madison  was  simply  swept 
into  the  current  by  the  impetuosity  of  Young 
America.  He  himself  declared  in  1827,  in  a letter 
to  Wheaton,  that  “the  immediate  impulse”  to 
the  declaration  of  war  was  given  by  a letter  from 
Lord  Castlereagh  to  the  British  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, Forster,  which  was  communicated  to  the 
President,  and  which  stated  “that  the  Orders  in 
Council,  to  which  we  had  declared  we  would  not 
submit,  would  not  be  repealed  without  the  repeal 
of  the  internal  measures  of  France.  With  this 
formal  notice  no  choice  remained,  but  between  war 
and  degradation.” 

John  Randolph  made  a last  attempt  to  prevent 
the  extreme  step.  Having  heard  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  preparing  a message  to  Congress  recom- 
mending a declaration  of  war,  he  tried  to  force  a 
discussion  in  the  House  by  offering  a resolution, 
“that  it  was  inexpedient  to  resort  to  war  with 
Great  Britain.”  He  began  to  debate  it  on  the 
spot.  Clay,  as  speaker,  interrupted  him,  and  put 
to  the  House  the  question  whether  it  would  proceed 
to  the  consideration  of  the  resolution.  The  House 
voted  in  the  negative,  and  Randolph  was  silenced. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


85 


On  June  1 the  President’s  war  message  came.  On 
June  18  a bill  in  accordance  with  it,  which  had 
passed  both  Houses,  was  signed  by  the  President, 
who  proclaimed  hostilities  the  next  day. 

Thus  Young  America,  led  by  Henry  Clay,  car- 
ried their  point.  But  there  was  something  dis- 
quieting in  their  victory.  The  majority  they  com- 
manded in  Congress  was  not  so  large  as  a majority 
for  a declaration  of  war  should  be.  In  the  House, 
Pennsylvania  and  the  States  south  and  west  of  it 
gave  62  votes  for  the  war,  and  32  against  it;  the 
States  north  and  east  of  Pennsylvania  gave  17  yeas 
and  32  nays,  — in  all  7 9 for  and  49  against  war. 
This  showed  a difference  of  sentiment  according 
to  geographical  divisions.  Not  even  all  the  Re- 
publicans were  in  favor  of  war.  Thirteen  North- 
ern and  two  Southern  Republicans  voted  against 
it.  In  the  Senate  the  vote  stood  19  to  13,  and 
among  the  latter  were  six  Republicans.  So  large 
a minority  had  an  ugly  look.  It  signified  that 
there  would  be  a peace  party  in  the  United  States 
during  the  war.  And  indeed,  those  who  called 
themselves  the  “friends  of  peace,  liberty,  and  com- 
merce ” did  make  themselves  felt  in  obstructing 
military  preparations  and  subscriptions  to  the  na- 
tional loan.  In  some  parts  of  New  England  this 
opposition  assumed  an  almost  seditious  character. 

Nor  were  the  United  States  in  any  sense  well 
prepared  for  a war  with  a first  class  power.  The 
republic  was  still  comparatively  weak  in  military 
resources.  The  population,  including  slaves,  had 


8G 


HENRY  CLAY 


not  yet  reached  eight  millions.  Ohio,  Kentucky, 
and  Tennessee  were  the  westernmost  States.  In- 
diana was  still  a territory,  and  part  of  it  in  the 
possession  of  Indian  tribes.  The  battle  of  Tippe- 
canoe had  been  fought  the  year  before  on  its  soil. 
The  regular  army  had  scarcely  10,000  effective 
men.  Volunteer  and  militia  levies  had  to  be 
mainly  depended  upon,  and  to  command  these  the 
number  of  experienced  officers,  aside  from  super- 
annuated “ Revolutionary  veterans,”  was  extremely 
small.  The  naval  force  consisted  of  a few  old 
frigates  and  some  smaller  vessels.  These  were 
all  the  means  at  hand,  when  war  was  declared,  to 
force  Great  Britain,  through  a rapid  conquest  of 
Canada,  to  respect  the  maritime  rights  of  the 
United  States. 

All  this  looked  unpromising  enough.  But  Clay 
believed  in  the  power  of  enthusiasm.  His  voice 
resounded  through  the  land.  His  eloquence  filled 
volunteer  regiments  and  sent  them  off  full  of  fight- 
ing spirit  and  hope  of  victory.  From  place  to 
place  he  went,  reassuring  the  doubters,  arousing 
the  sluggards,  encouraging  the  patriots,  — in  one 
word,  “ firing  the  national  heart.”  But,  after  all, 
his  enthusiasm  could  not  beat  the  enemy.  His 
conquest  of  Canada  turned  out  to  be  a much  more 
serious  affair  than  he  had  anticipated.  Active 
operations  began.  The  first  attempt  at  invasion, 
made  by  General  Hull  on  the  western  frontier, 
resulted  in  the  ignominious  surrender  of  that  com- 
mander, with  his  whole  force,  to  the  British,  at 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


87 


Detroit.  Other  attempts  on  the  Niagara  River 
and  on  Lake  Champlain  ended  but  little  less  in- 
gloriously.  These  failures  were  not  only  military 
disasters,  but  were  calculated  to  bury  in  ridicule 
the  advocates  of  the  war  with  their  glowing  pre- 
dictions of  the  taking  of  Quebec  and  the  peace 
dictated  at  Halifax.  Only  the  little  navy  did 
honor  to  the  country.  The  American  men-of-war 
gathered  laurels  in  one  encounter  after  another,  to 
the  astonishment  of  the  world.  It  was  a revela- 
tion to  England  as  well  as  to  the  American  people. 

Meanwhile  the  situation  was  curiously  changed 
by  other  events.  Before  the  declaration  of  war 
was  known  in  Europe,  Napoleon  tried  to  increase 
the  excitement  of  the  Americans  against  England, 
and  to  propitiate  their  feeling  with  regard  to 
France,  by  causing  to  be  exhibited  to  the  Amer- 
ican minister  a decree  pretending  to  have  been 
signed  on  April  28,  1810,  but  really  manufactured 
for  the  occasion,  to  the  effect  that  the  Berlin  and 
Milan  Decrees  should,  as  to  the  United  States,  be 
considered  as  having  been  of  no  force  since  No- 
vember 1,  1810.  On  the  other  hand,  in  England 
the  mercantile  interest  and  the  manufacturing 
population  had  at  last  become  dissatisfied  with  the 
prohibition  of  the  American  trade.  There  had 
been  a parliamentary  inquiry  into  the  effects  of  the 
Orders  in  Council,  and  the  government,  pressed  by 
motions  in  Parliament  for  their  repeal,  had  finally 
yielded  and  withdrawn  the  obnoxious  measures  on 
June  23,  1812,  reserving  the  right  to  renew  them, 


88 


HENRY  CLAY 


should  the  Americans  persist  in  a policy  hostile  to 
British  interests.  But  five  days  before,  unknown 
to  the  British  government,  the  United  States  had 
declared  war.  The  Orders  in  Council  had  no 
doubt  been  considered  the  principal  cause  for  that 
war.  Now  Great  Britain  had  shown  herself  ready 
to  remove  that  cause.  Nothing  remained  but  the 
complaint  about  the  impressment  of  American  sea- 
men. On  that  ground  the  war  went  on,  — with 
what  success  at  first,  we  have  seen. 

It  is  reported  that  Madison  seriously  contem- 
plated making  Clay  commanding  general  of  the 
forces  in  the  field,  and  that  Gallatin  dissuaded 
him,  saying:  “But  what  shall  we  do  without  Clay 
in  Congress?”  Indeed,  the  next  session  showed 
how  much  he  was  needed  there. 

When  Congress  met  in  the  fall  of  1812  the  gen- 
eral situation  was  dismal  in  the  extreme.  On  land 
there  had  been  nothing  but  defeat  and  humiliation. 
On  the  sea  some  splendid  achievements,  indeed, 
in  duels  between  ship  and  ship,  but  no  prospect 
of  success  in  a struggle  between  navy  and  navy. 
England  had  not  yet  begun  to  put  forth  her  colos- 
sal power.  What  was  to  happen  when  she  should ! 
With  all  this,  the  offered  withdrawal  of  the  Orders 
in  Council  stood  as  conclusive  proof  of  the  fact 
that,  had  the  United  States  only  waited  a little 
longer  with  the  declaration  of  war,  the  principal 
cause  of  complaint  might  have  been  peaceably 
removed.  What  an  opportunity  for  an  able  op- 
position! Madison  was  indeed  reelected  to  the 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


89 


presidency  in  the  fall  of  1812,  by  an  electoral  vote 
of  128  against  89;  but  the  opposition,  especially 
bitter  in  New  England,  had  no  reason  to  be  dis- 
couraged by  that  proportion. 

Bills  to  increase  the  navy  were  swiftly  passed, 
almost  without  objection,  for  the  Federalists  them- 
selves, especially  those  from  the  shipping  States, 
desired  a more  efficient  naval  force.  But  on  a 
bill  for  reinforcing  the  army  the  attack  came.  At 
first  it  was  tame  enough.  The  bill  had  already 
passed  by  a large  majority  to  a third  reading,  when 
Josiah  Quincy  of  Massachusetts,  the  leader  of  the 
Federalists  in  the  House,  made  an  assault  upon  the 
whole  war  policy,  which  in  brilliancy  of  diction 
and  bitterness  of  spirit  has  hardly  ever  been  ex- 
celled in  our  parliamentary  history.  He  depicted 
the  attempted  invasion  of  Canada  as  a buccaneer- 
ing expedition,  an  act  of  bloodthirsty  cruelty 
against  unoffending  neighbors.  Its  failure  was  a 
disgrace,  but  “the  disgrace  of  failure  was  terres- 
trial glory  compared  with  the  disgrace  of  the  at- 
tempt.” If  an  army  were  put  into  the  field  strong 
enough  to  accomplish  the  conquest  of  Canada,  it 
would  also  be  strong  enough  to  endanger  the  liber- 
ties of  the  American  people.  In  view  of  the  crim- 
inality of  the  attempt,  he  thanked  God  that  the 
people  of  New  England  — referring  to  their  vote 
against  Madison  in  the  preceding  national  election 
— “had  done  what  they  could  to  vindicate  them- 
selves and  their  children  from  the  burden  of  this 
sin.”  This  was  not  the  way  to  obtain  an  early 


90 


HENRY  CLAY 


and  honorable  peace.  “Those  must  be  very  young 
politicians,”  he  exclaimed,  his  eye  fixed  on  the 
youthful  speaker  of  the  House,  — “their  pin-fea- 
thers not  yet  grown,  and,  however  they  may  flutter 
on  this  floor,  they  are  not  yet  fledged  for  any  high 
or  distant  flight,  who  think  that  threats  and  ap- 
pealing to  fear  are  the  ways  of  producing  any  dis- 
position to  negotiate  in  Great  Britain,  or  in  any 
other  nation  which  understands  what  it  owes  to  its 
own  safety  and  honor.”  The  voluntary  yielding 
of  England  with  regard  to  the  Orders  in  Council 
had  shown  how  peace  might  have  been  secured. 
But  he  was  convinced  that  the  administration  did 
not  want  peace.  The  administration  party  had  its 
origin  and  found  its  daily  food  in  hatred  of  Great 
Britain.  He  reviewed  the  whole  diplomatic  his- 
tory of  the  United  States  to  show  that  Republican 
influence  had  always  been  bent  upon  forcing  a 
quarrel  with  England,  and  that  during  Jefferson’s 
and  Madison’s  administrations  there  had  been  con- 
stant plotting  against  peace  and  friendship.  This 
review  he  followed  with  a scathing  exposure  of  the 
subserviency  of  the  administration  to  the  audacious 
and  insulting  duplicity  of  Bonaparte,  and  the 
shameful  humiliation  of  the  government  in  conse- 
quence of  it.  Finally,  he  declared  that,  while  he 
would  unite  with  any  man  for  purposes  of  mari- 
time and  frontier  defense,  he  would  unite  with  no 
one  nor  with  any  body  of  men  “for  the  conquest 
of  any  country,  either  as  a means  of  carrying  on 
this  war  or  for  any  other  purpose.” 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


91 


This  savage  attack  struck  deeply.  It  was  fol- 
lowed by  several  speeches  on  the  same  side,  insist- 
ing that  the  quarrel  between  the  United  States  and 
England  had,  after  the  revocation  of  the  Orders  in 
Council,  been  narrowed  down  to  the  impressment 
question,  and  that  the  United  States  would  never 
have  gone  to  war  on  that  account  alone. 

Then  Clay,  the  foremost  of  the  young  politicians 
whose  “pin-feathers  were  not  yet  grown,”  took  up 
the  gauntlet.  Quincy  and  his  followers  had  made 
a mistake  not  unusually  made  under  such  circum- 
stances. They  had  overshot  the  mark.  The  most 
serious  danger  of  an  opposition  in  time  of  war  is 
to  expose  themselves  to  the  suspicion  of  a lack  of 
patriotism.  This  danger  they  did  not  avoid. 

The  report  we  have  of  Clay’s  speech,  delivered 
on  January  8 and  9,  1813,  although  not  perfect, 
is  sufficient  to  stamp  this  as  one  of  his  greatest 
performances.  He  did  not  find  it  difficult  to  de- 
fend Jefferson  and  Madison  — who,  indeed,  had 
toiled  enough  to  maintain  peaceable  relations  with 
everybody  — against  the  charge  of  having  wan- 
tonly provoked  a war  with  England.  It  was,  he 
said,  the  interest,  as  well  as  the  duty,  of  the  ad- 
ministration to  preserve  peace.  Nothing  was  left 
untried  to  that  end.  The  defensive  measures  — 
non-importation  and  embargo  — adopted  to  protect 
our  maritime  trade,  were  “sacrificed  on  the  altar 
of  conciliation.”  Any  “indication  of  a return  to 
the  public  law  and  the  path  of  justice  on  the  part 
of  either  belligerent  was  seized  upon  with  avidity 


92 


HENRY  CLAY 


by  the  administration;”  so  the  friendly  disposi- 
tion shown  by  Erskine.  But  — here  the  orator 
skillfully  passed  to  the  offensive  — what  was  the 
conduct  of  the  opposition  meanwhile?  When 
peaceful  experiments  were  undergoing  a trial,  the 
opposition  was  “the  champion  of  war,  the  proud, 
the  spirited,  the  sole  repository  of  the  nation’s 
honor,  denouncing  the  administration  as  weak, 
feeble,  pusillanimous,”  and  incapable  of  being 
kicked  into  war : — 

“ When,  however,  foreign  nations,  perhaps  emboldened 
by  the  very  opposition  here  made,  refuse  to  listen  to 
amicable  appeals  ; when,  in  fact,  war  with  one  of  them 
has  become  a matter  of  necessity,  demanded  by  our 
independence  and  our  sovereignty,  behold  the  opposi- 
tion veering  round  and  becoming  the  friends  of  peace 
and  commerce,  telling  of  the  calamities  of  war,  the  waste 
of  the  public  treasury,  the  spilling  of  innocent  blood  — 
6 Gorgons,  hydras,  and  chimeras  dire.’  Now  we  see 
them  exhibiting  the  terrific  form  of  the  roaring  king 
of  the  forest ; now  the  meekness  and  humility  of  the 
lamb.  They  are  for  war  and  no  restrictions,  when  the 
administration  is  for  peace.  They  are  for  peace  and 
restrictions,  when  the  administration  is  for  war.  You 
find  them,  sir,  tacking  with  every  gale,  displaying  the 
colors  of  every  party  and  of  all  nations,  steady  only  in 
one  unalterable  purpose,  — to  steer,  if  possible,  into  the 
haven  of  power.” 

Over  the  charge  that  the  administration  had  been 
duped  by  France,  a very  sore  point,  he  skipped 
nimbly,  ridiculing  the  idea  of  French  influence  as 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


93 


well  as  the  tremendous  denunciations  of  Bonaparte, 
in  which  the  opposition  were  fond  of  indulging. 
With  these  denunciations  he  dexterously  coupled 
an  attack  made  by  Quincy  upon  Jefferson;  and 
then,  to  inflame  the  party  spirit  of  wavering  Re- 
publicans, he  burst  out  in  that  famous  eulogy  on 
Jefferson  which  has  long  figured  in  our  school- 
books : — 

“Neither  his  retirement  from  public  office,  nor  his 
eminent  services,  nor  his  advanced  age,  can  exempt  this 
patriot  from  the  coarse  assaults  of  party  malevolence. 
Sir,  in  1801  he  snatched  from  the  rude  hand  of  usurpa- 
tion the  violated  Constitution  of  his  country,  and  that  is 
his  crime.  He  preserved  that  instrument  in  form,  and 
substance,  and  spirit,  a precious  inheritance  for  genera- 
tions to  come ; and  for  this  he  can  never  be  forgiven. 
How  vain  and  impotent  is  party  rage  directed  against 
such  a man  ! He  is  not  more  elevated  by  his  lofty  resi- 
dence upon  the  summit  of  his  favorite  mountain  than 
he  is  lifted,  by  the  serenity  of  his  mind,  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  a well-spent  life,  above  the  malignant  pas- 
sions and  bitter  feelings  of  the  day.” 

Did  the  opposition  speak  of  the  danger  to  popu- 
lar liberty  arising  from  a large  army  ? They  were 
the  same  party  that  had  tried  to  strangle  popular 
liberty  with  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws.  Did  the 
opposition,  as  Quincy  had  done,  accuse  the  Repub- 
lican leaders  of  cabinet  plots,  presidential  plots, 
and  all  manner  of  plots  for  the  gratification  of 
personal  ambition?  “I  wish,”  he  replied  with 
stinging  force,  “that  another  plot  — a plot  that 


94 


HENRY  CLAY 


aims  at  the  dismemberment  of  the  Union  - — had 
only  the  same  imaginary  existence.”  Then,  with 
a moderation  of  tone  which  made  the  arraignment 
all  the  more  impressive,  he  pointed  at  the  efforts 
made  to  alienate  the  minds  of  the  people  of  New 
England  from  the  Union. 

On  the  second  day  of  his  speech  he  discussed  the 
causes  of  the  war.  uThe  war  was  declared,”  he 
said,  “because  Great  Britain  arrogated  to  herself 
the  pretension  of  regulating  our  foreign  commerce, 
under  the  delusive  name  of  retaliatory  Orders  in 
Council;  because  she  persisted  in  the  practice  of 
impressing  American  seamen;  because  she  had 
instigated  the  Indians  to  commit  hostilities  against 
us ; and  because  she  refused  indemnity  for  her  past 
injuries  upon  our  commerce.  The  war,  in  fact, 
was  announced,  on  our  part,  to  meet  the  war  which 
she  was  waging  on  her  part.”  Why  not  declare 
war  against  France,  also,  for  the  injuries  she  in- 
flicted upon  American  commerce,  and  the  outrage- 
ous duplicity  of  her  conduct?  “I  will  concede  to 
gentlemen,”  he  said,  “ everything  they  ask  about 
the  injustice  of  France  toward  this  country.  I 
wish  to  God  that  our  ability  was  equal  to  our  dis- 
position to  make  her  feel  the  sense  that  we  enter- 
tain of  that  injustice.”  But  one  war  at  a time  was 
enough.  Great  Britain,  he  argued,  demanded 
more  than  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees  as  to 
America;  she  demanded  their  repeal  as  to  Great 
Britain  and  her  allies,  also,  before  giving  up  the 
Orders  in  Council;  and  she  gave  them  up  only  in 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


95 


consequence  of  an  inquiry,  reluctantly  consented 
to  by  the  ministry,  into  the  effect  of  our  non -im- 
portation law,  or  by  reason  of  our  warlike  atti- 
tude, or  both. 

But  now  came  the  ticklish  question:  Were  the 
Orders  in  Council  the  decisive  cause  of  the  war, 
and  should  their  withdrawal  end  it?  Does  it  fol- 
low, he  answered,  that  what  in  the  first  instance 
would  have  prevented  the  war  should  also  termi- 
nate it?  By  no  means.  The  war  of  the  Revolu- 
tion was  an  example,  begun  for  one  object  and 
prosecuted  for  another.  He  declared  that  he  had 
always  considered  the  impressment  of  American 
seamen  as  the  most  serious  aggression,  no  matter 
upon  what  principle  Great  Britain  defended  her 
policy.  “It  is  in  vain,”  he  said,  “to  set  up  the  plea 
of  necessity,  and  to  allege  that  she  cannot  exist 
without  the  impressment  of  her  seamen.  The 
naked  truth  is,  she  comes,  by  her  press-gangs,  on 
board  of  our  vessels,  seizes  our  native  as  well  as 
naturalized  seamen,  and  drags  them  into  her  ser- 
vice. It  is  wrong  that  we  should  be  held  to  prove 
the  nationality  of  our  seamen;  it  is  the  business  of 
Great  Britain  to  identify  her  subjects.  The  colors 
that  float  from  the  masthead  should  be  the  cre- 
dentials of  our  seamen.”  Then  he  put  forth  his 
whole  melodramatic  power,  drawing  tears  from  the 
eyes  of  his  listeners. 

“ It  is  impossible  that  this  country  should  ever  aban- 
don the  gallant  tars  who  have  won  for  us  such  splendid 
trophies.  Let  me  suppose  that  the  genius  of  Columbia 


96 


HENRY  CLAY 


should  visit  one  of  them  in  his  oppressor’s  prison,  and 
attempt  to  reconcile  him  to  his  forlorn  and  wretched 
condition.  She  would  say  to  him,  in  the  language  of 
gentlemen  on  the  other  side  : 4 Great  Britain  intends 
you  no  harm ; she  did  not  mean  to  impress  you,  but 
one  of  her  own  subjects.  Having  taken  you  by  mis- 
take, I will  remonstrate  and  try  to  prevail  upon  her,  by 
peaceable  means,  to  release  you  ; but  I cannot,  my  son, 
fight  for  you.’  If  he  did  not  consider  this  mockery,  the 
poor  tar  would  address  her  judgment  and  say  : ‘You 
owe  me,  my  country,  protection  ; I owe  you,  in  return, 
obedience.  I am  not  a British  subject ; I am  a native 
of  Massachusetts,  where  lives  my  aged  father,  my  wife, 
my  children.  I have  faithfully  discharged  my  duty. 
Will  you  refuse  to  do  yours  ? ’ Appealing  to  her  pas- 
sions, he  would  continue  : 4 I lost  this  eye  in  fighting 
under  Truxton  with  the  Insurgente  ; I got  this  scar  be- 
fore Tripoli ; I broke  this  leg  on  the  Constitution,  when 
the  Guerriere  struck.’  If  she  remained  still  unmoved, 
he  would  break  out,  in  the  accents  of  mingled  distress 
and  despair,  — 

4 Hard,  hard  is  my  fate ! Once  I freedom  enjoyed, 

Was  as  happy,  as  happy  could  be  ! 

Oh,  how  hard  is  my  fate,  how  galling  these  chains  ! ’ 

“ I will  not  imagine  the  dreadful  catastrophe  to  which 
he  would  be  driven  by  an  abandonment  of  him  to  his 
oppressor.  It  will  not  be,  it  cannot  be,  that  his  country 
will  refuse  him  protection  ! If  there  be  any  descrip- 
tion of  rights,  which,  more  than  any  other,  should  unite 
all  parties  in  all  quarters  of  the  Union,  it  is  unquestion- 
ably the  rights  of  the  person.  No  matter  what  his  voca- 
tion, whether  he  seeks  subsistence  amid  the  dangers  of 
the  sea,  or  draws  them  from  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  or 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


97 


from  the  humblest  occupations  of  mechanic  life,  where- 
ever  the  sacred  rights  of  an  American  freeman  are  as- 
sailed, all  hearts  ought  to  unite  and  every  arm  be  braced 
to  vindicate  his  cause.” 

After  this,  the  objections  to  the  invasion  of  Can- 
ada were  easily  disposed  of.  Canada  was  simply  a 
base  of  supplies  and  of  operations  for  the  British. 
Moreover,  “what  does  a state  of  war  present? 
The  united  energies  of  one  people  arrayed  against 
the  combined  energies  of  another;  a conflict  in 
which  each  party  aims  to  inflict  all  the  injury  it 
can,  by  sea  and  land,  upon  the  territories,  pro- 
perty, and  citizens  of  another,  subject  only  to  the 
rules  of  mitigated  war  practiced  by  civilized  na- 
tions.” This  was  his  final  appeal:  — 

“ The  administration  has  erred  in  the  steps  to  restore 
peace  ; but  its  error  has  not  been  in  doing  too  little,  but 
in  betraying  too  great  a solicitude  for  that  event.  An 
honorable  peace  is  attainable  only  by  an  efficient  war. 
My  plan  would  be,  to  call  out  the  ample  resources  of  the 
country,  give  them  a judicious  direction,  prosecute  the 
war  with  the  utmost  vigor,  strike  wherever  we  can  reach 
the  enemy,  at  sea  and  on  land,  and  negotiate  the  terms 
of  a peace  at  Quebec  or  at  Halifax.  We  are  told  that 
England  is  a proud  and  lofty  nation,  which,  disdaining 
to  wait  for  danger,  meets  it  half  way.  Haughty  as  she 
is,  we  once  triumphed  over  her,  and,  if  we  do  not  listen 
to  the  counsels  of  timidity  and  despair,  we  shall  again 
prevail.  In  such  a cause,  with  the  aid  of  Providence, 
we  must  come  out  crowned  with  success.  But  if  we 
fail,  let  us  fail  like  men,  lash  ourselves  to  our  gallant 


98 


HENRY  CLAY 


tars,  and  expire  together  in  one  common  struggle,  fight- 
ing for  Free  Trade  and  Seamen’s  Rights ! ” 

This  speech  produced  a profound  impression  in 
the  House.  What  became  known  of  it  outside 
rang  like  a bugle-call  all  over  the  country.  The 
increase  of  the  army  was  voted  by  Congress.  The 
war  spirit  rose  again  with  renewed  ardor.  But 
what  news  came  from  the  front?  In  the  West, 
General  Winchester  was  overpowered  at  French- 
town  on  February  22.  His  command  had  to  sur- 
render and  part  of  it  was  massacred.  General 
Harrison  found  himself  obliged  to  fall  back.  On 
the  Niagara  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  an  expedition 
was  pushed  forward,  which,  on  April  27,  resulted 
in  the  temporary  capture  of  York  (now  Toronto), 
but  no  lodgment  was  effected.  While  the  navy 
had  struck  some  splendid  blows,  the  British  grad- 
ually increased  their  force  and  made  the  superior- 
ity of  their  power  tell.  They  strengthened  their 
blockade  of  New  York,  of  the  Delaware,  and  the 
Chesapeake.  British  ships  ascended  the  bays  and 
the  rivers,  and  landed  parties  to  plunder  and  set 
fire  to  villages  on  the  banks.  Philadelphia,  Balti- 
more, and  Annapolis  became  alarmed  for  their 
safety.  In  Virginia,  a slave  insurrection  was 
feared.  The  port  of  Charleston  was  strictly  block- 
aded. 

Every  day  it  became  clearer,  too,  that  the  Madi- 
son administration  was  ill-fitted  for  times  of  great 
exigency.  The  war  and  navy  departments  were 
wretchedly  managed.  There  was  incapacity  above 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


99 


and  below.  The  Treasury  was  in  a state  of  ex- 
haustion. By  April  1,  the  requisitions  of  the  war 
and  navy  departments  must  have  gone  unsatisfied 
had  not  Astor,  Parish,  and  Girard,  three  rich  for- 
eigners, come  to  the  assistance  of  the  government. 
New  England  Federalism  grew  constantly  more 
threatening  in  its  hostility  to  the  war  policy.  In 
addition  to  all  this,  tidings  of  evil  import  arrived 
from  Europe.  Napoleon’s  disastrous  retreat  from 
Moscow  brought  forth  new  European  combinations 
against  him  in  aid  of  England.  More  and  more 
English  ships  and  English  veteran  regiments  might 
then  be  spared  from  the  European  theatre  of  war, 
to  be  hurled  against  the  United  States.  The  pro- 
spect of  dictating  a peace  at  Quebec  or  Halifax 
grew  exceedingly  dim. 

Just  then  a ray  of  peace  flashed  from  an  unex- 
pected quarter.  When,  late  in  the  summer  of 
1812,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  learned  that  the 
United  States  had  declared  war  against  Great 
Britain,  it  struck  him  as  very  inconvenient  that 
his  ally,  England,  should  be  embarrassed  by  this 
outside  affair  while  Napoleon  was  invading  Russia, 
and  while  a supreme  effort  seemed  to  be  required 
to  prevent  him  from  bringing  all  Europe  to  his 
feet.  Alexander  resolved  to  offer  himself  as  a 
mediator.  His  chancellor,  Romanzoff,  on  Sep- 
tember 21,  opened  the  matter  to  the  American 
minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
as  well  as  to  the  British  envoy.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Russian  minister  at  Washington,  Daschkoff, 


100 


HENRY  CLAY 


was  instructed  to  communicate  to  President  Madi- 
son the  emperor’s  wish.  This  he  did  in  March, 
1813,  a few  days  after  Madison’s  second  inaugu- 
ration. Madison  received  the  proposition  with 
exceeding  gladness.  Without  waiting  to  learn 
whether  this  Russian  mediation  was  acceptable  to 
England,  he  forthwith  nominated  as  ministers,  to 
act  jointly  with  John  Quincy  Adams  in  negotiat- 
ing a peace,  Albert  Gallatin,  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  and  Senator  Bayard  of  Delaware,  a pa- 
triotic Federalist  and  a man  of  excellent  abilities. 
They  sailed  for  St.  Petersburg  early  in  May,  and 
took  instructions  with  them  in  which  impressments 
and  illegal  blockades  were  designated  as  the  chief 
causes  of  the  war.  With  regard  to  the  impress- 
ment question,  the  instructions  said:  “If  this  en- 
croachment is  not  provided  against,  the  United 
States  have  appealed  to  arms  in  vain.  If  your 
efforts  to  accomplish  it  should  fail,  all  further 
negotiation  will  cease,  and  you  will  return  home 
without  delay.” 

The  envoys  reached  St.  Petersburg  in  July,  and 
learned  that  Great  Britain  was  not  inclined  to  ac- 
cept any  mediation.  The  haughty  mistress  of  the 
sea  would  not  submit  her  principles  of  blockade 
and  her  claim  to  the  right  of  impressment  and 
search  to  the  judgment  of  any  third  party.  She 
preferred  to  treat  with  the  United  States  directly ; 
and  when  the  Russian  offer  of  mediation  was  re- 
newed, the  British  government  sent  a proposal  of 
direct  negotiation  to  Washington.  This  was 


THE  WAR  OF  1812 


101 


promptly  accepted,  and  the  President  appointed 
for  that  purpose  a new  commission,  consisting  of 
John  Quincy  Adams,  Bayard,  Clay,  Jonathan 
Bussell,  then  minister  of  the  United  States  to 
Sweden,  and  Gallatin. 

Clay  had  again  been  elected  speaker,  in  May, 
1813,  when  the  new  Congress  met.  He  had  again 
done  all  he  could  to  “fire  the  national  heart,”  this 
time  by  a resolution  to  inquire  into  certain  acts  of 
barbarous  brutality  committed  by  the  British  and 
their  savage  allies  during  the  winter  and  spring. 
But  when  the  President  urged  upon  him  a place  in 
the  peace  commission,  he  accepted.  His  subse- 
quent conduct  permits  the  guess  that  his  motive 
in  accepting  it  was  his  anxious  desire  to  prevent 
a humiliating  peace.  On  January  14,  1814,  he 
resigned  the  speakership  of  the  House  of  Bepre- 
sentatives,  and  soon  afterward  he  set  out  on  one 
of  the  strangest  diplomatic  missions  of  our  time. 


CHAPTER  VI 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 

The  British  government,  when  offering  to  nego- 
tiate directly  with  the  United  States,  had  desig- 
nated London,  or  Gottenburg  in  Sweden,  as  the 
places  where  the  negotiators  might  meet.  Its  pur- 
pose was  to  isolate  the  United  States  as  much  as 
possible.  It  desired  to  be  left  alone  in  dealing 
with  the  Americans,  and  to  shut  out  all  influences 
friendly  to  them.  To  this  end,  London  and  Got- 
tenburg seemed  to  be  convenient  localities.  Fi- 
nally, however,  it  agreed  that  the  peace  commis- 
sioners should  meet  at  Ghent,  in  the  Netherlands. 
The  American  envoys  had  all  arrived  there  on  July 
6,  1814.  There  were  among  them  men  so  differ- 
ent in  point  of  character  and  habits  and  ways  of 
thinking,  that  to  make  them  agree  among  them- 
selves might  have  appeared  almost  as  difficult  as 
to  make  a satisfactory  treaty  with  England.  The 
principal  clash  was  between  Adams  and  Clay. 
John  Quincy  Adams  was  then  forty-seven  years 
old,  with  all  his  peculiarities  fully  matured,  — a 
man  of  great  ability,  various  knowledge,  and  large 
experience ; of  ardent  patriotism,  and  high  princi- 
ples of  honor  and  duty ; brimful  of  courage,  and  a 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


103 


pugnacious  spirit  of  contention;  precise  in  his 
ways;  stiff  and  cold  in  manners;  tenacious  of  his 
opinions;  irritable  of  temper;  inclined  to  be  sus- 
picious, and  harsh  in  his  judgments  of  others,  and, 
in  the  Puritan  spirit,  also  severe  with  himself;  one 
of  the  men  who  keep  diaries,  and  in  them  regular 
accounts  of  their  own  as  well  as  other  people’s 
doings.  Two  days  after  the  commissioners  had  all 
arrived  at  Ghent,  he  wrote  in  his  journal:  — 

“ I dined  again  at  the  table  d’hote  at  one.  The  other 
gentlemen  dined  together  at  four.  They  sit  after  din- 
ner, and  drink  bad  wine  and  smoke  cigars,  which  neither 
suits  my  habits  nor  my  health,  and  absorbs  time  which 
I can  ill  spare.  I find  it  impossible,  even  with  the  most 
rigorous  economy  of  time,  to  do  half  the  writing  that  I 
ought.” 

He  had  been  a Federalist,  but  his  patriotic  soul 
had  taken  fire  at  the  injuries  and  insults  his  coun- 
try had  suffered  from  Great  Britain.  For  this 
reason  he  had  broken  with  his  party,  exposed  him- 
self to  the  ill-will  of  his  neighbors,  and  supported 
Jefferson’s  and  Madison’s  administrations  in  their 
measures  of  resistance  to  British  pretensions. 

Clay  was  ten  years  younger  than  Adams,  cer- 
tainly no  less  enthusiastic  an  American  patriot, 
nor  less  spirited,  impulsive,  and  hot-tempered; 
having  already  acquired  something  of  that  im- 
periousness of  manner  which,  later  in  his  career, 
was  so  much  noticed ; quick  in  forming  opinions, 
and  impatient  of  opposition,  but  warm-hearted 
and  genial;  no  Puritan  at  all  in  his  ways;  rather 


104 


HENRY  CLAY 


inclined  to  “sit  after  dinner,”  whether  the  wine 
was  good  or  bad ; and,  while  willing  to  work,  also 
bent  on  having  his  full  share  of  the  enjoyments  of 
this  world.  “Just  before  rising,”  Adams  wrote  in 
his  Diary  one  day,  “I  heard  Mr.  Clay’s  company 
retiring  from  his  chamber.  I had  left  him  with 
Mr.  Russell,  Mr.  Bentzon,  and  Mr.  Todd,  at 
cards.  They  parted  as  I was  about  to  rise.” 
John  Quincy  Adams  played  cards,  too,  but  it  was 
that  solemn  whist,  which  he  sometimes  went 
through  with  the  conscientious  sense  of  performing 
a diplomatic  duty.  No  wonder  the  prim  New 
Englander  and  the  dashing  Kentuckian,  one  the 
representative  of  Eastern,  the  other  of  Western, 
ways  of  thinking,  when  they  had  struck  points  of 
disagreement,  would  drift  into  discussions  much 
more  animated  than  was  desirable  for  the  task  they 
had  in  common.  Russell,  a man  of  ordinary  abil- 
ity, was  much  under  the  influence  of  Clay,  while 
Bayard,  although  not  disposed  to  quarrel  with 
anybody,  showed  not  seldom  a disposition  to  stick 
to  his  opinion,  when  it  differed  from  those  of  his 
colleagues,  with  polite  but  stubborn  firmness. 
“Each  of  us,”  wrote  Mr.  Adams,  “takes  a sepa- 
rate and  distinct  view  of  the  subject-matter,  and 
each  naturally  thinks  his  own  view  of  it  the  most 
important.”  A commission  so  constituted  would 
hardly  have  been  fit  to  accomplish  a task  of  ex- 
traordinary delicacy,  had  it  not  been  for  the  con- 
spicuous ability,  the  exquisite  tact,  the  constant 
good-nature,  the  “playfulness  of  temper,”  as  Mr. 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


105 


Adams  expressed  it,  and  the  inexhaustible  patience 
of  Albert  Gallatin,  a man  whose  eminence  among 
his  contemporaries  has  probably  never  been  appre- 
ciated as  it  deserves.  Without  in  the  least  obtrud- 
ing himself,  he  soon  became  the  peacemaker,  the 
moderating  and  guiding  mind  of  the  commission. 

The  British  envoys,  who  arrived  at  Ghent  on 
August  6,  having  permitted  the  Americans  to  wait 
for  them  one  full  month,  were  Lord  Gambier,  a 
vice-admiral,  Henry  Goulburn,  secretary  in  the 
colonial  department,  and  Dr.  William  Adams,  an 
admiralty  lawyer,  men  not  remarkable  for  ability 
or  standing,  but  apparently  somewhat  inclined  to 
be  overbearing  in  conduct.  Indeed,  the  advan- 
tage of  position  was  altogether  on  their  side. 

Since  the  time  when  President  Madison  seized 
upon  the  Russian  offer  of  mediation,  in  March, 
1813,  the  fortunes  of  war  had  been  vacillating. 
The  Americans  had  made  a successful  expedition 
against  Fort  George,  and  the  British  had  been 
repulsed  at  Sackett’s  Harbor.  But  the  first  great 
naval  disaster  then  happened  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Chesapeake  by  the  Shannon  off  Boston  Light. 
New  naval  successes,  especially  Perry’s  splendid 
victory  on  Lake  Erie,  September  10,  1813,  re- 
lieved the  gloom.  General  Harrison  won  in  the 
fight  of  the  Thames,  in  which  Tecumseh  was  killed, 
on  October  5.  But  a winter  expedition  led  by 
Hampton  and  Wilkinson  against  Montreal  failed; 
Fort  Niagara  was  lost,  Black  Rock  and  Buffalo 
were  burned,  and  great  quantities  of  provisions 


106 


HENRY  CLAY 


and  stores  destroyed.  These  disasters  were  scarcely 
counterbalanced  by  General  Jackson’s  success 
against  the  Creeks  in  the  Southwest ; but  this  and 
the  recovery  of  Detroit  were  the  only  considerable 
advantages  gained  on  land  in  1813.  The  opening 
spring  brought  another  failure  of  an  expedition 
along  the  shore  of  Lake  Champlain  into  Canada 
under  Wilkinson.  The  blockade  was  constantly 
growing  more  rigid.  Not  a single  American  man- 
of-war  was  on  the  open  sea.  The  successful  fights 
at  Chippewa  and  Lundy’s  Lane,  and  then  the 
crowning  disgrace  of  the  capture  of  Washington, 
were  still  to  come.  Meanwhile  the  discontent  with 
the  war  prevailing  in  New  England,  which  was 
destined  to  culminate  in  the  Hartford  Convention, 
although  apparently  not  spreading,  continued  to 
be  active  and  to  threaten  rebellious  outbreaks. 
But  the  most  ominous  events  were  the  downfall  of 
Napoleon,  the  conclusion  of  peace  in  Europe,  and, 
in  consequence,  the  liberation  of  the  military, 
naval,  and  financial  resources  of  Great  Britain  for 
a vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  in  America. 
What  had  already  happened  was  only  child’s  play. 
The  really  serious  business  was  now  to  come.  The 
outlook  appeared,  therefore,  extremely  gloomy. 
While  on  his  way  to  Ghent,  Gallatin  had  spent 
some  time  in  London,  and  had  earnestly  tried 
there  to  interest,  in  behalf  of  the  United  States, 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  who  was  on  a visit  to  his 
English  ally.  That  effort,  too,  had  failed.  The 
United  States  were  without  an  active  friend. 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


107 


Most  of  these  things  had  become  known,  not 
only  to  the  Americans,  but  also  to  the  British  com- 
missioners. These  gentlemen  were,  therefore,  nat- 
urally inclined  to  treat  the  United  States  as  a de- 
feated enemy  suing  for  peace.  At  the  opening  of 
the  negotiation  the  British  demanded  as  a sine  qua 
non  that  a large  territory  in  the  United  States,  all 
the  country  now  occupied  by  the  States  of  Michi- 
gan, Illinois,  and  Wisconsin,  the  larger  part  of 
Indiana,  and  about  one  third  of  Ohio,  should  be 
set  apart  for  the  Indians,  to  constitute  a sort  of 
Indian  sovereignty  under  British  guaranty,  not  to 
be  purchased  from  the  Indians  by  the  United 
States,  and  to  serve  as  a “buffer,”  a perpetual 
protection  of  the  British  possessions  against 
American  ambition.  They  demanded  also  that  the 
United  States  should  relinquish  the  right  of  keep- 
ing any  armed  vessels  on  the  Great  Lakes ; and,  in 
addition  to  all  this,  they  asked  for  the  cession  of 
a piece  of  Maine  in  order  to  make  a road  from 
Halifax  to  Quebec,  and  for  a formal  renewal  of 
the  provision  of  the  treaty  of  1783  giving  English 
subjects  the  right  of  navigating  the  Mississippi. 

This  meant  almost  a surrender  of  American 
independence.  It  was  the  extreme  of  humiliation. 
That  such  a proposition  could  be  thought  of  was 
a most  painful  shock  to  the  American  envoys. 
All  they  could  do  was  promptly  to  reject  the  sine 
qua  non , and  then  think  of  going  home.  This 
they  did.  They  not  only  thought  of  going  home, 
but  they  openly  spoke  of  it.  The  British  commis- 


108 


HENRY  CLAY 


sioners  received  the  impression,  and  reported  it 
to  their  government,  that  the  Americans  were  very- 
much  in  earnest,  and  that  what  they  really  desired 
was  not  to  make  peace,  but  to  put  things  in  an 
aspect  calculated  to  unite  their  people  at  home  in 
favor  of  the  war.  Then  something  of  decisive 
importance  happened  behind  the  scenes,  which, 
no  doubt,  the  Americans  would  have  been  glad  to 
know.  The  leading  statesmen  in  England  were 
not  at  all  anxious  to  break  off  negotiations,  espe- 
cially not  upon  points  a final  rupture  on  which 
might  have  “made  the  war  popular  in  America.’’ 
In  fact,  as  Lord  Liverpool  wrote  to  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  they  were  apprehensive  that  then  the  war 
would  be  a long  affair;  that  “some  of  their  Euro- 
pean allies  would  not  be  indisposed  to  favor  the 
Americans,”  meaning  especially  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  and  that  this  American  business  would 
“entail  upon  them  prodigious  expense.”  They 
did  not  desire  to  have  it  said  that  “the  property 
tax  was  continued  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a 
better  frontier  for  Canada.”  Besides,  the  state 
of  the  negotiations  at  the  Vienna  Congress  was 
“unsatisfactory;”  the  situation  of  the  interior  of 
France  was  “alarming;  ” the  English  people  were 
tired  of  war  taxes.  Was  it  not  more  prudent  after 
all  to  let  the  Americans  off  without  a cession  of 
territory?  The  Duke  of  Wellington  was  consulted; 
he  emphatically  expressed  himself  against  any 
territorial  or  other  demand  which  would  “afford 
the  Americans  a proper  and  creditable  ground” 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


109 


for  declining  to  make  peace.  The  British  commis- 
sioners were  instructed  accordingly. 

Of  this  the  Americans  were,  of  course,  ignorant. 
Only  Clay  felt  it  intuitively.  According  to  Mr. 
Adams’s  Diary,  Clay  had  “an  inconceivable  idea 
that  they  will  recede  from  the  ground  they  have 
taken.”  That  is  to  say,  he  had  the  instinct  of  the 
situation.  The  British  dropped  their  sine  qua  non ; 
they  gave  up  a proposition  which  they  made  to 
treat  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis , each  nation  to 
hold  what  it  possessed  or  occupied  at  the  time  of 
signing  the  treaty ; they  finally  showed  themselves 
willing  to  accept  the  American  proposition  of  the 
status  ante  helium  as  a basis  for  the  final  arrange- 
ment. But  one  thing  they  would  not  do:  they 
would  not  listen  to  anything  about  stipulations 
touching  principles  of  blockade,  rights  of  neutrals, 
impressment  and  right  of  search,  concerning  which 
the  Americans  insisted  upon  submitting  the  draft 
of  an  article.  This  they  declined  so  peremptorily 
that  all  further  discussion  seemed  useless.  What, 
then,  became  of  “Free  Trade  and  Seamen’s 
Bights?”  What  of  the  original  instruction  that 
the  commissioners  should  break  off  forthwith  and 
come  home  if  they  failed  in  obtaining  a concession 
with  regard  to  impressment?  President  Madison 
had  in  the  mean  time  reconsidered  the  matter  and 
sent  further  instructions  authorizing  them  to  treat 
on  the  basis  of  the  status  ante  helium , — substan- 
tially, to  restore  things  to  the  state  in  which  the 
war  had  found  them.  Not  a proud  thing  to  do, 


110 


HENRY  CLAY 


but  better,  he  thought,  than  to  go  on  with  such  a 
war. 

When  the  British  accepted  this  basis,  and  the 
Americans  gave  up  their  contention  for  definite 
stipulations  concerning  the  principles  of  blockade 
and  the  impressment  question,  the  peace  was  vir- 
tually assured.  Only  matters  of  detail  had  to  be 
agreed  upon,  which,  if  both  parties  sincerely  de- 
sired peace,  would  not  be  difficult.  But  confused 
and  apparently  interminable  wrangles  sprang  up 
concerning  the  definition  of  the  status  ante  helium , 
mainly  with  regard  to  the  British  right  to  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  and  the  American  right 
to  fish  in  British  waters,  which  had  been  coupled 
together  in  the  first  treaty  of  peace,  in  1783,  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The 
British  commissioners  now  insisted  upon  the  Brit- 
ish right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  but  proposed 
to  put  an  end  to  the  American  right  to  the  fish- 
eries. It  is  needless  to  recount  in  detail  the  pro- 
positions and  counter-propositions  which  passed 
between  the  two  parties  upon  this  point,  as  well 
as  the  furious  altercations  in  the  American  com- 
mission between  Clay  and  Adams,  taxing  to  the  ut- 
most Gallatin’s  resources  as  a peacemaker;  Clay 
insisting  that  a renewal  of  the  right  of  the  British 
to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  which  had  been  con- 
ceded in  the  treaty  of  1783,  and  again  in  Jay’s 
treaty  of  1794,  when  Spain  held  the  whole  of  the 
right  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  with  part  of  the  left, 
and  the  British  dominions  were  erroneously  sup- 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


111 


posed  to  touch  on  the  head-waters  of  the  great 
river,  would  be  giving  them  a privilege  far  more 
important  than  we  should  secure  in  return,  as  the 
fisheries  were  “a  matter  of  trifling  moment;  ” and 
Adams  maintaining  with  equal  heat  that  the  fish- 
eries were  a thing  of  great  value,  while  the  privi- 
lege to  navigate  the  Mississippi  enjoyed  by  the 
British  under  the  treaty  of  1783  had  never  led  to 
any  trouble  or  inconvenience.  At  last,  after  these 
long  and  angry  discussions,  after  much  sending  of 
notes  and  replies,  in  which  the  American  envoys 
displayed  great  skill  in  argument,  and  after  re- 
peated references  of  the  disputed  points  by  the 
British  commissioners  to  the  Foreign  Office  in 
London  and  long  waiting  for  answers,  the  British 
government  declared  that  it  was  willing  to  accept 
a treaty  silent  on  both  subjects,  the  fisheries  as 
well  as  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  This 
declaration  reached  the  American  commissioners 
December  22,  1814,  and  with  it  the  last  obstacle 
to  a final  agreement  was  removed.  It  appeared 
that  the  British  government  had  become  fully  as 
anxious  for  peace  as  the  American.  Clay  adhered 
to  his  first  impressions  in  this  respect  throughout 
the  negotiation ; for  ten  days  before,  on  December 
12,  when  other  members  of  the  commission  still 
suspected  the  British  of  seeking  an  occasion  for 
breaking  off,  Adams  wrote  in  his  Diary : “ Mr.  Clay 
was  so  confident  that  the  British  government  had 
resolved  upon  peace,  that  he  said  he  would  give 
himself  as  a hostage  and  a victim  to  be  sacrificed 


112 


HENRY  CLAY 


if  they  broke  off  on  these  points.”  There  is  rea- 
son to  believe  that  he  would  not  have  been  sorry 
if  they  had  broken  off. 

The  treaty  was  signed  on  December  24,  1814. 
It  may  well  be  imagined  that  the  American  com- 
missioners heaved  a sigh  of  relief,  all,  at  least, 
except  Clay.  For  five  weary  months  they  had 
been  fighting  from  point  to  point  a foe  who  seemed 
to  have  all  the  advantages  of  strength  and  position, 
and  all  the  while  they  had  been  in  constant  appre- 
hension that  any  hour  might  bring  more  evil  news 
to  destroy  the  fruit  of  their  anxious  labors.  With 
dignity  but  not  without  impatience  they  had  borne 
the  gruffness  with  which  the  English  commission- 
ers had  frequently  thought  proper  to  emphasize 
the  superiority  of  the  power  behind  them.  Like 
brave  men  they  had  gone  through  the  dinners  with 
their  British  colleagues,  the  ghastly  humor  of  which 
during  the  first  period  of  the  negotiation  consisted 
in  cheerful  conversations  about  the  impossibility 
of  agreeing,  the  short  and  fruitless  visit  of  the 
American  commissioners  to  Europe,  their  speedy 
return  home,  and  so  on.  Then  finally  the  alterca- 
tions among  themselves,  which  grew  warmer  as 
the  negotiation  proceeded,  had  made  it  appear 
doubtful  more  than  once  whether  they  would  be 
able  to  present  a united  front  upon  all  the  impor- 
tant points.  In  these  altercations  Clay  had  ap- 
peared especially  fretful,  constantly  dissatisfied, 
and  ungovernable.  Adams’s  Diary  teems  with 
significant  remarks  about  Clay  “ waxing  loud  and 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


113 


warm;”  about  his  “ great  heat  and  anger;”  how 
“Mr.  Clay  lost  his  temper,  as  he  generally  does 
whenever  the  right  of  the  British  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi  is  discussed;”  how  “Mr.  Clay,  who 
was  determined  to  foresee  no  public  misfortune  in 
our  affairs,  bears  them  with  less  temper,  now  they 
have  come,  than  any  of  us;  he  rails  at  commerce 
and  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  and  tells  us  what 
wonders  the  people  of  Kentucky  would  do  if  they 
should  be  attacked;  ” how  “Mr.  Clay  is  growing 
peevish  and  fractious,”  — and,  recollecting  him- 
self, Adams  contritely  adds : “ I too  must  not  for- 
get to  keep  guard  on  my  temper.”  At  the  very 
last,  just  before  separating,  Adams  and  Clay  quar- 
reled about  the  custody  of  the  papers,  in  language 
bordering  upon  the  unparliamentary.  But  for  the 
consummate  tact  and  the  authority  of  Gallatin  the 
commission  would  not  seldom  have  been  in  danger 
of  breaking  up  in  heated  controversy. 

The  complaints  about  Clay’s  ill-tempered  moods 
were  undoubtedly  well  founded.  Always  some- 
what inclined  to  be  dictatorial  and  impatient  of 
opposition,  he  had  on  this  occasion  especial  reason 
for  being  ill  at  ease.  He,  more  than  any  one  else, 
had  made  the  war.  He  had  advised  the  invasion 
of  Canada,  and  predicted  an  easy  conquest.  He 
had  confidently  spoken  of  dictating  a peace  at 
Quebec  or  Halifax.  He  had,  after  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Orders  in  Council,  insisted  that  the  matter 
of  impressment  alone  was  sufficient  reason  for  war. 
He  had  pledged  the  honor  of  the  country  for  the 


114 


HENRY  CLAY 


maintenance  of  the  cause  of  “Free  Trade  and  Sea- 
men’s Rights.”  Now  to  make  a peace  which  was 
not  only  not  dictated  at  Quebec  or  Halifax,  but 
looked  rather  like  a generous  concession  on  the 
part  of  a victorious  enemy;  to  make  peace  while 
disgraceful  defeats  of  the  American  arms,  among 
them  the  capture  of  the  seat  of  government  and 
the  burning  of  the  Capitol,  were  still  unavenged, 
and  while,  after  some  brilliant  exploits,  the  Ameri- 
can navy  was  virtually  shut  up  in  American  har- 
bors by  British  blockading  squadrons;  a peace 
based  upon  the  status  ante  helium , without  even 
an  allusion  to  the  things  that  had  been  fought  for, 

— in  one  word,  a peace,  which,  whatever  its  merits 
and  advantages,  was  certainly  not  a glorious  peace, 

— this  could  not  but  be  an  almost  unendurable 
thought  to  the  man  who,  above  all  things,  wanted 
to  be  proud  of  his  country. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that,  during 
these  five  weary  months  of  negotiation,  Clay  should 
have  been  constantly  tormented  by  the  perhaps 
half-unconscious  desire  to  secure  to  his  country 
another  chance  to  retrieve  its  fortunes  and  restore 
its  glory  on  the  field  of  war,  and,  to  that  end,  to 
break  off  negotiations  on  some  point  that  would 
rouse  and  rally  the  American  people.  Thus  we 
find  that,  according  to  Adams,  on  October  31, 
when  complaint  was  made  of  the  delays  of  the 
British  government  in  furnishing  passports  for 
vessels  to  carry  the  dispatches  of  the  American 
commissioners,  “Mr.  Clay  was  for  making  a strong 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


115 


remonstrance  on  the  subject,  and  for  breaking  off 
the  negotiation  upon  that  point,  if  they  did  not 
give  us  satisfaction.”  A passport  arrived  the 
same  day,  rendering  the  remonstrance  unnecessary. 
When  the  negotiation  had  gone  on  for  three  months 
and  it  was  perfectly  well  understood  that  the  Brit- 
ish would  not  listen  at  all  to  any  proposition  con- 
cerning impressment,  Clay,  who  alone  had  pressed 
this  subject,  was  again  “so  urgent  to  present  an 
article”  on  impressment  that  Mr.  Adams  “acqui- 
esced in  his  wishes;”  the  article  was  presented 
and  rejected  by  the  British  at  once.  Less  than 
two  weeks  before  the  final  agreement,  discussing 
the  question  of  the  fisheries  and  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  in  the  commission,  Clay  broke  out, 
saying,  “he  was  for  a war  three  years  longer;  he 
had  no  doubt  three  years  more  of  war  would  make 
us  a warlike  people,  and  that  then  we  should  come 
out  of  the  war  with  honor,  — whereas  at  present, 
even  upon  the  best  terms  we  could  possibly  obtain, 
we  shall  have  only  a half -formed  army,  and  half 
retrieve  our  military  reputation.”  His  agony  grew 
as  an  agreement  was  approached,  and  culminated 
two  days  before  the  treaty  was  signed,  when  the 
British  note  on  the  fisheries  and  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  had  been  received,  which  seemed 
to  make  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  certain.  “Mr. 
Clay  came  to  my  chamber  ” (writes  Mr.  Adams), 
“and  on  reading  the  British  note  manifested  some 
chagrin.  He  still  talked  of  breaking  off  the  nego- 
tiation, but  he  did  not  exactly  disclose  the  motive 


116 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  his  ill-humor,  which  was,  however,  easily  seen 
through.  In  the  evening  we  met,  and  Mr.  Clay 
continued  in  his  discontented  humor.  He  was  for 
taking  time  to  deliberate  upon  the  British  note. 
He  was  for  meeting  about  it  to-morrow  morning. 
He  was  sounding  all  round  for  support  in  making 
another  stand  of  resistance  at  this  stage  of  the 
business.  At  last  he  turned  to  me  and  asked  me 
whether  I would  not  join  him  now  and  break  off 
the  negotiation.  I told  him,  No,  there  was  no- 
thing now  to  break  off  on.” 

Only  then  he  gave  it  up,  and  with  a heavy  heart 
he  consented  to  sign  the  treaty  of  peace.  The 
treaty  provided  that  hostilities  should  cease  imme- 
diately upon  its  ratification.  It  further  stipulated 
for  a mutual  restoration  of  territory  (except  some 
small  disputed  islands),  of  property,  archives,  etc. ; 
a mutual  restoration  of  prisoners  of  war;  a com- 
mission to  settle  boundary  questions,  those  ques- 
tions, if  the  commission  should  disagree,  to  be 
submitted  to  some  friendly  government  for  arbi- 
tration; cessation  of  Indian  hostilities,  each  party 
to  restore  the  Indians  with  whom  they  were  still 
at  war  to  all  possessions  and  rights  they  enjoyed 
in  1811;  compensation  for  slaves  abducted  by 
British  forces;  a promise  by  both  governments  to 
promote  the  entire  abolition  of  the  slave  trade; 
but  not  a word  to  indicate  what  the  British  and 
the  Americans  had  been  fighting  about. 

Thus  ended  the  war  of  1812,  on  paper;  in  real- 
ity, it  went  on  until  the  news  of  the  peace  arrived 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


117 


in  America.  It  stands  as  one  of  the  most  singular 
wars  in  history.  It  was  begun  on  account  of  out- 
rages committed  upon  the  maritime  commerce  of 
the  United  States;  but  those  parts  of  the  country 
which  had  least  to  do  with  that  maritime  com- 
merce, the  South  and  West,  were  most  in  favor  of 
the  war,  while  those  whose  fortunes  were  on  the 
sea  most  earnestly  opposed  it.  Considering  that  the 
conduct  of  Napoleon  toward  the  United  States  had 
been  in  some  respects  more  outrageous,  certainly 
more  perfidious  and  insulting,  than  the  conduct  of 
Great  Britain,  it  might  be  questioned  whether  the 
war  was  not  waged  against  the  wrong  party.  As 
a matter  of  fact  the  Orders  in  Council  furnished 
the  principal  cause  of  the  war.  That  principal 
cause  happened  to  disappear  at  the  same  time  that 
the  war  was  declared.  Hostilities  were  continued 
on  a secondary  issue.  But  when  peace  was  made, 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other  was  by  so  much  as 
a single  word  alluded  to  in  the  treaty.  To  cap 
the  climax,  the  principal  battle  of  the  war,  the 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  was  fought  after  the  peace 
had  been  signed,  but  before  it  had  become  known 
in  America.  It  is  questionable  whether  such  a 
peace  would  have  been  signed  at  all,  had  that 
battle  happened  at  an  earlier  period.  While  the 
peace,  as  to  the  United  States,  was  not  one  which 
a victorious  power  would  make,  the  closing  tri- 
umph in  America  had  given  to  the  American  arms 
a prestige  they  had  never  possessed  before. 

Neither  was  the  reception  the  treaty  met  with 


118 


HENRY  CLAY 


in  accord  with  the  fears  of  the  American,  or  the 
hopes  of  the  British  commissioners.  While  the 
leading  statesmen  of  England  congratulated  one 
another,  as  Lord  Castlereagli,  writing  from  Vienna, 
expressed  it  in  a letter  to  Lord  Liverpool,  upon 
being  “ released  from  the  millstone  of  an  American 
war,”  the  war  party  in  England,  who  wanted  to 
“punish”  the  impudence  of  the  United  States, 
were  deeply  mortified.  They  would  not  admit 
that  the  peace  on  the  British  side  was  an  “hon- 
orable” one,  since  England  had  failed  to  “force 
her  principles  on  America,”  and  had  retired  from 
the  contest  with  some  defeats  unavenged.  In  the 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  where  some  of 
the  American  envoys,  especially  Clay,  had  feared 
their  work  would  find  very  little  favor,  the  news 
of  peace  was  received  with  transports  of  joy.  To 
the  American  people  it  came  after  the  victory  of 
New  Orleans;  and  their  national  pride,  relieved 
of  the  terrible  anxieties  of  the  last  two  years,  and 
elated  at  the  great  closing  triumph  on  the  field  of 
battle,  which  seemed  to  wipe  out  all  the  shame  of 
previous  defeats,  was  content  not  to  look  too  closely 
at  the  articles  of  the  treaty.  Indeed,  the  Ameri- 
can commissioners  received,  for  what  they  had 
done,  the  praise  of  all  their  fellow  citizens  who 
were  unbiased  by  party  feeling,  — praise,  which, 
taking  into  account  the  perplexities  of  their  situa- 
tion, they  well  deserved.  With  no  decisive  victo- 
ries on  their  side  to  boast  of,  with  no  well-organ- 
ized armies  to  support  their  pretensions,  with  no 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


119 


national  ships  on  the  high  seas,  with  the  capture 
of  Washington,  the  burning  of  the  Capitol,  and 
the  hurried  flight  of  the  President  still  a favorite 
theme  of  jest  at  the  dinner-tables  and  in  the  clubs 
all  over  Europe,  they  had  to  confront  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  haughtiest,  and,  in  some  respects, 
the  strongest  power  on  earth.  If  it  was  true  that 
they  had  not  succeeded  in  forcing  the  British  for- 
mally to  renounce  the  right  of  impressment  and  to 
accept  just  principles  of  blockade  and  of  neutral 
rights,  it  was  also  true  that  the  British  had  begun 
the  negotiation  with  extravagant,  humiliating,  per- 
emptory demands,  presenting  them  in  the  most 
overbearing  manner  as  sine  qua  non ; that  they 
had  found  themselves  obliged  to  drop  these  one 
after  another;  that  in  the  discussion  about  the 
fisheries  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  they 
had  been  dislodged  from  position  after  position, 
until  finally  they  accepted  a treaty  which  stood  in 
strange  contrast  to  their  original  attitude.  The 
American  commissioners  had  the  satisfaction  of 
hearing  the  Marquis  of  Wellesley  declare  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  that  “in  his  opinion  they  had 
shown  a most  astonishing  superiority  over  the 
British  during  the  whole  of  the  correspondence.” 
However  reluctantly  Clay  had  signed  the  peace, 
his  proud  patriotic  heart  became  reconciled  to  it 
as  the  general  effects  of  all  that  had  been  done 
disclosed  themselves.  These  effects  were  indeed 
very  great,  and  he  had  reason  to  be  satisfied  with 
them.  The  question  has  been  much  discussed, 


120 


HENRY  CLAY 


whether  there  was  any  statesmanship,  any  good 
sense,  in  making  the  war  of  1812  at  all.  It  is 
true  that  it  was  resolved  upon  without  preparation, 
and  that  it  was  wretchedly  managed.  But  if  war 
is  ever  justified,  there  was  ample  provocation  for 
it.  The  legitimate  interests  of  the  United  States 
had  been  trampled  upon  by  the  belligerent  powers, 
as  if  entitled  to  no  respect.  The  American  flag 
had  been  treated  with  a contempt  scarcely  con- 
ceivable now.  The  question  was  whether  the 
American  people  should  permit  themselves  not 
only  to  be  robbed,  and  maltreated,  and  insulted, 
but  also  to  be  despised,  — all  this  for  the  privilege 
of  picking  up  the  poor  crumbs  of  trade  which  the 
great  powers  of  Europe  would  still  let  them  have. 
When  a nation  knowingly  and  willingly  accepts 
the  contempt  of  others,  it  is  in  danger  of  losing 
also  its  respect  for  itself.  Against  this  the  na- 
tional pride  of  Young  America  rose  in  revolt. 
When  insulted  too  grievously,  it  felt  an  irresisti- 
ble impulse  to  strike.  It  struck  wildly,  to  be  sure, 
and  received  ugly  blows  in  return.  But  it  proved, 
after  all,  that  this  young  democracy  could  not  be 
trampled  upon  with  impunity,  that  it  felt  an  insult 
as  keenly  as  older  nations,  and  that  it  was  capable 
of  risking  a fight  with  the  most  formidable  power 
on  earth  in  resenting  it.  It  proved,  too,  that  this 
most  formidable  power  might  find  in  the  young 
democracy  a very  uncomfortable  antagonist. 

If  the  warlike  impulse  in  this  case  was  mere 
sentiment,  as  has  been  said,  it  was  a statesmanlike 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


121 


sentiment.  For  the  war  of  1812,  with  all  the 
losses  in  blood  and  treasure  entailed  by  it,  and  in 
spite  of  the  peace  which  ignored  the  declared 
causes  of  the  war,  transformed  the  American  re- 
public in  the  estimation  of  the  world  from  a feeble 
experimental  curiosity  into  a power,  — a real  power, 
full  of  brains,  and  with  visible  claws  and  teeth.  It 
made  the  American  people,  who  had  so  far  con- 
sisted of  the  peoples  of  so  many  little  common- 
wealths, not  seldom  wondering  whether  they  could 
profitably  stay  long  together,  a consciously  united 
nation,  with  a common  country,  a great  country, 
worth  fighting  for;  and  a common  national  de- 
stiny, nobody  could  say  how  great ; and  a common 
national  pride,  at  that  time  filling  every  American 
heart  brimful.  The  war  had  encountered  the  first 
practical  disunion  movement,  and  killed  it  by  ex- 
posing it  to  the  execration  of  the  true  American 
feeling;  killed  it  so  dead,  at  least  on  its  field  of 
action,  in  New  England,  that  a similar  aspiration 
has  never  arisen  there  again.  The  war  put  an 
end  to  the  last  remnant  of  colonial  feeling;  for 
from  that  time  forward  there  was  no  longer  any 
French  party  or  any  English  party  in  the  United 
States ; it  was  thenceforth  all  American  as  against 
the  world.  A war  that  had  such  results  was  not 
fought  in  vain. 

Clay  might,  therefore,  well  say,  as  he  did  say  a 
year  later  in  a debate  in  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives : — 

“ I gave  a vote  for  the  declaration  of  war.  I exerted 


122 


HENRY  CLAY 


all  the  little  influence  and  talent  I could  command  to 
make  the  war.  The  war  was  made.  It  is  terminated. 
And  I declare,  with  perfect  sincerity,  if  it  had  been  per- 
mitted to  me  to  lift  the  veil  of  futurity,  and  to  foresee 
the  precise  series  of  events  which  has  occurred,  my  vote 
would  have  been  unchanged.  We  had  been  insulted, 
and  outraged,  and  spoliated  upon  by  almost  all  Europe, 
— by  Great  Britain,  by  France,  Spain,  Denmark,  Na- 
ples, and,  to  cap  the  climax,  by  the  little  contemptible 
power  of  Algiers.  We  had  submitted  too  long  and  too 
much.  We  had  become  the  scorn  of  foreign  powers, 
and  the  derision  of  our  own  citizens.  What  have  we 
gained  by  the  war  ? Let  any  man  look  at  the  degraded 
condition  of  this  country  before  the  war,  the  scorn  of 
the  universe,  the  contempt  of  ourselves  ; and  tell  me  if 
we  have  gained  nothing  by  the  war  ? What  is  our  sit- 
uation now  ? Respectability  and  character  abroad,  se- 
curity and  confidence  at  home.” 

All  this  was  true;  but  he  was  very  far  from 
foreseeing  such  happy  results  at  the  time  when  he 
put  his  name  to  the  treaty  of  peace.  To  him  it 
seemed  then  a “ damned  bad  treaty,”  and  his  mind 
was  restless  with  dark  forebodings  as  to  its  effect 
upon  the  character  of  his  country  and  his  own 
standing  as  a public  man. 

But  the  sojourn  in  Ghent  was  after  all  by  no 
means  all  gloom  to  his  buoyant  nature.  He  had 
found  things  to  enjoy.  The  American  commis- 
sioners were  most  hospitably  received  by  the  au- 
thorities and  the  polite  burghers  of  Ghent.  Public 
and  private  entertainments  in  their  honor  crowded 
one  another,  and  they  enjoyed  them.  Even  Mr. 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


123 


Adams  enjoyed  them,  he,  however,  not  without 
characteristic  remorse,  for  thus  he  castigates  him- 
self in  his  Diary : u There  are  several  particulars  in 
my  present  mode  of  life  in  which  there  is  too  much 
relaxation  of  self-discipline.  I have  this  month 
frequented  too  much  the  theatre  and  other  public 
amusements;  indulged  too  much  conviviality,  and 
taken  too  little  exercise.  The  consequence  is  that 
I am  growing  corpulent,  and  that  industry  becomes 
irksome  to  me.  May  I be  cautious  not  to  fall  into 
any  habit  of  indolence  or  dissipation!”  Clay’s 
temperament,  no  doubt,  enabled  him  to  bear  such 
pleasures  with  more  fortitude  and  less  apprehen- 
sion of  dire  consequences.  There  was  no  twinge 
of  self-reproach  in  his  mind,  and  later  in  life  he 
often  spoke  of  the  days  of  Ghent  with  great  satis- 
faction. He  would  certainly  have  enjoyed  them 
still  more,  had  he  at  the  time  looked  farther  into 
the  future. 

The  diplomatic  business  at  Ghent  completed, 
Clay,  in  conjunction  with  Adams  and  Gallatin, 
was  instructed  to  go  to  London  for  the  purpose  of 
negotiating  a treaty  of  commerce.  He  did  not, 
however,  make  haste  to  present  himself  in  Eng- 
land, for  there  was  still  a feeling  weighing  upon 
his  mind,  as  if,  after  the  many  defeats  in  America 
and  the  to  him  unsatisfactory  peace,  he  would  not 
like  to  be  in  the  land  of  a triumphant  enemy.  So 
he  lingered  in  Paris.  But  as  soon  as  he  heard  of 
the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  he  was  ready  to  start. 
“Now,”  said  he  to  the  bearer  of  the  news,  “now 


124 


HENRY  CLAY 


I can  go  to  England  without  mortification.”  While 
in  Paris  he  was  introduced  to  the  polite  society  of 
the  French  capital.  A clever  saying  is  reported 
of  him  in  a conversation  with  Madame  de  Stael: 
“I  have  been  in  England,”  said  she,  “and  have 
been  battling  for  your  cause  there.  They  were  so 
much  enraged  against  you  that  at  one  time  they 
thought  seriously  of  sending  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton to  lead  their  armies  against  you.”  “I  am  very 
sorry,”  replied  Mr.  Clay,  “that  they  did  not  send 
the  duke.”  “And  why?”  “Because  if  he  had 
beaten  us,  we  should  but  have  been  in  the  condi- 
tion of  Europe,  without  disgrace.  But  if  we  had 
been  so  fortunate  as  to  defeat  him,  we  should  have 
greatly  added  to  the  renown  of  our  arms.” 

He  arrived  in  London  in  March  and  went  to 
work  with  Gallatin  to  open  the  negotiation  in- 
trusted to  them.  Mr.  Adams  did  not  follow  them 
until  May.  They  met  again,  as  British  commis- 
sioners, Goulburn  and  Dr.  Adams.  Mr.  Robin- 
son, afterwards  Lord  Goderich  and  Earl  Ripon, 
then  vice-president  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  were 
substituted  for  Lord  Gambier.  The  negotiation 
lasted  three  months;  it  was  friendly  in  character, 
but  resulted  in  very  little.  The  British  govern- 
ment declined  to  open  the  questions  of  impress- 
ment, blockade,  trade  with  enemies’  colonies  in 
time  of  war,  West  Indian  and  Canadian  trade; 
nothing  of  value  was  obtained  save  some  advan- 
tages in  the  commerce  with  the  East  Indies,  and 
a provision  abolishing  discriminating  duties. 


GHENT  AND  LONDON 


125 


Clay  arrived  in  the  United  States  again  in  Sep- 
tember, 1815,  and  was  duly  received  and  feasted 
by  his  friends  and  admirers.  The  people  of  the 
Lexington  district  in  Kentucky  had  in  the  mean 
time  reelected  him  to  the  national  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 


CHAPTER  VII 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

Before  Clay  left  Lexington  to  take  his  seat  in 
Congress,  he  received  a letter  from  the  secretary 
of  state,  James  Monroe,  offering  him  the  mission 
to  Russia.  He  declined  it.  He  was  evidently 
resolved  to  remain  in  Congress  while  Madison  was 
president,  for  when,  less  than  a year  later,  in 
August,  1816,  Madison  invited  him  to  a place  in 
his  cabinet  as  secretary  of  war,  his  answer  was 
still  a refusal. 

On  the  first  day  of  the  session,  December  4, 
1815,  Clay  was  again  elected  speaker.  In  both 
Houses  the  Republicans  had  strong  majorities;  in 
the  Senate  twenty -two.  against  fourteen  Federal- 
ists, and  in  the  House  of  Representatives  one  hun- 
dred and  seventeen  against  sixty -five.  But  the 
Federalists,  as  a party  contending  for  power,  were 
weaker  even  than  these  numbers  indicated.  There 
is  no  heavier  burden  for  a political  party  to  bear, 
than  to  have  appeared  unpatriotic  in  time  of 
war.  The  Federal  party  went  down  under  this 
load  at  a period  when  its  principles  were,  one  after 
another,  unconsciously  adopted  by  its  victorious 
opponents. 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  127 


The  Republicanism  left  behind  by  the  war  of 
1812  was  no  longer  the  Republicanism  of  frugal 
economy,  simple,  unpretentious,  narrowly  circum- 
scribed government,  and  peace  and  friendship  with 
all  the  world,  which  the  famous  triumvirate,  Jef- 
ferson, Madison,  and  Gallatin,  had  set  out  with  in 
1801,  and  which  was  the  political  ideal  of  bucolic 
democracy.  The  rough  jostle  with  the  strong 
powers  of  the  external  world  had  made  sad  havoc 
of  the  idyl.  Instead  of  the  least  possible  govern- 
ment there  had  been,  even  before  the  war,  while 
Jefferson  himself  was  president,  during  that  pain- 
ful struggle  under  the  oppressive  practices  of  the 
European  belligerents,  enormous  stretches  of  power, 
such  as  the  laws  enforcing  the  embargo,  which 
equaled,  if  not  outstripped,  anything  the  Federal- 
ists had  ever  done.  Instead  of  frugal  economy 
and  regular  debt  paying,  there  had  been  enormous 
war  expenses  with  new  taxes  and  heavy  loans. 
Instead  of  unbroken  peace  and  general  friendship, 
there  had  been  a long  and  bloody  war  with  the 
nearest  of  kin.  Now,  with  that  war  finished,  there 
was  a large  public  debt,  a frightfully  disordered 
currency,  a heavy  budget  of  yearly  expenditures, 
and  a people  awakened  to  new  wants  and  new  am- 
bitions, for  the  satisfaction  of  which  they  looked, 
more  than  ever  before,  to  the  government.  The 
old  triumvirate  of  leaders  were  indeed  still  alive ; 
but  Jefferson  was  sitting  in  his  lofty  Monticello, 
the  sage  of  the  period,  giving  forth  oracular  sounds, 
many  of  them  very  wise,  always  respectfully  re- 


128 


HENRY  CLAY 


ceived,  but  apt  to  be  minded  only  when  what  he 
said  corresponded  with  the  wishes  of  his  listeners; 
Gallatin,  having  witnessed  and  sagaciously  recog- 
nized the  breakdown  of  his  favorite  theory  of  gov- 
ernment, was  serving  the  republic  as  a diplomatic 
representative  abroad;  Madison  was  still  presi- 
dent, but,  having  never  been  a strong  leader  of  men 
for  his  own  purposes,  he  could  offer  but  feeble 
resistance  to  the  new  tendencies.  A new  school 
of  Republican  leaders  had  pressed  forward  into  the 
places  of  these  retired  veterans,  — new  leaders, 
who  would  speak  with  pity  of  a government  “go- 
ing on  in  the  old  imbecile  method,  contributing 
nothing  by  its  measures  to  the  honor  and  reputa- 
tion of  the  country;”  who  wanted  a conduct  of 
public  affairs  “on  an  enlarged  policy;”  who 
thought  that  revenues  might  be  raised,  not  only 
to  provide  for  the  absolute  wants  of  the  govern- 
ment, but,  beyond  that,  for  the  advancement  of 
the  public  benefit. 

Of  this  new  Republican  school  Clay  and  Cal- 
houn were  the  foremost  champions.  Clay  boldly 
put  forth  its  programme  in  a speech  made  in  com- 
mittee of  the  whole  on  January  29,  1816,  on  a bill 
reported  by  Lowndes,  to  reduce  the  direct  taxes 
imposed  during  the  war.  After  having  defended, 
with  great  force,  the  war  of  1812  as  a just  and 
necessary  war,  and  the  peace  of  Ghent  as  an  hon- 
orable peace,  he  enumerated  the  reasons  why  he 
deemed  no  great  reduction  of  taxes  advisable. 
Our  relations  with  Spain,  he  said,  were  unsatis- 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  129 


factory;  there  would  be  more  wars  with  Great 
Britain;  and  the  United  States  might  have  to  aid 
the  Spanish  South  American  colonies  in  their  strug- 
gle for  independence.  It  was  necessary,  therefore, 
to  maintain  a respectable  military  establishment, 
to  augment  the  navy,  and  to  provide  for  coast  de- 
fenses. Furthermore  he  would,  46  as  earnestly, 
commence  the  great  work,  too  long  delayed,  of 
internal  improvement.  He  desired  to  see  a chain 
of  turnpike  roads  and  canals  from  Passamaquoddy 
Bay  to  New  Orleans,  and  other  similar  roads  in- 
tersecting the  mountains,  to  facilitate  intercourse 
between  all  parts  of  the  country,  and  to  bind  and 
connect  us  together.”  He  would  also  44 effectually 
protect  our  manufactories,  — not  so  much  for  the 
manufactories  themselves,  as  for  the  general  inter- 
est. We  should  thus  have  our  wants  supplied, 
when  foreign  resources  are  cut  off ; and  we  should 
also  lay  the  basis  of  a system  of  taxation  to  be 
resorted  to  when  the  revenue  from  imports  is 
stopped  by  war.”  Provision  for  the  contingency 
of  war  was  a prominent  consideration  in  all  this ; 
Clay’s  political  ideas  had  not  yet  come  down  to 
the  peace  footing.  Calhoun  followed  him  with  a 
vigorous  speech  of  similar  tenor.  These  argu- 
ments prevailed,  and  the  direct  tax  was  in  part 
retained. 

Then  the  tariff  was  taken  in  hand.  The  em- 
bargo, the  non-intercourse,  and  the  war,  while 
dealing  the  shipping  interest  a terrible  blow,  had, 
by  excluding  foreign  products,  served  as  a powerful 


130 


HENRY  CLAY 


stimulus  to  manufacturing  industry.  But  after 
the  war  the  country  was  flooded  by  a tremendous 
importation  of  English  goods.  American  indus- 
try, artificially  developed  by  an  abnormal  state  of 
things,  was  now  to  be  artificially  sustained  against 
that  competition.  Tariff  duties  were  resorted  to 
for  that  avowed  purpose,  and  a scheme  was  pro- 
posed by  Dallas,  the  secretary  of  the  treasury. 
He  arranged  the  articles  subject  to  duty  in  three 
classes:  1.  Those  of  which  the  home  supply  was 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  demand ; they  were  to  bear 
the  highest  duty,  thirty-five  per  cent,  ad  valorem. 
2.  Those  of  which  the  domestic  supply  was  only 
partially  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  demand,  compris- 
ing cotton  and  woolen  goods,  as  well  as  iron  and 
most  of  its  coarser  products,  distilled  spirits,  etc. ; 
these  were  to  bear  twenty  per  cent.  And  3,  those 
of  which  the  home  production  was  small,  or  no- 
thing; these  were  to  bear  a simple  revenue  tax. 

Most  of  the  Federalists  opposed  this  protective 
policy,  while  the  Republican  protectionists,  illus- 
trating the  remarkable  mutation  of  things,  quoted 
against  them  Hamilton’s  famous  report  on  manu- 
factures. Webster  and  most  of  the  New  England 
men  opposed  it,  because  it  would  injure  the  ship- 
ping interest.  John  Randolph,  independent  of 
party,  opposed  it,  because  it  would  benefit  the 
Northern  States  at  the  expense  of  the  South. 
Calhoun,  Lowndes,  and  their  Southern  followers 
supported  it,  not  only  as  a means  of  national  de- 
fense, but  also  in  order  to  help  the  cotton  interest, 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  131 


since  England  at  that  time  levied  a discriminating 
duty  on  raw  materials  to  the  disadvantage  of  cot- 
ton raised  in  America,  and  since  the  coarser  cotton 
fabrics  imported  into  the  United  States  were  mostly 
made  of  India  cotton.  The  principal  argument 
urged  by  Clay  and  generally  accepted  by  the  Re- 
publicans was,  that  certain  manufacturing  indus- 
tries must  be  built  up  and  sustained  for  the  safety 
of  the  country  in  time  of  war.  Thus  the  tariff  of 
1816  was  enacted,  embodying  substantially  the 
scheme  proposed  by  Dallas. 

So  far  Clay  had,  as  to  definite  measures  of  pub- 
lic concern,  preserved  a plausible  consistency  with 
the  principles  and  measures  advocated  by  him  be- 
fore the  war  of  1812.  But  he  should  not  be  spared 
the  ordeal  brought  on  by  direct  self-contradiction. 
The  war  had  thrown  the  currency  into  great  disor- 
der. Upon  the  expiration  of  the  charter  of  the 
United  States  Bank,  the  renewal  of  which  Clay 
had  helped  to  defeat,  the  notes  of  that  institution 
were  withdrawn,  and  the  notes  of  state  banks  took 
their  place.  These  banks  multiplied  very  rapidly. 
In  the  years  1811,  1812,  and  1813  one  hundred 
and  twenty  of  them  went  into  operation,  many 
with  insufficient  capital.  The  secretary  of  the 
treasury  endeavored  in  vain  to  bring  the  banks 
into  prudent  cooperation.  They  began  to  refuse 
one  another’s  bills.  In  1814  specie  payments  were 
suspended.  Reckless  paper  issues  produced  a cor- 
responding inflation  of  prices.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances Dallas  finally  saw  no  other  way  to 


132 


HENRY  CLAY 


restore  order  in  the  currency  than  by  the  promptest 
possible  return  to  specie  payments,  and  to  this  end 
he  proposed  the  establishment  of  a specie-paying 
national  bank,  virtually  a revival  of  the  old  Bank 
of  the  United  States. 

The  Republican  majority  of  1816  was  ready  to 
return  to  Hamilton’s  plan  of  a financial  agency, 
which  the  Republicans  of  1811  had  denounced  and 
rejected ; and  they  were  ready,  too,  to  enlarge  that 
plan  in  all  the  features  formerly  objected  to.  But 
how  could  Clay  support  such  a scheme?  We  shall 
see. 

On  January  8,  1816,  Calhoun  reported  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  a bill  providing  that  a 
Bank  of  the  United  States  should  be  chartered  for 
twenty  years,  with  a capital  of  185,000,000,  di- 
vided into  850,000  shares,  Congress  to  have  the 
power  to  authorize  an  increase  of  the  capital  to 
$50,000,000;  70,000  shares,  amounting  to  $7,000,- 
000,  to  be  subscribed  and  paid  for  by  the  United 
States,  and  280,000  shares  to  be  taken  by  individ- 
uals, companies,  or  corporations;  the  government 
to  appoint  five  of  the  twenty -five  directors;  the 
bank  to  be  authorized  to  establish  branches,  to 
have  the  deposits  of  the  public  money,  subject  to 
the  discretion  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  and 
to  pay  to  the  government  $1,500,000  in  three  in- 
stalments, as  a bonus  for  its  charter.  This  was 
substantially  Hamilton’s  National  Bank  of  1791, 
only  on  a larger  scale.  It  was  exactly  the  thing 
which,  five  years  before,  Clay  had  found  so  utterly 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  133 


unconstitutional,  and  in  its  very  nature  so  danger- 
ous, that  he  could  under  no  circumstances  consent 
to  a prolongation  of  its  existence. 

Again  the  two  parties  found  themselves  reversed 
in  position:  the  Federalists  were  now  opposing 
the  bank, — some  of  them,  like  Webster,  because 
the  capital  was  too  large ; while  the  Republicans, 
with  some  exceptions,  were  favoring  it  as  a neces- 
sity. But  how  did  Clay  perform  his  somersault? 
He  made  a speech  which  his  contemporary  friends 
praised  as  very  able.  It  was  not  reported,  but  he 
reproduced  its  main  propositions  in  an  address 
subsequently  delivered  before  his  constituents  for 
the  purpose  of  defending  himself  against  that  charge 
which  has  such  terrors  for  public  men,  — the  charge 
of  inconsistency.  This  was  his  argument:  In  1811 
the  legislature  of  his  State  had  instructed  him  to 
oppose  the  re-chartering  of  the  bank,  while  now 
the  people  of  his  district,  as  far  as  he  had  been 
able  to  ascertain  their  minds  by  conversation  with 
them,  were  in  favor  of  a new  bank.  Secondly, 
the  old  bank  had  abused  its  powers  for  political 
purposes,  while  the  new  bank  would  be  deterred 
from  doing  so  by  the  fate  of  its  predecessor.  This 
was  making  an  audacious  draft  upon  the  credulity 
of  his  audience.  Thirdly,  the  bank  had  been 
unconstitutional  in  1811,  but  it  was  constitutional 
in  1816,  owing  to  a change  of  circumstances.  We 
remember  that  magnificent  passage  in  Clay’s  speech 
of  1811  in  which  he  arrayed  in  parade  the  monster 
corporations  of  history,  arguing  that  so  tremendous 


134 


HENRY  CLAY 


a power  as  tlie  authority  to  charter  such  companies 
could  not  possibly  have  been  given  to  the  federal 
government  by  mere  inference  and  implication; 
that,  if  the  Constitution  did  not  grant  that  power 
in  so  many  words,  directly,  specifically,  unmistak- 
ably, it  was  not  granted  at  all.  What  did  he  say 
now? 

“ The  Constitution  contained  powers  delegated  and 
prohibitory,  powers  expressed  and  constructive.  It  vests 
in  Congress  all  powers  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  enu- 
merated powers.  The  powers  that  may  be  so  necessary 
are  deducible  by  construction.  They  are  not  defined  in 
the  Constitution.  They  are  in  their  nature  undefinable. 
With  regard  to  the  degree  of  necessity  various  rules 
have  been,  at  different  times,  laid  down  ; but  perhaps,  at 
last,  there  is  no  other  than  a sound  and  honest  judgment, 
exercised  under  the  control  which  belongs  to  the  Consti- 
tution and  the  people.  It  is  manifest  that  this  necessity 
may  not  be  perceived  at  one  time  under  one  state  of 
things,  while  it  is  perceived  at  another  time  under  a 
different  state  of  things.  The  Constitution,  it  is  true, 
never  changes  ; it  is  always  the  same ; but  the  force  of 
circumstances  and  the  lights  of  experience  may  evolve, 
to  the  fallible  persons  charged  with  its  administration, 
the  fitness  and  necessity  of  a particular  exercise  of  con- 
structive power  to-day,  which  they  did  not  see  at  a 
former  period.” 

And  how  did  he  apply  this  constitutional  theory 
to  the  pending  case?  In  1811,  he  said,  the  bank 
did  not  seem  to  him  necessary,  because  it  was 
supported  mainly  upon  the  ground  uthat  it  was 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  135 


indispensable  to  the  Treasury  operations,”  which, 
in  his  opinion,  could  have  been  sufficiently  aided 
by  the  state  banks  then  existing.  Therefore  the  re- 
chartering of  the  United  States  Bank  would  have 
been,  in  his  view,  at  that  time  unconstitutional. 
But  now  he  beheld  specie  payments  suspended. 
He  saw  about  three  hundred  banking  institutions 
which  had  lost  the  public  confidence  in  a greater 
or  less  degree,  and  which  were  exercising  what 
had  always  and  everywhere  been  considered  “one 
of  the  highest  attributes  of  sovereignty,”  namely, 
the  “regulation  of  the  current  medium  of  the 
country.”  They  were  no  longer  capable  of  aiding, 
but  were  really  obstructing,  the  operations  of  the 
Treasury.  To  renew  specie  payments  and  to  pre- 
vent further  disaster  and  distress  a national  bank 
now  appeared  to  him  “not  only  necessary,  but 
indispensably  necessary.”  Under  these  circum- 
stances, therefore,  he  considered  the  chartering  of 
a national  bank  constitutional.  “He  preferred,” 
he  added,  “to  the  suggestions  of  the  pride  of 
opinion  the  evident  interests  of  the  community, 
and  determined  to  throw  himself  upon  their  candor 
and  justice.  Had  he  in  1811  foreseen  what  now 
existed,  and  no  objection  had  laid  against  the  re- 
newal of  the  charter  other  than  that  derived  from 
the  Constitution,  he  should  have  voted  for  the 
renewal.” 

This  was  virtually  a confession  that  he  had  seri- 
ously mistaken  the  situation  of  things  in  1811, 
when,  against  Gallatin’s  judgment,  he  had  helped 


136 


HENRY  CLAY 


in  disarranging  the  fiscal  machinery  of  the  govern- 
ment on  the  eve  of  a war.  But  it  was  a confes- 
sion, too,  that  he  had  thrown  overboard  that  con- 
stitutional theory  according  to  which  such  things 
as  the  power  of  chartering  corporations,  not  being 
among  the  specifically  granted  powers,  could  not 
be  an  implied  power.  He  had  familiarized  him- 
self with  larger  views  of  governmental  function,  as 
the  republic  had  grown  in  dimensions,  in  strength, 
and  in  the  reach  of  its  interests.  Indeed,  the  rea- 
soning with  which  he  justified  his  change  of  posi- 
tion in  1816  stopped  but  little,  if  at  all,  short  of 
the  assertion  that  whatever  may  be  considered 
necessary,  or  even  eminently  desirable,  to  help  the 
country  over  a temporary  embarrassment,  may  also 
be  considered  constitutional.  Clay,  who  seldom, 
if  ever,  reasoned  out  a point  in  all  its  logical  bear- 
ings, would  not  have  admitted  that  as  a general 
proposition.  But  he  evidently  inclined  to  the  most 
latitudinarian  construction.  His  constitutional 
principles  had  become  prodigiously  elastic  accord- 
ing to  the  requirements  of  the  occasion.  In  this 
respect  he  was  not  peculiar.  Most  of  our  public 
men  have  been  inclined  to  interpret  the  Constitu- 
tion according  to  their  purposes.  This  tendency 
was  especially  strong  among  the  young  Republi- 
cans of  that  period;  and  there  it  was  all  the  more 
remarkable  as  their  party  had  in  its  design  and 
beginning  been  a living  protest  against  the  strong 
government  theory  favored  by  the  Federalists. 
There  was,  however,  this  difference  left  between 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  137 


them  and  their  old  antagonists:  the  Federalists 
believed  that  government,  in  order  to  be  good,  or 
even  tolerable,  must  be  strong  enough  to  restrain 
the  disorderly  tendencies  of  democracy ; while  the 
young  Republicans  rejected  the  theory  of  strong 
government  in  that  sense,  but  believed  that  it  must 
have  large  powers  in  order  to  do  the  things  which 
they  thought  it  should  do  for  the  development  of 
a great  nation. 

At  the  next  session  of  Congress,  in  February, 
1817,  Calhoun  took  the  lead  in  advocating  a bill 
to  set  apart  and  pledge  the  bonus  of  the  national 
bank  and  the  share  of  the  United  States  in  its 
dividends,  as  a permanent  fund  for  “ constructing 
roads  and  canals  and  improving  the  navigation  of 
watercourses,  in  order  to  facilitate,  promote,  and 
give  security  to  internal  commerce  among  the 
several  States,  and  to  render  more  easy  and  less 
expensive  the  means  and  provisions  for  the  com- 
mon defense.”  In  his  speech  Calhoun  pronounced 
himself  strongly  in  favor  of  a latitudinarian  con- 
struction of  constitutional  powers,  and  a liberal 
exercise  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  binding  the 
people  of  this  vast  country  more  closely  together, 
and  of  preventing  “the  greatest  of  all  calamities, 
next  to  the  loss  of  liberty,  and  even  that  in  its 
consequence  — disunion.”  Clay  thanked  him  for 
“the  able  and  luminous  view  which  he  had  sub- 
mitted to  the  committee  of  the  whole,”  and  vigor- 
ously urged  the  setting  apart  of  a fund  to  be  used 
at  a future  time  when  the  specific  objects  to  be 


138 


HENRY  CLAY 


accomplished  should  have  been  more  clearly  ascer- 
tained and  fixed.  This  contemplated  the  accumu- 
lation of  funds  in  the  Treasury  with  the  expecta- 
tion that  suitable  objects  would  be  found  for  which 
to  spend  them,  — a dangerous  practice  in  a demo- 
cratic government.  “Congress,”  he  said,  “could 
at  some  future  day  examine  into  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  question,  and  if  it  had  the  power,  it 
could  exercise  it;  if  it  had  not,  the  Constitution, 
there  could  be  no  doubt,  would  be  so  amended  as 
to  confer  it.”  At  any  rate,  he  wished  to  have  the 
fund  set  apart.  Clay  himself  did  not  doubt  that 
Congress  had  the  constitutional  power  to  use  that 
fund,  and  possibly  he  thought  that,  if  only  the 
money  were  provided  to  be  spent,  Congress  would 
easily  come  to  the  same  conclusion. 

The  bill  passed  both  houses,  but  old-school  Re- 
publicanism once  more  stemmed  the  tide.  Presi- 
dent Madison,  who  himself  had  formerly  expressed 
opinions  favorable  to  internal  improvements,  ve- 
toed it  on  strictly  constitutional  grounds,  much  to 
the  astonishment  and  disgust  of  the  young  Repub- 
lican statesmen.  It  was  his  last  act. 

Clay  had  in  the  mean  time,  by  way  of  episode, 
gone  through  the  experience  of  flagging  popular- 
ity. It  was  not  on  account  of  his  constitutional 
doctrines,  or  any  other  great  question  of  state,  but 
by  reason  of  a matter  to  which  he  had  probably 
given  but  little  thought.  At  the  previous  ses- 
sion he  had  voted  for  a bill  to  increase  the  pay 
of  members  of  Congress  from  a per  diem  of  six 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  139 


dollars  to  a fixed  salary  of  $1500.  a year,  the  law  to 
apply  to  the  Congress  then  in  session.  He  sup- 
ported it  on  the  ground  that  he  had  never  been 
able  to  make  both  ends  meet  at  Washington. 
“The  rate  of  compensation,”  he  said,  “ought  to 
be  such  at  least  as  that  ruin  should  not  attend  a 
long  service  in  Congress.”  Such  arguments  pre- 
vailed, and  the  bill  passed  both  houses.  But  many 
of  Clay’s  constituents  thought  differently.  To  the 
Kentucky  farmers  a yearly  income  of  $1500  for 
a few  months’  sitting  on  cushioned  chairs  in  the 
Capitol  looked  monstrously  extravagant.  They 
were  sure  men  could  be  found  who  would  do  the 
business  for  less  money.  When  the  election  of 
members  of  Congress  came  on,  Clay  was  fortunate 
enough  to  force  the  candidate  opposing  him  into 
a “joint  debate,”  in  which,  as  that  gentleman  had 
been  “against  the  war,”  Clay  made  short  work  of 
him.  But  he  himself  had  an  arduous  canvass.  It 
was  then  that  his  meeting  with  the  old  hunter  oc- 
curred, which  furnished  material  for  a school-book 
anecdote.  The  old  hunter,  who  had  always  voted 
for  Clay,  was  now  resolved  to  vote  against  him  on 
account  of  the  back-pay  bill.  “My  friend,”  said 
Clay,  “have  you  a good  rifle?”  “Yes.”  “Did 
it  ever  flash?”  “Yes,  but  only  once.”  “What 
did  you  do  with  the  rifle  when  it  flashed,  — throw 
it  away?”  “No,  I picked  the  flint,  tried  again, 
and  brought  down  the  game.”  “Have  I ever 
flashed,  except  upon  the  compensation  bill?  ” 
“No.”  “Well,  will  you  throw  me  away?”  “No, 


140 


HENRY  CLAY 


Mr.  Clay;  I will  pick  the  flint  and  try  you  again.” 
Clay  was  tried  again,  but  only  by  a majority  of 
some  six  or  seven  hundred  votes.  At  the  next 
session  of  Congress  he  voted  for  the  repeal  of  the 
compensation  act,  avowedly  on  the  ground  of  its 
unpopularity ; but  he  favored  the  raising  of  the  per 
diem . The  pay  of  members  of  Congress  was  fixed 
at  eight  dollars  per  day.  This  was  the  only  time 
that  his  home  constituency  threatened  to  fail  him. 

James  Monroe  was  elected  president  in  1816 
with  little  opposition.  He  received  183  electoral 
votes ; while  his  competitor,  Rufus  King,  the  can- 
didate of  the  Federalists,  had  only  34.  Monroe 
was  inaugurated  March  4,  1817,  and  the  famous 
“era  of  good  feeling”  set  in, — that  is  to  say, 
with  the  disappearance  of  the  Federal  party  as  a 
national  organization,  the  great  organized  contests 
of  the  old  parties  for  power  ceased,  to  make  room 
for  the  smaller  contests  of  personal  ambitions. 
But  these  infused  fully  as  much  bitterness  into  the 
era  of  good  feeling  as  the  differences  on  important 
questions  of  public  policy  had  infused  into  great 
party  struggles.  Until  then  the  presidents  of  the 
United  States  had  been  men  of  note  in  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution.  Monroe  was  the  last  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary generation  and  of  the  “Virginia  dynasty.” 
It  was  taken  for  granted  that  he  would  have  his 
two  terms,  and  that  then  the  competition  for  the 
presidency  would  be  open  to  a new  class  of  men. 
As  Madison  had  been  Jefferson’s  secretary  of  state 
before  he  became  president,  and  Monroe  had  been 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  141 


Madison’s,  the  secretaryship  of  state  was  looked 
upon  as  the  stepping-stone  to  the  presidency. 
Those  who  expected  to  be  candidates  for  the  high- 
est place  in  the  future,  therefore,  coveted  it  with 
peculiar  solicitude. 

One  of  them  was  Henry  Clay.  Among  the  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  he  could  find  none  to 
whom  the  succession  to  Mr.  Monroe,  as  he  believed, 
belonged  more  rightfully  than  to  himself.  Thus 
he  started  on  the  career  of  a candidate  for  the 
presidency,  and  that  career  began  with  a disap- 
pointment. Monroe  selected  for  the  secretaryship 
John  Quincy  Adams,  a most  excellent  selection, 
although  Clay  very  decidedly  did  not  think  so. 
Monroe  also  signified  his  appreciation  of  Clay’s 
merits  by  offering  him  the  War  Department,  and 
then  the  mission  to  England.  But  Clay  declined 
both  places,  on  the  ground,  as  Mr.  Adams  reports, 
“that  he  was  satisfied  with  the  situation  which  he 
held,  and  could  render  more  service  to  the  public 
in  it  than  in  the  other  situations  offered  him.” 
This  was  true  enough ; but  it  is  also  probable  that 
he  was  then  already  resolved  to  stand  as  a candi- 
date for  the  presidency  after  Monroe’s  second  term, 
although  Adams  had  been  designated  as  heir-ap- 
parent; and,  moreover,  his  disappointment  had  so 
affected  his  personal  feelings  toward  Monroe  and 
Adams  as  to  make  unsuitable  his  acceptance  of  a 
place  among  the  President’s  confidential  advisers. 
This  supposition  is  borne  out  by  his  subsequent 
conduct. 


142 


HENRY  CLAY 


The  fifteenth  Congress  met  on  December  1, 
1817,  and  Clay  was  on  the  same  day  reelected 
speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  by  an 
almost  unanimous  vote,  — 140  to  7.  An  opportu- 
nity for  an  open  disagreement  between  Clay  and 
the  administration  was  not  long  in  appearing.  In 
his  first  message  to  Congress,  Monroe,  referring 
to  the  passage  at  the  preceding  session  of  the  act 
concerning  a fund  for  internal  improvements,  which 
Madison  vetoed,  deemed  it  proper  to  make  known 
his  sentiments  on  that  subject  beforehand,  so  that 
there  should  be  no  uncertainty  as  to  his  prospec- 
tive action  in  case  such  a bill  were  passed  again. 
He  declared  it  to  be  his  “settled  conviction”  that 
Congress  did  not  possess  the  right  of  constructing 
roads  and  canals.  “It  is  not  contained  in  any  of 
the  specified  powers  granted  to  Congress ; nor  can 
I consider  it  incidental  to,  or  a necessary  means, 
viewed  on  the  most  liberal  scale,  for  carrying  into 
effect  any  of  the  powers  specifically  granted.”  He 
then  suggested,  as  Jefferson  and  Madison  had 
done,  the  adoption  of  a constitutional  amendment 
to  give  to  Congress  the  right  in  question. 

This  spontaneous  declaration  by  the  President 
of  what  he  intended  to  do  in  certain  contingencies 
was  taken  as  something  like  a challenge,  and  the 
challenge  was  promptly  accepted.  Calhoun,  next 
to  Clay  the  foremost  champion  of  internal  improve- 
ments, having  gone  into  the  cabinet  as  secretary 
of  war,  Tucker  of  Virginia  reported  on  December 
15,  from  a select  committee,  a resolution  equiva- 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  143 


lent  to  that  which  Madison  had  vetoed.  Against 
it  Monroe’s  constitutional  objections  were  mar- 
shaled in  debate.  Clay  took  up  the  gauntlet  and 
made  two  speeches,  in  which  he  disclosed  his  views 
of  policy,  as  well  as  his  constitutional  principles, 
more  pointedly  than  he  had  ever  done  before.  He 
maintained  that  the  Constitution  did  give  the  gen- 
eral government  the  power  to  construct  roads  and 
canals,  and  that  the  consent  of  the  States,  which 
had  been  thought  necessary  in  the  case  of  the 
Cumberland  Road,  was  not  required  at  all.  He 
spoke  as  a Western  man,  as  a representative  of 
a new  country  and  a pioneer  population,  needing 
means  of  communication,  channels  of  commerce 
and  intelligence,  as  the  breath  of  life.  He  spoke 
as  a citizen  of  the  Union,  looking  forward  to  a 
great  destiny.  Was  the  Constitution,  he  asked, 
giving  Congress  the  power  to  establish  post-offices 
and  post-roads,  and  to  regulate  commerce  between 
the  States,  made  for  the  benefit  of  the  Atlantic 
margin  of  the  country  only?  Was  the  Constitu- 
tion made  only  for  the  few  millions  then  inhabiting 
this  continent?  No ! “ Every  man,”  he  exclaimed, 
“who  looks  at  the  Constitution  in  the  spirit  to 
entitle  him  to  the  character  of  a statesman,  must 
elevate  his  views  to  the  height  which  this  nation  is 
destined  to  reach  in  the  rank  of  nations.  We  are 
not  legislating  for  this  moment  only,  or  for  the 
present  generation,  or  for  the  present  populated 
limits  of  the  United  States;  but  our  acts  must 
embrace  a wider  scope,  — reaching  northwestward 


144 


HENRY  CLAY 


to  the  Pacific,  and  southwardly  to  the  river  Del 
Norte.  Imagine  this  extent  of  territory  covered 
with  sixty,  or  seventy,  or  an  hundred  millions  of 
people.  The  powers  which  exist  in  this  govern- 
ment now  will  exist  then;  and  those  which  will 
exist  then  exist  now.” 

“What  was  the  object  of  the  convention,”  he 
asked,  “in  framing  the  Constitution?  The  lead- 
ing object  was  Union.  Union,  then,  peace  exter- 
nal and  internal,  and  commerce,  but  more  particu- 
larly union  and  peace,  the  great  objects  of  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution,  should  be  kept  steadily 
in  view  in  the  interpretation  of  any  clause  of  it; 
and  where  it  is  susceptible  of  various  interpreta- 
tions, that  construction  should  be  preferred  which 
tends  to  promote  the  objects  of  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution,  to  the  consolidation  of  the  Union.” 
This  he  emphasized  with  still  greater  force.  “I 
am  a friend,  a true  friend,  to  state  rights,  but 
not  in  all  cases  as  they  are  asserted.  We  should 
equally  avoid  that  subtile  process  of  argument 
which  dissipates  into  air  the  powers  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  that  spirit  of  encroachment  which  would 
snatch  from  the  States  powers  not  delegated  to  the 
general  government.  We  shall  then  escape  both 
the  dangers  I have  noticed,  — that  of  relapsing 
into  the  alarming  weakness  of  the  Confederation, 
which  was  described  as  a mere  rope  of  sand ; and 
also  that  other,  perhaps  not  the  greatest,  danger, 
consolidation.  No  man  deprecates  more  than  I do 
the  idea  of  consolidation;  yet  between  separation 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  145 


and  consolidation,  painful  as  would  be  the  alterna- 
tive, I should  greatly  prefer  the  latter.” 

Here  was  the  well-spring  from  which  Henry 
Clay  drew  his  political  inspirations,  — a grand 
conception  of  the  future  destiny  of  the  American 
republic,  and  of  a government  adapted  to  the  ful- 
fillment of  that  great  destiny;  an  ardent  love  for 
the  Union,  as  the  ark  of  liberty  and  national  gran- 
deur, a Union  to  be  maintained  at  any  price ; an 
imaginative  enthusiasm  which  infused  its  patriotic 
glow  into  his  political  opinions,  but  which  was 
also  apt  to  carry  him  beyond  the  limits  of  existing 
things  and  conditions,  and  not  seldom  unfitted 
him  for  the  formation  of  a clear  and  well-balanced 
judgment  of  facts  and  interests.  But  this  enthu- 
siastic conception  of  national  grandeur,  this  lofty 
Unionism  constantly  appearing  as  the  inspiration 
of  his  public  conduct,  gave  to  his  policies,  as  they 
stood  forth  in  the  glow  of  his  eloquence,  a pecul- 
iarly potent  charm. 

The  result  of  this  debate  was  the  passage,  not 
of  the  resolution  reported  by  Tucker,  but  of  a 
substitute  declaring  that  “ Congress  has  power, 
under  the  Constitution,  to  appropriate  money  for 
the  construction  of  post-roads,  military  and  other 
roads,  and  of  canals,  and  for  the  improvement  of 
watercourses.”  Other  resolutions,  asserting  the 
power  of  Congress  not  only  to  appropriate  money 
for  such  roads  and  canals,  but  to  construct  them, 
failed  by  small  majorities,  so  that  Clay  carried  his 
point  only  in  part. 


146 


HENRY  CLAY 


That  Clay  would  continue  to  assert  the  power  of 
Congress  to  construct  internal  improvements,  Pre- 
sident Monroe’s  message  notwithstanding,  every- 
body expected.  But  when  he  interspersed  that 
advocacy  with  keen  criticism  of  Monroe’s  attitude 
concerning  that  subject,  — criticism  which  had  a 
strong  flavor  of  bitterness  in  it,  — the  effect  was 
not  to  his  advantage.  The  unfriendly  tone  of  his 
remarks  was  generally  attributed  to  his  disappoint- 
ment in  the  matter  of  the  secretaryship  of  state. 
Not  many  men  like  to  see  personal  resentments 
carried  into  the  discussion  of  public  interests ; 
and  in  this  case,  to  make  the  matter  worse,  the 
demonstrations  of  resentment  were,  in  the  shape 
of  oratorical  flings,  darted  at  a president  who  was 
by  no  means  a great  man,  rather  a man  of  moder- 
ate parts,  but  who  was  regarded  as  inoffensive  and 
well-meaning,  and  as  honestly  busying  himself 
about  his  presidential  duties,  — one  of  those  re- 
spectable mediocrities  in  high  public  station,  with 
whom  people  are  apt  to  sympathize  in  their  trou- 
bles, especially  when  unnecessarily  attacked  and 
humiliated  by  persons  of  greatly  superior  ability. 

But  the  disappointment  of  the  aspirant  for  the 
presidency  was  so  little  under  his  control  that  he 
permitted  it  to  appear  even  in  another  of  his  great 
endeavors,  which,  in  order  to  succeed,  required 
particularly  prudent  management.  This  was  his 
effort  in  behalf  of  the  Spanish -American  colonies, 
which  had  risen  against  the  mother  country,  and 
were  struggling  to  achieve  their  independence. 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  147 


It  has  been  said  by  Clay’s  opponents  that  his 
zeal  for  the  cause  of  the  South  American  patriots 
was  wholly  owing  to  his  desire  to  annoy  the  Mon- 
roe administration.  This  is  clearly  an  unjust 
charge,  for  he  had  loudly  proclaimed  his  ardent 
sympathies  with  the  South  American  insurgents 
while  Madison  was  still  president.  We  remember 
that  in  his  speech  on  the  direct  taxes  in  January, 
1816,  he  seriously  put  the  question  whether  the 
United  States  would  not  have  openly  “to  take 
part  with  the  patriots  of  South  America.”  So 
on  January  24,  1817,  before  Monroe’s  inaugura- 
tion, he  had  stoutly  opposed  a bill  “more  effectu- 
ally to  preserve  the  neutral  relations  of  the  United 
States,”  intended  to  stop  the  fitting  out  of  armed 
cruisers  in  American  ports;  he  had  opposed  the 
bill  on  the  ground  that  it  might  be  advantageous 
to  old  Spain  in  the  South  American  struggle.  All 
this  had  sprung  naturally  from  his  emotional  en- 
thusiasm. He  was  therefore,  although  imprudent 
in  his  propositions,  yet  only  true  to  himself,  when, 
under  Monroe’s  administration,  he  continued  to 
demand  that  the  neutrality  law  of  1817  be  re- 
pealed; that  our  neutrality  be  so  arranged  as  to 
be  as  advantageous  as  possible  to  the  insurgent 
colonies;  and  finally  that  the  United  States  send 
a minister  to  the  “United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la 
Plata,”  thereby  formally  recognizing  that  revolu- 
tionized colony  as  an  independent  state.  This  he 
proposed  in  March,  1818.  Three  commissioners 
had  been  appointed  by  the  President  to  go  to 


148 


HENRY  CLAY 


South  America  for  the  purpose  of  looking  into 
the  condition  of  things;  and,  to  cover  the  neces- 
sary expenses,  the  President  asked  for  an  appro- 
priation. Clay  strenuously  opposed  this  on  the 
ground  that  the  commissioners  had  been  appointed 
without  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  He 
moved  instead  an  appropriation  for  a regular  min- 
ister to  be  sent  there. 

The  speech  with  which  he  supported  this  propo- 
sition was  in  his  grandest  style.  South  America 
had  charmed  his  poetic  fancy.  In  gorgeous  colors 
he  drew  a picture  of  “the  vast  region  in  which  we 
behold  the  most  sublime  and  interesting  objects  of 
creation;  the  loftiest  mountains,  the  most  majestic 
rivers  in  the  world;  the  richest  mines  of  the  pre- 
cious metals,  the  choicest  productions  of  the  earth; 
we  behold  there  a spectacle  still  more  interesting 
and  sublime,  — the  glorious  spectacle  of  eighteen 
millions  of  people  struggling  to  burst  their  chains 
and  to  be  free.”  A burning  description  followed 
of  their  degradation  and  sufferings,  and  of  the 
terrible  cruelties  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  re- 
lentless oppressors.  In  his  imagination  they  were 
a people  of  high  mental  and  moral  qualities,  not- 
withstanding their  ignorance  and  their  subserviency 
to  the  influence  of  the  church.  He  was  sure  that, 
“Spanish  America  being  once  independent,  what- 
ever may  be  the  form  of  the  governments  estab- 
lished in  its  several  parts,  these  governments  will 
be  animated  by  an  American  feeling,  and  guided 
by  an  American  policy.”  He  affirmed  that  they 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  149 


had  established  and  for  years  maintained  an  inde- 
pendent government  on  the  river  La  Plata,  and 
that,  as  the  United  States  always  recognized  de 
facto  governments,  it  was  a duty  to  recognize  this. 
He  demanded  it  in  the  name  of  a just  neutrality. 
As  the  United  States  had  received  a minister  sent 
by  Spain,  so  they  were  “bound”  to  receive  a min- 
ister of  the  La  Plata  republic  if  they  meant  to  be 
neutral.  “If  the  royal  belligerent  is  represented 
and  heard  at  our  government,  the  republican  bel- 
ligerent ought  also  to  be  heard.”  All  this,  he 
thought,  could  be  done  without  any  danger  of  war. 
Spain  herself  was  too  much  crippled  in  her  re- 
sources to  make  war  on  the  United  States,  and  no 
other  power  would  do  so. 

It  was  a brilliant  display  of  oratorical  splen- 
dors, but  the  House  resisted  the  fascination.  In 
the  discussion  which  followed,  much  of  the  halo, 
with  which  Clay’s  poetic  fancy  had  surrounded  the 
South  American  people  and  their  struggle,  was 
dissipated  by  sober  statements  of  fact.  Neither 
was  it  difficult  to  show  that  Clay  was  much  in 
error  in  his  views  of  true  neutrality,  and  that  neu- 
trality between  two  belligerents  did  by  no  means 
always  require  equal  diplomatic  relations  with 
them.  Finally,  the  contemptuous  flings  at  the 
President  and  the  secretary  of  state,  with  which 
Clay  seasoned  his  speech,  displeased  a large  part 
of  the  House.  It  was  well  known  that  Monroe 
and  Adams  were  not  at  all  unfriendly  to  the  insur- 
gent colonies ; only  they  wanted  to  be  sure  of  the 


150 


HENRY  CLAY 


fact  that  the  new  government  had  the  necessary 
element  of  stability  to  justify  recognition;  they 
hoped  to  obtain  the  cooperation  of  England  in 
that  recognition ; they  desired  to  avoid  the  embar- 
rassment which  a hasty  recognition  would  cause  in 
the  negotiations  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  concerning  the  cession  of  Florida;  and 
finally,  they  wished  to  be  first  assured  that  the 
public  opinion  of  the  country  would  sustain  them 
in  so  important  a step. 

The  motion  was  defeated  by  a vote  of  115  against 
45.  But  Monroe  was  terribly  disturbed  at  Clay’s 
hostile  attitude,  so  much  so  indeed  that,  two  or 
three  days  after  Clay’s  great  speech,  Adams  wrote 
in  his  Diary : — 

“ The  subject  which  seems  to  absorb  all  the  faculties 
of  his  (Monroe’s)  mind  is  the  violent  systematic  opposi- 
tion that  Clay  is  raising  against  his  administration.  . . . 
Mr.  Monroe  added,  if  Mr.  Clay  had  taken  the  ground 
that  the  executive  had  gone  as  far  as  he  could  go  with 
propriety  towards  the  acknowledgment  of  the  South 
Americans,  that  he  was  well  disposed  to  go  farther, 
if  such  were  the  feeling  of  the  nation  and  of  Congress, 
and  had  made  his  motion  with  that  view,  to  ascertain 
the  real  sentiments  of  Congress,  it  might  have  been  in 
perfect  harmony  with  the  executive.  But  between  that 
and  the  angry,  acrimonious  course  pursued  by  Mr.  Clay, 
there  was  a wide  difference.” 

Monroe  was  perfectly  right.  Clay  would  have 
served  the  cause  he  had  at  heart  better  had  he 
maintained  friendly  relations  with  the  administra- 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  151 


tion.  But  that  strange  disturber  of  impulses  and 
motives,  of  perceptions  and  conclusions  — the  as- 
piration to  the  presidency  — clouded  his  discern- 
ment. 

In  the  second  session  of  the  fifteenth  Congress 
a debate  took  place  which  was  destined  to  be  of 
far  greater  consequence  to  Clay’s  political  for- 
tunes than  anything  that  had  gone  before.  It 
was  the  first  clash  between  Henry  Clay  and  An- 
drew Jackson.  This  is  the  story.  The  Floridas 
were  still  in  the  possession  of  Spain.  They  served 
as  a place  of  refuge  for  runaway  slaves,  and  a 
base  of  operations  for  raiding  Indians.  Spain  was 
bound  by  treaty  to  prevent  hostile  excursions  on 
the  part  of  the  savages,  but  too  weak  or  too  negli- 
gent to  do  so.  There  were  frequent  collisions  be- 
tween whites  and  Indians  on  the  border,  one  party 
being  as  often  the  aggressor  as  the  other.  General 
Gaines  sent  soldiers  against  the  Indians,  and  an 
Indian  war  began.  In  December,  1817,  General 
Jackson  took  command.  He  received  authority 
to  pursue  the  Indians,  but,  as  the  administration 
understood  it,  he  was  to  respect  Spanish  rights. 
This  was  Jackson’s  famous  Seminole  war.  He 
enlisted  volunteers  in  Tennessee  by  his  own  pro- 
clamation, without  waiting  for  the  President  to  call 
upon  the  governor  for  a levy  of  militia  in  the 
legal,  regular  way.  He  broke  into  Florida  in 
March,  1818,  took  the  Spanish  fort  of  St.  Mark’s, 
hanged  Indian  chiefs  who  had  been  captured  by 
stratagem,  ordered  a Scotchman  and  an  English- 


152 


HENRY  CLAY 


man,  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister,  whom  he  had 
found  with  the  Indians,  to  be  tried  by  court-mar- 
tial for  having  instigated  the  savages  to  hostilities ; 
and  when,  on  very  insufficient  evidence,  they  were 
found  guilty,  he  had  them  promptly  executed, 
after  having  changed  the  sentence  in  Ambrister ’s 
case  from  mere  flogging  to  the  penalty  of  death  by 
shooting;  he  took  Pensacola  on  his  way  home, 
deposed  the  Spanish  governor,  appointed  a new 
one,  left  a garrison  there,  and  conducted  himself 
throughout  as  a victorious  general  with  absolute 
power  in  a conquered  country,  like  a Roman  pro- 
consul  in  a subjugated  province. 

When  the  news  arrived  in  Washington,  the  Pre- 
sident and  the  cabinet  were  astonished  and  per- 
plexed. Except  Adams,  who  was  always  inclined 
to  take  the  highest  ground  for  his  country  against 
any  foreign  power,  they  all  agreed  that  General 
Jackson  had  gone  far  beyond  his  instructions  and 
done  lawless  things.  Calhoun,  the  secretary  of  war, 
thought  that  the  general  should  promptly  be  held 
to  a severe  account.  But  they  shrunk  from  affront- 
ing the  “hero  of  New  Orleans.”  The  administra- 
tion finally  concluded  to  restore  to  the  Spaniards 
possession  of  the  forts  taken  by  General  Jackson, 
and  to  affirm  that  the  capture  of  those  places  by 
Jackson  and  his  conduct  generally  were  justified, 
on  the  principle  of  self-defense,  by  the  hostile 
attitude  of  the  Spanish  governors,  thus  denying 
that  any  warlike  step  had  been  taken  against  Spain 
while  at  the  same  time  making  a case  against  her 
officers. 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  153 


On  January  16,  1819,  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives began  the  discussion  of  a resolution  reported 
by  its  military  committee,  “disapproving  the  pro- 
ceedings in  the  trial  of  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister,” 
to  which  three  further  resolutions  were  added,  de- 
claring the  seizure  of  Pensacola  and  Fort  Barran- 
cas to  have  been  contrary  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and  calling  for  appropriate 
legislation.  A debate  of  three  weeks  followed,  in 
which  Clay  was  the  most  prominent  figure  on  the 
anti-Jackson  side.  He  had  no  personal  feeling 
against  General  Jackson.  On  the  contrary,  he 
was  sincerely  and  profoundly  grateful  to  the  man 
who,  after  all  the  disgraceful  failures  of  the  war 
of  1812,  had  so  brilliantly  restored  the  lustre  of 
the  American  arms,  and  enabled  him  to  “go  to 
England  without  mortification.”  But  as  a friend 
of  constitutional  government  he  felt  that  he  could 
not  possibly  approve  of  the  general’s  lawless  con- 
duct in  Florida.  There  is  no  reason  to  attribute 
the  position  he  took  to  any  but  conscientious  mo- 
tives. But  he  was  an  aspirant  to  the  presidency, 
and  known  to  be  such,  while  Jackson,  too,  was 
beginning  to  be  whispered  about  as  a possible  can- 
didate for  that  honor.  Would  not  a frank  expres- 
sion of  his  views  on  Jackson’s  conduct  appear  like 
an  attempt  to  injure  a dreaded  rival?  It  dawned 
upon  him  that  his  unnecessary  flings  at  the  Monroe 
administration  had  subjected  his  motives  to  suspi- 
cion, and  thus,  while  attacking,  he  felt  himself  on 
the  defensive.  He  began  with  an  almost  painful 


154 


HENRY  CLAY 


effort  to  retrieve  the  ground  which  he  feared  that 
he  had  lost  in  the  confidence  of  the  House  and  the 
country : — 

“ In  rising  to  address  you,  sir,  I must  be  allowed  to 
say,  that  all  inferences,  drawn  from  the  course  which  it 
will  be  my  painful  duty  to  take  in  this  discussion,  of 
unfriendliness  either  to  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  coun- 
try, or  to  the  illustrious  military  chieftain  whose  opera- 
tions are  under  investigation,  will  be  wholly  unfounded. 
Toward  that  distinguished  captain  who  shed  so  much 
glory  on  our  country,  whose  renown  constitutes  so  great 
a portion  of  its  moral  property,  I never  had,  I never  can 
have,  any  other  feelings  than  those  of  the  most  profound 
respect  and  of  the  utmost  kindness.  I know  the  mo- 
tives which  have  been,  and  will  again  be,  attributed  to 
me  in  regard  to  the  other  exalted  personage  alluded  to. 
They  have  been  and  they  will  be  unfounded.  I have  no 
interest  other  than  that  of  seeing  the  concerns  of  my 
country  well  and  happily  administered.  Rather  than 
throw  obstructions  in  the  way  of  the  President,  I would 
precede  him  and  pick  out  those,  if  I could,  which  might 
jostle  him  in  his  progress.  I may  be  again  reluctantly 
compelled  to  differ  from  him,  but  I will  with  the  utmost 
sincerity  assure  the  committee  that  I have  formed  no 
resolution,  come  under  no  engagements,  and  that  I never 
will  form  any  resolution,  or  contract  any  engagements, 
for  systematic  opposition  to  his  administration,  or  to 
that  of  any  other  chief  magistrate.” 

This  might  have  been  sufficient  to  disarm  sus- 
picion, had  he  not  been  believed  to  have  an  eye 
toward  the  presidency. 

He  arraigned  General  Jackson’s  conduct  with 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  155 


dignity  and  a certain  degree  of  moderation.  He 
emphatically  acquitted  him  of  uany  intention  to 
violate  the  laws  of  his  country,  or  the  obligations 
of  humanity.”  He  declared  himself  far  from  wish- 
ing to  intimate  that  “General  Jackson  cherished 
any  design  inimical  to  the  liberties  of  the  people.” 
He  believed  the  general’s  “ intentions  to  be  pure 
and  patriotic.”  But  he  denounced  the  hanging  of 
Indian  chiefs  without  trial,  “ under  color  of  retalia- 
tion,” as  utterly  unjustifiable  and  disgraceful. 
He  admitted  retaliation  as  justifiable  only  when 
“ calculated  to  produce  an  effect  in  the  war,”  but 
never  on  the  motive  of  mere  vengeance.  As  to 
Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister,  whether  they  were  in- 
nocent or  guilty,  he  utterly  rejected  the  argument 
by  which  J ackson  tried  to  justify  their  execution, 
namely,  “that  it  is  an  established  principle  of  the 
law  of  nations,  that  any  individual  of  a nation, 
making  war  against  the  citizens  of  any  other  na- 
tion, they  being  at  peace,  forfeits  his  allegiance, 
and  becomes  an  outlaw  and  a pirate.”  He  main- 
tained that,  “whatever  may  be  the  character  of 
individuals  making  private  war,  the  principle  is 
totally  erroneous  when  applied  to  such  individuals 
associated  with  a power,  whether  Indian  or  civil- 
ized, capable  of  maintaining  the  relations  of  peace 
or  war.”  He  showed  that  Jackson’s  doctrine 
would  make  every  foreign  subject  serving  in  an 
American  army  an  outlaw  and  a pirate ; he  might 
have  cited  Lafayette  and  Steuben.  This  was  the 
moral  he  drew : — 


15G 


HENRY  CLAY 


“ However  guilty  these  men  were,  they  should  not  have 
been  condemned  or  executed  without  the  authority  of 
law.  I will  not  dwell  on  the  effect  of  these  prece- 
dents in  foreign  countries,  but  I shall  not  pass  unnoticed 
their  dangerous  influence  in  our  own.  Bad  examples 
are  generally  set  in  the  case  of  bad  men,  and  often  re- 
mote from  the  central  government.  It  was  in  the  pro- 
vinces that  were  laid  the  seeds  of  the  ambitious  projects 
which  overturned  the  liberties  of  Rome.” 

He  affirmed  that  Jackson,  going  far  beyond  the 
spirit  of  his  instructions,  had  not  only  assumed, 
by  an  unauthorized  construction  of  his  own,  to 
determine  what  Spain  was  bound  by  treaty  to  do, 
but  had  “also  assumed  the  power,  belonging  to 
Congress  alone,  of  determining  what  should  be  the 
effect  and  consequence  of  her  breach  of  engage- 
ment;” that  then  he  had  seized  the  Spanish  forts 
and  thus  usurped  the  power  of  making  war,  which 
the  Constitution  had  “ expressly  and  exclusively” 
vested  in  Congress,  “to  guard  our  country  against 
precisely  that  species  of  rashness  which  has  been 
manifested  in  Florida.”  A glowing  peroration 
followed,  protesting  against  “the  alarming  doc- 
trine of  unlimited  discretion  in  our  military  com- 
manders,” and  pointing  out  how  other  free  nations, 
from  antiquity  down,  had  lost  their  liberties,  and 
how  we  might  lose  ours.  “Are  former  services,” 
he  exclaimed,  “howTever  eminent,  to  preclude  even 
inquiry  into  recent  conduct?  Is  there  to  be  no 
limit,  no  prudential  bounds  to  the  national  grati- 
tude? I hope  gentlemen  will  deliberately  survey 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  157 


the  awful  isthmus  on  which  we  stand.  They  may 
bear  down  all  opposition ; they  may  even  vote  the 
general  the  public  thanks;  they  may  carry  him 
triumphantly  through  this  House.  But  if  they  do 
so,  it  will  be  a triumph  of  the  principle  of  insubor- 
dination, a triumph  of  the  military  over  the  civil 
authority,  a triumph  over  the  powers  of  this  House, 
a triumph  over  the  Constitution  of  the  land.  And 
I pray  most  devoutly  to  Heaven  that  it  may  not 
prove,  in  its  ultimate  effects  and  consequences,  a 
triumph  over  the  liberties  of  the  people.” 

It  was  a fine  speech  and  much  admired ; bril- 
liant in  diction;  statesmanlike  in  reasoning;  full 
of  stirring  appeals;  also  undoubtedly  right  in  its 
general  drift  of  argument.  But  it  had  some  very 
weak  points.  Clay  had  again  gone  a little  beyond 
what  the  occasion  required;  he  had  attacked,  aside 
from  Jackson’s  conduct  in  Florida,  certain  Indian 
treaties  which  Jackson  had  made,  and  this  attack 
was  based  upon  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  facts. 
Such  flaws  were  exposed,  and  thus  the  impression 
was  created  that  he  had  been  rather  quick  in  mak- 
ing his  assault  without  having  taken  the  trouble 
of  thoroughly  studying  his  case.  In  fact,  he  had 
not  exactly  measured  the  power  which  in  this  in- 
stance he  had  to  deal  with.  It  was  the  popularity 
of  a victorious  soldier. 

A military  “hero”  has  an  immense  advantage 
over  ordinary  mortals,  especially  in  a country 
where  the  military  hero  is  a rare  character.  The 
achievements  of  statesmen  usually  remain  subject 


158 


HENRY  CLAY 


to  differences  of  opinion.  A victory  on  the  field 
of  battle  won  for  the  country  is  a title  to  public 
gratitude,  seldom  to  be  questioned  by  anybody. 
It  is  a matter  of  common  pride.  It  lives  in  the 
imagination  of  the  people.  That  imagination  is 
apt  to  attribute  to  the  hero  of  such  a victory  an 
abundance  of  other  good  qualities.  His  failings 
are  judged  with  leniency.  To  many  it  appears 
almost  sacrilegious  to  think  that  a man  who  has 
rendered  his  country  service  so  valuable  in  the 
crisis  of  war  should  ever  be  able  to  act  upon  any 
but  the  most  patriotic  motives.  It  will  require  an 
extraordinary  degree  of  wrong-doing  on  his  part 
to  make  suspicion  and  criticism  with  regard  to  him 
acceptable  to  the  popular  mind;  and  even  then  he 
is  apt  to  be  easily  forgiven. 

General  Jackson  enjoyed  this  advantage  in  the 
highest  degree.  He  had  given  the  American  peo- 
ple a brilliant  victory  when  it  was  most  needed  to 
soothe  the  popular  pride.  Would  he  disgrace  and 
endanger  the  republic  after  having  so  magnificently 
fought  for  it?  To  convince  the  people,  and  to 
make  Congress  declare  that  he  had  done  so,  would 
have  required  a very  calm  and  careful  presentation 
of  the  case,  moving  from  point  to  point  of  the  alle- 
gation, and  proving  every  position  with  evidence 
so  conclusive  as  to  extort  a verdict  of  guilty  from 
ever  so  unwilling  a jury.  Even  then  the  result 
would  not  have  been  certain.  But  any  argument 
not  absolutely  irrefutable;  any  arraignment  having 
in  it  the  smallest  flaw ; any  appeal  proceeding  in 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  159 


the  slightest  degree  upon  a mere  assumption  of 
fact,  was  sure  to  be  drowned  by  a cry  far  more 
powerful  than  any  oratorical  declamation,  — the 
battle  of  New  Orleans.  So  it  was  in  this  instance. 
The  hero  of  New  Orleans  could  not  have  intended, 
he  could  not  have  done,  any  wrong.  At  any  rate, 
he  had  full  absolution  for  what  he  had  done,  per- 
haps also  for  what  he  might  do  in  the  future,  and 
the  resolutions  disapproving  his  conduct  were  voted 
down  by  heavy  majorities. 

Thus  was  Henry  Clay  defeated  in  his  first  en- 
counter with  Andrew  Jackson.  The  great  duel 
had  begun  which  was  to  embitter  the  best  part  of 
Clay’s  life.  His  war  of  1812  had  put  the  military 
hero  into  his  way,  and  a military  hero,  too,  of  the 
most  exasperating  kind ; a hero  who  would  not  be 
conciliated  by  a mere  recognition  of  his  good  in- 
tentions; who  demanded  absolute  compliance  with 
his  will,  and  who  treated  any  one  finding  fault 
with  him  as  little  better  than  “an  outlaw  and  a 
pirate;  ” a hero  who  not  seldom  made  Clay  almost 
despair  of  the  republic.  The  case  was  indeed  not 
as  desperate  as  Clay  sometimes  feared.  Victorious 
generals  begin  to  become  really  dangerous  to  re- 
publican institutions  when  a large  portion  of  the 
people  are  tired  of  popular  liberty.  It  is  true, 
however,  that  their  peculiarly  privileged  position 
before  the  popular  mind  may  put  those  institutions 
at  all  times  to  temporary  strain,  and  facilitate  the 
establishment  of  precedents  prolific  of  evil. 

For  the  present  General  Jackson,  “vindicated” 


160 


HENRY  CLAY 


by  the  House  of  Representatives,  was  received 
wherever  he  went  with  great  enthusiasm,  and  was 
“thought  of  in  connection  with  the  presidency,” 
not  only  as  a hero,  but  as  a persecuted  hero.  At 
the  same  time  Clay’s  star  seemed  to  be  somewhat 
obscured.  The  impression  that  his  disappointment 
with  regard  to  the  secretaryship  of  state  had  led 
him  to  make  a factious  opposition  to  the  adminis- 
tration had  lowered  him  in  the  estimation  of  many 
men.  This  impression  had  become  so  general  as 
to  make  his  reasons  for  permitting  now  and  then 
an  administration  measure  to  pass  unchallenged  a 
matter  of  gossiping  speculation.  A striking  in- 
stance of  this  is  found  in  Mr.  Adams’s  Diary, 
where  Mr.  Middleton  of  South  Carolina  is  intro- 
duced as  telling  the  story,  that  Clay  neglected  to 
oppose  a certain  bill  because  “the  last  fortnight 
of  the  session  Clay  spent  almost  every  night  at  the 
card  table,  and  one  night  Poindexter  had  won  of 
him  eight  thousand  dollars.  This  discomposed 
him  to  such  a degree  that  he  paid  no  attention  to 
the  business  of  the  House  the  remainder  of  the 
session.  Before  it  closed,  however,  he  had  won 
back  from  Poindexter  all  that  lie  had  lost,  except 
about  nine  hundred  dollars.”  Whether  this  story 
in  all  its  details  was  true  or  not,  certain  it  is  that 
Clay  at  that  period  spent  far  more  time  at  the 
card  table  than  was  good  for  his  reputation.  In- 
deed, Nathan  Sargent  says  in  his  recollections 
(“Public  Men  and  Events”):  “When  a candidate 
for  the  presidency,  Mr.  Clay  was  denounced  as  a 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  161 


gambler.  He  was  no  more  a gambler  than  was 
almost  every  Southern  and  Southwestern  gentleman 
of  that  day.  Play  was  a passion  with  them;  it 
was  a social  enjoyment;  they  loved  its  excitement, 
and  they  played  whenever  and  wherever  they  met ; 
not  for  the  purpose  of  winning  money  of  one  an- 
other, which  is  the  gambler’s  motive,  but  for  the 
pleasure  it  gave  them.  They  bet  high  as  a matter 
of  pride  and  to  give  interest  to  the  game.”  But 
Clay  himself  felt  that  his  habits  in  that  respect 
had  been  unfavorably  noticed.  Soon  afterwards, 
in  a speech  in  the  House,  he  referred  by  way  of 
illustration  to  games  of  chance,  as  “an  amusement 
which  in  early  life  he  had  sometimes  indulged  in, 
but  which  years  and  experience  had  determined 
him  to  renounce.”  To  a man  of  Clay’s  standing 
before  the  country  there  was  a keen  self-humilia- 
tion in  a remark  like  this,  and  he  would  hardly 
have  made  it,  had  he  not  thought  something  like 
a promise  of  better  conduct  urgently  called  for. 
The  promise  referred,  however,  only  to  “games  of 
chance,”  for  whist  seemed  to  maintain  an  almost 
irresistible  charm  over  him,  except  in  his  own 
house  at  Ashland,  where  no  card  playing  was 
allowed. 

Clay’s  political  standing  was  so  much  shaken 
that  about  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the  sixteenth 
Congress,  in  December,  1819,  several  members  of 
the  House  went  to  President  Monroe  to  consult 
with  him  as  to  whether  it  would  be  advisable  to 
displace  Clay  as  speaker.  Adams  says  in  his  Diary 


162 


HENRY  CLAY 


that  Monroe  advised  against  it,  partly  because  such 
a movement  would  increase  Clay’s  importance, 
partly  because  Clay’s  course  had  injured  his  own 
influence  more  than  that  of  the  administration,  and 
partly  because,  as  there  was  no  Western  man  in 
the  cabinet,  it  was  a matter  of  pride  with  that  part 
of  the  country  to  have  a Western  man  in  the  speak- 
er’s chair,  and  there  was  no  Western  man  of  suffi- 
cient eminence  to  be  put  in  competition  with  Clay. 
44 In  all  this,”  wrote  Adams,  44 1 think  the  Presi- 
dent has  acted  and  spoken  wisely.”  It  was  indeed 
wisely  spoken,  for,  had  a contest  been  made,  it 
would  after  all  have  appeared  that  most  of  the 
members  of  the  House,  although  they  voted  against 
Clay  time  and  again  in  his  opposition  to  the  ad- 
ministration, were  proud  of  the  lustre  his  brilliant 
abilities  shed  upon  the  House,  believed  in  his 
patriotism,  and  liked  the  gay,  spirited,  dashing 
Kentuckian  as  a man.  So  he  was,  on  the  first  day 
of  the  session,  December  6, 1819,  reelected  speaker 
virtually  without  opposition. 

Before  long  he  was  up  in  arms  against  the  ad- 
ministration again.  After  long  and  arduous  nego- 
tiation, Mr.  Adams  had,  in  February,  1819,  con- 
cluded a treaty  with  the  Spanish  minister,  which 
provided  for  the  cession  of  the  whole  of  Florida 
to  this  republic,  fixed  the  southwestern  boundary 
line  of  the  United  States  along  the  Sabine  River 
(thus  excluding  Texas),  expunged  the  claims  of 
Spanish  subjects  against  the  United  States,  and 
provided  that  the  United  States,  as  a compensation 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  163 


for  the  cession  of  Florida,  should  undertake  to 
settle  the  claims  of  American  citizens  against  Spain 
to  an  amount  not  exceeding  $5,000,000.  The 
treaty  was  unanimously  approved  by  the  Senate ; 
but  the  King  of  Spain,  faithlessly  it  was  thought, 
withheld  his  ratification  of  it,  which  ratification 
should  have  taken  place  within  six  months.  This 
conduct  produced  an  irritating  effect  in  the  United 
States.  Many  were  in  favor  of  treating  the  whole 
matter  again  as  an  open  one.  The  proposition  to 
take  forcible  possession  of  Florida  was  freely  dis- 
cussed and  widely  approved,  and  a bill  to  that 
effect  was  introduced  in  Congress.  Then  the  news 
arrived  that  the  Spanish  government  had  sent  a 
new  minister.  Under  these  circumstances  Monroe 
addressed  a special  message  to  Congress,  on  March 
27,  1820,  mentioning  the  friendly  interest  taken 
in  the  matter  by  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  — 
England,  Russia,  and  France;  expressing  the  hope 
that,  in  response  to  their  solicitations,  the  King  of 
Spain  would  soon  ratify  the  treaty,  and  suggesting 
that  Congress  for  the  time  being  should  postpone 
action  on  the  matter. 

This  brought  Clay  to  his  feet.  He  took  the 
ground  that,  as  the  King  of  Spain  had  not  ratified 
it  within  the  prescribed  time,  the  whole  treaty  had 
fallen,  and  that  it  ought  not  to  be  renewed,  mainly 
because  it  had,  by  accepting  the  Sabine  as  the 
southwestern  boundary  line,  instead  of  insisting 
upon  the  Rio  Grande  del  Norte,  surrendered  to 
Spain  a large  and  valuable  territory  belonging  to 


164 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  United  States,  namely  Texas.  It  had  indeed 
been  a disputed  question  whether  the  limits  of 
Louisiana  did  not  embrace  Texas.  If  so,  Texas 
belonged  by  purchase  to  the  United  States;  if  not, 
it  was  considered  part  of  the  Spanish  American 
territory.  Adams,  in  making  his  treaty,  had  only 
reluctantly  given  up  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande 
del  Norte,  and  accepted  that  of  the  Sabine;  he 
might  have  carried  his  point,  had  not  Monroe, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  rest  of  the  cabinet, 
desired  the  Sabine  as  a boundary  for  peculiar 
reasons.  In  a letter  to  General  Jackson  he  said: 
“ Having  long  known  the  repugnance  with  which 
the  eastern  portion  of  our  Union  have  seen  its 
aggrandizement  to  the  west  and  south,  I have  been 
decidedly  of  opinion  that  we  ought  to  be  content 
with  Florida  for  the  present.”  It  was,  therefore, 
in  deference  to  what  Monroe  understood  to  be 
northeastern  sentiment  that  Texas  was  given  up, 
and  it  was  the  abandonment  of  Tekas  which  Clay 
put  forward  as  a decisive  reason  for  not  renewing 
the  Spanish  treaty. 

He  introduced  two  resolutions  in  the  House: 
one  asserting  that  no  treaty  making  a cession  of 
territory  was  valid  without  the  concurrence  of 
Congress;  and  the  other,  substantially,  that  the 
cession  of  Florida  to  the  United  States  was  not  an 
“ adequate  equivalent  ” for  the  “ transfer  ” of  Texas 
by  the  United  States  to  Spain.  In  support  of 
these  resolutions  he  made  a fiery  speech,  fiercely 
castigating  the  administration  for  truckling  to  for- 


IN  TIIE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  1G5 


eign  powers,  and  extolling  the  value  of  Texas, 
which  he  stoutly  assumed  to  belong  to  the  United 
States  under  the  Louisiana  purchase.  Texas  was, 
in  his  opinion,  much  more  valuable  than  Florida. 
Even  if  the  treaty  were  not  renewed,  Florida 
would  surely  drop  into  our  lap  at  last,  but  Texas 
might  escape  us.  Lowndes  answered,  as  to  the 
first  resolution,  that,  if  the  principle  asserted  by 
Clay  were  admitted  in  its  whole  breadth,  the  treaty- 
making power  under  the  Constitution  (the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Senate)  would  no  longer  have  author- 
ity to  make  a treaty  for  a boundary  rectification, 
which  almost  always  involved  a cession  of  territory 
on  one  side  or  the  other;  and,  as  to  the  second 
resolution,  that  Texas  had  always  been  considered 
by  the  United  States  as  a debatable  territory,  and 
it  had  been  given  up  as  such,  not  as  a territory 
clearly  belonging  to  this  republic. 

Clay’s  resolutions  failed.  The  King  of  Spain 
finally  ratified  the  treaty,  the  Senate  reaffirmed  it 
by  all  except  four  votes,  and  it  was  proclaimed  by 
Monroe,  February  22,  1821.  But  Clay  had  made 
his  mark  as  maintaining  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  Texas.  How  little  could  he  then  foresee 
what  a fateful  part  the  acquisition  of  Texas  was  to 
play  twenty -four  years  later  in  his  public  career ! 

The  miscarriage  of  his  opposition  to  the  Spanish 
treaty  did  not  deter  him  from  renewing  his  efforts 
for  the  South  American  colonies.  On  May  20, 
1820,  he  spoke  to  a resolution  he  had  moved,  de- 
claring it  expedient  to  provide  outfits  and  salaries 


166 


HENRY  CLAY 


for  a minister  or  ministers  to  be  sent  to  “any  of 
the  governments  in  South  America  which  have 
established  and  are  maintaining  their  independence 
of  Spain.”  His  attacks  became  more  virulent. 
For  instance:  “If  Lord  Castlereagh  says  we  may 
recognize,  we  do;  if  not,  we  do  not.  A single 
expression  of  the  British  minister  to  the  present 
secretary  of  state,  then  our  minister  abroad,  I am 
ashamed  to  say,  has  moulded  the  policy  of  our 
government  toward  South  America.”  In  the  same 
speech  he  furnished  a picture  of  the  character  of 
the  South  American  people  and  their  future  rela- 
tions with  the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  his 
imagination  painted  it.  “That  country  has  now 
a population  of  eighteen  millions.  The  same  ac- 
tivity in  the  principle  of  population  would  exist  in 
that  country  as  here.  Twenty-five  years  hence, 
it  might  be  estimated  at  thirty-six  millions;  fifty 
years  hence,  at  seventy-two.  We  have  now  a pop- 
ulation of  ten  millions.  From  the  character  of 
our  population  we  must  always  take  the  lead  in 
commerce  and  manufactures.  Imagine  the  vast 
power  of  the  two  countries,  and  the  value  of  the 
intercourse  between  them,  when  we  shall  have  a 
population  of  forty,  and  they  of  seventy  millions ! ” 
The  fifty  years  are  over,  and  we  have  had  ample 
opportunity  to  appreciate  this  forecast.  As  to 
their  political  capabilities,  too,  he  entertained 
glowing  expectations.  “Some  gentlemen,”  he 
said,  “had  intimated  that  the  people  of  the  south 
were  unfit  for  freedom.  In  some  particulars,  he 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  167 


ventured  to  say,  the  people  of  South  America  were 
in  advance  of  us.  Grenada,  Venezuela,  and  Buenos 
Ayres  had  all  emancipated  their  slaves ; — [recol- 
lecting himself]  — he  did  not  say  that  we  ought  to 
do  so,  or  that  they  ought  to  have  done  so  under 
different  circumstances,  but  he  rejoiced  that  the 
circumstances  were  such  as  to  permit  them  to  do 
it.” 

His  resolution  passed  by  80  yeas  to  75  nays,  but 
the  administration,  which  was  then  still  occupied 
with  the  Spanish  treaty,  did  not  stir.  Clay  re- 
turned to  the  charge  in  February,  1821,  when  he 
moved  directly  an  appropriation  for  the  sending  of 
a minister  or  ministers  to  South  America,  which 
was  defeated  by  a small  majority,  owing  probably 
to  the  arrival  at  that  time  of  the  ratification  of  the 
Spanish  treaty  by  the  king.  But,  nothing  daunted, 
he  was  up  again  shortly  afterwards  with  a resolu- 
tion “that  the  House  of  Representatives  partici- 
pates with  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  the 
deep  interest  which  they  feel  for  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces of  South  America,  which  are  struggling  to 
establish  their  liberty  and  independence,  and  that 
it  will  give  its  constitutional  support  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  whenever  he  may  deem 
it  expedient  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence of  any  of  the  said  provinces.”  This 
resolution,  being  mainly  a declaration  of  mere 
sentiment,  passed,  the  first  clause  by  134  yeas  to 
12  nays,  and  the  second  by  87  to  68.  A commit- 
tee was  appointed;  at  the  head  of  which  was  Clay 


168 


HENRY  CLAY 


himself,  to  present  this  resolution  to  the  President. 
Still  the  administration  would  not  move  until  a 
year  later,  when  the  ability  of  the  South  American 
republics  to  maintain  their  independence  was  as 
a matter  of  fact  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  On 
March  8,  1822,  Monroe  sent  a message  to  Con- 
gress recommending  the  recognition  of  the  inde- 
pendent South  American  governments,  which  was 
promptly  responded  to. 

Clay’s  efforts  in  behalf  of  this  cause  gave  him 
great  renown  in  South  America.  Some  of  his 
speeches  were  translated  into  Spanish  and  read  at 
the  head  of  the  revolutionary  armies.  His  name 
was  a household  word  among  the  patriots.  In  the 
United  States,  too,  his  fervid  appeals  in  behalf  of 
an  oppressed  people  fighting  for  their  liberty  awak- 
ened the  memories  of  the  North  American  war  for 
independence,  and  called  forth  strong  emotions  of 
sympathy.  There  is  no  doubt  that  those  appeals 
were  on  his  part  not  a mere  manoeuvre  of  opposi- 
tion, but  came  straight  from  his  generous  impulses. 
The  idea  of  the  whole  American  continent  being 
occupied  by  a great  family  of  republics  naturally 
flattered  his  imagination.  That  imagination  sup- 
plied the  struggling  brethren  with  all  the  excellent 
qualities  he  desired  them  to  possess,  and  his  chiv- 
alrous nature  was  impatient  to  rush  to  their  aid. 
This  tendency  was  reinforced  by  his  general  apt- 
ness to  take  a somewhat  superficial  view  of  things, 
and,  as  is  often  the  case  with  men  of  the  oratorical 
temperament,  to  persuade  himself  with  the  gor- 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  1G9 


geous  flow  of  his  own  rhetoric.  That  his  own 
thoughts  appear  to  him  originally  in  the  seductive 
garb  of  sonorous  phrase  is  a source  of  serious 
danger  to  the  oratorical  statesman.  The  influence 
which  his  embittered  feeling  towards  the  adminis- 
tration had  on  Clay’s  conduct  was  simply  to  make 
him  more  inaccessible  to  the  prudential  reasons 
which  the  administration  had  for  its  dilatory  pol- 
icy. There  was  indeed  a fundamental  difference 
of  views  between  them.  The  administration  had 
the  Spanish  treaty  much  at  heart,  and  would  not 
permit  the  recognition  of  the  Spanish  American 
republics  to  complicate  that  transaction.  Clay 
wanted  his  country  to  possess  all  it  could  obtain, 
and  as  he  thought  that  Florida  would  some  time 
drop  into  tlie  lap  of  the  United  States  in  any 
event,  and  as  the  Spanish  treaty  relinquished  the 
claim  to  Texas,  it  was  from  his  point  of  view  the 
correct  thing  to  hasten  the  recognition  of  the  South 
American  republics  and  thereby  to  defeat  the  Span- 
ish treaty. 

There  was  also  a great  difference  of  opinion  as 
to  the  character  of  the  South  American  revolution. 
Adams  gives  in  his  Diary  an  account  of  an  inter- 
view between  him  and  Clay  in  March,  1821,  at 
which  an  interesting  conversation  took  place. 

“ I regretted  (he  wrote)  the  difference  between  his 
[Clay’s]  views  and  those  of  the  administration  upon 
South  American  affairs.  That  the  final  issue  of  their 
present  struggle  would  be  their  entire  independence  of 
Spain  I had  never  doubted.  That  it  was  our  true  policy 


170 


HENRY  CLAY 


and  duty  to  take  no  part  in  the  contest  was  equally 
clear.  The  principle  of  neutrality  in  all  foreign  wars 
was,  in  my  opinion,  fundamental  to  the  continuance  of 
our  liberties  and  our  Union.  So  far  as  they  were  con- 
tending for  independence  I wished  well  to  their  cause ; 
but  I had  seen,  and  yet  see,  no  prospect  that  they  would 
establish  free  or  liberal  institutions  of  government. 
They  are  not  likely  to  promote  the  spirit  either  of  free- 
dom or  order  by  their  example.  They  have  not  the 
first  elements  of  free  or  good  government.  Arbitrary 
power,  military  and  ecclesiastical,  was  stamped  upon 
their  education,  upon  their  habits,  and  upon  all  their  in- 
stitutions. Civil  dissension  was  infused  into  all  their 
seminal  principles.  War  and  mutual  destruction  was 
in  every  member  of  their  organization,  moral,  political, 
and  physical.  I had  little  expectation  of  any  beneficial 
result  to  this  country  from  any  future  connection  with 
them,  political  or  commercial.  We  should  derive  no 
improvement  to  our  own  institutions  by  any  communion 
with  theirs.  Nor  was  there  any  appearance  of  any  dis- 
position in  them  to  take  any  political  lesson  from  us. 
As  to  the  commercial  connection,  there  was  no  basis  for 
much  traffic  between  us.  They  want  none  of  our  pro- 
ductions, and  we  could  afford  to  purchase  very  few  of 
theirs.  Of  these  opinions,  both  his  and  mine,  time  must 
be  the  test.” 

This  kind  of  reasoning  appeared  painfully  cold 
by  the  side  of  Clay’s  glowing  periods.  But  it 
must  be  confessed  that  Adams’s  prognostications 
have,  in  the  main,  stood  the  test  of  time  far  better 
than  Clay’s.  It  seems  that  Clay  then  did  not 
command  sufficient  information  to  answer  such 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  171 


arguments,  for  we  find  it  recorded  that  when  Adams 
had  finished  his  lecture,  Clay  “did  not  pursue  the 
discussion.”  Neither  would  he,  at  that  moment, 
have  believed  the  prediction,  if  anybody  had  made 
it,  that  only  four  years  later  he  and  Adams,  as 
members  of  the  same  administration,  would  bear 
a common  responsibility  and  suffer  the  same  re- 
proach for  a common  policy  friendly  to  the  Spanish 
American  republics. 

At  any  rate,  a popular  vein  had  been  struck  by 
his  speeches  in  behalf  of  a foreign  people.  But 
he  strengthened  his  reputation  and  political  stand- 
ing more  substantially  by  his  efforts  to  avert  a 
danger  which  threatened  the  disruption  of  his  own 
country. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 

On  March  6,  1818,  a petition  was  presented  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  praying  that  Missouri 
be  admitted  as  a State.  A bill  authorizing  the 
people  of  Missouri  to  form  a state  government  was 
taken  up  in  the  House  on  February  18,  1819,  and 
Tallmadge  of  New  York  moved  as  an  amendment, 
that  the  further  introduction  of  slavery  should  be 
prohibited,  and  that  all  children  born  within  the 
said  State  should  be  free  at  the  age  of  twenty-five 
years.  Thus  began  the  struggle  on  the  slavery 
question  in  connection  with  the  admission  of  Mis- 
souri, which  lasted,  intermittently,  until  March, 
1821. 

No  sooner  had  the  debate  on  Tallmadge’s  propo- 
sition begun  than  it  became  clear  that  the  philo- 
sophical anti-slavery  sentiment  of  the  revolutionary 
period  had  entirely  ceased  to  have  any  influence 
upon  current  thought  in  the  South.  The  abolition 
of  the  foreign  slave  trade  had  not,  as  had  been 
hoped,  prepared  the  way  for  the  abolition  of  sla- 
very or  weakened  the  slave  interest  in  any  sense. 
On  the  contrary,  slavery  had  been  immensely 
strengthened  by  an  economic  development  making 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


173 


it  more  profitable  than  it  ever  had  been  before. 
The  invention  of  the  cotton  gin  by  Eli  Whitney 
in  1793  had  made  the  culture  of  cotton  a very 
productive  source  of  wealth.  In  1800  the  ex- 
portation of  cotton  from  the  United  States  was 
19,000,000  pounds,  valued  at  15,700,000.  In 
1820  the  value  of  the  cotton  export  was  nearly 
$20,000,000,  almost  all  of  it  the  product  of  slave 
labor.  The  value  of  slaves  may  be  said  to  have 
at  least  trebled  in  twenty  years.  The  breeding  of 
slaves  became  a profitable  industry.  Under  such 
circumstances  the  slaveholders  arrived  at  the  con- 
clusion that  slavery  was  by  no  means  so  wicked 
and  hurtful  an  institution  as  their  Revolutionary 
fathers  had  thought  it  to  be.  The  anti-slavery 
professions  of  the  Revolutionary  time  became  to 
them  an  awkward  reminiscence,  which  they  would 
have  been  glad  to  wipe  from  their  own  and  other 
people’s  memories. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Northern  States  there 
was  no  such  change  of  feeling.  Slavery  was  still, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  believed  to  be  a wrong 
and  a sore.  The  change  of  sentiment  in  the  South 
had  not  yet  produced  its  reflex  in  the  North.  The 
slavery  question  had  not  become  a subject  of  dif- 
ference of  opinion  and  of  controversy  among  the 
Northern  people.  As  they  had  abolished  slavery 
in  their  States,  so  they  took  it  for  granted  that  it 
ought  to  disappear,  and  would  disappear  in  time, 
everywhere  else.  Slavery  had  indeed,  now  and 
then,  asserted  itself  in  the  discussions  of  Congress 


174 


HENRY  CLAY 


as  a distinct  interest,  but  not  in  such  a way  as 
to  arouse  much  alarm  in  the  free  States.  The 
amendment  to  the  Missouri  bill,  providing  for  a 
restriction  with  regard  to  slavery,  came  therefore 
in  a perfectly  natural  way  from  that  Northern 
sentiment  which  remained  still  faithful  to  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  Revolutionary  period.  And  it  was 
a great  surprise  to  most  Northern  people  that  so 
natural  a proposition  should  be  so  fiercely  resisted 
on  the  part  of  the  South.  It  was  the  sudden  reve- 
lation of  a change  of  feeling  in  the  South  which 
the  North  had  not  observed  in  its  progress.  “The 
discussion  of  this  Missouri  question  has  betrayed 
the  secret  of  their  souls,”  wrote  John  Quincy 
Adams.  The  slaveholders  watched  with  apprehen- 
sion the  steady  growth  of  the  free  States  in  popu- 
lation, wealth,  and  power.  In  1790  the  popula- 
tion of  the  two  sections  had  been  nearly  even.  In 
1820  there  was  a difference  of  over  600,000  in 
favor  of  the  North  in  a total  of  less  than  ten  mil- 
lions. In  1790  the  representation  of  the  two  sec- 
tions in  Congress  had  been  about  evenly  balanced. 
In  1820  the  census  promised  to  give  the  North  a 
preponderance  of  more  than  thirty  votes  in  the 
House  of  Representatives.  As  the  slaveholders 
had  no  longer  the  ultimate  extinction,  but  now  the 
perpetuation,  of  slavery  in  view,  the  question  of 
sectional  power  became  one  of  first  importance  to 
them,  and  with  it  the  necessity  of  having  more 
slave  States  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the 
political  equilibrium  at  least  in  the  Senate.  A 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


175 


straggle  for  more  slave  States  was  to  them  a strug- 
gle for  life.  This  was  the  true  significance  of  the 
Missouri  question. 

The  debate  was  the  prototype  of  all  the  slavery 
debates  which  followed  in  the  forty  years  to  the 
breaking  out  of  the  civil  war.  One  side  offered 
the  constitutional  argument  that  any  restriction  as 
to  slavery  in  the  admission  of  a new  State  would 
nullify  one  of  the  most  essential  attributes  of  state 
sovereignty  and  break  the  “federal  compact;  ” the 
moral  argument  that  negro  slavery  was  the  most 
beneficial  condition  for  the  colored  race  in  this 
country,  and  for  the  white  race  too,  so  long  as  the 
two  races  must  live  together;  and  the  economic 
argument  that  negro  slavery  was  necessary  to  the 
material  prosperity  of  the  Southern  States,  as 
white  men  could  not  work  in  the  cotton  and  rice 
fields.  The  other  side  offered  the  constitutional 
argument  that  slavery  was  not  directly  recognized 
by  the  Constitution  itself;  that  the  power  of  the 
general  government  to  exclude  slavery  from  the 
territories  had  always  been  recognized,  and  that, 
in  admitting  a new  State,  conditions  of  admission 
could  be  imposed  upon  it ; the  moral  argument  that 
slavery  was  a great  wrong  in  itself,  and  that  in  its 
effects  it  demoralized  the  whites  together  with  the 
blacks;  and  the  economic  argument  that,  wherever 
it  went,  it  degraded  labor,  paralyzed  enterprise 
and  progress,  and  greatly  injured  the  general  in- 
terest. 

No  debate  on  slavery  had  ever  so  stirred  the 


176 


HENRY  CLAY 


passions  to  the  point  of  open  defiance.  The  disso- 
lution of  the  Union,  civil  war,  and  streams  of 
blood  were  freely  threatened  by  Southern  men, 
while  some  anti-slavery  men  declared  themselves 
ready  to  accept  all  these  calamities  rather  than 
the  spread  of  slavery  over  the  territories  yet  free 
from  it.  Neither  was  the  excitement  confined  to 
the  halls  of  Congress.  As  the  reports  of  the 
speeches  made  there  went  over  the  land,  the  people 
were  profoundly  astonished  and  alarmed.  The 
presence  of  a great  danger,  and  a danger,  too, 
springing  from  an  inherent  antagonism  in  the  in- 
stitutions of  the  country,  suddenly  flashed  upon 
their  minds.  They  experienced  something  like  a 
first  violent  shock  of  earthquake,  making  them 
feel  that  the  ground  under  their  very  feet  was  at 
the  mercy  of  volcanic  forces.  It  is  true,  wise  men 
had  foretold  something  like  this,  but  actual  expe- 
rience was  far  more  impressive  than  the  mere  pre- 
diction had  been.  Resolutions  earnestly  demand- 
ing the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  Missouri  were 
passed  by  one  after  another  of  the  Northern  legis- 
latures except  those  of  New  England,  where,  how- 
ever, the  same  sentiment  found  vigorous  expression 
in  numerous  memorials  from  cities  and  towns.  Of 
the  slaveholding  States,  one,  Delaware,  spoke 
through  a unanimous  resolve  of  its  legislature  in 
the  same  sense;  and  even  in  Baltimore  a public 
meeting  protested  against  the  extension  of  slavery. 
But  beyond  these  points  no  anti-slavery  sentiment 
made  itself  heard  in  the  South.  The  legislatures 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


177 


of  Virginia  and  Kentucky  pronounced  loudly  for 
the  admission  of  Missouri  with  slavery,  and  the 
Maryland  legislature  joined  them.  Public  senti- 
ment in  the  other  slave  States  spoke  out  with  equal 
emphasis.  Thus  the  country  found  itself  divided 
geographically  upon  a question  of  vital  importance. 

On  February  16,  1819,  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives adopted  the  amendment  restricting  slavery, 
and  thus  passed  the  Missouri  bill.  But  the  Sen- 
ate, eleven  days  afterwards,  struck  out  the  anti- 
slavery provision  and  sent  the  bill  back  to  the 
House.  A bill  was  then  passed  organizing  the 
Territory  of  Arkansas,  an  amendment  moved  by 
Taylor  of  New  York  prohibiting  the  further  intro- 
duction of  slavery  there  having  been  voted  down. 
Clay  had  opposed  that  amendment  in  a speech  and 
thrown  the  casting  vote  of  the  speaker  adversely 
to  it  on  a motion  to  reconsider.  Thus  slavery  was 
virtually  fastened  on  Arkansas.  But  the  Missouri 
bill  failed  in  the  fifteenth  Congress.  The  popular 
excitement  steadily  increased. 

The  sixteenth  Congress  met  in  December,  1819. 
In  the  Senate  the  admission  of  Missouri  with  sla- 
very was  coupled  with  the  admission  of  Maine,  on 
the  balance-of -power  principle  that  one  free  State 
and  one  slave  State  should  always  be  admitted  at 
the  same  time.  An  amendment  was  moved  abso- 
lutely prohibiting  slavery  in  Missouri,  but  it  was 
voted  down.  Then  Mr.  Thomas,  a senator  from 
Illinois,  on  January  18,  1820,  proposed  that  no 
restriction  as  to  slavery  be  imposed  upon  Missouri 


178 


HENRY  CLAY 


in  framing  a state  constitution,  but  that  in  all 
the  rest  of  the  country  ceded  by  France  to  the 
United  States  north  of  36°  30',  this  being  the 
southern  boundary  line  of  Missouri,  there  should 
be  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude.  This 
was  the  essence  of  the  famous  Missouri  Compro- 
mise, and  after  long  and  acrimonious  debates  and 
several  more  votes  in  the  House  for  restriction 
and  in  the  Senate  against  it,  this  compromise  was 
adopted.  By  it  the  slave  power  obtained  the  pre- 
sent tangible  object  it  contended  for;  free  labor 
won  a contingent  advantage  in  the  future.  The 
South  was  strongly  bound  together  by  a material 
interest ; it  obeyed  a common  impulse  and  an  in- 
tolerant will,  presenting  a solid  and  determined 
front.  The  Northern  anti-slavery  men  were  held 
together,  not  by  a well  understood  common  inter- 
est, but  by  a sentiment ; and  as  this  sentiment  was 
stronger  or  weaker  in  different  individuals,  they 
would  stand  firm  or  yield  to  the  entreaties  or 
threats  of  the  Southern  men.  Thus  the  bargain 
was  accomplished. 

Clay  has  been  widely  credited  with  being  the 
“ father”  of  the  Missouri  Compromise.  As  to  the 
main  features  of  the  measure  this  credit  he  did 
not  deserve.  So  far  he  had  taken  a prominent  but 
not  an  originating  part  in  the  transaction.  His 
leadership  in  disposing  of  the  Missouri  question 
belonged  to  a later  stage  of  the  proceeding.  But 
the  part  he  had  so  far  taken  appeared  to  be  little 
in  accord  with  his  early  anti-slavery  professions. 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


179 


The  speeches  he  made  in  the  course  of  these  de- 
bates, among  them  one  of  four  hours,  have  never 
been  reported.  But  some  of  the  things  he  said 
we  can  gather  from  the  speeches  of  those  who  re- 
plied to  him.  Thus  we  find  that  he  most  strenu- 
ously opposed  the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  Mis- 
souri, and  any  interference  with  it;  we  find  him 
asserting  that  Congress  had  no  right  whatever  to 
prescribe  conditions  to  newly  organized  States  in 
any  way  restricting  their  “ sovereign  rights;”  we 
find  him  sneering  at  the  advocates  of  slavery  re- 
striction as  afflicted  with  “ negrophobia ; ” we  find 
him  pathetically,  in  the  name  of  humanity,  excus- 
ing the  extension  of  slavery  as  apt  to  improve  the 
condition  of  the  negro,  and  advancing  the  argu- 
ment that  the  evils  of  slavery  might  be  cured  by 
spreading  it ; we  find  him  provoking  a reply  like 
the  following  from  Taylor  of  New  York:  — 


Nv 


“ It  [labor]  is  considered  low  and  unfit  for  freemen. 
I cannot  better  illustrate  this  truth  than  by  referring  to 
a remark  of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Kentucky 
[Mr.  Clay].  I have  often  admired  the  liberality  of  his 
sentiments.  He  is  governed  by  no  vulgar  prejudices  ; 
yet  with  what  abhorrence  did  he  speak  of  the  perform- 
ance, by  your  wives  and  daughters,  of  those  domestic 
offices  which  he  was  pleased  to  call  servile ! What 
comparison  did  he  make  of  the  ‘ black  slaves  9 of  Ken- 
tucky and  the  6 white  slaves 9 of  the  North  ; and  how 
instantly  did  he  strike  a balance  in  favor  of  the  condition 
of  the  former ! If  such  opinions  and  expressions,  even 
in  the  ardor  of  debate,  can  fall  from  that  honorable 


180 


HENRY  CLAY 


gentleman,  what  ideas  do  you  suppose  are  entertained  of 
laboring  men  by  the  majority  of  slaveholders  ! 99 

We  find  him  arguing  that  the  provision  of  the 
Constitution,  “ The  citizens  of  each  State  shall  be 
entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  in  the  several  States,”  would  be  violated 
by  the  restriction  to  be  imposed  on  Missouri  as  to 
slavery. 

The  compromise  as  proposed  he  supported  heart- 
t ily,  and  when  the  bill  embodying  it  had  passed 
we  find  him  resorting  to  a very  sharp  and  question- 
able trick  to  save  it  from  further  interference. 
The  bill  passed  on  March  2.  On  the  morning  of 
March  3,  John  Randolph,  having  voted  with  the 
majority,  offered  a motion  that  the  vote  be  recon- 
sidered. Clay,  as  speaker,  promptly  ruled  the 
motion  out  of  order  u until  the  ordinary  business 
of  the  morning,  as  prescribed  by  the  rules  of  the 
House,  should  be  disposed  of.”  The  House  went 
on  receiving  and  referring  petitions.  When  peti- 
tions were  called  for  from  the  members  from  Vir- 
ginia, Randolph  moved  “that  the  House  retain  in 
their  possession  the  Missouri  bill  until  the  period 
should  arrive  when,  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
House,  a motion  to  reconsider  should  be  in  order.” 
Speaker  Clay  “ declared  this  motion  out  of  order 
for  the  reason  assigned  on  the  first  application  of 
Mr.  Randolph  on  this  day.”  When  the  morning 
business  was  at  last  disposed  of,  Randolph  “ moved 
the  House  now  to  reconsider  their  vote  of  yester- 
day.” Then  Speaker  Clay  — so  the  record  runs  — 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


181 


“ having  ascertained  the  fact,  stated  to  the  House 
that  the  proceedings  of  the  House  on  that  bill 
yesterday  had  been  communicated  to  the  Senate 
by  the  clerk,  and  that,  the  bill  not  being  in  posses- 
sion of  the  House,  the  motion  to  reconsider  could 
not  be  entertained.”  The  bill  had  been  hurried  up 
to  the  Senate  while  Speaker  Clay  was  ruling  Ran- 
dolph’s motions  out  of  order.  It  is  certain  that 
a mere  hint  by  the  speaker  to  the  clerk  would  have 
kept  the  bill  in  the  House.  It  is  also  probable, 
if  not  certain,  that  the  first  motion  by  Randolph, 
being  heard  by  the  clerk,  would  have  had  the  same 
effect,  had  not  that  official  received  a hint  from 
the  speaker,  that  he  desired  the  bill  to  be  hurried 
off,  out  of  Randolph’s  reach.  The  history  of  the 
House  probably  records  no  sharper  trick. 

Thus  it  is  clear  that  Clay,  who  at  the  beginning 
of  his  public  life  had  risked  all  his  political  pro- 
spects by  advocating  emancipation  in  Kentucky, 
now  not  only  favored  a compromise  admitting  a 
new  slave  State,  — some  of  the  sincerest  anti-sla- 
very men  did  that,  — but  in  doing  so  used  some 
of  the  very  arguments  characteristic  of  those  who 
had  worked  themselves  up  to  a belief  in  slavery  as 
a blessing,  and  endeavored  to  strengthen  and  per- 
petuate its  rule. 

Were  these  his  real  sentiments?  Clay’s  conduct 
with  regard  to  the  slavery  question  appears  singu- 
larly inconsistent.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that 
his  condemnations  of  the  system  of  slavery,  and 
his  professions  of  hope  that  it  would  be  extinguished, 


182 


HENRY  CLAY 


were  insincere.  His  feelings  in  this  respect  would 
occasionally  burst  out  in  an  unpremeditated,  un- 
studied, and  unguarded  way,  as  when,  at  this  same 
period,  while  the  Missouri  struggle  was  going  on 
in  all  its  fury,  he  complimented  the  new  South 
American  republics  for  having  emancipated  their 
slaves.  But  the  same  man  would  advocate  “with 
great  force,”  and  “in  a speech  of  considerable 
length,”  a bill  to  facilitate  the  catching  of  “fugi- 
tives from  justice,  and  persons  escaping  from  the 
service  of  their  masters.”  He  would  in  the  Mis- 
souri struggle  “go  with  his  section  ” in  doing  what 
could  be  done  at  the  time  to  secure  the  foothold  of 
slavery  in  new  States,  and  thus  to  facilitate  the 
growth  of  its  power.  It  is  a remarkable  circum- 
stance at  the  same  time  that  none  of  the  speeches 
he  made  on  the  pro-slavery  side,  although  they 
were  mentioned  in  the  record  of  the  debates,  were 
reported,  even  in  short  outline.  Did  he  suppress 
them?  Did  he  dislike  to  see  such  arguments  in 
print  coupled  with  his  name  ? We  do  not  know. 
We  shall  find  more  such  puzzles  in  his  career. 

At  the  close  of  the  session  in  May,  1820,  Clay 
announced  to  the  House  that  he  found  himself 
obliged  to  retire  from  public  life  for  some  time. 
He  had  formed  that  resolution  on  account  of  the 
embarrassed  condition  of  his  private  affairs.  He 
had  lost  a large  sum  of  money  by  indorsing  the 
obligations  of  a friend,  and  there  was  a rumor  also, 
whether  true  or  not,  that  he  had  suffered  heavily 
at  play.  At  any  rate,  his  necessities  must  have 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


183 


been  pressing,  for  he  strenuously  urged  with  the 
President  and  the  secretary  of  state  an  old  claim 
for  a “half -outfit,”  $4500,  due  him  as  a commis- 
sioner of  the  United  States  in  negotiating  a com- 
mercial convention  with  Great  Britain  in  1815. 
He  returned  to  Kentucky  with  the  hope  of  repair- 
ing his  fortunes  by  industrious  application  to  his 
legal  practice ; and  at  the  meeting  of  the  sixteenth 
Congress  for  its  second  session,  in  November,  1820, 
a letter  from  him  was  read  to  the  House,  in  which, 
“ owing  to  imperious  circumstances,”  he  resigned 
the  office  of  speaker,  as  he  would  not  be  able  to 
attend  until  after  the  Christmas  holidays.  In 
fact  he  did  not  reach  Washington  until  January 
16,  1821.  Then  his  services  were  urgently  in  de- 
mand. 

The  “ Missouri  question,”  which  in  the  previous 
session  seemed  to  have  been  put  to  rest  by  the 
compromise,  had  risen  again  in  a new,  unexpected, 
and  threatening  form.  The  bill  passed  at  the  last 
session  had  authorized  the  people  of  Missouri  to 
make  a state  constitution  without  any  restriction 
as  to  slavery.  The  formal  admission  of  the  State 
was  now  to  follow.  But  the  Constitution  with 
which  Missouri  presented  herself  to  Congress  not 
only  recognized  slavery  as  existing  there ; it  pro- 
vided also  that  it  should  be  the  duty  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  pass  such  laws  as  would  be  necessary  to 
prevent  free  negroes  or  mulattoes  from  coming 
into  or  settling  in  the  State.  This  was  more  than 
those  Northern  men  who  accepted  the  compromise 


184 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  the  last  session  had  bargained  for.  Not  a few 
of  them,  at  heart  profoundly  dissatisfied  with  what 
had  been  done,  and  whose  scruples  had  been  re- 
vived and  strengthened  by  their  contact  with  the 
popular  feeling  at  home,  were  ready  to  seize  upon 
this  obnoxious  clause  in  the  state  Constitution,  to 
reopen  the  whole  question.  A good  many  South- 
ern men,  too,  disliked  the  compromise,  on  account 
of  the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  territory  north 
of  36°  30'.  The  most  prudent  among  them  were 
willing  to  yield  a point  on  the  questioned  constitu- 
tional clause,  rather  than  put  in  jeopardy  the 
solid  advantage  of  the  admission  of  Missouri  as  a 
slave  State.  But  the  bulk  of  them  were  for  insist- 
ing upon  the  reception  of  the  State  without  further 
condition.  A few  Southern  extremists  still  thought 
of  upsetting  the  36°  30'  restriction.  In  the  Sen- 
ate, Eaton  of  Tennessee  offered  to  the  resolution 
admitting  Missouri  an  amendment  providing  “that 
nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  so  construed  as 
to  give  the  assent  of  Congress  to  any  provision  of 
the  Constitution  of  Missouri,  if  any  there  be,  that 
contravenes  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  that  6 the  citizens  of  each  State  shall 
be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  in  the  several  States,  " ” — the  point  being 
that,  as  free  persons  of  color  were  citizens  in  some 
States,  for  example,  Massachusetts,  Vermont,  and 
New  Hampshire,  the  proposed  Constitution  of  Mis- 
souri deprived  them  in  that  State  of  the  privileges 
granted  them  by  the  federal  Constitution,  After 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


185 


long  and  acrimonious  debates,  the  resolution  with 
this  amendment  passed  the  Senate,  on  December 
12,  1820,  by  a majority  of  eight. 

In  the  House  the  struggle  raged  at  the  same 
time.  On  November  23  Lowndes  of  South  Caro- 
lina reported  a resolution  to  admit  Missouri,  tak- 
ing the  ground  that,  as  Congress  at  the  last  ses- 
sion had  authorized  the  people  of  Missouri  to  form 
a state  constitution,  Missouri  had  thereby  been 
invested  with  all  the  rights  and  attributes  of  a 
State,  and  all  those  who  in  good  faith  respected 
the  acts  of  the  government  would  now  vote  for 
the  formal  admission  of  Missouri  as  a matter  of 
course.  This  was  vigorously  combated  by  John 
Sergeant  of  Pennsylvania,  a stanch  opponent  of 
slavery,  and  a man  of  fine  ability  and  high  charac- 
ter, whom  we  shall  meet  again  in  political  compan- 
ionship with  Clay  under  interesting  circumstances. 
He  stoutly  maintained  that  Congress,  when  au- 
thorizing the  people  of  Missouri  to  form  a consti- 
tution, had  not  parted  with  the  power  of  looking 
into  that  constitution  to  see  whether  it  conformed 
to  the  prescribed  conditions.  The  debate  then 
ranged  again  over  the  whole  slavery  question,  grow- 
ing hotter  as  it  went  on,  and  finally  the  resolution 
admitting  Missouri  was,  on  December  13,  rejected 
by  a majority  of  fourteen.  The  excitement  which 
followed  was  intense.  When  the  vote  was  an- 
nounced, Lowndes  rose  and  solemnly  called  upon 
the  House  to  take  measures  for  the  preservation 
of  peace  in  Missouri.  The  apprehension  that  the 


186 


HENRY  CLAY 


fate  of  the  Union  trembled  in  the  balance  was 
again  freely  expressed.  Six  weeks  later,  on  Jan- 
uary 24,  a resolution  offered  by  Eustis  of  Mas- 
sachusetts, to  admit  Missouri  on  condition  that 
she  expunge  from  her  Constitution  the  provision 
discriminating  against  free  persons  of  color,  was 
taken  up  for  consideration.  It  was  voted  down 
by  146  yeas  to  6 nays.  When  the  vote  had  been 
announced,  there  was  a pause  in  the  proceedings. 
The  deadlock  seemed  complete.  A feeling  of  help- 
lessness appeared  to  pervade  the  House.  It  was 
then  that  Clay,  who  had  arrived  a week  before, 
took  the  matter  in  hand.  Breaking  the  silence 
which  prevailed,  he  rose  and  said  that,  if  no  other 
gentleman  made  any  motion  on  the  subject,  “he 
should  on  the  day  after  to-morrow  move  to  go  into 
committee  of  the  whole  to  take  into  consideration 
the  resolution  from  the  Senate  on  the  subject  of 
Missouri.” 

He  did  so  on  January  29.  He  declared  himself 
ready  to  vote  for  the  senate  resolution  even  with 
the  proviso  it  contained,  although  he  did  not  deem 
that  proviso  necessary.  The  speeches  he  delivered 
on  this  occasion  were  again  left  unreported,  but 
their  arguments  appear  in  the  replies  they  called 
forth.  Admitting  that  the  clause  in  the  Missouri 
Constitution  respecting  free  persons  of  color  was 
incompatible  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  this  circumstance  could  not,  he  argued,  be 
an  objection  to  the  admission  of  Missouri  as  a 
State  of  the  Union,  because  the  legislators  of 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


187 


Missouri  would  be  bound  by  their  oaths  to  support 
the  federal  Constitution,  and  would,  therefore, 
never  make  any  law  obnoxious  to  it.  The  weak- 
ness of  this  argument  did  not  escape  the  attention 
of  his  audience.  But,  he  said,  if  the  Missouri 
legislature  should  enact  any  law  in  pursuance  of 
the  obnoxious  clause  in  their  Constitution,  it  would 
be  declared  void  by  the  courts  of  the  United  States. 
However,  he  added,  a limitation  or  restriction 
upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  of  Missouri 
might  be  imposed  by  adding  to  the  senate  resolu- 
tion a provision,  that  no  law  should  be  enacted, 
under  the  obnoxious  clause  of  the  state  Constitu- 
tion, affecting  the  rights  of  citizens  of  other  States. 
Thus  he  argued  on  both  sides  of  the  question,  try- 
ing to  conciliate  the  good-will  of  all,  at  the  same 
time  addressing  to  them  the  most  fervid  appeals 
to  unite  in  a spirit  of  harmony,  in  order  to  save 
the  country  from  this  dangerous  quarrel  which 
threatened  the  disruption  of  the  Union.  But  the 
peacemaker  had  a complicated  task  before  him. 
In  order  to  unite,  he  had  to  convince  or  move  men 
who  pursued  the  most  different  objects,  ranging 
from  the  absolute  exclusion  of  new  slave  States  to 
the  unconditional  admission  of  them.  There  were 
not  a few  also  who  thought  of  postponing  the 
whole  subject  to  the  meeting  of  the  next  Congress. 
Several  amendments  to  the  senate  resolution  were 
moved,  but  all  were  voted  down.  Nothing  was 
found  on  which  a majority  could  be  united.  The 
perplexity  and  excitement  increased.  Then,  as  a 


188 


HENRY  CLAY 


last  expedient,  Clay  moved  to  refer  the  senate 
resolution  to  a special  committee  of  thirteen  mem- 
bers. This  was  agreed  to,  and  Clay  was  put  at 
the  head  of  the  committee. 

On  February  10  he  brought  in  a report,  which 
was  rather  an  appeal  than  an  argument.  “Your 
committee  believe  that,  all  must  ardently  unite  in 
wishing  an  amicable  termination  of  a question, 
which,  if  it  be  longer  kept  open,  cannot  fail  to 
produce,  and  possibly  to  perpetuate,  prejudices 
and  animosities  among  a people  to  whom  the  con- 
servation of  their  moral  ties  should  be  even  dearer, 
if  possible,  than  that  of  their  political  bond.” 
The  committee  then  proposed  a resolution  to  admit 
Missouri  into  the  Union  “on  an  equal  footing  with 
the  original  States  in  all  respects  whatever,  upon 
the  fundamental  condition  that  the  said  State  shall 
never  pass  any  law  preventing  any  description  of 
persons  from  coming  to  and  settling  in  the  said 
State  who  now  are,  or  hereafter  may  become,  citi- 
zens of  any  of  the  States  of  this  Union.”  This 
was  to  satisfy  the  Northern  people.  The  resolu- 
tion provided  further  that,  as  soon  as  the  Missouri 
legislature  should,  by  solemn  public  act,  have  de- 
clared the  assent  of  the  State  to  this  fundamental 
condition,  the  President  should  by  proclamation 
announce  the  fact,  whereupon  the  admission  of  the 
State  should  be  considered  complete.  This  was 
to  prevent  further  trouble  in  Congress.  Finally 
the  resolution  declared  that  nothing  contained  in 
it  should  “be  construed  to  take  from  the  said  State 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


189 


of  Missouri,  when  admitted  into  this  Union,  the 
exercise  of  any  right  or  power  which  can  now  be 
constitutionally  exercised  by  any  of  the  original 
States.”  This  was  to  conciliate  the  extreme  state- 
sovereignty  men.  “Thus  consulting  the  opinions 
of  both  sides  of  the  House,”  he  said  in  opening 
the  debate,  “in  that  spirit  of  compromise  which  is 
occasionally  necessary  to  the  existence  of  all  socie- 
ties, he  hoped  it  would  receive  the  countenance  of 
the  House.”  He  concluded  by  “earnestly  invok- 
ing the  spirit  of  harmony  and  kindred  feeling  to 
preside  over  the  deliberations  of  the  House  on  the 
subject.”  But  this  appeal  still  failed.  After  a 
heated  debate  the  resolution  was  voted  down  in 
committee  of  the  whole  by  a majority  of  nine,  in 
the  House  by  a majority  of  three,  and  upon  recon- 
sideration by  a majority  of  six.  Among  the  yeas 
there  were  but  few  Northern,  among  the  nays  only 
four  Southern  votes,  and  these  were  extremists  of 
the  John  Randolph  type.  This  was  on  February 
13.  There  were  not  many  days  of  the  session 
left.  The  situation  became  more  and  more  critical 
and  threatening. 

On  February  14  the  electoral  vote  was  to  be 
counted,  Monroe  having  in  the  preceding  autumn 
been  reelected  president.  The  people  of  Missouri 
had  chosen  electors.  The  question  occurred,  should 
their  votes  be  counted?  Some  Southern  members 
hotly  maintained  that  Missouri  was  of  right  a 
State.  Northern  men  asserted  with  equal  warmth 
that  she  was  only  a territory,  having  no  right  to 


190 


HENRY  CLAY 


take  part  in  a presidential  election.  The  Missouri 
quarrel  threatened  to  invade,  and  perhaps  to  break 
up  in  disorder,  the  joint  convention  of  the  two 
Houses  sitting  to  count  the  electoral  vote.  The 
danger  was  averted  by  skillful  management.  Clay 
reported,  from  the  joint  committee  to  which  the 
matter  had  been  referred,  a resolution  “that,  if 
any  objection  be  made  to  the  votes  of  Missouri, 
and  the  counting  or  omitting  to  count  which  shall 
not  essentially  change  the  result  of  the  election,. 
— in  that  case  they  shall  be  reported  by  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Senate  in  the  following  manner:  Were 
the  votes  of  Missouri  to  be  counted,  the  result 
would  be,  for  A.  B.  for  president  of  the  United 

States,  votes ; if  not  counted,  for  A.  B.  as 

president  of  the  United  States, votes;  but  in 

either  case  A.  B.  is  elected  president ; and  in  the 
same  manner  for  vice-president.”  This  resolution 
was  adopted  and  served  its  purpose.  Fortunately 
the  three  electoral  votes  of  Missouri  were  of  no 
practical  importance,  Monroe  having  received  all 
the  votes  but  one,  and  Tompkins,  for  vice-presi- 
dent, a very  large  majority. 

But  as  soon  as  Missouri  was  reached  in  the  elec- 
toral count,  objection  was  made  by  a Northern 
member  to  the  counting  of  her  votes,  on  the  ground 
that  she  was  not  a State  of  the  Union.  The  Sen- 
ate then  withdrew,  and  the  House  having  been 
called  to  order,  Floyd  of  Virginia  moved  a resolu- 
tion that  Missouri  was  a State  of  the  Union,  and 
that  her  vote  should  be  counted.  He  thought  he 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


191 


had  now  forced  the  issue,  so  that  it  could  not  be 
avoided.  “Let  us  know,”  he  exclaimed  in  closing 
his  speech,  “whether  Missouri  be  a State  of  the 
Union  or  not.  Sir,  we  cannot  take  another  step 
without  hurling  this  government  into  the  gulf  of 
destruction.  For  one,  I say  I have  gone  as  far 
as  I can  go  in  the  way  of  compromise;  and  if 
there  is  to  be  a compromise  beyond  that  point,  it 
must  be  at  the  edge  of  the  sword.”  After  some 
more  speaking  in  a similar  vein,  mainly  by  John 
Randolph,  Clay  rose  to  pour  oil  on  the  troubled 
waters.  He  calmly  reminded  the  House  of  the 
fact  that  a resolution  had  been  adopted  covering 
the  treatment  of  the  vote  of  Missouri,  to  bridge 
over  the  very  difficulty  now  presenting  itself.  He 
therefore  moved  that  Floyd’s  resolution  be  laid  on 
the  table,  which  was  done  by  a large  majority. 
The  Senate  then  was  invited  to  return,  and  the 
counting  of  the  electoral  vote  proceeded  to  the 
end.  When  the  result  was  to  be  announced,  Ran- 
dolph and  Floyd  tried  once  more  to  interpose,  but 
were  ruled  out  of  order ; the  president  of  the  Sen- 
ate finished  his  announcement,  and  the  act  of  vote- 
counting was  happily  concluded. 

But  after  all  this,  the  Missouri  question  seemed 
to  be  no  nearer  its  solution.  As  the  end  of  the 
session  approached,  the  excitement  rose  and  spread. 
Some  attempts  were  made  in  the  Senate  and  the 
House  to  find  a basis  of  agreement,  but  without 
avail.  Then,  as  a last  resort,  Clay  moved  the 
appointment  of  a committee,  together  with  a simi- 


192 


HENRY  CLAY 


lar  committee  to  be  appointed  by  the  Senate,  to 
consider  and  report  u whether  it  be  expedient  or 
not  to  make  provision  for  the  admission  of  Mis- 
souri into  the  Union,  and  for  the  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  within  Missouri;  and  if 
not,  whether  any  other  and  what  provision,  adapted 
to  her  condition,  ought  to  be  made  by  law.”  This 
was  adopted  by  101  yeas  to  55  nays.  The  com- 
mittee was  to  consist  of  twenty-three  members, 
the  number  of  the  States  then  in  the  Union.  Al- 
though it  was  to  be  elected  by  ballot,  Clay  was 
by  tacit  consent  permitted  to  draw  up  a list  to  be 
voted  for.  The  Senate  elected  a committee  of 
seven  to  join  the  twenty -three  of  the  House.  On 
February  28  Clay  reported  a resolution,  the  same 
in  effect  as  that  which  he  had  previously  reported 
from  his  committee  of  thirteen,  and  in  introducing 
it  he  said  that  the  committee  on  the  part  of  the 
Senate  was  unanimously  in  its  favor,  and  that  on 
the  part  of  the  House  nearly  so.  After  a short 
debate  the  resolution  was  adopted  by  86  yeas  to 
82  nays.  The  bulk  of  the  Northern  vote  went 
against  it;  of  the  Southerners,  only  a few  extreme 
men  under  Randolph’s  lead.  The  resolution  passed 
the  Senate  likewise.  Missouri  promptly  complied 
with  the  fundamental  condition,  and  thus  the  strug- 
gle which  had  so  violently  agitated  Congress  and 
the  country  came  to  an  end. 

It  was  generally  admitted  that  this  final  accom- 
modation was  mainly  due  to  Clay’s  zeal,  persever- 
ance, skill,  and  the  moving  warmth  of  his  personal 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


193 


appeals.  He  did  not  confine  himself  to  speeches 
addressed  to  the  House,  but  he  went  from  man  to 
man,  expostulating,  beseeching,  persuading,  in  his 
most  winning  way.  Even  his  opponents  in  debate 
acknowledged,  involuntarily  sometimes,  the  im- 
pressive sincerity  of  his  anxious  entreaties.  What 
helped  him  in  gaining  over  the  number  of  votes 
necessary  to  form  a majority  was  the  growing  fear 
that  this  quarrel  would  break  up  the  ruling  party, 
and  lead  to  the  forming  of  new  divisions.  His 
success  added  greatly  to  his  reputation  and  gave 
new  strength  to  his  influence.  Adams  wrote  in 
his  journal  that  one  of  “the  greatest  results  of 
this  conflict  of  three  sessions”  was  “to  bring  into 
full  display  the  talents  and  resources  and  influence 
of  Mr.  Clay.”  In  newspapers  and  speeches  he 
was  praised  as  “the  great  pacificator.” 

As  a measure  of  temporary  pacification  the  com- 
promise could  not  indeed  have  been  more  success- 
ful. Only  a short  time  before  its  accomplishment 
the  aged  Jefferson,  from  his  retreat  at  Monticello, 
had  sent  forth  a cry  of  alarm  in  a private  letter, 
which  soon  became  public:  “The  Missouri  ques- 
tion is  the  most  portentous  one  that  ever  threat- 
ened the  Union.  In  the  gloomiest  moments  of 
the  Revolutionary  war  I never  had  any  apprehen- 
sion equal  to  that  I feel  from  this  source.”  No 
sooner  had  the  compromise  passed  than  the  excite- 
ment and  anxiety  subsided.  With  that  singular 
carelessness,  that  elasticity  of  temper,  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  American,  the  danger,  of 


194 


HENRY  CLAY 


which  the  shock  of  earthquake  had  warned  him, 
was  forgotten.  The  public  mind  turned  at  once 
to  things  of  more  hopeful  interest,  and  the  Union 
seemed  safer  than  ever. 

The  American  people  have  since  become  pain- 
fully aware  that  this  was  a delusion ; and  the  ques- 
tion has  often  been  asked  whether,  in  view  of  what 
came  afterwards,  those  who  accommodated  the 
Missouri  quarrel  really  did  a good  service  to  their 
country.  It  is  an  interesting  question.  The  com- 
promise had  in  fact  settled  only  two  points:  the 
admission  of  Missouri  as  a slave  State;  and  the 
recognition  of  the  right  of  slavery  to  go,  if  the 
settlers  there  wanted  it,  into  the  territory  belong- 
ing to  the  Louisiana  purchase  south  of  36°  30L 
It  was  practically  so  recognized  in  the  newly  or- 
ganized territory  of  Arkansas.  So  far,  the  com- 
promise directly  and  substantially  strengthened 
the  slave  interest.  On  the  other  hand,  the  slave 
interest  had,  in  order  to  secure  these  advantages, 
been  compelled  to  acquiesce  in  two  constitutional 
doctrines : that  Congress  had  the  power  to  exclude 
slavery  from  the  territories  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  the  admission  of  new  States  could  be  made 
subject  to  conditions.  But  these  points,  especially 
the  first  one,  were  yielded  only  for  the  occasion, 
and  might  be  withdrawn  wnen  the  interests  of 
slavery  should  demand  that  the  territory  north  of 
36°  30f  be  opened  to  its  invasion,  as  actually  hap- 
pened some  thirty -four  years  later  in  the  case  of 
Kansas. 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


195 


The  compromise  had  another  sinister  feature. 
The  anti-slavery  sentiment  in  the  North,  invoked 
by  the  Missouri  controversy,  was  no  doubt  strong 
and  sincere.  The  South  threatened  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Union ; and,  frightened  by  that  threat, 
a sufficient  number  of  Northern  men  were  found 
willing  to  acquiesce,  substantially,  in  the  demands 
of  the  South.  Thus  the  slave  power  learned  the 
weak  spot  in  the  anti-slavery  armor.  It  was  likely 
to  avail  itself  of  that  knowledge,  to  carry  further 
points  by  similar  threats,  and  to  familiarize  itself 
more  and  more  with  the  idea  that  the  dissolution 
of  the  Union  would  really  be  a royal  remedy  for 
all  its  complaints. 

Would  it  not  have  been  better  statesmanship, 
then,  to  force  the  Missouri  question  to  a straight 
issue  at  any  risk,  rather  than  compromise  it  ? 

It  was  certain  that  the  final  struggle  between 
slavery  and  free  labor  would  ultimately  come,  and 
also  that  then,  as  slavery  was  an  institution  utterly 
abhorrent  to  the  spirit  of  modern  civilization,  it 
would  at  last  be  overcome  by  that  spirit  and  per- 
ish. The  danger  was  that  in  its  struggle  for  life 
slavery  might  destroy  the  Union  and  free  institu- 
tions in  America.  The  question,  therefore,  which 
the  statesmanship  of  the  time  had  to  consider  was, 
which  would  be  the  safer  policy,  — to  resist  the 
demands  of  the  South  at  any  risk,  or  to  tide  over 
the  difficulty  until  it  might  be  fought  out  under 
more  favorable  circumstances  ? 

Had  the  anti-slavery  men  in  Congress,  by  un- 


196 


HENRY  CLAY 


yielding  firmness,  prevented  the  admission  of  Mis- 
souri as  a slave  State,  thus  shutting  out  all  pro- 
spect of  slavery  extension,  and  had  the  South  then 
submitted,  without  attempting  the  dissolution  of 
the  Union,  the  probability  is  that  the  slave  power 
would  have  lost  hope,  that  emancipation  move- 
ments would  have  sprung  up  with  renewed  strength, 
and  that  slavery  would  have  gradually  declined 
and  died.  But  would  the  South  in  1820  have 
submitted  without  attempting  dissolution?  There 
is  good  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  not.  The 
Union  feeling  had  indeed  been  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  war  of  1812,  but  it  had  not  grown  strong 
enough  in  the  South  to  command  the  self-sacrifice 
of  an  interest  which  at  that  time  was  elated  by  the 
anticipation  of  great  wealth  and  power.  In  New 
England  all  there  was  of  anti-Union  sentiment 
had  been  crushed,  but  not  so  in  the  South.  The 
dissolution  of  the  Union  was  not  then,  in  the  pop- 
ular imagination,  such  a monstrous  thing  as  it 
is  now.  The  Union  was  still,  in  some  respects, 
regarded  as  an  experiment;  and  when  a great  ma- 
terial interest  found  itself  placed  at  a disadvan- 
tage in  the  Union,  it  was  apt  to  conclude  that  the 
experiment  had  failed.  To  speculate  upon  the 
advisability  of  dissolving  the  Union  did  not  then 
appear  to  the  popular  mind  politically  treasonable 
and  morally  heinous. 

That  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  was  freely 
discussed  among  the  Southern  members  of  the 
sixteenth  Congress  is  certain.  James  Barbour  of 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


197 


Virginia,  a man  of  very  high  character,  was  re- 
ported to  be  canvassing  the  free  state  members  as 
to  the  practicability  of  a convention  of  the  States 
to  dissolve  the  Union,  and  to  make  arrangements 
for  distributing  its  assets  and  liabilities.  At  one 
period  during  the  Missouri  struggle,  the  Southern 
members  seriously  contemplated  withdrawing  from 
Congress  in  a body;  and  John  Randolph,  although 
he  had  not  been  for  some  time  on  speaking  terms 
with  Clay,  one  evening  approached  him,  saying: 
“Mr.  Speaker,  I wish  you  would  leave  the  chair. 
I will  follow  you  to  Kentucky,  or  anywhere  else 
in  the  world.”  “That  is  a very  serious  proposi- 
tion,” answered  Clay,  “which  we  have  not  now 
time  to  discuss.  But  if  you  will  come  into  the 
speaker’s  room  to-morrow  morning,  before  the 
House  assembles,  we  will  discuss  it  together.” 
They  met.  Clay  strongly  advised  against  any- 
thing like  secession,. and  in  favor  of  a compromise, 
while  Randolph  was  for  immediate  and  decisive 
action.  The  slaveholders,  he  said,  had  the  right 
on  their  side;  matters  must  come  to  an  extremity, 
and  there  could  be  no  more  suitable  occasion  to 
bring  them  to  that  issue. 

The  secession  of  the  Southern  delegations  from 
Congress  did  indeed  not  come  to  pass ; it  was  pre- 
vented by  the  compromise.  But  Clay  himself, 
when  the  excitement  was  at  its  height,  gloomily 
expressed  his  apprehension  that  in  a few  years  the 
Union  would  be  divided  into  three  confederations, 
— a Southern,  an  Eastern,  and  a Western. 


198 


HENRY  CLAY 


While  thus  the  thought  of  dissolving  the  Union 
occurred  readily  to  the  Southern  mind,  the  thought 
of  maintaining  the  government  and  preserving  the 
Union  by  means  of  force  hardly  occurred  to  any- 
body. It  seemed  to  be  taken  for  granted  on  all 
sides  that,  if  the  Southern  States  insisted  upon 
cutting  loose  from  the  Union,  nothing  could  be 
done  but  to  let  them  go.  It  is  true  there  was  talk 
enough  about  swords  and  blood ; but  the  wars  were 
expected  to  turn  upon  questions  of  boundary  and 
the  like,  after  dissolution,  not  upon  the  right  of 
States  to  go  out.  Even  such  a man  as  John 
Quincy  Adams,  not  only  an  anti -slavery  man  but 
a statesman  always  inclining  to  strong  measures, 
approved  of  the  compromise  as  “all  that  could  be 
effected  under  the  present  Constitution,  and  from 
extreme  unwillingness  to  put  the  Union  at  hazard;  ” 
and  then  wrote  in  addition : “ But  perhaps  it  would 
have  been  a wiser  as  well  as  a bolder  course  to 
have  persisted  in  the  restriction  upon  Missouri, 
till  it  should  have  terminated  in  a convention  of 
the  States  to  revise  and  amend  the  Constitution. 
This  would  have  produced  a new  Union  of  thirteen 
or  fourteen  States  unpolluted  with  slavery,  with 
a great  and  glorious  object  to  effect, — namely, 
that  of  rallying  to  their  standard  the  other  States 
by  the  universal  emancipation  of  their  slaves.  If 
the  Union  must  be  dissolved,  slavery  is  precisely 
the  question  upon  which  it  ought  to  break.”  Thus 
even  this  patriotic  statesman  thought  rather  of 
separating  in  order  to  meet  again  in  a purer  condi- 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


199 


tion  of  existence  — a remarkably  fantastic  plan 
— than  of  denying  the  right  of  secession,  and  of 
maintaining  by  a vigorous  exertion  of  power  the 
government  of  which  he  was  a leading  member, 
and  the  Union  of  which  his  father  had  been  one 
of  the  principal  founders.  It  must  be  admitted 
also  that,  while  the  North  was  superior  to  the 
South  in  population  and  means  at  that  period,  yet 
the  disproportion  was  not  yet  large  enough  to 
make  the  maintenance  of  the  Union  by  force  a 
promising  task. 

An  attempt  by  the  South,  or  by  the  larger  part 
of  it,  to  dissolve  the  Union  would  therefore,  at 
that  time,  have  been  likely  to  succeed.  There 
would  probably  have  been  no  armed  collision  about 
the  dissolution  itself,  but  a prospect  of  complicated 
quarrels  and  wars  afterwards  about  the  property 
formerly  held  in  common,  and  perhaps  about  other 
matters  of  disagreement.  A reunion  might  possi- 
bly have  followed  after  a sad  experience  of  separa- 
tion. But  that  result  would  have  had  to  be  evolved 
from  long  and  confused  conflicts,  and  the  future 
would  at  best  have  been  dark  and  uncertain.  Even 
in  the  event  of  reunion,  the  fatal  principle  of  se- 
cession at  will,  once  recognized,  would  have  passed 
into  the  new  arrangement. 

In  view  of  all  this,  it  seemed  good  statesman- 
ship to  hold  the  Union  together  by  a compromise, 
and  to  adjourn  the  final  and  decisive  struggle  on 
the  slavery  question  to  a time  when  the  Union 
feeling  should  be  strong  and  determined  enough 


200 


HENRY  CLAY 


to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  republic,  if  neces- 
sary, by  force  of  arms,  and  when  the  free  States 
should  be  so  superior  in  men  and  means  to  the 
slaveholding  section  as  to  make  the  result  certain. 

That  this  train  of  reasoning  was  Clay’s  conscious 
motive  in  doing  what  he  did  will  not  be  asserted. 
It  is  more  likely  that  he  simply  followed  his  in- 
stinct as  a devoted  friend  of  the  Union,  leaving 
for  the  moment  all  other  interests  out  of  view. 
Although  he  had  not  originated  the  main  part  of 
the  compromise,  having  exercised  decisive  influ- 
ence only  at  the  close  of  the  controversy,  yet,  by 
common  consent,  he  carried  off  the  honors  of  the 
occasion.  As  the  peculiar  brilliancy  of  the  abili- 
ties he  possessed,  his  involuntary  showiness,  made 
him  always  the  most  conspicuous  figure  whenever 
he  appeared  in  a parliamentary  contest,  so  he  had 
impressed  himself  in  this  instance  upon  the  popu- 
lar mind  as  the  leading  actor  in  the  drama.  He 
retired,  therefore,  to  private  life  with  a larger 
stock  of  popularity  than  he  had  ever  possessed. 
What  he  had  lost  by  the  appearance  of  captious- 
ness in  his  opposition  to  Monroe’s  administration 
was  now  amply  retrieved  by  the  great  patriotic 
service  rendered  in  bringing  a very  dangerous  con- 
troversy to  what  was  considered  a happy  conclu- 
sion. It  is  interesting  to  hear  the  judgment  passed 
upon  him  at  that  period  by  another  public  man  of 
high  distinction.  After  a visit  he  had  received 
from  Clay,  John  Quincy  Adams  delivered  himself 
in  his  Diary  as  follows : — 


THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE 


201 


“ Clay  is  an  eloquent  man,  with  very  popular  man- 
ners and  great  political  management.  He  is,  like  almost 
all  the  eminent  men  of  this  country,  only  half  educated. 
His  school  has  been  the  world,  and  in  that  he  is  profi- 
cient. His  morals,  public  and  private,  are  loose,  but  he 
has  all  the  virtues  indispensable  to  a popular  man.  As 
he  is  the  first  distinguished  man  that  the  Western  coun- 
try has  presented  as  a statesman  to  the  Union,  they  are 
profoundly  proud  of  him.  Clay’s  temper  is  impetuous 
and  his  ambition  impatient.  He  has  long  since  marked 
me  as  the  principal  rival  in  his  way,  and  has  taken  no 
more  pains  to  disguise  his  hostility  than  was  necessary 
for  decorum,  and  to  avoid  shocking  the  public  opinion. 
His  future  fortunes  and  mine  are  in  wiser  hands  than 
ours.  I have  never  even  defensively  repelled  his 
attacks.  Clay  has  large  and  liberal  views  of  public 
affairs,  and  that  sort  of  generosity  which  attaches  indi- 
viduals to  his  person.  As  president  of  the  Union,  his 
administration  would  be  a perpetual  succession  of  in- 
trigue and  management  with  the  legislature.  It  would 
also  be  sectional  in  its  spirit,  and  sacrifice  all  interests  to 
those  of  the  W estern  country  and  the  slaveholders.  But 
his  principles  relative  to  internal  improvements  would 
produce  results  honorable  and  useful  to  the  nation.” 

This  was  not  the  judgment  of  a friend,  but  of 
a man  always  inclined  to  be  censorious,  and,  when 
stung  by  conflicts  of  opinion,  uncharitable.  It 
was  the  judgment,  too,  of  a rival  in  the  race  for 
the  presidency,  — a rival  careful  to  admit  to  him- 
self the  strong  qualities  of  the  adversary,  while 
dwelling  with  some  satisfaction  upon  his  weak 
points.  When  speaking  of  Clay’s  “ loose”  public 


202 


HENRY  CLAY 


morals,  Adams  can  have  meant  only  the  appar- 
ently factious  opposition  to  Monroe’s  administra- 
tion, and  his  resort  to  tricky  expedients  in  carry- 
ing his  points  in  the  House.  He  cannot  have 
meant  anything  like  the  use  of  official  power  and 
opportunities  for  private  pecuniary  advantage,  for 
in  this  respect  Clay’s  character  was  and  remained 
above  reproach.  No  species  of  corruption  stained 
his  name.  Neither  could  Clay  be  justly  charged 
with  a sectional  spirit.  His  feelings  were,  on  the 
contrary,  as  largely  and  thoroughly  national  as 
those  of  any  statesman  of  his  time.  Although  he 
had  at  first  spoken  the  language  of  the  slaveholder 
in  the  Missouri  debate,  it  could  certainly  not  be 
said  that  he  was  willing  to  “ sacrifice  all  interests 
to  those  of  the  slaveholders.”  He  would  have 
stood  by  the  Union  against  them  at  all  hazards, 
and  his  tariff  and  internal  improvement  policy 
soon  became  obnoxious  to  them.  But,  barring 
these  points,  Adams’s  judgment  was  not  far  astray. 
In  the  course  of  this  narration  we  shall  find  more 
opinions  of  Adams  on  Clay,  expressed  at  a time 
when  the  two  men  had  learned  to  understand  each 
other  better. 

When  Clay  left  Washington,  his  professional 
prospects  were  very  promising.  The  Bank  of  the 
United  States  engaged  him,  upon  liberal  terms, 
as  its  standing  counsel  in  Ohio  and  Kentucky. 
He  expected  his  practice  to  retrieve  his  fortunes 
in  three  or  four  years,  and  to  enable  him  then  to 
return  to  the  service  of  the  country. 


CHAPTER  IX 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY 

Clay’s  retirement  was  not  of  long  duration. 
The  people  of  Kentucky  were  then  passing  through 
the  last  stages  of  a confused  excitement  caused  by 
a popular  delusion  that  riches  can  be  created  and 
happiness  acquired  by  a plentiful  issue  of  paper 
money  and  an  artificial  inflation  of  prices.  The 
consequence  was  what  it  always  is.  The  more 
plenty  the  paper  money  became,  the  more  peo- 
ple ran  into  debt.  They  then  sought  “relief”  by 
legislative  contrivances  in  favor  of  debtors,  which 
caused  a political  division  into  the  “relief”  and 
the  “anti-relief”  parties.  The  “relief  measures” 
came  before  the  highest  state  court,  which  declared 
them  unconstitutional;  whereupon  the  court  was 
abolished  and  a new  one  created,  and  this  brought 
forth  the  “old  court”  and  the  “new  court”  parties 
in  Kentucky.  The  whole  story  is  told  with  admir- 
able clearness  in  Professor  Sumner’s  biography 
of  Andrew  Jackson.  In  these  fierce  controver- 
sies, Clay  took  position  as  an  advocate  of  good 
sense,  honesty,  and  sound  principles  of  finance, 
sometimes  against  a current  of  popular  feeling 
which  seemed  to  be  overwhelming.  He  made  ene- 


204 


HENRY  CLAY 


mies  in  that  way  from  whom  he  was  to  hear  in 
later  years;  but,  on  the  whole,  his  popularity 
weathered  the  storm.  Without  opposition,  he  was 
elected  to  represent  his  faithful  Lexington  district 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  eighteenth 
Congress,  which  met  on  the  first  Monday  in  De- 
cember, 1823.  During  his  absence  from  the  House 
there  had  been  contest  enough  about  the  speaker- 
ship.  But  as  soon  as  he  appeared  again,  an  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  members  gathered  around 
him,  and  he  was  elected  speaker  by  139  to  42,  the 
minority  voting  for  Philip  P.  Barbour  of  Virginia, 
who  had  been  speaker  during  the  seventeenth  Con- 
gress. 

This  was  the  session  preceding  the  presidential 
election  of  1824,  and  Clay  was  a confessed  candi- 
date for  the  succession  to  Monroe.  His  friends  in 
Kentucky  — or,  as  many  would  have  it,  the  people 
of  Kentucky  — were  warm  and  loud  in  their  advo- 
cacy of  his  “ claims.”  His  achievement  as  “the 
great  pacificator”  had  much  increased  his  popu- 
larity in  other  States.  His  conduct  in  the  House 
was  likely  to  have  some  effect  upon  his  chances, 
and  to  be  observed  with  extraordinary  interest. 
The  first  thing  he  did  was  to  take  the  unpopular 
side  of  a question  appealing  in  an  unusual  degree 
to  patriotic  emotion  and  human  sympathy.  He 
opposed  a bill  granting  a pension  to  the  mother  of 
Commodore  Perry,  the  hero  of  Lake  Erie.  The 
death  of  her  illustrious  son  had  left  the  old  matron 
in  needy  circumstances.  The  debate  ran  largely 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  205 


upon  the  great  services  rendered  to  the  country 
by  Commodore  Perry  in  the  days  of  great  public 
danger  and  distress;  and,  by  way  of  contrast,  on 
the  sorrows  and  cares  of  the  bereft  mother.  The 
eloquence  expended  upon  these  points  had  been 
formidable,  threatening  with  the  contempt  of  the 
American  people  those  who  dared  to  “go  back  to 
their  constituents”  to  tell  them  “that  they  had 
turned  from  their  door,  in  the  evening  of  a long 
life,  the  aged  and  venerable  mother  of  the  gallant 
Perry,  and  doomed  her  to  the  charity  of  the  world.” 
It  looked  like  a serious  matter  for  any  presiden- 
tial candidate  who  naturally  desired  to  be  popular 
with  people  of  tender  sensibilities  and  patriotic 
feelings,  and  who  had  also  to  look  after  the  soldier 
and  sailor  vote.  Of  this  aspect  of  the  case,  how- 
ever, Clay  did  not  seem  to  think.  He  calmly  ar- 
gued that  this  case,  however  great  the  sympathy 
it  deserved,  did  not  fall  within  the  principles  of 
the  pension  laws,  since  Commodore  Perry  had  not 
died  of  injuries  received  in  the  service;  that  the 
principle  of  the  law  had  already  been  overstepped 
in  granting  a pension  to  his  widow  and  children; 
that  there  must  be  a limit  to  gratitude  at  the  pub- 
lic expense  for  military  and  naval  service;  that 
he  saw  no  reason  why  the  services  of  the  warrior 
should  be  held  in  so  much  higher  esteem  than  the 
sometimes  even  more  valuable  services  of  the  civil 
officer  of  the  republic,  and  so  on.  His  apprehen- 
sion concerning  the  superiority  in  popular  favor 
of  military  glory  over  civil  merit  he  was  to  find 


206 


HENRY  CLAY 


strikingly  confirmed  by  liis  own  experience.  Evi- 
dently this  candidate  for  the  presidency  still  had 
opinions  of  his  own  and  courage  to  express  them. 
It  was  not  by  the  small  tricks  of  the  demagogue, 
but  rather  by  a strong  advocacy  of  the  policies  he 
believed  in,  that  he  hoped  to  commend  himself 
to  the  confidence  of  the  people.  So  we  find  him 
soon  engaged  in  a hot  debate  on  internal  improve- 
ments. 

In  May,  1822,  Monroe  had  vetoed  a bill  to  es- 
tablish tollgates  on  the  Cumberland  Road,  and  on 
the  same  occasion  submitted  to  Congress  an  elabo- 
rate statement  supporting  his  belief  that  the  prac- 
tical execution  of  works  of  internal  improvement 
by  the  general  government  was  unwarranted  by 
the  Constitution,  admitting,  however,  the  power 
of  Congress  under  the  Constitution  to  grant  and 
appropriate  money  in  aid  of  works  of  internal  im- 
provement to  be  executed  by  others.  In  January, 
1824,  a bill  was  reported  authorizing  the  President 
to  cause  the  necessary  surveys,  plans,  and  estimates 
to  be  made  for  such  a system  of  roads  and  canals 
as  he  might  deem  of  national  importance  in  a 
postal,  commercial,  or  military  point  of  view. 
For  this  purpose  the  bill  proposed  an  appropria- 
tion of  $80,000.  The  debate  turned  mainly  on 
the  point  of  constitutional  power,  and  in  his  most 
dashing  style  Clay  attacked  Monroe’s  constitu- 
tional doctrines,  stopping  but  little  short  of  ridi- 
cule, and  pronounced  himself  again  in  favor  of  the 
most  liberal  construction  of  the  fundamental  law. 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  207 


In  the  power  “to  establish”  post-roads,  he  easily 
found  the  power  to  build  roads  and  to  keep  them 
in  repair.  The  power  to  “regulate  commerce 
among  the  several  States  ” had  to  his  mind  little 
meaning,  if  it  did  not  imply  “authority  to  foster” 
interstate  commerce,  “to  promote  it,  to  bestow 
on  it  facilities  similar  to  those  which  had  been 
conceded  to  our  foreign  trade.”  To  him,  this  in- 
volved unquestionably  the  power  to  build  canals. 
“All  the  powers  of  this  government,”  he  argued, 
“should  be  interpreted  in  reference  to  its  first,  its 
best,  its  greatest  object,  the  Union  of  these  States. 
And  is  not  that  Union  best  invigorated  by  an  in- 
timate social  and  commercial  connection  between 
all  the  parts  of  the  confederacy?”  He  described 
the  unsatisfied  needs  of  the  great  West  in  stirring 
terms,  and  then  opened  once  more  that  glorious 
perspective  of  the  great  ocean -bound  republic  which 
his  ardent  mind  was  so  fond  of  contemplating. 
“Sir,”  he  exclaimed,  “it  is  a subject  of  peculiar 
delight  to  me  to  look  forward  to  the  proud  and 
happy  period,  distant  as  it  may  be,  when  circula- 
tion and  association  between  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific  and  the  Mexican  Gulf  shall  be  as  free  and 
perfect  as  they  are  at  this  moment  in  England, 
and  in  any  other,  the  most  highly  improved  coun- 
try on  the  globe.  Sir,  a new  world  has  come  into 
being  since  the  Constitution  was  adopted.  Are 
the  narrow,  limited  necessities  of  the  old  thirteen 
States,  indeed  of  parts  only  of  the  old  thirteen 
States  as  they  existed  at  the  formation  of  the  Con- 


208 


HENRY  CLAY 


stitution,  forever  to  remain  a rule  of  its  interpre- 
tation? Are  we  to  forget  the  wants  of  our  coun- 
try? Are  we  to  neglect  and  refuse  the  redemption 
of  that  vast  wilderness  which  once  stretched  un- 
broken beyond  the  Alleghany  ? I hope  for  better 
and  nobler  things!  ” 

These  were  captivating  appeals,  but  they  in- 
volved the  largest  of  latitudinarian  doctrines,  — 
namely,  that  the  powers  granted  by  the  Constitu- 
tion must  grow  with  the  size  of  the  country.  The 
bill  passed  the  House  by  a handsome  majority;  it 
passed  the  Senate  too,  and  Monroe  signed  it  on 
the  ground  that  it  provided  merely  for  the  collec- 
tion of  information.  It  resulted  in  nothing  beyond 
the  making  of  surveys  for  some  roads  and  canals. 
However,  Clay  had  on  the  occasion  of  this  debate 
not  only  put  the  internal  improvement  part  of  his 
programme  once  more  in  the  strongest  form  before 
Congress  and  the  people,  but  he  had  also  managed 
to  revive  the  memory  of  his  opposition  to  the 
Monroe  administration. 

Next  came  a plunge  into  the  domain  of  foreign 
politics.  The  rising  of  the  Greeks  against  the 
Turks  was  at  that  time  occupying  the  attention  of 
civilized  mankind.  The  Philhellenic  fever,  fed 
partly  by  a genuine  sympathy  with  a nation  fight- 
ing for  its  freedom,  partly  by  a classical  interest 
in  the  country  of  Leonidas,  Phidias,  and  Plato, 
swept  over  all  Europe  and  America  alike.  In  the 
United  States  meetings  were  held,  speeches  made, 
and  resolutions  passed,  boiling  over  with  entliu- 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  209 


siasm  for  the  struggling  Greeks.  It  is  curious  to 
find  even  the  cool-headed  Gallatin,  at  that  period 
minister  of  the  United  States  in  Paris,  proposing 
in  a dispatch  (“  as  if  he  was  serious,”  writes 
Adams)  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
should  assist  the  Greeks  with  its  naval  force  then 
in  the  Mediterranean.  Monroe  expressed  his  sym- 
pathy with  the  Greeks  in  his  message ; and  Daniel 
Webster,  in  January,  1824,  in  the  House  of  Re- 
presentatives presented  a resolution  to  provide  for 
the  sending  of  an  agent  or  commissioner  to  Greece, 
whenever  the  President  should  find  it  expedient. 
This  resolution  he  introduced  by  a speech  not  only 
eulogizing  the  Greek  cause,  but  also  gravely  and 
elaborately  arraigning  the  “ Holy  Alliance  ” as  a 
league  of  despotic  governments  against  all  popular 
aspirations  towards  constitutional  liberty. 

A nation  fighting  for  its  freedom  naturally  called 
Clay  to  the  front.  He  not  only  supported  Web- 
ster’s motion,  but  remembering  that  the  “Holy 
Alliance,”  while  it  hung  like  a dark  cloud  over 
Europe,  also  threatened  to  cast  its  shadow  upon 
these  shores,  he  flung  down  the  gauntlet  by  offer- 
ing a resolution  of  his  own  to  be  called  up  at  some 
future  time.  It  declared  that  the  American  peo- 
ple “would  not  see  without  serious  inquietude 
any  forcible  interposition  of  the  allied  powers  of 
Europe  in  behalf  of  Spain,  to  reduce  to  their 
former  subjection  those  parts  of  America  which 
have  proclaimed  and  established  for  themselves, 
respectively,  independent  governments,  and  which 


210 


HENRY  CLAY 


have  been  solemnly  recognized  by  the  United 
States.” 

This  was  essentially  in  the  spirit  of  the  utter- 
ances which  had  appeared  at  the  opening  of  the 
session  in  Monroe’s  message  to  Congress,  and 
which  have  since  become  celebrated  as  the  Monroe 
doctrine.  The  message  had  been  even  a little 
stronger  in  language.  Referring  to  the  difference 
existing  between  the  political  system  of  the  “ allied 
powers  ” in  Europe,  and  that  of  the  American  re- 
publics, it  declared  that  “we  should  consider  any 
attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to 
any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety.”  Further,  with  regard  to 
schemes  supposed  to  be  contemplated  by  the  allied 
powers,  for  interfering  with  the  independence  of 
the  newly  established  Spanish  American  republics, 
it  said  that  the  American  people  could  not  view 
such  interposition  “in  any  other  light  than  as  the 
manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward 
the  United  States.”  Here,  then,  Clay  found  him- 
self in  thorough  accord  with  the  Monroe  adminis- 
tration, whose  master  spirit  in  all  that  concerned 
foreign  affairs  was  John  Quincy  Adams.  More- 
over, although  his  resolution  did  not  touch  it, 
Clay  certainly  agreed  with  the  other  point  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  “that  the  American  continents, 
by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they 
have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to 
be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  European  power.” 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  211 


But  when  he  thrust  his  resolution  into  the  de- 
bate on  the  Greek  question,  though  with  no  inten- 
tion of  having  it  discussed  immediately,  there  was 
an  evident  flutter  in  the  House.  It  was  darkly, 
shyly  hinted  at  in  several  speeches  as  something 
“ extraordinary,”  something  peculiarly  calculated 
to  involve  the  United  States  in  dangerous  compli- 
cations with  foreign  powers.  The  consequence 
was  that  Clay,  irritated,  broke  out  with  a speech 
full  of  zeal  but  rather  loose  in  argument.  lie 
predicted  that  a “ tremendous  storm  was  ready  to 
burst  upon  our  happy  country,”  meaning  a design 
on  the  part  of  the  “Holy  Alliance”  to  subvert 
free  institutions  in  America ; he  denounced  as 
“low  and  debased”  those  who  did  not  “dare”  to 
express  their  sympathies  with  suffering  Greece; 
and  finally  he  defied  them  to  go  home,  if  they 
“dared,”  to  their  constituents,  to  tell  them  that 
their  representatives  had  “ shrunk  from  the  decla- 
ration of  their  own  sentiments,”  just  as  he  had 
been  “dared”  when  opposing  the  pension  to  Com- 
modore Perry’s  mother. 

Some  members  of  the  House  resented  such  lan- 
guage, and  a bitter  altercation  followed,  especially 
undesirable  in  the  case  of  a candidate  for  the  presi- 
dency. Indeed,  ambitious  statesmen  gifted  with 
oratorical  temperaments,  whose  perorations  are  apt 
to  run  away  with  their  judgment,  may  study  this 
debate  with  profit,  to  observe  some  things  which  it 
is  well  to  avoid.  Richard  M.  Johnson  of  Ken- 
tucky, at  the  time  one  of  Clay’s  most  ardent 


212 


HENRY  CLAY 


friends  and  backers  for  the  presidency,  dolefully 
remarked  after  this  debate  that  “Clay  was  the 
most  imprudent  man  in  the  world.’’ 

The  resolution  on  the  Greek  cause  was  never 
acted  upon,  and  Clay’s  resolution  concerning  the 
Spanish  American  republics  never  called  up.  We 
shall  see  him  return  to  that  subject  as  the  head  of 
the  department  of  foreign  affairs  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States. 

Clay’s  most  important  oratorical  effort  at  this 
session,  and  indeed  one  of  the  most  important 
of  his  life,  was  brought  forth  by  a debate  on 
the  tariff.  The  country  had  gone  through  trying 
experiences  during  the  last  eight  years.  As  we 
remember,  the  tariff  of  1816  had  been  enacted  to 
ward  off  the  flood  of  cheap  English  goods  which, 
immediately  after  the  close  of  the  war  of  1812, 
were  pouring  into  the  country  and  underselling 
American  fabrics.  That  object,  however,  was  not 
accomplished,  except  in  the  case  of  cheap  cotton 
goods,  which  had  the  advantage  of  a “minimum” 
provision:  that  all  cotton  fabrics  invoiced  at  less 
than  twenty-five  cents  should  be  taken  to  have  cost 
that  price  at  the  place  of  exportation,  and  should 
be  taxed  accordingly.  The  tariff  did  not  prevent 
the  reaction  naturally  following  the  abnormally 
stimulated  business  and  the  inflated  values  of  war 
times.  When  prices  rose,  people  ran  into  debt  in 
the  hope  of  a still  greater  rise.  Those  who  made 
money  became  accustomed  to  more  expensive  liv- 
ing. With  the  return  of  peace,  the  expenditures 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  213 


of  the  government  were  contracted.  There  was 
less  demand  for  breadstuff  s.  Then  came  currency 
troubles.  The  return  to  specie  payments  in  Eng- 
land, and  the  raising  of  the  French  indemnity, 
created  an  unusual  demand  for  the  precious  metals 
in  Europe,  which  rendered  more  difficult  the  rees- 
tablishment of  specie  payments  in  America.  The 
notes  of  the  state  banks  outside  of  New  England 
were  depreciated,  and  these  banks  resisted  the 
efforts  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  toward 
general  resumption.  A great  tightness  of  money 
ensued.  Times  became  pinching.  Prices  went 
down.  A crisis  broke  out  in  1819.  Many  busi- 
ness failures  followed.  The  necessity  of  returning 
to  more  frugal  ways  of  living  was  painfully  felt. 
“ Cheap  money  ” theories  sprung  up.  The  distress 
was  greatest  where  the  local  bank  currency  was 
most  uncertain  in  its  value.  The  manufacturing 
interest  suffered  heavily,  but  the  difficulties  under 
which  it  labored  were  only  a part  of  those  troubles 
always  occurring  when  the  business  enterprise  of 
a country  has,  by  abnormal  circumstances  or  artifi- 
cial means,  been  overstimulated  in  certain  direc- 
tions, and  then  has  to  accommodate  itself  to  en- 
tirely different  conditions.  The  process  of  natural 
recuperation  had,  however,  already  begun,  and 
that  too  on  a solid  basis,  after  the  elimination  of 
the  unsound  elements  of  business.  But  the  cry 
for  “ relief  ” was  still  kept  up,  and  a demand  for 
“more  protection  ” arose. 

In  1818  the  duty  on  iron  was  raised.  In  1820 


214 


HENRY  CLAY 


an  attempt  was  made,  and  supported  by  Clay  in 
an  eloquent  speech,  for  a general  revision  of  the 
tariff,  with  a view  to  higher  rates.  The  bill 
passed  the  House,  but  failed  in  the  Senate.  Now, 
in  January,  1824,  the  Committee  on  Manufactures 
reported  to  the  House  a bill  which,  in  the  way  of 
protecting  the  manufacturing  industries,  was  to 
accomplish  what  the  tariff  of  1816  had  so  signally 
failed  to  do.  The  duties  proposed  were:  1,  on 
articles  the  importation  of  which  would  not  inter- 
fere with  home  manufactures,  such  as  silks,  linens, 
cutlery,  spices,  and  some  others,  these  being  mere 
revenue  duties;  and  2,  on  iron,  hemp,  glass,  lead, 
wool  and  woolen  goods,  cotton  goods,  etc.,  these 
being  high  protective  duties. 

Clay  soon  assumed  the  championship  of  the  bill 
in  committee  of  the  whole.  The  debate  began 
with  a skirmish  on  details;  but  then  the  friends 
of  the  bill  forced  a discussion  on  its  general  prin- 
ciples, which  lasted  two  months.  This  gave  Clay 
one  of  his  great  opportunities.  He  was  now  no 
longer  the  Kentucky  farmer  pleading  for  hemp 
and  homespun,  nor  the  cautious  citizen  anxious  to 
have  his  country  make  its  own  clothes  and  blankets 
in  time  of  war.  He  had  developed  into  the  full- 
blown protectionist,  intent  upon  using  the  power 
of  the  government,  so  far  as  it  would  go,  to  mul- 
tiply and  foster  manufactures,  not  with  commerce, 
but  rather  in  preference  to  commerce.  His  speech, 
one  of  the  most  elaborate  and  effective  he  ever 
made,  presented  in  brilliant  array  the  arguments 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  215 


which  were  current  among  high  tariff  men  then, 
and  which  remain  so  still.  He  opened  with  a 
harrowing  description  of  the  prevailing  distress, 
and  among  the  most  significant  symptoms  of  the 
dreadful  condition  of  things  he  counted  “the  rav- 
enous pursuit  after  public  situations,  not  for  the 
sake  of  their  honors  and  the  performance  of  their 
public  duties,  but  as  a means  of  private  sub- 
sistence.” “The  pulse  of  incumbents,”  he  said  in 
his  picturesque  style,  “who  happen  to  be  taken 
ill,  is  not  marked  with  more  anxiety  by  the  attend- 
ing physicians  than  by  those  who  desire  to  succeed 
them,  though  with  very  opposite  feelings.”  (To 
“make  room”  for  one  man  simply  by  removing 
another  was  at  that  time  not  yet  readily  thought 
of.)  The  cause  of  the  prevailing  distress  he  found 
in  the  dependence  of  this  country  on  the  foreign 
market,  which  was  at  the  mercy  of  foreign  inter- 
ests, and  which  might  for  an  indefinite  time  be 
unable  to  absorb  our  surplus  of  agricultural  pro- 
ducts; and  in  too  great  a dependence  on  foreign 
sources  of  supply.  It  seemed  to  him  necessary  to 
provide  a home  market  for  our  products,  the  supe- 
riority of  which  would  consist  in  its  greater  steadi- 
ness, in  the  creation  of  reciprocal  interests,  in 
greater  security,  and  in  an  ultimate  increase  of 
consumption,  and  consequently  of  comfort,  owing 
to  an  increased  quantity  of  the  product,  and  a re- 
duction of  prices  by  home  competition.  To  this 
end  the  development  of  manufacturing  industries 
was  required,  which  could  not  be  accomplished 


216 


HENRY  CLAY 


without  high  protective,  in  some  cases  not  without 
prohibitory,  tariff  duties.  No  country  had  ever 
flourished  without  such  a policy,  and  England 
especially  was  a shining  example  of  its  wisdom. 
British  statesmanship  had  therefore  strictly  ad- 
hered to  it.  A member  of  Parliament  remonstrat- 
ing against  the  passage  of  the  corn-laws  in  favor 
of  foreign  production  would,  he  thought,  make  a 
poor  figure. 

This  policy  Clay  now  christened  “the  American 
system.”  The  opposite  policy  he  denounced  as 
“the  foreign  policy.”  He  then  reviewed  elabo- 
rately one  after  another  the  objections  urged  against 
the  “American  system,”  and  closed  with  a glowing 
appeal  to  the  people  of  the  planting  States  to  sub- 
mit to  the  temporary  loss  which  this  policy  would 
bring  upon  them,  since  that  loss  would  be  small  in 
comparison  with  the  distress  which  the  rest  of  the 
country  would  suffer  without  it. 

This  speech  on  the  “American  system”  exhib- 
ited conspicuously  Clay’s  strong  as  well  as  his 
weak  points:  his  skill  of  statement;  his  ingenuity 
in  the  grouping  of  facts  and  principles ; his  plau- 
sibility of  reasoning;  his  brilliant  imagination; 
the  fervor  of  his  diction ; the  warm  patriotic  tone 
of  his  appeals : and,  on  the  other  hand,  his  super- 
ficial research;  his  habit  of  satisfying  himself  with 
half -knowledge;  his  disinclination  to  reason  out 
propositions  logically  in  all  their  consequences. 
We  find  there  statements  like  this : — 

“ The  measure  of  the  wealth  of  a nation  is  indicated 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  217 


by  the  measure  of  its  protection  of  its  industry.  Great 
Britain  most  protects  her  industry,  and  the  wealth  of 
Great  Britain  is  consequently  the  greatest.  France  is 
next  in  the  degree  of  protection,  and  France  is  next  in 
the  order  of  wealth.  Spain  most  neglects  the  duty  of 
protecting  the  industry  of  her  subjects,  and  Spain  is  one 
of  the  poorest  of  European  nations.  Unfortunate  Ire- 
land, disinherited,  or  rendered  in  her  industry  subser- 
vient to  England,  is  exactly  in  the  same  state  of  pov- 
erty with  Spain,  measured  by  the  rule  of  taxation.  And 
the  United  States  are  still  poorer  than  either.,, 

And  this  still  more  startling  remark : — 

“ No  man  pays  the  duty  assessed  on  the  foreign  article 
by  compulsion,  but  voluntarily ; and  this  voluntary  duty, 
if  paid,  goes  into  the  common  exchequer,  for  the  common 
benefit  of  all.  Consumption  has  four  objects  of  choice  : 
First,  it  may  abstain  from  the  use  of  the  foreign  article, 
and  thus  avoid  the  payment  of  the  tax ; second,  it  may 
employ  the  rival  American  fabric  ; third,  it  may  en- 
gage in  the  business  of  manufacturing,  which  this  bill  is 
designed  to  foster ; fourth,  it  may  supply  itself  from  the 
household  manufactures.” 

By  the  side  of  this  amazing  revelation  of  the 
means  by  which  the  consumer  can  for  himself 
neutralize  the  effects  of  a high  tariff,  we  find  strik- 
ingly wise  sayings,  which,  however,  sometimes  fit 
economic  theories  different  from  his  own.  He  ob- 
served, for  instance,  that : — 

“ The  great  desideratum  in  political  economy  is  the 
same  as  in  private  pursuits ; that  is,  what  is  the  best 
application  of  the  aggregate  industry  of  a nation  that 


218 


HENRY  CLAY 


can  be  made  honestly  to  produce  the  largest  sum  of 
national  wealth  ? ” 

Notwithstanding  its  weak  points  the  speech  made 
a great  impression.  The  immediate  effect  may  be 
judged  from  the  extent  to  which  it  monopolized 
the  attention  of  speakers  on  the  other  side.  Among 
these  stood  forth  as  the  strongest  Daniel  Webster. 
A remarkable  contrast  it  was  when,  against  the 
flashing  oratory  of  the  gay,  spirited  Kentuckian, 
there  rose  up  the  dark-browed  New  Englander 
with  his  slow,  well-measured,  massive  utterances. 
These  two  speeches  together  are  as  interesting  an 
economic  study  as  can  be  found  in  our  parliamen- 
tary history.  The  student  can  scarcely  fail  to  be 
struck  with  Webster’s  superiority  in  keenness  of 
analysis,  in  logical  reasoning,  in  extent  and  accu- 
racy of  knowledge,  in  reach  of  thought  and  mas- 
tery of  fundamental  principles.  Not  only  the  calm 
precision  with  which  Webster’s  speech  exposed 
some  of  Clay’s  reckless  statements  and  conclusions, 
but  the  bright  flashes  of  light  which  it  threw  upon 
a variety  of  important  economic  questions,  — such 
as  the  relation  of  currency  to  the  production  of 
wealth,  the  balance  of  trade,  the  principles  of  ex- 
change, the  necessary  limits  of  protection,  — give 
it  a high  and  lasting  value  in  our  literature.  It 
is  a remarkable  fact  that  Webster  — although  four 
years  afterwards  he  became  an  advocate  of  high 
tariffs  on  the  ground  that  New  England  had  taken 
protection  as  the  settled  policy  of  the  country,  had 
therefore  engaged  its  capital  in  manufactures,  and 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  219 


should  not  be  left  in  the  lurch  — never  could  deny 
or  reason  away  the  principles  laid  down  in  his 
great  argument  of  1824.  It  stands  to-day  as  his 
strongest  utterance  upon  economic  subjects. 

But  Clay  carried  the  day.  After  a long  strug- 
gle the  tariff  bill  passed  the  House  by  a majority 
of  five,  and  after  being  slightly  amended  was  also 
passed  in  the  Senate  by  a majority  of  four.  The 
vote  in  the  House  was  significant  in  its  geograph- 
ical distribution.  It  was  thus  classed  by  Niles: 
The  “ navigating  and  fishing  States  ” of  New  Eng- 
land — Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Maine 
— gave  twenty -two  votes  against  and  only  three 
for  the  bill.  Of  the  “manufacturing  States,” 
Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut,  seven  votes  went 
for  and  one  against  it.  Of  the  “grain -growing 
States,”  Vermont,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware,  Kentucky,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Il- 
linois, and  Missouri,  ninety -two  votes  were  given 
for  and  nine  against  it.  The  “tobacco -planting 
and  grain-growing  State”  of  Maryland  gave  six 
against  and  three  for  it.  The  “cotton  and  grain 
growing  State,”  Tennessee,  gave  seven  against 
and  two  for  it.  The  “tobacco  and  cotton  planting 
States,”  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Caro- 
lina, Georgia,  Mississippi,  and  Alabama,  threw 
fifty-four  votes  against  and  one  for  it.  All  the 
three  votes  of  the  “sugar  and  cotton  planting 
State,”  Louisiana,  went  against  it.  Since  the 
time  when  Calhoun  had  eloquently  argued  for  the 
fostering  of  manufacturing  industries  and  internal 


220 


HENRY  CLAY 


improvements,  a significant  change  had  taken  place 
in  the  current  of  Southern  sentiment.  The  plant- 
ing interest,  most  closely  identified  with  slavery, 
began  to  present  an  almost  solid  front  not  only 
against  the  tariff,  but  against  everything  not  in 
harmony  with  its  system  of  labor.  Massachusetts, 
Maine,  and  New  Hampshire  opposed  the  tariff 
because  it  would  be  injurious  to  commerce.  But 
they  soon  accommodated  themselves  to  it.  It  was 
a combination  of  the  grain-growing  with  the  manu- 
facturing interest,  the  idea  of  the  “home  market,” 
that  carried  the  day. 

Clay  achieved  a great  triumph  for  himself.  He 
had  not  only  far  outshone  all  others  by  his  cham- 
pionship of  the  successful  measure,  but  he  had 
given  to  the  protective  policy  a new  name,  the 
“American  system,”  which  became  inseparably 
identified  with  his  own.  This  appellation  was 
indeed  not  without  its  ludicrous  side,  which  Web- 
ster did  not  fail  promptly  to  perceive  and  to  ex- 
hibit with  keen  sarcasm.  “If  names  are  thought 
necessary,”  said  he,  “it  would  be  well  enough, 
one  would  think,  that  the  name  should  be  in  some 
measure  descriptive  of  the  thing:  and  since  Mr. 
Speaker  denominates  the  policy  which  he  recom- 
mends, 6 a new  policy  in  this  country;  9 since  he 
speaks  of  the  present  measure  as  a new  era  in  our 
legislation;  since  he  professes  to  invite  us  to  de- 
part from  our  accustomed  course,  to  instruct  our- 
selves by  the  wisdom  of  others,  and  to  adopt  the 
policy  of  the  most  distinguished  foreign  States,  — 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  221 


one  is  a little  curious  to  know  with  what  propriety 
of  speech  this  imitation  of  other  nations  is  denom- 
inated an  6 American  policy,’  while,  on  the  con- 
trary, a preference  for  our  own  established  system, 
as  it  now  actually  exists  and  always  has  existed, 
is  called  a 6 foreign  policy.  ’ This  favorite  Amer- 
ican policy  is  what  America  has  never  tried ; and 
this  odious  foreign  policy  is  what,  as  we  are  told, 
foreign  states  have  never  pursued.”  But  although 
the  “ American  system”  had  nothing  peculiarly 
American  about  it,  the  name  was  adroitly  chosen 
and  served  its  purpose.  It  proved  a well-sounding 
cry  which  to  many  minds  was  as  good  as  an  argu- 
ment. 

Thus  Clay  had  put  his  opinions  on  internal  im- 
provements, on  the  tariff,  and  on  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  the  country,  as  conspicuously  as  possible 
before  the  people;  his  platform  left  nothing  to 
desire  as  to  completeness  and  precision.  He  was 
ready  for  the  presidential  campaign. 

The  “era  of  good  feeling”  under  Monroe  left 
the  country  without  national  parties;  for  when 
there  is  only  one,  there  is  practically  none.  The 
Federal  party  had  disappeared  as  a national  or- 
ganization; it  had  only  a local  existence.  There 
were  differences  of  opinion  on  matters  of  public 
interest  within  the  Republican  party  — about  the 
tariff,  for  instance,  and  about  internal  improve- 
ments, which  had  some  effect  in  the  campaign, 
but  which  did  not  yet  produce  well-defined  and 
lasting  divisions.  The  violent  and  threatening 


222 


HENRY  CLAY 


excitement  on  slavery  called  forth  by  the  Missouri 
trouble  had  come  and  gone  like  a thunderstorm. 
In  the  planting  States  the  question  was  sometimes 
quietly  asked,  when  a public  man  was  discussed, 
whether  he  had  been  for  or  against  “slavery  re- 
striction;” but  in  the  rest  of  the  country  the  an- 
tagonists of  an  hour  had,  after  the  compromise 
was  passed,  silently  agreed  to  say  no  more  about 
it,  — at  least  for  the  time  being.  Under  these 
circumstances  the  personal  question  became  the 
most  important  one.  Hitherto  candidates  for  the 
.presidency  had  been  formally  nominated  by  the 
party  caucus  of  members  of  Congress.  But  in 
the  course  of  time  the  congressional  caucus  had 
become  odious,  there  being  a popular  impression 
that  it  was  too  much  subject  to  intrigue.  Recom- 
mendations of  candidates  had  always  been  made 
by  state  legislatures,  or  even  by  meetings  of  citi- 
zens, but  they  had  been  looked  upon  merely  as 
more  or  less  respectable  demonstrations  of  public 
sentiment.  These,  however,  as  the  congressional 
caucus  fell  into  discredit,  gained  in  importance. 
National  conventions  of  political  parties  had  not 
yet  been  invented.  A suggestion  to  call  one  was 
made  in  Pennsylvania,  but  it  remained  unheeded. 
In  the  breaking  up  of  old  political  habits,  the 
traditional  notion  that  the  secretaryship  of  state 
should  be  regarded  as  the  stepping-stone  to  the 
presidency,  had  also  become  very  much  weakened. 
There  opened  itself,  then,  a free  field  for  what 
might  irreverently  be  called  a “scramble.” 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  223 


The  consequence  was  that  no  less  than  six  can- 
didates for  the  presidency  presented  themselves 
to  the  people:  Crawford  of  Georgia,  Jackson  of 
Tennessee,  Adams  of  Massachusetts,  Clay  of  Ken- 
tucky, Calhoun  of  South  Carolina,  and  Clinton  of 
New  York.  The  two  last  named  were  soon  with- 
drawn. All  belonged  to  the  ruling  party.  Craw- 
ford was  secretary  of  the  treasury.  He  was  a 
man  of  imposing  presence.  He  had  filled  several 
public  stations  of  importance  creditably  enough, 
but  in  none  of  them  had  he  rendered  services  so 
eminent  as  to  entitle  him  to  rank  among  the  first 
order  of  statesmen.  Still  he  had  managed  to  pass 
in  those  days  as  a great  man.  His  was  that  tem- 
porary sort  of  greatness  which  appears  in  history 
as  the  reputation  of  a reputation.  He  had  much 
of  the  intriguing  politician  in  him.  He  was  strongly 
and  not  unjustly  suspected  of  manipulating  the 
patronage  of  his  department  for  his  own  political 
benefit.  It  was  he  who  in  1820  had  caused  the 
four-years’ -term  law  to  be  enacted,  — that  law 
which  has  done  so  much  to  develop  the  “spoils 
system.”  He  insisted  upon  holding  a “regular” 
congressional  caucus,  having  made  his  arrange- 
ments to  control  it.  It  was  accordingly  called  to 
meet  on  February  14,  1824;  but  of  two  hundred 
and  sixteen  Republicans,  only  sixty-six  appeared, 
and  two  more  sent  their  proxies.  Of  these  sixty  - 
eight  votes,  Crawford  received  sixty-four.  Thus 
he  had  the  “regular”  nomination;  but  as  it  had 
been  made  only  by  a majority  of  a minority,  all 


224 


HENRY  CLAY 


but  his  friends  having  refused  to  attend  the  cau- 
cus, it  lacked  authoritative  weight.  Moreover, 
his  health  was  seriously  impaired  by  a paralytic 
attack,  which  naturally  injured  him  much  as  a 
candidate. 

The  candidacy  of  General  Andrew  Jackson  was 
an  innovation  in  American  politics.  From  Wash- 
ington down,  no  man  had  been  elected  to  the  presi- 
dency, nor  indeed  been  a candidate  for  it,  who 
had  not  grown  up  to  eminence  in  civil  station. 
Every  president  had  been  known  as  a statesman. 
Now,  for  the  first  time,  a candidate  was  presented 
for  the  highest  office  whose  reputation  had  been 
won  entirely  on  a different  field*  General  Jack- 
son  had  indeed  held  civil  positions.  As  a young 
man  of  thirty,  he  had  for  a short  time  represented 
Tennessee  in  Congress.  But  there  he  had  shown 
no  sign  of  capacity  as  a legislator,  and  had  at- 
tracted attention  in  debate,  as  Jefferson  said,  only 
because  “he  could  never  speak  on  account  of  the 
rashness  of  his  feelings,”  for  as  often  as  he  at- 
tempted it  he  would  “choke  with  rage.”  Next  he 
had  become  a judge,  but  nothing  was  heard  of  his 
decisions.  It  was  only  as  a soldier  that  he  won 
brilliant  successes,  and  in  the  field  indeed  achieved 
great  renown  by  his  energy,  his  intrepid  spirit, 
and  the  natural  gift  of  command.  But  whenever 
the  general  had  to  exercise  any  function  of  author- 
ity beyond  the  handling  of  troops  on  the  march 
or  in  action,  he  distinguished  himself  by  an  im- 
patience of  restraint,  a reckless  disregard  of  the 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  225 


laws,  an  uncontrollable  violence  of  temper,  and  a 
daring  assumption  of  power,  not  seldom  seriously- 
compromising  the  character  as  well  as  the  peace 
of  the  country.  His  private  life  too,  while  it  was 
that  of  a man  of  integrity  and  generous  impulses, 
abounded  in  tumultuous  broils  and  bloody  encoun- 
ters. Thus  his  military  achievements  had  given 
him  his  only  prestige,  while  at  the  same  time  he 
had  shown  in  their  strongest  development  those 
qualities  sometimes  found  in  the  successful  man  of 
war,  which  render  him  peculiarly  unfit  for  respon- 
sible position  and  the  delicate  tasks  of  statesman- 
ship in  time  of  peace. 

But  his  candidacy,  although  a complete  abandon- 
ment of  the  good  old  tradition  and  made  possible 
only  by  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  was  “ worked 
up  ” with  consummate  skill  by  one  of  his  friends 
in  Tennessee,  Major  Lewis,  who  thus  earned  a 
place  in  the  very  front  rank  of  political  managers. 
Some  letters  deprecating  the  spirit  of  partisan 
proscription  in  filling  public  offices,  which  General 
Jackson  had  written  to  Monroe  years  before,  were 
brought  before  the  public  to  propitiate  the  rem- 
nants of  the  Federal  party.  He  was  made  to 
write  another  letter,  to  Dr.  L.  H.  Coleman,  pro- 
nouncing in  a vague  way  in  favor  of  a protective 
tariff.  In  order  to  keep  man  of  ability  and 
character,  but  unfriendly  to  him,  out  of  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  and  also  to  give  the  general 
an  opportunity  to  renew  friendly  relations  with 
public  men  with  whom  he  had  quarreled,  Jackson 


226 


HENRY  CLAY 


himself  was  elected  a senator  from  Tennessee,  and 
took  his  seat  in  December,  1823.  The  Tennessee 
legislature  had  expressed  its  preference  for  him  as 
a candidate  for  the  presidency  in  1822.  A con- 
vention of  Federalists  at  Harrisburg  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, a State  in  which  the  Federalists  still  main- 
tained an  organization,  likewise  nominated  him  in 
February,  1824,  and  a month  later  a Democratic 
convention  at  the  same  place  followed  their  exam- 
ple. Thus  Jackson  was  fairly  started  as  a “man 
of  the  people,”  and  presently  many  began  to  see 
in  him  not  only  the  greatest  military  hero  in  his- 
tory, but  also  a political  sage. 

The  candidate  who  most  completely  answered 
the  traditional  requirements  was  unquestionably 
John  Quincy  Adams,  the  candidate  of  New  Eng- 
land. He  had  been  longest  in  public  duty.  He 
had  won  eminence  by  conspicuous  service.  His 
experience  and  knowledge  as  a statesman  were 
unexcelled  by  any  American  of  his  time.  His 
private  life  was  spotless,  and  his  public  character 
above  reproach.  Austere,  cold  and  distant  in  his 
manners,  he  lacked  altogether  those  qualities  which 
“make  friends.”  He  was  the  embodied  sense  of 
duty,  commanding  respect  but  not  kindling  affec- 
tion. Although  full  of  ambition  to  be  president, 
he  would  owe  his  elevation  solely  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  his  merits.  His  election  was  to  signify 
the  popular  approval  of  his  public  conduct.  He 
would  not  “work”  to  obtain  it,  nor  countenance 
his  friends  in  “working”  for  him.  He  would 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  227 


gratefully  and  proudly  take  the  presidency  from 
the  hands  of  the  people,  but  not  be  obliged  to  any 
person  for  procuring  it.  A letter  which  he  wrote 
in  reply  to  a suggestion  that  he  should  ask  and 
encourage  others  to  promote  his  interests  as  a can- 
didate, portrays  his  ideal  of  public  virtue : — 

“ Detur  digniori  is  the  inscription  upon  the  prize. 
The  principle  of  the  Constitution  in  its  purity  is,  that 
the  duty  shall  be  assigned  to  the  most  able  and  the  most 
worthy.  Politicians  and  newspapers  may  bestir  them- 
selves to  point  out  who  that  is  ; and  the  only  question 
between  us  is,  whether  it  be  consistent  with  the  duties  of 
a citizen,  who  is  supposed  to  desire  that  the  choice  should 
fall  upon  himself,  to  assist,  countenance,  and  encourage 
those  who  are  disposed  to  befriend  him  in  the  pursuit. 
The  law  of  friendship  is  a reciprocation  of  good  offices. 
He  who  asks  or  accepts  the  offer  of  friendly  service  con- 
tracts the  obligation  of  meeting  it  with  a suitable  return. 
If  he  seeks  or  accepts  the  aid  of  one,  he  must  ask  or 
accept  the  aid  of  multitudes.  Between  the  principle  of 
which  much  has  been  said  in  the  newspapers,  that  a 
president  of  the  United  States  must  remember  those  to 
whom  he  owes  his  elevation,  and  the  principle  of  accept- 
ing no  aid  on  the  score  of  friendship  or  personal  kind- 
ness to  him,  there  is  no  alternative.  The  former,  as  it 
has  been  announced  and  urged,  I deem  to  be  essentially 
and  vitally  corrupt.  The  latter  is  the  only  principle  to 
which  no  exception  can  be  taken.” 

This  principle  he  not  only  professed,  but  he 
acted  upon  it.  Compared  with  what  the  political 
usages  of  our  days  have  accustomed  us  to  consider 
admissible,  such  a principle  may  appear  to  be  an 


228 


HENRY  CLAY 


exaggerated  refinement  of  feeling,  fitted  only  for 
an  ideal  state  of  society.  It  may  be  said  that  a 
statesman  so  conscientious  will  throw  away  his 
chance  of  rising  into  power,  and  thus  set  narrow 
limits  to  his  own  usefulness.  But,  after  all,  a 
conscientious  public  man,  in  order  to  remain  per- 
fectly true  to  his  public  duty,  will  either  have  to 
accept  the  principle  insisted  upon  by  John  Quincy 
Adams,  or  at  least  he  must  make  the  friends  who 
promote  his  interests  clearly  understand  that  there 
may  be  circumstances  under  which  he  will  consider 
it  a virtue  to  forget  the  obligations  of  friendship, 
and  that,  whenever  the  public  interest  demands  it, 
he  will  always  have  the  courage  of  ingratitude. 

Clay  was  first  nominated  as  a candidate  for  the 
presidency  by  the  members  of  the  Kentucky  legis- 
lature in  November,  1822.  Similar  demonstra- 
tions followed  in  Louisiana,  Missouri,  and  Ohio. 
Of  his  anxiety  to  be  elected  president  he  made  no 
secret.  He  conducted  a large  correspondence  with 
friends  all  over  the  country,  from  whom  he  received 
reports,  and  to  whom  he  sent  his  suggestions  in 
return.  One  of  his  most  active  canvassers  was 
Thomas  H.  Benton,  who  represented  the  young 
State  of  Missouri  in  the  Senate.  Benton  traveled 
through  Tennessee,  Ohio,  and  Missouri  advocating 
Clay’s  interest  and  reporting  progress  from  time 
to  time.  Before  long  we  shall  find  these  two  men 
engaged  in  a very  different  sort  of  conversation. 
A part  of  Clay’s  correspondence  about  the  canvass 
with  General  Peter  B.  Porter  and  W.  B.  Roches- 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  229 


ter  of  New  York,  Senator  J.  S.  Johnston  of  Loui- 
siana, and  his  old  friend  Francis  Brooke  of  Vir- 
ginia, is  still  preserved.  It  reveals  a very  warm 
and  active  interest  on  his  part  in  the  conduct  of 
his  campaign  — sometimes  quite  urgent  as  to  things 
to  be  done.  He  was  very  much  chagrined  not  to 
see  a vigorous  movement  in  his  favor  in  Virginia, 
his  native  State,  and  he  pressed  his  friends  re- 
peatedly, with  evident  impatience,  to  take  some 
demonstrative  step. 

Thus  he  did  not,  as  a candidate  for  the  presi- 
dency, adopt  the  lofty  standard  of  John  Quincy 
Adams’s  principles  for  the  guidance  of  his  con- 
duct. He  did  accept  and  encourage  the  aid  of 
friends,  and  was  quite  active  in  spurring  and  di- 
recting their  zeal.  But  beyond  that  he  did  not 
go.  He  kept  rigidly  clear  of  promises  and  bar- 
gains. As  early  as  January  31,  1823,  he  wrote 
to  Francis  Brooke:  — 

“ On  one  resolution  my  friends  may  rest  assured  I will 
firmly  rely,  and  that  is,  to  participate  in  no  intrigues,  to 
enter  into  no  arrangements,  to  make  no  promises  or 
pledges ; but  that,  whether  I am  elected  or  not,  I will 
have  nothing  to  reproach  myself  with.  If  elected  I will 
go  into  the  office  with  a pure  conscience,  to  promote 
with  my  utmost  exertions  the  common  good  of  our  coun- 
try, and  free  to  select  the  most  able  and  faithful  public 
servants.  If  not  elected,  acquiescing  most  cheerfully  in 
the  better  selection  which  will  thus  have  been  made,  I 
will  at  least  have  the  satisfaction  of  preserving  my  honor 
unsullied  and  my  heart  uncorrupted. 


230 


HENRY  CLAY 


And  when  in  the  heat  of  the  canvass  a proposi- 
tion was  made  to  him  which  looked  like  a bargain, 
he  wrote  (to  J.  S.  Johnston,  June  15,  1824):  — 

“ If  the  communication  from  Mr. is  to  be  consid- 

ered in  the  nature  of  an  overture,  there  can  be  but  one 
answer  given.  I can  make  no  promises  of  office  of  any 
sort,  to  any  one,  upon  any  condition  whatever.  What- 
ever support  shall  be  given  to  me  must  be  spontaneous 
and  unsough t.” 

When  in  the  course  of  the  campaign  Martin 
Van  Buren,  then  a leading  manager  for  Crawford, 
becoming  alarmed  at  the  unexpected  strength  of 
the  Jackson  movement,  caused  Clay  to  be  ap- 
proached with  the  suggestion  of  a coalition  between 
the  Crawford  and  Clay  forces  to  make  Crawford 
president  and  Clay  vice-president,  Clay  replied 
that  he  was  resolved  neither  to  offer  nor  to  accept 
any  arrangement  with  regard  to  himself  or  to  office 
for  others,  and  that  he  would  not  decline  the  vice- 
presidency, provided  it  were  offered  to  him  “by 
the  public  having  the  right  to  tender  it.”  Neither 
can  it  be  said  that  Clay,  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives or  in  his  public  utterances  elsewhere, 
had  tried,  as  a candidate  for  the  presidency,  to 
trim  his  sail  to  the  wind,  to  truckle  to  the  opinions 
of  others,  to  carry  water  on  both  shoulders.  In 
the  advocacy  of  his  principles  and  policies  he  was 
as  outspoken  and  straightforward  as  he  ever  had 
been,  perhaps  even  more  dashing  and  combative 
than  he  had  occasion  to  be.  It  would  hardly  have 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  231 


been  predicted  then  that  twenty  years  later  he 
would  lose  the  presidency  by  an  equivocation. 

In  the  course  of  the  canvass  it  became  obvious 
that  no  one  of  the  four  candidates  could  obtain  a 
majority  of  the  electoral  vote,  and  that  the  election 
would  devolve  upon  the  House  of  Kepresentatives. 
This,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  campaign  from 
becoming  very  animated.  There  being  no  marked 
difference  of  principle  or  opinion  between  the 
competitors,  the  effusions  of  stump  orators  and  of 
newspapers  turned  mainly  on  personalities.  Adams 
wrote  in  August : “ The  bitterness  and  violence  of 
presidential  electioneering  increase  as  the  time 
advances.  It  seems  as  if  every  liar  and  calumni- 
ator in  the  country  was  at  work  day  and  night  to 
destroy  my  character.  It  is  impossible  to  be  wholly 
insensible  to  this  process  while  it  is  in  operation. 
It  distracts  my  attention  from  public  business  and 
consumes  precious  time.”  But  the  other  candi- 
dates fared  no  better  than  he.  Against  Crawford 
charges  of  corruption  were  brought.  Jackson  was 
denounced  as  a murderer;  and  Clay’s  well  known 
fondness  for  the  card-table  came  home  to  him  in 
giving  him  the  name  of  a gambler.  His  adherents 
in  Ohio  resolved  at  a meeting  that,  as  “all  the 
gentlemen  named  as  candidates  for  the  presidency 
were  honorable  and  intelligent  men,  and  to  degrade 
and  vilify  them  was  discreditable  to  the  moral 
sense  and  sound  judgment  of  the  country,”  the 
friends  of  Mr.  Clay  would  “not  indulge  in  the 
unworthy  practice  of  vilifying  the  candidates  whom 


232 


HENRY  CLAY 


they  did  not  support.”  This,  however,  did  not 
have  the  effect  of  improving  the  temper  of  his 
opponents.  As  the  day  of  election  approached, 
the  J ackson  managers  started  a report  that  Clay, 
seeing  no  chance  for  himself,  would  withdraw  from 
the  contest  and  throw  his  influence  for  Crawford ; 
whereupon  his  friends  issued  another  proclamation, 
declaring  that  Clay  “would  not  be  withdrawn  from 
the  contest  except  by  the  fiat  of  his  Maker.” 
There  were  demonstrations  of  enthusiasm,  too,  — 
not,  indeed,  by  uniformed  campaign  organizations 
and  great  torchlight  parades;  but  splendors  of  a 
different  kind  were  not  lacking.  Niles  records, 
for  instance:  “ Presidential  vests ! A large  parcel 
of  silk  vestings  have  been  received  at  New  York, 
from  France,  stamped  with  pretty  good  likenesses 
of  Washington  and  of  the  presidential  candidates, 
Adams,  Clay,  and  Jackson.”  There  was  great 
confusion  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  as  to 
the  vice-presidency.  The  Jackson  men  rallied  on 
Calhoun.  The  friends  of  Adams  tried  to  “run” 
Jackson  for  the  second  office.  Indeed,  such  a 
combination  had  long  been  in  the  mind  of  Adams 
himself.  Gallatin  was  at  first  on  the  Crawford 
ticket,  but  then  withdrew  entirely  from  the  con- 
test. The  Clay  men  selected  Sanford  of  New 
York. 

The  result  of  the  election  did  not  become  fully 
known  before  December.  It  turned  out  that  Jack- 
son  had  won  ninety-nine  electoral  votes,  Adams 
^ighty-four,  Crawford  forty -one,  and  Clay  thirty- 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  233 

seven.  No  one  having  received  a clear  majority, 
the  election  devolved  upon  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives; and  as,  according  to  the  Constitution, 
the  choice  by  the  House  was  confined  to  the  three 
candidates  having  the  highest  number  of  votes, 
Clay’s  chance  was  gone.  He  received  the  whole 
electoral  vote  of  only  three  States,  Kentucky, 
Ohio,  and  Missouri,  and  four  votes  from  New 
York.  For  the  vice-presidency,  Calhoun  had  a 
decided  majority,  one  hundred  and  eighty-two  out 
of  two  hundred  and  sixty-one. 

Clay  was  deeply  disappointed.  He  had  hoped 
to  be  at  least  among  the  three  eligible  by  the 
House  of  Representatives.  He  had  counted  upon 
a majority  of  the  electoral  vote  of  Illinois;  he  had 
not  despaired  of  Virginia,  his  native  State.  It 
was  said  that  the  five  votes  of  Louisiana  had 
been  taken  from  Clay  by  a trick  in  the  legislature, 
and  that  if  he  had  received  them,  which  would 
have  put  him  ahead  of  Crawford,  his  personal 
popularity  in  the  House  would  have  given  him  the 
presidency.  What  “ might  have  been  ” only  sharp- 
ened the  sting  of  the  disappointment  he  suffered. 
In  his  letters  he  spoke  philosophically  enough: 
“As  it  is,  I shall  yield  a cheerful  acquiescence  in 
the  public  decision.  We  must  not  despair  of  the 
republic.  Our  institutions,  if  they  have  the  value 
which  we  believe  them  to  possess  and  are  worth 
preserving,  will  sustain  themselves,  and  will  yet 
do  well.”  But  Martin  Van  Buren  wrote  on  De- 
cember 31,  1824,  to  a friend:  “He  (Clay)  appears 


234 


HENRY  CLAY 


to  me  not  to  sustain  his  defeat  with  as  much  com- 
posure and  fortitude  as  I should  have  expected, 
and  evinces  a degree  of  despondency  not  called 
for  by  the  actual  state  of  things.”  This  is  not 
improbable,  for  a man  of  Clay’s  sanguine,  impul- 
sive temperament  feels  misfortune  as  keenly  as  he 
enjoys  success. 

His  greatest  trial,  however,  was  still  to  come. 
But  before  it  came,  he  had  as  speaker  of  the 
House  a ceremonial  act  to  perform,  which  at  the 
same  time  was  an  act  of  friendship,  and  which, 
by  the  emotions  it  awakened,  may  for  a moment 
have  made  him  forget  the  humiliation  of  defeat 
and  the  anxieties  besetting  him.  Lafayette  was 
visiting  the  United  States,  and  wherever  he  went 
all  the  bitter  quarrels  of  the  presidential  struggle 
were  silenced  by  the  transports  of  enthusiasm  with 
which  he  was  received.  He  appeared  among  the 
American  people  as  the  impersonation  of  their 
heroic  ancestry  to  whom  they  owed  everything 
they  were  proudest  of.  Only  Washington  him- 
self, had  he  risen  from  the  grave,  could  have 
called  forth  deeper  feelings  of  reverence  and  affec- 
tion. As  the  guest  of  the  nation,  he  was  invited 
to  the  Capitol,  and  Clay  had  to  welcome  him  in 
the  House  of  Representatives.  It  was  a solemn 
and  touching  scene.  Clay  delivered  an  address 
full  of  feeling.  With  delicate  instinct,  the  orator 
seized  upon  the  poetic  side  of  Lafayette’s  visit. 
46 The  vain  wish  has  been  sometimes  indulged,” 
said  he,  44  that  Providence  would  allow  the  patriot, 


CANDIDATE  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  235 


after  death,  to  return  to  his  country,  and  to  con- 
template the  intermediate  changes  which  had  taken 
place,  to  view  the  forests  felled,  the  cities  built, 
the  mountains  leveled,  the  canals  cut,  the  highways 
constructed,  the  progress  of  the  arts,  the  advance- 
ment of  learning,  and  the  increase  of  population. 
General,  your  present  visit  to  the  United  States 
is  a realization  of  the  consoling  object  of  that  wish. 
You  are  in  the  midst  of  posterity.” 

The  relations  between  Clay  and  Lafayette  were 
of  the  friendliest  character.  They  had  long  been 
in  correspondence,  which  continued  for  years  after 
this  meeting  at  Washington.  Lafayette’s  letters 
to  Clay,  many  of  which  have  been  preserved, 
abound  in  expressions  not  only  of  regard,  but  of 
affection.  It  seems  that  the  heart  of  the  old  pa- 
triot was  completely  captured  by  the  brilliant, 
frank,  and  generous  American,  and  he  was  re- 
peatedly heard  to  speak  of  Clay  as  the  man  he 
wished  to  see  made  president  of  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  X 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 

Instead  of  being  made  president,  Clay  found 
himself  invested  with  the  dangerous  power  of 
choosing  one  among  his  rivals  for  the  great  office. 
It  was  generally  admitted  that  his  influence  com- 
manded in  the  House  of  Representatives  a suffi- 
cient number  of  votes  to  decide  the  contest  between 
Adams,  Jackson,  and  Crawford.  He  was,  there- 
fore, so  long  as  his  preference  remained  unknown, 
a much-sought,  much-courted  man.  In  a letter 
written  on  January  8 to  Francis  P.  Blair,  whom 
he  then  counted  among  his  friends  in  Kentucky, 
he  humorously  described  the  situation:  “I  am 
sometimes  touched  gently  on  the  shoulder  by  a 
friend,  for  example,  of  General  Jackson,  who  will 
thus  address  me : 6 My  dear  sir,  all  my  dependence 
is  upon  you;  don’t  disappoint  us;  you  know  our 
partiality  was  for  you  next  to  the  hero,  and  how 
much  we  want  a Western  president.’  Immediately 
after  a friend  of  Mr.  Crawford  will  accost  me: 
4 The  hopes  of  the  Republican  party  are  concen- 
trated on  you;  for  God’s  sake  preserve  it.  If  you 
had  been  returned  instead  of  Mr.  Crawford,  every 
man  of  us  would  have  supported  you  to  the  last 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


237 


hour.  We  consider  you  and  him  as  the  only  gen- 
uine Republican  candidates.’  Next  a friend  of 
Mr.  Adams  comes  with  tears  in  his  eyes  [an  allu- 
sion to  Adams’s  watering  eyes]:  6 Sir,  Mr.  Adams 
has  always  had  the  greatest  respect  for  you,  and 
admiration  of  your  talents.  There  is  no  station 
to  which  you  are  not  equal.  Most  undoubtedly 
you  are  the  second  choice  of  New  England,  and  I 
pray  you  to  consider  seriously  whether  the  public 
good  and  your  own  future  interests  do  not  point 
most  distinctly  to  the  choice  which  you  ought  to 
make?  ’ How  can  one  withstand  all  this  disinter- 
ested homage  and  kindness?” 

General  Jackson  himself  thought  it  good  policy 
now  to  be  on  pleasant  terms  with  Clay.  There 
had  been  u non -intercourse  ” between  them  ever 
since  that  memorable  debate  in  which  Clay  found 
fault  with  the  general’s  conduct  in  the  Florida 
war.  Jackson  had  left  Clay’s  visit  of  courtesy 
unreturned,  and  when  accidentally  meeting  Clay 
at  a Kentucky  village  inn,  in  the  summer  of  1819, 
he  had  hardly  deigned  to  notice  Clay’s  polite  salu- 
tation. But  now,  having  become  an  anxious  can- 
didate for  the  presidency  while  Clay  was  believed 
to  control  the  decisive  vote  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, Jackson  took  a less  haughty  view  of 
things.  Several  members  of  Congress  from  Ten- 
nessee approached  Clay  to  bring  about  an  accom- 
modation. They  declared  in  General  Jackson’s 
behalf,  that  when  treating  Clay’s  courtesy  with 
apparent  contempt,  he  was  “laboring  under  some 


238 


HENRY  CLAY 


indisposition,”  and  meant  no  offense.  Clay  in 
response  said  that  in  censuring  General  Jackson’s 
official  conduct  he  had  merely  “expressed  opinions 
in  respect  to  public  acts,”  without  any  feeling  of 
personal  enmity.  The  Tennessee  delegation  then 
arranged  a dinner  to  which  both  Clay  and  Jackson 
were  invited,  and  at  which  both  appeared.  They 
exchanged  salutations  and  dined  together.  When 
Clay  retired  from  the  table,  Jackson  and  his  friend 
Eaton  followed  him  to  the  door  and  insisted  that 
he  should  take  a seat  with  them  in  their  carriage. 
Clay,  dismissing  his  own  coach,  rode  with  them 
and  was  set  down  at  his  door.  Jackson  then  in- 
vited him  to  dinner  and  he  accepted.  Soon  after- 
wards Jackson  with  several  members  of  Congress 
dined  at  Clay’s  lodgings,  and  then  they  “fre- 
quently met  in  the  course  of  the  winter,  always 
respectfully  addressing  each  other.”  Thus  the 
“non-intercourse”  was  laboriously  raised. 

But  all  the  while  Clay  was  firmly  resolved  to 
give  his  vote  and  influence  to  Adams.  He  had 
made  this  declaration  to  J.  J.  Crittenden  before 
he  left  Kentucky  for  Washington,  and  he  informed 
Benton  of  his  determination  early  in  December. 
The  legislature  of  Kentucky  passed  a resolution 
requesting  the  members  of  Congress  from  that 
State  to  vote  for  Jackson,  but  even  that  could  not 
swerve  Clay  from  his  purpose.  His  conclusion 
was,  for  him,  the  only  possible  one.  Crawford 
was  a paralytic.  For  months  he  had  been  unable, 
as  secretary  of  the  treasury,  to  sign  his  official 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


239 


papers  with  his  own  hand.  It  was  extremely  doubt- 
ful whether,  if  elected  president,  he  would  ever  be 
able  to  discharge  the  duties  of  the  office.  For  this 
reason,  aside  from  other  considerations,  Clay  could 
not  vote  for  him.  Could  he  vote  for  Jackson? 
We  remember  Clay’s  speech  on  Jackson’s  lawless 
conduct  in  the  Seminole  war.  He  had  not  since 
changed  his  opinion.  “As  a friend  of  liberty, 
and  to  the  permanence  of  our  institutions,”  he 
wrote  to  Francis  Brooke,  “I  cannot  consent,  in 
this  early  stage  of  their  existence,  by  contributing 
to  the  election  of  a military  chieftain,  to  give  the 
strongest  guaranty  that  the  republic  will  march 
in  the  fatal  road  which  has  conducted  every  other 
republic  to  ruin.”  So  again  he  wrote  to  Blair: 
“Mr.  Adams,  you  know  well,  I should  never  have 
selected,  if  at  liberty  to  draw  from  the  whole  mass 
of  our  citizens,  for  a president.  But  there  is  no 
danger  in  his  elevation  now,  or  in  time  to  come. 
Not  so  of  his  competitor,  of  whom  I cannot  believe 
that  killing  two  thousand  five  hundred  Englishmen 
at  New  Orleans  qualifies  for  the  various  difficult 
and  complicated  duties  of  the  chief  magistracy.” 
These  were  his  honest  opinions.  How  could  he 
vote  to  make  Jackson  president? 

It  was  indeed  argued  that,  as  Jackson  had  re- 
ceived, not  a majority  of  the  electoral  votes  (for 
he  had  only  ninety-nine  out  of  two  hundred  and 
sixty-one),  but  more  votes  than  any  one  of  his 
competitors,  the  members  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives were  bound,  in  obedience  to  the  popular 


240 


HENRY  CLAY 


will,  to  ratify  that  verdict.  Not  to  do  so  was,  as 
Benton  expressed  it  with  a desperate  plunge  into 
Greek,  “a  violation  of  the  demos  krateo  principle.” 
This  was  equivalent  to  saying  that  a mere  plurality 
of  the  electoral  vote  should  be  sufficient  to  elect 
a president;  for  if  the  House  of  Representatives 
were  in  duty  bound  to  ratify  that  plurality  as  if 
it  were  a majority,  then  the  plurality  would  prac- 
tically elect.  But  the  Constitution  expressly  pro- 
vides that  a president  shall  not  be  elected  by  a 
plurality  of  the  electoral  votes,  and  that,  when  no 
clear  majority  is  obtained,  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives shall  freely  choose  from  those  three  candi- 
dates who  shall  have  received  the  highest  numbers. 
Moreover,  the  electors  having  in  six  States  been 
appointed  by  the  legislatures,  it  was  a mere  matter 
of  conjecture  whether  General  Jackson  would  have 
had  a plurality  of  the  popular  vote,  had  the  elec- 
tors in  all  the  States  been  chosen  by  the  people. 
Finally,  there  was  nothing  to  prove  that  Adams 
would  not  have  been  the  second  choice  of  the 
friends  of  Crawford  and  Clay,  in  a sufficient  num- 
ber of  cases  to  insure  him  a clear  majority  in  an 
election  confined  to  him  and  Jackson.  The  pre- 
sumption may  be  said  to  have  been  in  favor  of 
this,  if,  as  proved  to  be  the  fact,  the  House  of 
Representatives  was  inclined  to  give  him  that  ma- 
jority. There  was,  therefore,  nothing  in  such  an 
argument  to  limit  the  freedom  of  Clay’s  choice. 

Benton  himself  admitted  that  his  “ demos  krateo 
principle”  was  in  conflict  with  the  theory  of  the 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


241 


Constitution.  Indeed,  if  carried  to  its  logical 
consequences,  it  would  have  demanded  that  a can- 
didate receiving  an  absolute  majority  of  the  elec- 
toral vote,  but  a smaller  popular  vote  than  another 
candidate,  could  not  legitimately  be  president. 
Nobody  could  have  gone  this  length.  But  in  1825 
a great  cry  was  raised  because  a mere  plurality 
was  not  regarded  as  a majority,  and  it  had  much 
effect. 

When  the  friends  of  Jackson  and  of  Crawford 
began  to  suspect  that  Clay  favored  Adams,  their 
conduct  towards  him  changed  abruptly.  As  they 
could  not  persuade  him,  they  sought  to  drive  and 
even  to  frighten  him.  He  received  anonymous 
letters  full  of  abuse  and  menace.  Some  of  them 
contained  threats  of  personal  violence.  In  others 
he  was  informed  that,  unless  Jackson  were  elected, 
there  would  be  insurrection  and  bloodshed.  A 
peculiar  kind  of  fanaticism  seems  to  have  been 
blazing  up  among  Jackson’s  friends.  Their  news- 
papers opened  furiously  on  Clay,  and  denounced 
his  unwillingness  to  vote  for  Jackson  as  a sort  of 
high  treason.  But  Clay  could  not  be  moved.  “I 
shall  risk,”  he  said  in  a letter  to  his  friend  Brooke, 
“I  shall  risk  without  emotion  these  effusions  of 
malice,  and  remain  unshaken  in  my  purpose.  What 
is  a public  man  worth  if  he  will  not  expose  himself, 
on  fit  occasions,  for  the  good  of  the  country?” 

At  last  the  J ackson  party  resorted  to  a desper- 
ate expedient.  The  election  in  the  House  was  to 
take  place  on  February  9.  On  January  28  a letter 


242 


HENRY  CLAY 


dated  at  Washington  appeared  in  a Philadelphia 
newspaper  pointedly  accusing  Clay  of  having  struck 
a corrupt  bargain  with  Adams.  Clay,  the  writer 
said,  was  to  transfer  his  friends  to  Adams  for  the 
purpose  of  making  Adams  president,  and  Adams 
was  then  to  make  Clay  secretary  of  state.  “And 
the  friends  of  Mr.  Clay,”  so  the  letter  continued, 
“gave  the  information  to  the  friends  of  Jackson 
that,  if  the  friends  of  Jackson  would  offer  the 
same  price,  they  would  close  with  them.  But 
none  of  the  friends  of  Jackson  would  descend  to 
such  mean  barter  and  sale.”  The  letter  pretended 
to  come  from  a member  of  Congress,  who,  how- 
ever, did  not  give  his  name.  A copy  of  the  paper 
was  mailed  to  Clay.  This  stung  him  to  the  quick. 
On  February  1 he  published  “a  card”  in  the 
“National  Intelligencer,”  in  which  he  expressed 
his  belief  that  the  letter  purporting  to  come  from 
a member  of  the  House  was  a forgery;  “but,”  he 
added,  “if  it  be  genuine,  I pronounce  the  mem- 
ber, whoever  he  may  be,  a base  and  infamous 
calumniator,  a dastard  and  liar;  and  if  he  dare 
unveil  himself  and  avow  his  name,  I will  hold  him 
responsible,  as  I here  admit  myself  to  be,  to  all 
the  laws  which  govern  and  regulate  men  of  honor.” 
Clay’s  hot  blood  had  run  away  with  his  judgment. 
He  himself  felt  it  as  soon  as  he  saw  his  “card” 
in  print.  But  a high-spirited  man,  conscious  of 
his  rectitude,  should  not  be  judged  too  harshly  if 
the  first  charge  of  corruption  publicly  brought 
against  him  does  not  find  him  cool  enough  to 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


243 


determine  whether  the  silence  of  contempt  or  the 
angry  cry  of  insulted  honor  will  better  comport 
with  his  dignity. 

Unfortunately,  the  threat  of  a challenge,  which 
would  have  been  wrong  under  any  circumstances, 
in  this  case  turned  out  to  be  even  ludicrous.  Two 
days  afterwards  another  “card”  appeared  in  the 
“National  Intelligencer,”  in  which  George  Kremer, 
a representative  from  Pennsylvania,  avowed  him- 
self as  the  author  of  the  letter.  George  Kremer 
was  one  of  those  men  in  high  political  station  of 
whom  people  wonder  “how  they  ever  got  there;” 
an  insignificant,  ordinarily  inoffensive,  simple  soul, 
uneducated,  ignorant,  and  eccentric,  attracting  at- 
tention in  Washington  mainly  by  a leopard-skin 
overcoat  of  curious  cut  which  he  was  in  the  habit 
of  wearing.  This  man  now  revealed  himself  as 
the  great  Henry  Clay’s  antagonist,  declaring  him- 
self “ready  to  prove,  to  the  satisfaction  of  unpreju- 
diced minds,  enough  to  satisfy  them  of  the  accu- 
racy of  the  statements  which  were  contained  in 
that  letter.”  The  thought  of  a duel  with  George 
Kremer  in  his  leopard-skin  overcoat  appeared  at 
once  so  farcical  that  the  most  passionate  duelist 
would  not  have  seriously  entertained  it.  As  Dan- 
iel Webster  wrote  to  his  excellent  brother  Ezekiel, 
who  lived  on  a farm  in  New  Hampshire,  “Mr. 
Kremer  is  a man  with  whom  one  would  think  of 
having  a shot  about  as  soon  as  with  your  neigh- 
bor, Mr.  Simeon  Atkinson,  whom  he  somewhat 
resembles.” 


244 


HENRY  CLAY 


The  rashness  of  Clay’s  fierce  proclamation  was 
thus  well  punished.  He  had  now  to  retrieve  the 
dignity  of  his  character.  On  the  day  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  Kremer’s  card,  Clay  rose  solemnly  in 
the  House  to  ask  for  a special  committee  to  inquire 
into  the  charges  made  by  that  gentleman,  “in 
order  that  if  he  [Clay]  were  guilty,  here  the  proper 
punishment  might  be  applied,  or,  if  innocent,  here 
his  character  and  conduct  might  be  vindicated.” 
He  expressed  the  anxious  hope  that  his  request  for 
an  investigation  of  the  charges  would  be  granted. 
“Emanating  from  such  a source,”  he  said,  “this 
was  the  only  notice  he  could  take  of  them.”  The 
challenge  to  mortal  combat,  Henry  Clay  against 
George  Kremer,  was  thus  withdrawn.  A motion 
was  made  by  Forsyth  of  Georgia  that  the  commit- 
tee asked  for  be  appointed.  This  unexpected  turn 
of  affairs  threw  poor  Kremer  into  a great  flutter. 
He  followed  Forsyth,  saying  that,  if  it  should 
appear  that  he  had  not  sufficient  reason  to  justify 
his  statements,  he  trusted  he  should  receive  proper 
reprobation.  He  was  willing  to  meet  the  inquiry 
and  abide  the  result,  but  he  desired  to  have  the 
honorable  speaker’s  “card”  referred  to  the  com- 
mittee too.  He  was  restless  and  bustled  about, 
saying  to  one  member  that  the  letter  in  question 
was  not  really  of  his  own  making;  to  others,  that 
he  had  not  intended  at  all  to  make  any  charge 
against  Mr.  Clay.  Then  he  put  a sort  of  dis- 
claimer on  a piece  of  paper  and  sent  it  to  Clay, 
asking  whether  this  would  be  satisfactory ; but  he 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


245 


received  the  answer  that  the  matter  was  now  in 
the  hands  of  the  House.  After  two  days’  debate 
the  committee  was  elected  by  ballot,  not  one  mem- 
ber being  on  it  who  had  supported  Clay  for  the 
presidency. 

On  February  9,  the  very  day  when  the  electoral 
vote  was  to  be  counted  and  the  election  by  the 
House  was  to  take  place,  the  committee  reported. 
And  what  was  the  report?  George  Kremer,  who 
at  first  had  promised  to  “meet  the  inquiry  and 
abide  the  result,”  had  reconsidered  over  night; 
instead  of  giving  the  testimony  the  committee 
asked  of  him,  he  sent  to  that  tribunal  a long  let- 
ter, refusing  to  testify.  He  would  not,  he  wrote, 
appear  before  the  committee  either  as  an  accuser 
or  a witness,  as  there  was  no  constitutional  author- 
ity by  which  the  House  could  assume  jurisdiction 
over  the  case ; such  an  assumption  would  threaten 
a dangerous  invasion  of  the  liberty  of  speech  and 
of  the  press;  he  therefore  protested  against  the 
whole  proceeding,  and  preferred  to  communicate 
to  his  constituents  the  proofs  of  his  statements 
with  regard  to  the  corrupt  bargain  charged. 

This  letter  the  committee  laid  before  the  House, 
and  that  was  all  the  report  they  made.  In  the 
course  of  time,  much  light  has  been  thrown  upon 
this  remarkable  transaction.  It  has  now  become 
clear  that,  instead  of  a bargain  being  struck  be- 
tween Adams  and  Clay,  overtures  were  made  by 
Jackson’s  friends  to  Clay’s  friends;  that  George 
Kremer,  a simple-minded  man  and  a fanatical 


246 


HENRY  CLAY 


adherent  of  Jackson,  was  used  as  a tool  by  the 
J ackson  managers,  especially  Senator  Eaton  from 
Tennessee;  that  they  were  the  real  authors  of 
Kremer’s  first  letter  to  the  Philadelphia  newspa- 
per; that  Clay’s  demand  for  an  inquiry  by  the 
House  into  the  charge  made  by  Kremer  was  an 
unwelcome  surprise  to  them;  that  Kremer,  having 
been  told  by  them  that  the  charge  would  be  sub- 
stantiated, blunderingly  assented  to  the  inquiry 
when  the  motion  was  made;  that  they,  knowing 
the  charge  to  be  false,  wanted  to  avoid  an  investi- 
gation of  it  by  the  House ; that,  when  the  commit- 
tee called  upon  Kremer  for  proofs,  he  was  taken 
in  hand  by  the  Jackson  managers,  who  wrote  for 
him  the  letter  protesting  against  the  congressional 
proceeding;  that,  in  avoiding  an  investigation  by 
the  House  and  a report  on  the  merits  of  the  case, 
their  purpose  was  to  keep  the  charge  without  any 
authoritative  refutation  before  the  people;  that 
they  first  hoped  to  terrorize  Clay  into  supporting 
Jackson,  or  at  least  to  separate  his  friends  from 
him,  while,  in  the  event  of  Jackson’s  defeat,  the 
cry  of  his  having  been  defrauded  of  his  rights  by 
a corrupt  bargain  would  help  in  securing  his  elec- 
tion the  next  time.  This  was  the  famous  “ bar- 
gain and  corruption  ” affair,  which  during  a long 
period  excited  the  minds  of  men  all  over  the  United 
States.  It  was  an  infamous  intrigue  against  the 
good  name  of  two  honorable  men,  designed  to 
promote  the  political  fortunes  of  a third. 

The  “ inside  view”  of  the  relations  between 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


247 


Adams  and  Clay  came,  long  after  this  period, 
to  public  knowledge  through  the  publication  of 
Adams’s  Diary.  The  most  unfavorable  inference 
which  can  be  drawn  from  the  revelations  therein 
made  is,  that  some  of  Clay’s  friends  very  urgently 
desired  his  appointment  as  secretary  of  state ; and 
that  one  of  them,  Letcher  of  Kentucky,  a good- 
natured  but  not  very  strong-headed  man,  had  said 
to  Adams  that  Clay’s  friends,  in  supporting  Adams, 
would  expect  Clay  to  have  an  influential  place  in 
the  administration,  disclaiming,  however,  all  au- 
thority from  Clay,  and  receiving  no  assurance  from 
Adams.  Those  who  have  any  experience  of  public 
life  know  that  the  adherents  of  a prominent  public 
man  are  almost  always  extremely  anxious  to  see 
him  in  positions  of  power,  and  very  apt  to  go 
ahead  of  his  wishes  in  endeavoring  to  put  him 
there,  thus  not  seldom  compromising  him  without 
his  fault.  Adams  received  a good  many  visits  of 
men  who  wished  to  sound  his  disposition,  among 
them  Webster,  who  desired  to  obtain  a promise 
that  the  Federalists  would  not  be  excluded  from 
office,  and  who  himself  hoped  to  be  appointed 
minister  to  England,  though  he  did  not  express 
such  a wish  at  the  time.  Clay  too  visited  Adams, 
to  tell  him  that  he  would  have  the  vote  of  Ken- 
tucky, and  to  converse  with  him  upon  the  general 
situation.  It  would  be  absurd  to  see  in  these 
occurrences  anything  to  support  the  charge  that 
Clay’s  vote  and  influence  were  thrown  for  Adams 
in  execution  of  a bargain  securing  him  a place  in 


248 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  cabinet;  for  by  the  testimony  of  Crittenden 
and  Benton,  the  fact  stands  conclusively  proven 
that,  before  all  these  conversations  with  Adams 
happened,  Clay  had  already  declared  his  firm  de- 
termination to  vote  for  Adams,  upon  the  grounds 
then  and  afterwards  avowed.  The  “ bargain  and 
corruption”  charge  remains,  therefore,  simply  a 
calumny. 

The  effect  produced  at  the  time  upon  Clay’s 
mind  by  these  things  appears  in  his  correspond- 
ence. They  aroused  in  him  the  indignant  pride 
of  one  who  feels  himself  high  above  the  venal 
crowd.  Just  before  the  appearance  of  Kremer’s 
letter  he  wrote  to  Blair:  “The  knaves  cannot  com- 
prehend how  a man  can  be  honest.  They  cannot 
conceive  that  I should  have  solemnly  interrogated 
my  conscience,  and  asked  it  to  tell  me  seriously 
what  I ought  to  do.”  And  to  Francis  Brooke  on 
February  4:  “The  object  now  is,  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Crawford  and  General  Jackson,  to  drive  me 
from  the  course  which  my  deliberate  judgment 
points  out.  They  all  have  yet  to  learn  my  charac- 
ter if  they  suppose  it  possible  to  make  me  swerve 
from  my  duty  by  any  species  of  intimidation  or 
denunciation.”  When  the  election  came  on,  Clay’s 
whole  influence  went  in  favor  of  Adams,  who,  on 
the  first  ballot  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
received  the  votes  of  a majority  of  the  States,  and 
was  declared  to  be  elected  president. 

But  Clay’s  trials  were  not  over.  When  Adams 
began  to  make  up  his  cabinet,  he  actually  did 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


249 


offer  to  Clay  the  secretaryship  of  state.  After 
what  had  happened,  should  Adams  have  made  the 
offer,  and  should  Clay  have  accepted  it?  These 
questions  have  been  discussed  probably  with  more 
interest  than  anything  connected  with  a cabinet 
appointment  in  our  political  history. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  offer  would 
have  been  regarded  as  a perfectly  proper  and  even 
natural  one.  Clay  was  by  far  the  most  brilliant 
leader  of  the  ruling  party.  His  influence  was 
large  and  his  ability  equal  to  his  influence.  It 
was  desirable  to  have  a Western  man  in  the  cabi- 
net. Clay  towered  so  high  above  all  the  public 
characters  in  that  region  that  it  would  have  looked 
almost  grotesque  to  pass  him  by,  exalting  some- 
body else.  It  is  true  that  Adams  had  differed 
from  Clay  on  important  things,  and  had  expressed 
some  unfavorable  opinions  of  him,  as,  indeed,  he 
had  of  almost  all  other  public  men  of  note.  But 
the  subjects  on  which  they  had  differed  were  dis- 
posed of;  and  as  to  personal  feelings,  it  was  one 
of  the  remarkable  features  of  Adams’s  character 
that,  strong  as  his  prejudices  and  resentments 
were,  he  put  them  resolutely  aside  when  they  stood 
in  the  way  of  the  fulfillment  of  a public  duty.  So, 
to  the  end  of  conciliating  the  Crawford  element, 
he  sufficiently  overcame  a feeling  of  strong  per- 
sonal dislike  to  offer  to  Crawford  himself,  in  spite 
of  that  gentleman’s  physical  disabilities,  to  con- 
tinue him  as  the  head  of  the  Treasury  Department, 

> — an  offer  which  Crawford  promptly  declined. 


250 


HENRY  CLAY 


Adams  had  even  conceived  the  idea  of  tendering 
the  War  Department  to  General  Jackson,  but 
learned  that  Jackson  would  take  such  an  offer  “in 
ill  part.”  In  an  administration  thus  designed  to 
be  constructed  upon  the  principle  that  the  leaders 
of  the  ruling  party  should  form  part  of  it,  Clay 
was  of  course  a necessary  man;  and  to  offer  him 
a place  in  the  cabinet  appeared  not  only  in  itself 
proper,  but  unavoidable.  Clay  would  therefore 
undoubtedly  have  been  invited  into  the  cabinet 
whether  he  had  or  had  not  exercised  any  influence 
favorable  to  Mr.  Adams’s  election. 

Neither  would  there  have  been  any  question  as 
to  the  propriety  of  Clay’s  accepting  any  place  in 
the  new  administration  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances. But  that  the  actual  circumstances  were 
not  of  the  ordinary  kind,  Clay  himself  felt.  When 
Adams,  a few  days  after  the  election  by  the  House, 
offered  him  at  a personal  interview  the  secretary- 
ship of  state,  he  replied  that  he  “would  take  it 
into  consideration,”  and  answer  “as  soon  as  he 
should  have  time  to  consult  his  friends.”  It  was  an 
anxious  consultation.  At  first  some  of  his  friends 
were  opposed  to  acceptance.  Would  not  his  taking 
the  secretaryship  of  state  be  treated  as  conclu- 
sive evidence  proving  the  justice  of  the  imputations 
which  had  been  made  against  him?  It  was  known 
that  Clay  and  Adams  had  not  been  on  terms  of 
cordial  friendship.  They  had  seriously  differed 
on  important  points  at  Ghent.  Clay  had  made 
opposition  to  Monroe’s  administration,  and  espe- 


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251 


cially  had  criticised  Adams  as  secretary  of  state. 
Less  than  two  years  before,  Adams  had  been  at- 
tacked by  one  of  the  Ghent  commissioners,  Jona- 
than Russell;  he  had  published  an  elaborate  de- 
fense, in  which  he  referred,  with  regard  to  some 
points  of  fact,  to  Clay  as  a witness,  and  Clay  had, 
in  a public  and  somewhat  uncalled-for  letter,  ques- 
tioned the  correctness  of  Adams’s  recollections, 
— an  act  which  was  generally  looked  upon  as  an 
indication  of  an  unfriendly  spirit.  Would  not 
this  sudden  reconciliation,  accompanied  with  an 
exchange  of  political  favors,  look  suspicious,  and 
render  much  more  plausible  the  charge  of  a cor- 
rupt bargain?  Besides,  was  not  the  House  of 
Representatives  Clay’s  true  field?  Would  not  the 
administration  want  his  support  there  more  than 
in  the  cabinet?  Would  not  the  Western  people 
rather  see  him  there  than  in  an  executive  depart- 
ment? 

These  were  weighty  questions.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  urged,  whether  he  accepted  or  not, 
he  would  be  subject  to  animadversion.  If  he  de- 
clined, it  would  be  said  that  the  patriotic  Kremer, 
by  bravely  exposing  the  corrupt  bargain,  had  ac- 
tually succeeded  in  preventing  its  consummation. 
Conscious  of  his  own  rectitude,  should  he  attach 
such  importance  to  an  accusation  coming  from  so 
insignificant  a person  ? Indeed,  would  not  either 
of  the  other  candidates,  had  he  been  elected,  have 
made  him  the  same  offer?  Moreover,  there  was 
a consideration  of  duty.  It  might  be  difficult  to 


252 


HENRY  CLAY 


form  the  administration  without  him.  Could  he 
permit  it  to  be  said  or  suspected  that,  after  having 
contributed  so  much  to  the  election  of  Adams  as 
president,  he  thought  too  ill  of  him  to  accept  the 
first  place  in  his  cabinet?  As  Adams  was  now 
the  constitutional  head  of  the  government,  ought 
not  Clay  to  regard  him  as  such,  dismissing  any 
personal  objections  which  he  might  have  had  to 
him?  These  arguments,  as  we  know  from  Clay’s 
correspondence,  finally  changed  the  opinions  of 
those  of  his  friends  who  had  at  first  been  averse 
to  his  taking  office.  The  friends  of  Adams  in 
New  England  were  especially  urgent.  Some  of 
Crawford’s  adherents  too,  and  even  some  of  those 
of  General  Jackson,  expressed  to  Clay  their  con- 
viction that  he  should  accept.  He  had  declared 
that  he  would  follow  the  advice  of  his  friends,  and 
so  he  did.  To  Brooke  he  wrote:  “I  have  an  un- 
affected repugnance  to  any  executive  employment, 
and  my  rejection  of  the  offer,  if  it  were  in  conform- 
ity to  their  deliberate  judgment,  would  have  been 
more  compatible  with  my  feelings  than  its  accept- 
ance.” 

In  spite  of  that  “ repugnance,”  it  is  not  probable 
that  much  persuasion  was  required  to  make  him 
accept.  He  was  a high  - spirited,  proud  man. 
When  George  Kremer  made  a charge,  should 
Henry  Clay  run  away?  Not  he.  He  would  not 
appear  to  be  afraid.  This  may  not  have  been  all. 
Clay’s  ambition  for  the  presidency  was  ardent  and 
impatient.  He  would  forget  it  for  a moment  when 


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253 


discussing  public  questions.  But  it  was  not  likely 
to  be  absent  from  his  mind  when  considering 
whether  he  should  take  the  place  offered  him. 
He  had  looked  upon  the  secretaryship  of  state  as 
the  stepping-stone  to  the  presidency  before;  he 
probably  continued  to  do  so.  The  presidential 
fever  is  a merciless  disease.  It  renders  its  victims 
blind  and  deaf.  So  now  Clay  misjudged  the  situ- 
ation altogether.  “An  opposition  is  talked  of 
here,”  he  wrote  to  Brooke;  “but  I regard  that  as 
the  ebullition  of  the  moment.  There  are  elements 
for  faction,  none  for  opposition.  Opposition  to 
what?  To  measures  and  principles  which  are  yet 
to  be  developed!  ” He  believed  the  new  adminis- 
tration would  be  judged  on  its  merits.  He  did  not 
know  the  spirit  it  was  to  meet.  When  he  declared 
himself  resolved  to  accept  the  secretaryship  of 
state,  six  days  after  the  offer  had  been  made,  he 
was  very  far  from  having  counted  the  cost. 

Immediately  before  the  final  adjournment  of  the 
eighteenth  Congress,  on  March  3,  1825,  the  House 
of  Representatives  passed  a resolution  thanking 
“the  Honorable  Henry  Clay  for  the  able,  impar- 
tial, and  dignified  manner  in  which  he  had  pre- 
sided over  its  deliberations,”  etc.  In  response, 
“retiring,  perhaps  forever,”  from  the  office  of 
speaker,  Clay  was  able  to  say  that,  in  the  fourteen 
years  during  which  he  had,  with  short  intervals, 
occupied  that  difficult  and  responsible  position, 
not  one  of  his  decisions  had  ever  been  reversed  by 
the  House.  Indeed,  Henry  Clay  stands  in  the 


254 


HENRY  CLAY 


traditions  of  tlie  House  of  Representatives  as  the 
greatest  of  its  speakers.  His  perfect  mastery  of 
parliamentary  law,  his  quickness  of  decision  in 
applying  it,  his  unfailing  presence  of  mind  and 
power  of  command  in  moments  of  excitement  and 
confusion,  the  courteous  dignity  of  his  bearing, 
are  remembered  as  unequaled  by  any  one  of  those 
who  had  preceded  or  who  have  followed  him.  The 
thanks  of  the  House  were  voted  to  him  with  zest. 
Yet  many  of  those  who  felt  themselves  obliged  to 
assent  to  this  vote  were  then  already  his  bitter 
enemies. 

The  next  day  J ohn  Quincy  Adams  was  inaugu- 
rated as  president  of  the  United  States.  As  soon 
as  the  nomination  of  Henry  Clay  for  the  office  of 
secretary  of  state  came  before  the  Senate,  the  war 
against  him  began  in  due  form.  An  address  by 
George  Kremer  to  his  constituents,  in  which  all 
conceivable  gossip  was  retailed  to  give  color  to  the 
“ bargain  and  corruption”  cry,  was  freely  used  in 
Washington  to  prevent  Clay’s  nomination  from 
being  confirmed.  General  Jackson  himself  ex- 
pressed his  hope  of  its  rejection.  A letter  written, 
evidently  for  publication,  by  Jackson  to  his  friend 
Samuel  Swartwout,  in  New  York,  which  bristled 
with  insidious  insinuations  against  Clay,  was  cir- 
culated in  Washington  on  the  eve  of  the  day  when 
Clay’s  nomination  was  to  be  acted  upon. 

Still  trying  to  obtain  an  authoritative  investiga- 
tion of  his  conduct,  Clay  asked  a senator  to  move 
a formal  inquiry  by  a senate  committee,  if  any 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


255 


charge  should  be  made  against  him  in  that  body. 
But  no  tangible  charge  was  brought  forward ; only 
one  senator  indulged  in  some  vague  animadver- 
sions, presenting  no  ground  for  an  inquiry.  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  then  still  a member  of  the  Senate, 
said  nothing;  but  he,  together  with  fourteen  other 
senators,  among  them  the  leading  Southerners, 
voted  against  consenting  to  the  nomination.  It 
was,  however,  confirmed  by  a majority  of  twelve, 
seven  senators  being  absent. 

On  the  day  of  the  inauguration,  General  Jack- 
son  had  been  one  of  the  earliest  of  those  who  “took 
the  hand  ” of  President  Adams,  congratulating 
him  upon  his  accession  to  power.  The  newspapers 
highly  praised  the  magnanimity  of  the  defeated 
candidate.  But  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Sen- 
ate, when  Jackson  was  on  his  way  to  his  home  in 
Tennessee,  his  tone  changed.  Everywhere  he  was 
cordially  received ; and  to  every  one  willing  to  hear 
it,  at  public  receptions,  in  hotels,  on  steamboats, 
he  was  ready  to  say  that  the  will  of  the  people 
had  been  fraudulently  defeated,  and  that  the  pre- 
sidential office  had  virtually  been  stolen  from  its 
rightful  owner  by  a corrupt  combination.  This 
foreshadowed  the  presidential  campaign  of  1828. 
The  cry  was  to  be:  “The  rights  of  the  people 
against  bargain  and  corruption.” 

Not  having  had  the  benefit  of  an  official  inquiry, 
Clay  now  tried  to  put  down  the  calumny  once  and 
forever  by  an  explicit  statement  of  the  case  over 
his  own  signature.  On  March  26,  not  many  days 


256 


HENRY  CLAY 


after  he  had  become  a member  of  the  new  ad- 
ministration, he  published  an  address  to  his  old 
constituents  in  Kentucky,  in  which  he  elaborately 
reviewed  the  whole  story,  conclusively  refuted  the 
charges  brought  against  him,  and  fully  explained 
and  defended  his  conduct.  It  was  an  exceedingly 
able  document,  temperate  in  tone,  complete  and 
lucid  in  the  presentation  of  facts,  and  unanswer- 
able in  argument.  One  of  its  notable  passages 
may  be  mentioned  as  characteristic.  Clay  was 
very  much  ashamed  of  having  threatened  to  chal- 
lenge George  Kremer.  Expressing  his  regret  there- 
for, he  added:  44 1 owe  it  to  the  community  to  say 
that,  whatever  I may  have  done,  or  by  inevitable 
circumstances  might  be  forced  to  do,  no  man  in  it 
holds  in  deeper  abhorrence  than  I do  that  perni- 
cious practice  [of  dueling].  Condemned  as  it  must 
be  by  the  judgment  and  the  philosophy,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  religion,  of  every  thinking  man,  it 
is  an  affair  of  feeling,  about  which  we  cannot, 
although  we  should,  reason.  Its  true  correction 
will  be  found  when  all  shall  unite,  as  all  ought  to 
unite,  in  its  unqualified  proscription.”  But  until 
that  comes  to  pass,  shall  we  go  on  challenging  and 
fighting,  the  slaves  of  false  notions  of  honor?  At 
any  rate,  we  shall  soon  see  the  Honorable  Henry 
Clay  again  with  pistol  in  hand. 

Clay  may  have  thought  that  his  address  would 
make  an  end  of  the  44 bargain  and  corruption” 
charge  for  all  time,  and  so  it  should  have  done. 
Indeed,  he  received  letters  from  such  men  as  Chief 


PRESIDENT-MAKER 


257 


Justice  Marshall,  John  Tyler,  Justice  Story,  Dan- 
iel Webster,  Lewis  Cass,  and  others,  congratulat- 
ing him  upon  the  completeness  of  his  vindication 
and  triumph.  But  he  lived  to  appreciate  the  won- 
derful vitality  of  a well-managed  political  lie. 
Nobody  believes  that  lie  now.  But  it  defeated  his 
dearest  ambitions,  and  darkened  the  rest  of  his 
public  life.  It  kept  him  refuting  and  explaining, 
explaining  and  refuting,  year  after  year ; yet  still 
thousands  of  simple-minded  citizens  would  continue 
honestly  to  believe  that  Henry  Clay  was  a great 
knave,  who  had  defeated  the  will  of  the  people  by 
bargain  and  corruption,  and  cheated  the  old  hero 
of  New  Orleans  out  of  his  rights. 


CHAPTER  XI 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 

The  administration  of  John  Quincy  Adams  was 
the  last  one  in  which  the  conduct  of  the  govern- 
ment accorded  strictly  with  the  best  traditions  of 
the  republic.  Nothing  was  farther  from  his  mind 
than  to  use  the  power  of  appointment  and  removal 
for  political  ends.  At  that  time  the  notion  that 
the  accession  of  a new  president  must  necessarily 
involve  a thorough  reconstruction  of  the  cabinet 
was  not  yet  invented.  Following  the  example  of 
most  of  his  predecessors,  he  applied  the  rule  that 
no  unnecessary  changes  should  be  made,  even  in 
the  heads  of  the  executive  departments.  His  elec- 
tion to  the  presidency  and  Calhoun’s  to  the  vice- 
presidency had  vacated  the  secretaryships  of  state 
and  of  war,  and  these  vacancies  he  filled  with 
Henry  Clay  and  James  Barbour  of  Virginia.  As 
we  have  seen,  he  offered  to  continue  Crawford  at 
the  head  of  the  Treasury  Department,  and  only 
after  Crawford  had  declined  he  summoned  to  that 
place  Richard  Rush  of  Pennsylvania.  Southard 
of  New  Jersey  remained  secretary  of  the  navy,  and 
William  Wirt  of  Virginia,  attorney-general.  The 
postmaster-general,  McLean,  was  also  left  in  his 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


259 


place,  but  that  officer  did  not  at  that  time  occupy 
a seat  in  the  cabinet;  and  there  was  no  Depart- 
ment of  the  Interior.  The  members  of  the  cabinet 
all  passed  as  Republicans.  But  the  Federalists, 
of  whom  there  were  scattered  remnants  here  and 
there,  — some  of  them  looked  up  to  as  venerable 
relics,  — were  by  no  means  excluded  from  place. 
When  De  Witt  Clinton  had  declined  the  mission 
to  England,  Adams  urged  it  upon  Rufus  King  of 
New  York,  who  then  stood  in  the  politics  of  the 
country  as  a fine  and  reverend  monument  of  an- 
cient Federalism. 

The  new  administration  had  hardly  taken  the 
reins  in  hand,  when  that  spirit  of  hostility  to  it 
which  prevailed  among  the  following  of  Jackson, 
Crawford,  and  Calhoun  appeared  even  among  per- 
sons in  federal  office ; and  the  question  whether  it 
would  not  be  well  to  fill  the  service  with  friends, 
or  at  least  to  clear  it  of  enemies,  presented  itself 
in  a very  pointed  form.  Then  Adams  proved  the 
quality  of  his  principles,  as  witness,  by  way  of 
example,  this  case : The  member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  from  Louisiana  denounced  Sterret, 
the  naval  officer  at  New  Orleans,  as  a noisy  and 
clamorous  re  viler  of  the  administration,  who  had 
even  gone  so  far  as  to  get  up  a public  demonstra- 
tion to  insult  the  member  of  Congress  for  having 
voted  to  make  Mr.  Adams  president.  The  mem- 
ber of  Congress,  therefore,  demanded  Sterret’s 
removal.  There  seemed  to  be  no  doubt  about 
the  facts.  The  insulting  demonstration  had  not 


260 


HENRY  CLAY 


actually  come  off,  but  Sterret  had  been  active  in 
making  preparations  for  it. 

Clay  agreed  with  the  member.  During  the  pend- 
ency of  an  election,  said  he,  every  man  in  the 
service  should  feel  free  to  “ indulge  his  prefer- 
ence;” but  no  officer  should,  after  election,  “be 
permitted  to  hold  a conduct  in  open  and  continual 
disparagement  of  the  administration  and  its  head.” 
In  the  treatment  of  persons  in  the  service,  he 
thought,  the  administration  “should  avoid,  on  the 
one  hand,  political  persecution,  and  on  the  other 
an  appearance  of  pusillanimity.”  Adams  came  to 
a different  conclusion.  He  looked  upon  this  as  a 
test  case,  and  it  is  wholesome  to  remember  what 
a president  of  the  United  States  thought  upon 
such  a question  in  the  year  1825.  He  asked  Clay 
in  reply  why  he  should  remove  this  man.  The 
insulting  demonstration,  of  which  the  member 
of  Congress  complained,  had  only  been  intended, 
but  not  practically  carried  out.  Would  a mere 
“intention  never  carried  into  effect”  justify  the 
removal  of  a man  from  office?  “Besides,”  he  con- 
tinued, “should  I remove  this  man  for  this  cause, 
it  must  be  upon  some  fixed  principle,  which  would 
apply  to  others  as  well  as  to  him.  And  where 
was  it  possible  to  draw  the  line  ? Of  the  custom- 
house officers  throughout  the  Union  four  fifths,  in 
all  probability,  were  opposed  to  my  election.  They 
were  all  now  in  my  power,  and  I had  been  urged 
very  earnestly  to  sweep  away  my  opponents  and 
provide,  with  their  places,  for  my  friends.  I can 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


261 


justify  the  refusal  to  adopt  this  policy  only  by  the 
steadiness  and  consistency  of  my  adhesion  to  my 
own.  If  I depart  from  this  in  one  instance,  I 
shall  be  called  upon  by  my  friends  to  do  the  same 
thing  in  many.  An  insidious  and  inquisitorial 
scrutiny  into  the  personal  dispositions  of  public 
officers  will  creep  through  the  whole  Union,  and 
the  most  selfish  and  sordid  passions  will  be  kindled 
into  activity  to  distort  the  conduct  and  misrepre- 
sent the  feelings  of  men  whose  places  may  become 
the  prize  of  slander  upon  them.”  This  was  the 
president’s  answer  to  Clay’s  suggestions,  and,  as 
the  Diary  tells  us,  “Mr.  Clay  did  not  press  the 
subject  any  farther.”  It  would  have  been  useless. 

What  moved  Adams,  in  laying  down  this  rule 
of  action,  was  not  faint-heartedness.  He  was  one 
of  the  most  courageous  of  men;  he  never  shrank 
from  a responsibility.  He  even  enjoyed  a conflict 
when  he  found  one  necessary  to  enforce  his  sense 
of  right.  Here  he  made  his  stand  for  the  princi- 
ples upon  which  the  government  in  its  early  days 
had  been  conducted,  and  his  decision  in  the  Ster- 
ret  case  became  the  rule  by  which  his  administra- 
tion was  governed  from  beginning  to  end.  He 
made  only  two  removals  during  the  four  years, 
and  these  were  for  bad  official  conduct.  With 
unbending  firmness  he  resisted  every  attempt  to 
make  him  dismiss  officers  who  intrigued  against 
his  reelection,  or  openly  embraced  the  cause  of  his 
opponents.  The  reappointment  of  worthy  officers 
upon  the  expiration  of  their  terms,  without  regard 
to  politics,  was  a matter  of  course. 


262 


HENRY  CLAY 


Clay  continued  to  think,  not  without  reason, 
that  the  president  carried  his  toleration  to  a dan- 
gerous extreme.  He  would  not  have  permitted 
men  in  office  to  make  their  hostility  to  the  admin- 
istration conspicuous  and  defiant.  But  he  was 
far  from  favoring  the  use  of  the  appointing  and 
removing  power  as  a political  engine.  He  was 
opposed  to  arbitrary  removals,  as  to  everything 
that  would  give  the  public  offices  the  character  of 
spoils. 

While  these  were  the  principles  upon  which  the 
administration  was  conducted,  the  virulent  hostil- 
ity of  its  opponents  continued  to  crop  out  in  a 
ceaseless  repetition,  in  speech  and  press,  of  the 
assaults  upon  its  members,  which  had  begun  with 
the  election.  In  May  Clay  went  to  Kentucky  to 
meet  his  family  and  to  take  them  to  Washing- 
ton. Wherever  he  passed,  his  friends  greeted  him 
with  enthusiastic  demonstrations.  Public  dinners 
crowded  one  another,  not  only  in  Kentucky,  but 
in  Virginia,  Pennsylvania,  and  Ohio,  along  his 
route  of  travel;  but  everywhere,  in  response  to 
expressions  of  affection  and  confidence,  he  felt 
himself  obliged  to  say  something  in  explanation  of 
his  conduct  in  the  last  presidential  election.  The 
spectre  of  the  “ bargain  and  corruption”  charge 
seemed  to  pursue  him  wherever  he  went. 

When  he  returned  to  Washington,  in  August, 
he  was  in  deep  affliction,  two  of  his  daughters 
having  died  in  one  month,  one  of  them  on  her  way 
to  the  national  capital.  But  as  to  the  state  of  the 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


263 


public  mind  he  felt  somewhat  encouraged.  He 
had  found  many  friends  to  welcome  him  with  great 
warmth.  He  had  heard  the  president  spoken  of 
with  high  respect  and  confidence.  Daniel  Web- 
ster, too,  sent  him  cheering  reports  as  to  “an  en- 
tire and  not  uneasy  acquiescence  in  the  events  of 
last  winter,”  which  he  had  found  on  his  summer 
excursions.  Clay  almost  persuaded  himself  that 
the  storm  had  blown  over.  But  then  he  was 
startled  again  by  some  stirring  manifestation  of 
the  bitterness  which  the  last  presidential  election 
had  left  behind  it.  One  day  he  met  a general  of 
the  regular  army,  with  his  aide-de-camp,  in  the 
president’s  anteroom.  The  aide-de-camp  being 
introduced  to  him,  Clay  politely  offered  his  hand, 
which  the  young  man,  drawing  back,  refused  to 
take.  It  turned  out  that  he  was  a connection  of 
General  Jackson.  Clay  was  so  shocked  by  this 
rude  demonstration  that  he  wrote  the  general  a 
complaining  letter  about  it. 

Something  far  more  serious  happened  in  Octo- 
ber. The  legislature  of  Tennessee  met,  and  pro- 
ceeded forthwith  to  nominate  General  Jackson  as 
a candidate  for  president  to  be  elected  in  1828. 
On  October  13,  more  than  three  years  before  the 
period  of  the  election,  General  Jackson  addressed 
a letter  to  the  legislature,  accepting  the  nomina- 
tion, and  at  the  same  time  resigning  his  seat  in 
the  Senate.  In  this  letter  he  laid  down  his  “ plat- 
form.” He  gave  the  world  to  understand  that 
there  was  much  corruption  at  Washington,  and 


264 


HENRY  CLAY 


that,  unless  a certain  remedy  were  applied,  corrupt 
tion  would  “ become  the  order  of  the  day  there.” 
The  remedy  was  an  amendment  to  the  Constitu- 
tion declaring  “ any  member  of  Congress  ineligible 
to  office  under  the  general  government  during  the 
term  for  which  he  was  elected,  and  for  two  years 
thereafter,  except  in  cases  of  judicial  office.”  This 
letter  was  generally  understood.  It  was  hardly 
taken  as  the  promise  of  a valuable  reform  to  be 
carried  out  if  Jackson  should  become  president. 
Nobody  attached  much  importance  to  that;  cer- 
tainly Jackson  did  not,  for  when  he  did  become 
president,  he,  as  we  shall  see,  appointed  a much 
larger  number  of  members  of  Congress  to  office 
than  had  been  so  appointed  by  any  one  of  his 
predecessors.  But  it  was  taken  as  a proclamation 
by  General  Jackson  that  he  had  been  defrauded 
of  the  presidency  by  a corrupt  bargain  between  a 
sitting  member  of  Congress  and  a presidential 
candidate,  the  member  of  Congress  obtaining  a 
cabinet  office  as  a reward  for  seating  the  candidate 
in  the  presidential  chair.  It  pointed  directly  at 
Adams  and  Clay.  Thus  — it  being  also  under- 
stood that,  according  to  custom,  Adams  would  be 
supported  by  his  followers  as  a candidate  for  a 
second  term  — the  campaign  of  1828  was  opened, 
not  only  constructively,  but  in  due  form,  with  the 
cry  of  “bargain  and  corruption”  sanctioned  by 
the  standard-bearer  of  the  opposition.  It  became 
more  lively  with  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth 
Congress  in  December,  1825. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


265 


Under  Monroe,  during  the  “era  of  good  feel- 
ing,” there  had  been  individual  opposition  to  this 
or  that  measure,  or  to  the  administration  gener- 
ally, but  there  had  been  no  opposition  party. 
With  the  accession  of  Adams  the  era  of  good  feel- 
ing was  well  over,  and  those  new  groupings  began 
to  appear  which,  in  the  course  of  time,  developed 
into  new  party  organizations.  Men  were  driven 
apart  or  drawn  together  by  different  motives.  Of 
these,  the  commotion  caused  by  the  last  presiden- 
tial election  furnished  the  most  potent  at  that 
time.  A great  many  of  the  adherents  of  the  de- 
feated candidates,  especially  the  Jackson  men, 
were  bound  to  make  odious  and  to  break  down  the 
Adams  administration  by  any  means  and  at  any 
cost.  This  was  a personal  opposition,  virulent 
and  remorseless.  There  were  rumors,  too,  of  an 
opposition  being  systematically  organized  by  Cal- 
houn, who  then  began  to  identify  his  ambition 
exclusively  with  the  cause  of  slavery.  In  the  vote 
against  Clay’s  confirmation  Adams  saw  “the  rally- 
ing of  the  South  and  of  Southern  interests  and 
prejudices  to  the  men  of  the  South.”  Not  a few 
Southern  men  began  to  feel  an  instinctive  dread 
of  the  spirit  represented  by  Adams. 

But  the  hostility  to  the  administration  was  soon 
furnished  with  an  opportunity  to  rally  on  a ques- 
tion of  constitutional  principle.  Already  in  his 
inaugural  address,  President  Adams  had  brought 
forth  something  vigorous  on  internal  improvements. 
But  in  his  first  message  to  Congress  he  went  be- 


266 


HENRY  CLAY 


yond  wliat  had  ever  been  uttered  upon  that  subject 
before.  After  having  laid  down  the  far-reaching 
doctrine  that  “the  great  object  of  the  institution 
of  civil  government  is  the  improvement  of  those 
who  are  parties  to  the  social  compact,”  he  enumer- 
ated a vast  array  of  powers  granted  in  the  Consti- 
tution, and  added  that,  “if  these  powers  may  be 
effectually  brought  into  action  by  laws  promoting 
the  improvement  of  agriculture,  commerce,  and 
manufactures,  the  cultivation  of  the  mechanic  and 
of  the  elegant  arts,  the  advancement  of  literature, 
and  the  progress  of  the  sciences,  ornamental  and 
profound,  to  refrain  from  exercising  them  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people  themselves  would  be  to  hide 
in  the  earth  the  talent  committed  to  our  charge, 
— would  be  treachery  to  the  most  sacred  of  trusts.” 
He  spoke  of  the  establishment  of  a national  uni- 
versity, astronomical  observatories,  and  scientific 
enterprises,  and  suggested  that,  while  European 
nations  advanced  with  such  rapid  strides,  it  would 
be  casting  away  the  bounties  of  Providence  if  we 
stood  still,  confessing  that  we  were  “palsied  by 
the  will  of  our  constituents.”  This  was  opening 
a perspective  of  governmental  functions  much 
larger  than  the  American  mind  was  accustomed  to 
contemplate.  There  had  been  some  serious  shak- 
ing of  heads  when  this  part  of  the  message  was 
discussed  in  the  cabinet,  especially  on  the  part  of 
Barbour  and  Clay.  This  went  a long  way  beyond 
the  building  of  roads  and  the  digging  of  canals, 
upon  which  Clay  had  been  so  fond  of  discoursing. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


267 


But  Adams,  who  was  always  inclined  to  express 
his  opinions  in  the  most  uncompromising  form, 
insisted  upon  doing  so  this  time.  The  doctrine 
that  the  Constitution  conferred  by  implication 
upon  the  government  powers  of  almost  unlimited 
extent,  and  also  imposed  upon  it  the  duty  of  keep- 
ing those  powers  in  constant  activity,  not  only 
disturbed  the  political  thinkers  of  the  Democratic 
school,  but  it  was  especially  apt  to  alarm  the  slave- 
holding interest,  which  at  that  period  began  to 
see  in  the  strictest  construction,  and  in  the  main- 
tenance of  the  extremest  states-rights  principles, 
its  citadel  of  safety. 

The  first  actual  collision  between  the  adminis- 
tration and  its  opponents  occurred  upon  another 
question.  The  president  announced  in  his  mes- 
sage that  the  Spanish-American  republics  had  re- 
solved upon  a congress  to  meet  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama,  in  which  they  should  all  be  represented; 
that  they  had  also  invited  the  United  States  to 
send  plenipotentiaries;  that  this  invitation  had 
been  accepted,  and  that  ministers  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  would  be  commissioned  to  “ at- 
tend at  those  deliberations.”  This  was  the  famous 
Panama  mission. 

A grand  council  of  the  South  and  Central 
American  republics  was  planned  as  early  as  1821, 
Bolivar  favoring  it,  and  a series  of  treaties  with 
regard  to  it  was  concluded  between  them.  In 
April,  1825,  Clay  was  approached  by  the  Mexican 
and  Colombian  ministers  with  the  inquiry  whether 


268 


HENRY  CLAY 


an  invitation  to  the  United  States  to  be  represented 
in  the  Panama  Congress  would  be  favorably  con- 
sidered. Nothing  could  be  more  apt  to  strike 
Clay’s  fancy  than  such  an  undertaking.  The  Holy 
Alliance  darkly  plotting  at  its  conferences  and 
congresses  in  Europe  to  reestablish  the  odious  de- 
spotism of  Spain  over  South  and  Central  America, 
and  thus  to  gain  a basis  of  operations  for  interfer- 
ence with  the  North  American  republic,  had  fre- 
quently disturbed  his  dreams.  To  form  against 
this  league  of  despotism  in  the  old  world  a league 
of  republics  in  the  new,  and  thus  to  make  this 
great  continent  the  ark  of  human  liberty  and  a 
higher  civilization,  was  one  of  those  large,  gener- 
ous conceptions  well  calculated  to  fascinate  his 
ardent  mind.  He  succeeded  even  in  infusing  some 
of  his  enthusiasm  into  Adams’s  colder  nature. 
The  invitation  was  promptly  accepted.  But  the 
definition  of  the  objects  of  the  congress,  filtered 
through  Adams’s  sober  mind,  appeared  somewhat 
tame  by  the  side  of  the  original  South  American 
scheme,  and  probably  of  Clay’s  desires,  too.  The 
South  Americans  had  thought  of  a league  for 
resistance  against  a common  enemy ; of  a combi- 
nation of  forces,  among  themselves  at  least,  to  be 
favored  by  the  United  States,  for  the  liberation 
of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  from  Spanish  power;  of 
some  concert  of  action  for  the  general  enforcement 
of  the  principles  of  the  American  policy  proclaimed 
by  President  Monroe,  and  so  on.  It  is  very  prob- 
able that  Clay,  although  not  going  quite  so  far, 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


269 


had  in  his  mind  some  permanent  concert  among 
American  states  looking  to  expressions  of  a com- 
mon will,  and  to  united  action  when  emergency 
should  require. 

But  the  purposes  of  our  participation  in  the 
Panama  Congress,  as  they  appeared  in  the  presi- 
dent’s messages  to  the  Senate  and  the  House,  and 
later  in  Clay’s  instructions  to  the  American  en- 
voys, were  cautiously  limited.  The  congress  was 
to  be  looked  upon  as  a good  opportunity  for  giving 
to  the  Spanish-American  brethren  kindly  advice, 
even  if  it  were  only  as  to  their  own  interests ; also 
for  ascertaining  in  what  direction  their  policy  was 
likely  to  run.  Advantageous  arrangements  of 
commercial  reciprocity  might  be  made;  proper 
definitions  of  blockade  and  neutral  rights  might 
be  agreed  upon.  The  “ perpetual  abolition  of  pri- 
vate war  on  the  ocean,”  as  well  as  a ‘‘concert  of 
measures  having  reference  to  the  more  effectual 
abolition  of  the  slave  trade,”  should  be  aimed  at. 
The  congress  should  also  be  used  as  “a  fair  occa- 
sion for  urging  upon  all  the  new  nations  of  the 
south  the  just  and  liberal  principles  of  religious 
liberty,”  not  by  interference  with  their  concerns, 
but  by  claiming  for  citizens  of  the  United  States 
sojourning  in  those  republics  the  right  of  free 
worship.  The  Monroe  doctrine  should  be  inter- 
preted to  them  as  meaning  only  that  each  Ameri- 
can nation  should  resist  foreign  interference,  or 
attempts  to  establish  new  colonies  upon  its  soil, 
with  its  own  means.  The  recognition  of  Hayti  as 


270 


HENRY  CLAY 


an  independent  state  was  to  be  deprecated,  — this 
against  Clay’s  first  impulse, — on  the  ostensible 
ground  that  Hayti,  by  yielding  exclusive  commer- 
cial advantages  to  France,  had  returned  to  a semi- 
dependent condition.  All  enterprises  upon  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico,  such  as  had  been  planned  by 
Mexico  and  Colombia,  were  by  all  means  to  be 
discouraged. 

This,  by  the  way,  was  an  exceedingly  ticklish 
subject.  If  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  were  to  be 
revolutionized,  slave  insurrections  would  follow, 
and  the  insurrectionary  spirit  would  be  likely  to 
communicate  itself  to  the  slave  population  of  the 
Southern  States.  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  would 
hardly  be  able  to  maintain  their  independence,  and 
if  they  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  a great  naval 
power,  that  power  would  command  the  Mexican 
Gulf  and  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  The  slave- 
holding influence,  therefore,  demanded  that  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico  should  not  be  revolutionized.  The 
general  interests  of  the  United  States  demanded 
that  the  two  islands  should  not  pass  into  the  hands 
of  a great  naval  power.  It  was,  therefore,  thought 
best  that  they  should  quietly  remain  in  the  ^posses- 
sion  of  Spain.  That  possession  was  threatened  so 
long  as  peace  was  not  declared  between  Spain  and 
her  former  colonies.  It  seemed,  therefore,  espe- 
cially desirable  that  the  war  should  come  to  a final 
close.  To  this  end  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  whom 
American  diplomacy  had  fallen  into  the  habit  of 
regarding  as  a sort  of  benevolent  uncle,  was  to  be 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


271 


pressed  into  service.  He  was  asked  to  persuade 
Spain,  in  view  of  the  utter  hopelessness  of  further 
war,  to  yield  to  necessity  and  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence of  her  former  colonies  on  the  American 
continent.  Clay’s  instructions  to  Middleton,  the 
American  minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  setting  forth 
the  arguments  to  be  submitted  to  the  emperor, 
were,  in  this  respect,  a remarkable  piece  of  reason- 
ing and  persuasiveness. 

At  the  Panama  Congress  all  was  then  to  be 
done  to  prevent  the  designs  of  Mexico  and  Colom- 
bia upon  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  from  being  executed. 
On  the  whole,  that  congress  was  to  be  regarded 
only  as  a consultative  assembly,  a mere  diplomatic 
conference,  leaving  the  respective  powers  repre- 
sented there  perfectly  free  to  accept  and  act  upon 
the  conclusions  arrived  at,  or  not,  as  they  might 
choose.  There  was  to  be  no  alliance  of  any  kind, 
no  entangling  engagement,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States.  This  was  the  character  in  which 
the  Panama  mission  was  presented  to  Congress. 

The  first  thing  at  which  the  Senate  took  offense 
was  that  the  President  in  his  message  had  spoken 
of  “ commissioning  ” ministers  at  his  own  pleasure. 
A practical  issue  on  this  point  was  avoided  when 
Adams  sent  to  the  Senate  the  nominations  of  the 
ministers  to  be  appointed.  Then  the  policy  of  the 
mission  itself  became  the  subject  of  most  virulent 
attack.  The  opposition  was  composed  of  two  dis- 
tinct elements.  One  consisted  of  the  slaveholding 
interest,  which  feared  every  contact  with  the  new 


272 


HENRY  CLAY 


republics  that  had  abolished  slavery ; which  scorned 
the  thought  of  envoys  of  the  United  States  sitting 
in  the  same  assembly  with  the  representatives  of 
republics  that  had  negroes  and  mulattoes  among 
their  generals  and  legislators ; which  dreaded  the 
possible  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Hayti 
as  a demonstration  showing  the  negro  slaves  in 
the  Union  what  they  might  gain  by  rising  in  in- 
surrection and  killing  their  masters.  This  element 
of  opposition  was  thoroughly  in  earnest.  It  had 
an  unbending  logic  on  its  side.  If  slavery  was  to 
exist  in  the  United  States,  it  had  to  demand  that 
not  only  the  home  policy,  but  also  the  foreign 
policy,  of  the  republic  must  be  accommodated  to 
the  conditions  of  its  existence. 

The  other  element  of  the  opposition  consisted 
mainly  of  those  who  were  determined  to  break 
down  the  administration  in  any  event  and  at  any 
cost.  Their  principal  argument  was  that,  notwith- 
standing the  assurances  given  by  the  president, 
participation  in  the  Panama  Congress  would  lead 
the  United  States  into  entangling  alliances;  and 
if  it  did  not  do  so  at  first,  it  would  do  so  in  its 
consequences.  In  the  country,  however,  the  Pan- 
ama mission  was  popular.  A grand  Amphictyonic 
council  of  the  American  republics,  held  on  the 
great  isthmus  of  the  continent,  to  proclaim  the 
glories  of  free  government  to  the  world,  pleased 
the  fancy  of  the  people.  When  public  opinion 
seemed  to  become  impatient  at  the  interminable 
wrangle  in  Congress,  the  Senate  voted  down  an 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


273 


adverse  report  of  its  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions by  twenty-four  to  nineteen,  and  confirmed 
the  nominations  for  the  Panama  mission.  In  the 
House  of  Representatives  another  debate  sprang 
up  on  the  bill  making  the  necessary  appropriation, 
which  passed  by  more  than  two  to  one.  The  spirit 
of  the  “opposition  in  any  event”  betrayed  itself 
in  unguarded  utterances,  such  as  the  following, 
ascribed  to  Van  Buren,  the  anti-administration 
leader  in  the  Senate:  “Yes,  they  have  beaten  us 
by  a few  votes,  after  a hard  battle;  but  if  they 
had  only  taken  the  other  side  and  refused  the 
mission,  we  should  have  had  them.” 

But  that  was  not  the  end  of  the  debate  in  the 
Senate.  The  attack  on  the  administration  was 
continued  in  the  discussion  on  a resolution  offered 
by  Branch  of  North  Carolina,  denying  the  com- 
petency of  the  President  to  send  ministers  to  the 
Panama  Congress  without  the  previous  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  which  competency  the  Pre- 
sident had  originally  claimed  in  his  message  to 
Congress.  This  presented  to  John  Randolph  an 
opportunity  for  a display  of  his  peculiar  power  of 
vituperation.  In  a long,  rambling  harangue  he 
insinuated  that  the  invitations  to  the  Panama 
Congress  addressed  by  the  ministers  of  the  South- 
ern republics  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States  had  been  written,  or  at  least  inspired,  by 
the  State  Department,  and  were  therefore  fraudu- 
lent. It  was  in  this  speech  that  he  characterized 
the  administration,  alluding  to  Adams  and  Clay, 


274 


HENRY  CLAY 


as  “ the  coalition  of  Blifil  and  Black  George,  — 
the  combination,  unheard  of  till  then,  of  the  Puri- 
tan with  the  blackleg.” 

When  Clay  heard  of  this,  he  boiled  over  with 
rage.  Only  a few  months  before  he  had,  in  the 
address  to  his  constituents,  spoken  of  the  duel  as 
a relic  of  barbarism,  much  to  be  discountenanced. 
The  same  Clay  now  promptly  sent  a challenge  to 
Randolph.  The  explanation,  which  might  have 
averted  the  duel,  Randolph  refused  to  give.  On 
April  8 they  “met,”  Randolph  not  intending  to 
harm  Clay,  but  Clay  in  terrible  earnest.  They 
exchanged  shots,  and  both  missed;  only  Randolph’s 
coat  was  touched.  At  the  second  fire  Clay  put 
another  bullet  through  Randolph’s  coat,  but  Ran- 
dolph emptied  his  pistol  into  the  air,  and  said:  “I 
do  not  fire  at  you,  Mr.  Clay.”  Thereupon  they 
shook  hands,  and  all  was  over.  Randolph’s  pistol 
had  failed  to  prove  that  Clay  was  a “blackleg,” 
and  Clay’s  pistol  had  also  failed  to  prove  that 
Randolph  was  a calumniator;  but,  according  to 
the  mysterious  process  of  reasoning  which  makes 
the  pistol  the  arbiter  of  honor,  the  honor  of  each 
was  satisfied.  Webster  wrote  to  Judge  Story: 
“You  will  have  heard  of  the  bloodless  duel.  I 
regret  it  very  much,  but  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Ran- 
dolph has  been  such  that  I suppose  it  was  thought 
that  it  could  no  longer  be  tolerated.”  Benton 
looked  at  the  matter  from  a different  point  of 
view.  With  the  keen  relish  of  a connoisseur,  he 
describes  the  whole  affair  down  to  the  minutest 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


275 


detail  in  his  46 Thirty  Years’  View,”  devoting 
nearly  eight  of  its  large  pages  to  it,  and  sums  up : 
46  It  was  about  the  last  high-toned  duel  that  I have 
witnessed,  and  among  the  highest  toned  I have 
ever  witnessed,  and  so  happily  conducted  to  a for- 
tunate issue,  — a result  due  to  the  noble  character 
of  the  seconds,  as  well  as  to  the  generous  and 
heroic  spirit  of  the  principals.” 

The  net  result  was  that  Randolph’s  epigram 
about  44  the  combination  of  the  Puritan  and  the 
blackleg  ” received  all  the  more  currency,  and  that 
Clay,  by  his  example,  had  given  new  sanction  to 
the  practice  he  had  denounced  as  barbarous.  He 
was  by  no  means  a professional  duelist.  His  hand 
was  in  fact  so  unused  to  the  pistol  that  on  this 
occasion  he  feared  he  would  not  be  able  to  fire  it 
within  the  time  given  him.  He  simply  did  not 
possess  that  courage  which  is  higher  than  the 
courage  to  face  death. 

The  debates  on  the  Panama  mission  served  as 
a first  general  drill  of  the  opposition.  It  went  on 
harassing  the  Adams  administration  to  its  last 
hour,  some  of  the  most  virulent  attacks  being  di- 
rected against  Clay.  Every  measure  which  was 
suspected  of  being  specially  favored  by  the  ad- 
ministration had  to  meet  bitter  resistance.  In 
the  Senate  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  was 
introduced,  in  accordance  with  Jackson’s  recom- 
mendation, to  exclude  members  of  Congress  from 
executive  appointments;  another  to  circumscribe 
the  power  of  the  general  government  with  regard 


276 


HENRY  CLAY 


to  internal  improvements ; also  a bill  to  limit  the 
executive  patronage.  However  much  good  there 
may  have  been  in  these  propositions,  it  became 
apparent  that  they  were  brought  forward  mainly 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  point  to  the  opposition 
and  to  keep  its  spirit  hot.  Not  one  of  them  led 
to  any  practical  result. 

The  confinement  of  office  life,  the  anxieties  of 
his  position,  and  probably  a feeling  of  regret  that 
he  had  put  himself  into  a situation  in  which  he 
could  only  with  difficulty  defend  himself  against 
the  virulent  hostility  assailing  him  without  cessa- 
tion, began  to  tell  upon  Clay’s  health.  He  felt 
weary  and  ill,  so  seriously  sometimes  that  he 
thought  of  giving  up  his  place  in  the  administra- 
tion. After  the  adjournment  of  Congress  he  vis- 
ited his  home  in  Kentucky.  Again  he  was  cheered 
and  feasted  on  the  way,  as  well  as  by  his  old  con- 
stituents at  home,  and  again  he  had,  at  dinners  and 
receptions,  to  tell  the  story  of  the  last  presidential 
election  over  and  over,  in  order  to  prove  that  the 
“ bargain  and  corruption  ” charge  was  false.  Again 
he  returned  to  W ashington,  encouraged  by  the  en- 
thusiastic affection  of  his  friends,  and  their  assur- 
ance that  there  were  large  masses  of  people  be- 
lieving in  the  honorable  character  of  the  President 
and  the  secretary  of  state. 

The  elections  for  the  twentieth  Congress  which 
took  place  that  summer  and  autumn  began  to  show 
new  lines  of  party  division.  In  many  districts  the 
struggle  was  avowedly  between  those  friendly  and 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


277 


those  hostile  to  the  administration.  The  forming 
groups  were  not  yet  divided  by  clearly  defined 
differences  of  principle  or  policy,  but  the  air  was 
full  of  charges,  insinuations,  and  personal  detrac- 
tion. General  Jackson’s  voice,  too,  was  heard 
again  in  characteristic  tones.  He  took  good  care 
to  keep  his  grievance  before  the  people.  Having 
been  invited  by  some  of  his  friends  in  Kentucky 
to  visit  that  State  “for  the  purpose  of  counteract- 
ing the  intrigue  and  management  of  certain  promi- 
nent individuals  against  him,”  he  wrote  a long 
letter  declining  the  invitation. 

“ Bat  [he  added]  if  it  be  true  that  the  administration 
have  gone  into  power  contrary  to  the  voice  of  the  nation, 
and  are  now  expecting,  by  means  of  this  power,  thus 
acquired,  to  mould  the  public  will  into  an  acquiescence 
with  their  authority,  then  is  the  issue  fairly  made  out  — 
shall  the  government  or  the  people  rule  ? And  it  be- 
comes the  man  whom  the  people  shall  indicate  as  their 
rightful  representative  in  this  solemn  issue,  so  to  have 
acquitted  himself  that,  while  he  displaces  these  enemies 
of  liberty,  there  will  be  nothing  in  his  own  example  to 
operate  against  the  strength  and  durability  of  the  gov- 
ernment.” 

No  candidate  for  the  presidency  had  ever  held 
such  language.  Here  he  plainly  denounced  the 
constitutionally  elected  chief  magistrate  as  a 
usurper,  and  arraigned  him  and  the  members  of 
his  administration  as  “these  enemies  of  liberty” 
who  were  using  the  power  of  the  government  to 
dragoon  the  public  will  into  acquiescence.  This 


278 


HENRY  CLAY 


fierce  denunciation  was  hurled  against  a president 
so  conscientious  in  the  exercise  of  his  power  that, 
among  the  public  officers,  his  most  virulent  ene- 
mies and  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters  of  his 
opponent  were  as  safe  in  their  places  as  were  his 
friends. 

The  last  session  of  the  nineteenth  Congress,  which 
opened  in  December,  1826,  passed  over  without 
any  event  of  importance,  but  not  without  many 
demonstrations  of  “the  bitter  and  rancorous  spirit 
of  the  opposition,”  which,  as  Adams  recorded, 
“ produced  during  the  late  session  of  Congress 
four  or  five  challenges  to  duels,  all  of  which,  how- 
ever, happily  ended  in  smoke;”  and,  he  added, 
“at  a public  dinner  given  last  week  to  John  Ran- 
dolph of  Roanoke,  a toast  was  given  directly  in- 
stigating assassination.”  No  opportunity  was  lost 
for  defaming  the  administration.  A fierce  attack 
was  made  on  Clay  for  having,  in  the  exercise  of 
his  power  as  secretary  of  state,  made  some  changes 
in  the  selection  of  newspapers  for  the  publication 
of  the  laws. 

The  clamor  of  the  opposition  grew,  indeed,  so 
loud  that  people  not  specially  engaged  in  politics 
wondered  in  amazement  whether  the  republic  really 
was  on  the  brink  of  destruction.  The  sedate  Niles, 
immediately  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress, 
expressed  in  the  “Register”  his  fear  that  the  com- 
ing presidential  election,  which  was  still  a year 
and  a half  ahead,  would  “cause  as  much  heat,  if 
not  violence,  as  any  other  event  that  ever  hap- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


279 


pened  in  this  country;  that  father  would  be  ar- 
rayed against  son,  and  son  against  father,  old 
friends  become  enemies,  and  social  intercourse  be 
cruelly  interrupted;  ” and  all  this  because  “the 
resolution  to  put  up  or  put  down  individuals  swal- 
lowed up  every  consideration  of  right  and  of 
wrong.” 

The  frenzy  to  which  politicians  wrought  them- 
selves up  was  sometimes  grotesque  in  its  manifes- 
tations. In  Virginia  it  became  known  that  John 
Tyler  had  written  a letter  to  Clay  approving  his 
conduct  in  the  last  presidential  election;  where- 
upon the  “Virginia  Jackson  Republican,”  a news- 
paper published  at  Richmond,  broke  out  in  these 
exclamations:  “John  Tyler  identified  with  Henry 
Clay!  We  are  all  amazement ! heartsick!!  chop- 
fallen  ! ! dumb ! ! ! Mourn,  Virginia,  mourn ! ! for 
you,  too,  have  your  time-serving  aspirants  who 
press  forward  from  round  to  round  on  the  ladder 
of  political  promotion,  under  the  disguises  of  re- 
publican orthodoxy,  while  they  conceal  in  their 
bosoms  the  lurking  dagger,  with  which,  upon  the 
mature  conjuncture,  to  plunge  the  Goddess  of 
Liberty  to  the  heart.”  So  John  Tyler  found  him- 
self obliged  to  explain,  in  a letter  several  columns 
long,  that  he  might  have  approved  of  Clay’s  vote 
for  Adams  without  supporting  the  Adams  admin- 
istration. 

General  Floyd,  a member  of  Congress  from 
Virginia,  in  a speech  to  his  constituents,  spoke  of 
“times  like  these,  when  great  political  revolutions 


280 


HENRY  CLAY 


are  in  progress,”  and  told  liis  hearers  that  they 
were  “now  engaged  in  a great  war, — a war  of 
patronage  and  power  against  patriotism  and  the 
people.”  He  fiercely  denounced  the  “coalition” 
which  had  put  Mr.  Adams  in  power,  and  now 
made  “the  upper  part  of  Virginia  the  great  the- 
atre of  its  intrigues;  ” but  at  the  same  time  he 
informed  his  friends  that  “the  combinations  for 
the  elevation  of  General  Jackson  were  nearly  com- 
plete.” Martin  Van  Buren,  who  in  the  last  presi- 
dential election  had  been  the  great  leader  of  the 
Crawford  forces  in  New  York,  but  now,  discerning 
in  General  Jackson  the  coming  man,  was  traveling 
through  the  Southern  States  in  the  interest  of  this 
candidate,  wrote  mysteriously  to  some  gentlemen 
at  Raleigh,  who  had  invited  him  to  a public  din- 
ner: “The  spirit  of  encroachment  has  assumed  a 
new  and  far  more  seductive  aspect,  and  can  only 
be  resisted  by  the  exercise  of  uncommon  virtues.” 
Thus  the  leaders  of  the  J ackson  movement 
worked  busily  to  excite  the  popular  mind  with 
spectral  visions  of  unprecedented  corruption  pre- 
vailing, and  of  terrible  dangers  hanging  over  the 
country;  and  their  newspapers,  led  by  a central 
organ  which  they  had  established  at  Washington, 
the  “Telegraph,”  edited  by  Duff  Green,  day  after 
day  hurled  the  most  reckless  charges  of  profligacy 
and  abuse  of  power  at  the  administration.  They 
also  brought  the  organization  of  local  committees 
as  electioneering  machinery  to  a perfection  never 
known  until  then,  and  these  committees  were  kept 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


281 


constantly  active  in  feeding  the  agitation.  Re- 
peating, by  the  press  and  in  speech,  without  cessa- 
tion, the  cry  of  bargain  and  corruption,  and  usur- 
pation of  power ; never  withdrawing  a charge,  even 
if  ever  so  conclusively  refuted,  but  answering  only 
with  new  accusations  equally  terrific,  — they  grad- 
ually succeeded  in  making  a great  many  well- 
meaning  people  believe  that  the  administration  of 
John  Quincy  Adams,  one  of  the  purest  and  most 
conscientious  this  republic  has  ever  had,  was  really 
a sink  of  iniquity,  and  an  abomination  in  the  sight 
of  all  just  men ; and  that,  if  such  a dreadful  event 
as  the  reelection  of  Adams  should  happen,  it  would 
inevitably  be  the  end  of  liberty  and  republican  in- 
stitutions in  America.  Such  a calamity  could  be 
prevented  only  by  the  election  of  the  “old  hero,” 
who,  having  once  been  “ cheated  out  of  the  presi- 
dency by  bargain  and  corruption,”  was  now  “justly 
entitled  to  the  office.” 

On  the  other  hand,  the  friends  of  the  adminis- 
tration were  not  entirely  idle.  The  President  did 
not,  indeed,  give  them  any  encouragement  in  the 
way  of  opening  places  for  them.  While  being 
constantly  accused  of  employing  the  power  and 
patronage  of  the  government  to  corrupt  public 
opinion,  and  to  dragoon  the  people  into  “acquies- 
cence,” John  Quincy  Adams  kept  the  even  tenor 
of  his  way.  The  public  service  was  full  of  his 
enemies,  but  he  did  not  remove  one  of  them. 
Even  when  well  persuaded  that  McLean,  the  post- 
master-general, had  been  intriguing  against  him 


282 


HENRY  CLAY 


and  using  the  patronage  of  his  department  in  the 
interest  of  the  opposition,  and  Clay  with  other 
members  of  the  cabinet  urged  McLean’s  dismissal, 
the  President  refused,  because  he  thought  the  Post- 
office  Department  was  on  the  whole  well  con- 
ducted. That  he  did  not  exclude  his  friends  from 
place  was  perhaps  all  that  could  be  truthfully 
said.  The  administration  had,  however,  some 
well-written  newspapers  and  able  speakers  on  its 
side.  They  vigorously  denounced  the  recklessness 
of  the  attacks  made  upon  the  government,  and 
spoke  of  General  Jackson  as  an  illiterate  “ military 
chieftain.”  But  that  phrase  was  a two-edged 
weapon;  for,  while  thinking  men  were  moved  to 
the  reflection  that  military  chieftains  were  not  the 
safest  chiefs  of  republics,  the  masses  would  see  in 
the  military  chieftain  only  the  “old  hero”  who 
had  right  gallantly  “whipped  the  Britishers  at 
New  Orleans.”  The  Jackson  movement  thus  re- 
mained greatly  superior  in  aggressive  force  and  in 
unscrupulousness  of  denunciation. 

On  one  occasion,  however,  this  was  carried  to 
a very  dangerous  length  by  Jackson  himself,  and 
Clay  apparently  scored  a great  advantage.  It  is 
a strange  story.  In  May,  1827,  there  appeared  in 
a North  Carolina  newspaper  a letter  from  Carter 
Beverly  of  Virginia,  concerning  a visit  made  by 
him  to  General  Jackson  at  the  Hermitage.  The 
general  had  then  said,  before  a large  company,  as 
the  letter  stated,  that,  before  the  election  of  Mr. 
Adams,  “Mr.  Clay’s  friends  made  a proposition 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


283 


to  Jackson’s  friends  that,  if  they  would  promise 
on  his  behalf  not  to  put  Mr.  Adams  in  the  seat 
of  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Clay  and  his  friends 
would  in  one  hour  make  Jackson  the  president,” 
but  that  General  Jackson  had  indignantly  repelled 
the  proposition.  Beverly’s  letter  created  much 
excitement.  His  veracity  being  challenged,  he 
fell  back  upon  General  Jackson,  and  the  general 
wrote  a long  reply,  telling  the  story  somewhat 
differently.  According  to  his  account,  “a  respect- 
able member  of  Congress  ” had  told  him  that,  as 
he  had  been  informed  by  Mr.  Clay’s  friends,  Mr. 
Adams’s  friends  had  held  out  the  secretaryship  of 
state  to  Mr.  Clay  as  a price  for  his  influence,  say- 
ing that,  if  General  Jackson  were  elected  presi- 
dent, Adams  would  be  continued  as  secretary  of 
state,  that  then  “there  would  be  no  room  for 
Kentucky,”  and  that,  if  General  Jackson  would 
promise  not  to  continue  Mr.  Adams  as  secretary 
of  state,  they  would  put  an  end  to  the  presidential 
contest  in  one  hour.  Then  he,  General  Jackson, 
had  contemptuously  repelled  this  “bargain  and 
corruption.” 

When  this  letter  of  General  Jackson  appeared 
in  the  newspapers,  Clay  thought  he  had  at  last 
what  he  had  long  been  looking  for,  — a responsi- 
ble sponsor  for  the  wretched  gossip.  He  forth- 
with, in  an  address  to  the  public,  made  an  unquali- 
fied and  indignant  denial  of  General  Jackson’s 
statements,  and  called  for  Jackson’s  proof.  In  a 
very  spirited  speech  delivered  at  a dinner  given 


284 


HENRY  CLAY 


him  by  his  old  constituents  at  Lexington,  he  once 
more  went  over  the  whole  dreary  story,  and  in  the 
most  pointed  language  he  defied  General  J ackson 
to  produce  his  “respectable  member  of  Congress,” 
or,  in  default  thereof,  to  stand  before  the  Ameri- 
can people  as  a willful  defamer.  The  general 
could  not  evade  this,  and  named  James  Buchanan 
of  Pennsylvania  as  his  authority.  Now  Buchanan 
had  to  rise  and  explain.  Accordingly,  in  a public 
letter,  he  denied  having  spoken  to  General  Jack- 
son  on  behalf  of  Mr.  Clay  or  his  friends ; he  had 
said  nothing  that  General  Jackson  could  have  so 
understood ; had  he  seen  reason  for  suspecting 
that  the  general  had  so  understood  him  at  the 
time,  he  would  have  set  himself  right  immediately. 
He  even  suggested  that  the  whole  story  of  the 
attempted  bargain  might  have  been  an  afterthought 
on  the  part  of  the  general.  Thus  Jackson’s  only 
witness  utterly  failed  him.  Not  only  that,  but 
Buchanan’s  letter,  together  with  the  correspond- 
ence which  followed,  left  ample  room  for  the 
suspicion  that,  if  bargaining  was  thought  of  and 
attempted,  it  was  rather  in  the  Jackson  camp  than 
among  Clay’s  friends. 

Clay  now  felt  as  if  he  had  the  slander  under  his 
heel.  To  make  its  annihilation  quite  complete, 
he  called  all  his  friends  upon  the  witness  stand. 
If  their  votes  in  Congress  had  been  transferred  to 
Mr.  Adams  by  a corrupt  bargain,  many  persons 
must  have  known  of  it.  One  after  another  they 
came  forward  in  public  letters,  declaring  that, 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


285 


while  the  election  was  pending,  they  had  never 
heard  of  any  attempt  at  bargaining  to  control 
their  votes  in  favor  of  Mr.  Adams,  and  that,  had 
the  attempt  been  made,  they  would  have  refused 
to  be  controlled.  All  these  things  were  elaborately 
summed  up  and  set  forth  in  another  address  to  the 
people  published  by  Clay  in  December. 

The  case  appeared  perfect.  Clay  and  his  friends 
were  jubilant.  Letters  of  congratulation  came 
pouring  in  upon  him.  Webster  was  lavish  in  his 
praise  of  Clay’s  dinner  speech  at  Lexington,  and 
thought  General  J ackson  would  never  recover  from 
the  blow  he  had  received.  Was  it  possible  that, 
in  the  face  of  this  overwhelming  evidence,  General 
Jackson  should  refuse  to  retract  his  charges,  or 
that  anybody  in  the  United  States  should  still  be- 
lieve them  to  be  true,  and  have  the  hardihood  to 
repeat  them?  It  was.  General  Jackson  did  not 
retract.  His  whole  moral  sense  was  subjugated 
by  the  dogged  belief  that  a man  who  seriously 
disagreed  with  him  must  necessarily  be  a very  bad 
man,  capable  of  any  villainy,  and  must  be  put 
down.  He  attempted  no  reply  to  Buchanan’s  let- 
ter and  Clay’s  addresses,  but,  as  we  shall  see, 
seventeen  years  later,  at  a most  critical  period  in 
Clay’s  public  life,  when  Carter  Beverly,  in  a re- 
gretful letter  to  Clay,  had  retracted  all  aspersions 
upon  him,  Jackson  repeated  the  slander  and  re- 
affirmed his  belief  in  it.  Neither  did  General 
Jackson’s  friends  remain  silent;  on  the  contrary, 
they  lustily  proclaimed  that  Buchanan’s  letter  had 


286 


HENRY  CLAY 


proved  Jackson’s  charge,  and  that  now  there  could 
be  no  further  doubt  about  it.  Among  the  masses 
of  the  people,  too,  who  did  not  read  long  explana- 
tions and  sift  evidence,  especially  in  Pennsylvania 
and  in  the  West  and  South,  the  bargain  and  cor- 
ruption cry  remained  as  powerful  as  ever.  It 
became  with  them  a sort  of  religious  belief  that, 
in  the  year  1824,  General  Jackson,  a guileless 
soldier,  the  hero  of  New  Orleans,  and  the  savior 
of  his  country,  had  been  cheated  out  of  his  rights 
by  two  rascally  politicians,  Clay  and  Adams,  who 
had  corruptly  usurped  the  highest  offices  of  the 
government,  and  plotted  to  destroy  the  liberties  of 
the  American  people. 

The  twentieth  Congress,  which  had  been  elected 
while  all  this  was  going  on,  and  which  assembled 
in  December,  1827,  had  a majority  hostile  to  the 
administration  in  both  branches,  — a thing  which, 
as  Adams  dolefully  remarked,  had  never  occuri^d 
during  the  existence  of  the  government.  More- 
over, that  opposition  was  determined,  if  it  could, 
not  only  to  harass  the  administration,  but  utterly 
to  destroy  it  in  the  opinion  of  the  country.  The 
only  important  measure  of  general  legislation  passed 
at  this  session  was  the  famous  tariff  of  1828,  called 
the  “tariff  of  abominations,”  on  account  of  its 
peculiarly  incongruous  and  monstrous  provisions. 
Members  of  Congress  from  New  England,  where, 
since  1824,  much  capital  had  been  turned  into 
manufacturing  industry,  from  the  Middle  States, 
and  from  the  West,  no  matter  whether  Repubii- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


287 


cans  or  Federalists,  Jackson  men  or  Adams  men, 
vied  with  one  another  in  raising  protective  duties, 
by  a wild  log-rolling  process,  on  the  different  arti- 
cles in  which  their  constituents  were  respectively 
interested.  It  created  great  dissatisfaction  in  the 
planting  States,  and  more  will  be  said  of  it  when 
we  reach  the  nullification  movement. 

The  time  not  occupied  by  the  tariff  debate  was 
largely  employed  in  defaming  the  administration. 
In  the  House  of  Kepresentatives,  the  struggle  be- 
tween the  Jackson  men  and  the  adherents  of  the 
administration  grew  almost  ludicrously  passionate. 
The  opposition  were  agreed  as  to  the  general  charge 
that  the  administration  was  most  damnable,  but 
they  were  somewhat  embarrassed  as  to  the  specifi- 
cations. One  drag-net  investigation  after  another 
was  ordered  to  help  them  out.  These  inquiries 
brought  forth  nothing  of  consequence,  but  that 
circumstance  served  only  as  a reason  for  repeating 
the  charges  all  the  louder.  The  noise  of  the  con- 
flict was  prodigious.  It  increased  in  volume,  and 
the  mutual  criminations  and  recriminations  grew 
in  rancor  and  unscrupulousness  as  the  presidential 
canvass  proceeded  after  the  adjournment  of  Con- 
gress. 

Until  then  the  friends  of  Adams  and  Clay  had 
mostly  contented  themselves  with  the  defense  of 
the  administration  from  the  accusations  which  were 
hurled  at  it  with  bewildering  violence  and  profu- 
sion. But  gradually  they,  too,  warmed  up  to 
their  work,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  campaign 


288 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  1828  became  one  of  the  most  furious  and  dis- 
gusting which  the  American  people  has  ever  wit- 
nessed. The  passions  were  excited  to  fever  heat, 
and  all  the  flood-gates  of  scurrility  opened.  The 
detractors  of  J ohn  Quincy  Adams  not  only  assailed 
his  public  acts,  but  they  traduced  this  most  scrupu- 
lously correct  of  men  as  the  procurer  to  the  Em- 
peror of  Russia  of  a beautiful  American  girl. 
With  frantic  energy  the  speakers  and  newspapers 
of  the  Jackson  party  rang  the  changes  upon  the 
“ bargain  and  corruption  ” charge,  and  Clay, 
although  not  himself  a candidate,  was  glibly  re- 
viled as  a professional  gambler,  a swindling  bank- 
rupt, an  abandoned  profligate,  and  an  accomplice 
of  Aaron  Burr.  On  the  other  hand,  not  only  the 
vulnerable  points  of  Jackson’s  public  career  were 
denounced,  but  also  his  private  character  and  even 
the  good  name  of  his  wife  were  ruthlessly  dragged 
in  the  dust.  Such  was  the  vile  war  of  detraction 
which  raged  till  the  closing  of  the  polls. 

Some  of  Mr.  Adams’s  friends,  among  them 
Webster,  were  hopeful  to  the  last.  But  Adams 
himself,  and  with  him  the  cooler  heads  on  his  side, 
did  not  delude  themselves  with  flattering  expecta- 
tions. When  the  votes  were  counted,  it  turned 
out  that  Adams  had  carried  all  New  England, 
with  the  exception  of  one  electoral  vote  in  Maine; 
also  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  four  ninths  of  the 
vote  of  New  York,  and  six  of  the  eleven  Maryland 
votes.  South  of  the  Potomac,  and  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  Jackson  had  swept  everything  before 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


289 


him.  In  Pennsylvania  he  had  a popular  majority 
of  fifty  thousand.  The  electoral  vote  for  Jackson 
was  one  hundred  and  seventy-eight,  that  for  Adams 
eighty-three.  All  the  Clay  States  of  1824  had  gone 
to  Jackson.  Calhoun  was  elected  vice-president. 

The  overwhelming  defeat  of  John  Quincy  Adams 
has  by  some  been  attributed  to  the  stubborn  con- 
sistency with  which  he  refused  to  build  up  a party 
for  himself  by  removing  his  enemies  and  distribut- 
ing the  offices  of  the  government  among  his  politi- 
cal friends.  This  is  a mistake.  The  civil  service 
reformer  of  our  days  would  say  that  President 
Adams  did  not  act  wisely,  nor  according  to  correct 
principles,  in  permitting  public  servants  to  take 
part  in  the  warfare  of  political  parties  with  as  lit- 
tle restraint  as  if  they  had  been  private  citizens; 
for  whenever  public  officers  do  so,  their  official 
power  and  opportunities  are  almost  always  taken 
advantage  of  for  the  benefit  of  the  party,  endan- 
gering the  freedom  of  elections  as  well  as  the 
integrity  of  the  service.  But  this  is  a conclusion 
formed  in  our  time,  when  the  abuses  growing  out 
of  a partisan  service  have  fully  developed  them- 
selves and  demand  a remedy,  which  was  not  then 
the  case.  Adams  simply  followed  the  traditions 
of  the  first  administrations.  Had  he  silenced  his 
enemies  together  with  his  friends  in  office,  it  would 
have  benefited  him  in  the  canvass  very  little. 
Neither  could  the  use  of  patronage  as  a weapon  in 
the  struggle  have  saved  him,  had  he  been  capable 
of  resorting  to  it.  Patronage  so  used  is  always 


290 


HENRY  CLAY 


demoralizing,  but  it  can  have  decisive  effect  only 
in  quiet  times,  while  the  popular  mind  is  languid 
and  indifferent.  When  there  are  strong  currents 
of  popular  feeling  and  the  passions  are  aroused,  a 
shrewd  management  of  patronage,  although  it  may 
indeed  control  the  nomination  of  candidates  by 
packing  conventions,  will  not  decide  elections. 
In  1828  there  were  such  elementary  forces  to  en- 
counter. Not  only  had  the  Jackson  party  the 
more  efficient  organization  and  the  shrewder  man- 
agers, but  they  were  favored  by  a peculiar  devel- 
opment in  the  condition  of  the  popular  mind. 

In  the  early  times  of  the  republic  the  masses  of 
the  American  people  were,  owing  to  their  circum- 
stances, uneducated  and  ignorant,  and,  owing  to 
traditional  habit,  they  had  a reverential  respect 
for  superiority  of  talent  and  breeding,  and  yielded 
readily  to  its  leadership.  Their  growing  prosper- 
ity, the  material  successes  achieved  by  them  in 
the  development  of  the  country,  strengthened  their 
confidence  in  themselves;  and  the  result  of  this 
widening  self-consciousness  was  the  triumph  of 
the  democratic  theory  of  government  in  the  elec- 
tion of  Jefferson.  Still  the  old  habit  of  readily 
accepting  the  leadership  of  superior  intelligence 
and  education  remained  sufficiently  strong  to  per- 
mit the  succession  of  several  presidents  taken  from 
the  ranks  of  professional  statesmen.  But  there 
always  comes  a time  in  the  life  of  a democracy  — 
and  it  is  a critical  period  — when  the  masses  grow 
impatient  of  all  pretensions  or  admissions  of  supe- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


291 


riority ; when  a vague  distrust  of  professional 
statesmanship,  of  trained  skill  in  the  conduct  of 
the  government,  seizes  upon  them,  and  makes 
them  easily  believe  that  those  who  possess  such 
trained  skill  will,  if  constantly  intrusted  with  the 
management  of  public  affairs,  take  some  sort  of 
advantage  of  those  less  trained;  that,  after  all, 
the  business  of  governing  is  no  more  difficult  than 
other  business ; and  that  it  would  be  safer  to  put 
into  the  highest  places  men  more  like  themselves, 
not  skilled  statesmen,  but  “men  of  the  people.” 

By  the  time  the  Revolutionary  generation  of 
presidents  had  run  out,  — that  is  to  say,  with  the 
close  of  Monroe’s  second  administration, — large 
numbers  of  voters  in  the  United  States  had  reached 
that  state  of  mind.  Its  development  was  wonder- 
fully favored  by  the  “ bargain  and  corruption  ” 
cry,  which,  after  the  election  of  Adams  in  1825, 
represented  “the  people’s  candidate”  as  cheated 
out  of  his  right  to  the  presidency  by  a conspiracy 
of  selfish  and  tricky  professional  politicians.  As 
this  cry  was  kept  resounding  all  over  the  coun- 
try, accompanied  with  stories  of  other  dreadful 
encroachments  and  intrigues,  the  masses  were  im- 
pressed with  the  feeling  not  only  that  a great 
wrong  had  been  done,  but  that  some  darkly  lurk- 
ing danger  was  threating  their  own  rights  and 
liberties,  and  that  nothing  but  the  election  of  a 
man  of  the  people,  such  as  “the  old  hero,”  could 
surely  save  the  republic.  This  was  the  real 
strength  of  the  Jackson  movement.  It  is  a signifi- 


292 


HENRY  CLAY 


cant  fact  that  it  was  weakest  where  there  were  the 
most  schools,  and  that  it  gathered  its  greatest 
momentum  where  the  people  were  least  accustomed 
to  reading  and  study,  and  therefore  most  apt  to 
be  swayed  by  unreasoning  impressions. 

No  patronage,  no  machine  work,  could  have 
stemmed  this  tide.  No  man  endowed  with  all 
the  charms  of  personal  popularity  could  have 
turned  it  back.  But  of  all  men  John  Quincy 
Adams  was  the  least  fitted  for  such  a task.  We 
can  learn  from  him  how  to  act  upon  lofty  princi- 
ples, and  also  how  to  make  their  enforcement  thor- 
oughly disagreeable.  He  possessed  in  the  highest 
degree  that  uprightness  which  leans  backward. 
He  had  a horror  of  demagogy,  and,  lest  he  should 
render  himself  guilty  of  anything  akin  to  it,  he 
would  but  rarely  condescend  to  those  innocent 
amenities  by  which  the  good-will  of  others  may 
be  conciliated.  His  virtue  was  freezing  cold  of 
touch,  and  forbidding  in  its  looks.  Not  only  he 
did  not  court,  but  he  repelled  popularity.  When 
convinced  of  being  right  in  an  opinion,  he  would 
make  its  expression  as  uncompromising  and  ag- 
gressive as  if  he  desired  rather  to  irritate  than  to 
persuade.  His  friends  esteemed,  and  many  of 
them  admired  him,  but  their  devotion  and  zeal 
were  measured  by  a cold  sense  of  duty.  To  the 
eye  of  the  people  he  seemed  so  distant  that  they 
were  all  the  more  willing  to  believe  ill  of  him. 
With  such  a standard-bearer  such  a contest  was 
lost  as  soon  as  it  was  begun. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


293 


Clay  tried  to  bear  the  defeat  with  composure. 
44 The  inauspicious  issue  of  the  election,”  he  wrote 
to  Niles,  44  has  shocked  me  less  than  I feared  it 
would.  My  health  and  my  spirits,  too,  have  been 
better  since  the  event  was  known  than  they  were 
many  weeks  before.”  The  hardest  blow  was  that 
even  his  beloved  Kentucky  had  refused  to  follow 
his  leadership,  and  had  joined  the  triumphal  pro- 
cession of  the  military  chieftain. 

On  the  day  before  General  Jackson’s  inaugura- 
tion Clay  put  his  resignation  into  the  hands  of 
Mr.  Adams,  and  thus  ended  his  career  as  secretary 
of  state.  It  may,  on  the  whole,  be  called  a very 
creditable  one,  although  its  failures  were  more 
conspicuous  than  its  successes.  His  greatest  affair, 
that  of  the  Panama  Congress,  had  entirely  miscar- 
ried. This,  however,  was  not  the  fault  of  his 
management.  He  had  desired  to  confide  the  mis- 
sion to  the  best  diplomatic  mind  in  America,  Al- 
bert Gallatin,  but  Gallatin,  after  some  considera- 
tion, declined.  John  Sergeant  of  Pennsylvania, 
of  whom  we  have  already  heard  as  an  anti -slavery 
man  in  the  Missouri  struggle,  and  Richard  C. 
Anderson  of  Kentucky  were  then  selected.  Owing 
to  the  long  delays  in  Congress,  the  envoys  did  not 
start  on  their  mission  until  early  in  the  summer  of 
1826.  Anderson  died  on  the  way.  In  his  place 
Joel  R.  Poinsett,  American  minister  in  Mexico, 
was  instructed  to  attend  the  congress.  When 
Sergeant  arrived  at  Panama,  the  congress  had 
adjourned  with  a resolution  to  meet  again  at  Tacu- 


294 


HENRY  CLAY 


baya,  in  Mexico.  But  by  the  time  that  meeting 
was  to  be  held,  the  attention  of  our  southern  sister 
republics  was  already  fully  engaged  by  internal 
discords  and  conflicts.  The  meeting,  therefore, 
never  took  place,  and  Sergeant  returned  without 
ever  having  seen  the  congress.  To  Clay  this  was 
a deep  disappointment.  His  zeal  in  behalf  of  the 
Spanish-American  republics  had  been  generous 
and  ardent.  He  had  sincerely  believed  that  na- 
tional independence  and  the  practice  of  free  insti- 
tutions would  lift  those  populations  out  of  their 
ignorance,  superstition,  and  sloth,  and  develop  in 
them  the  moral  qualities  of  true  freemen.  He 
had  battled  for  their  cause,  and  clung  to  his  hopes 
even  against  the  light  of  better  information.  He 
had  infused  some  of  his  enthusiasm  into  Mr. 
Adams  himself,  although  the  cooler  judgment  of 
the  President,  even  in  his  warmest  recommenda- 
tions to  Congress,  always  kept  the  contingency  of 
failure  in  view.  Clay  had  seen  his  gorgeous  con- 
ception of  a grand  brotherhood  of  free  peoples  on 
American  soil  almost  realized,  as  he  thought,  by 
the  convocation  of  the  Panama  council.  Then 
the  pleasing  picture  vanished.  He  was  obliged  to 
admit  to  himself  that  in  the  conversation  of  1821, 
concerning  the  southern  republics,  Adams,  after 
all,  had  been  right ; that  free  government  cannot 
be  established  by  mere  revolutionary  decrees;  that 
written  constitutions,  in  order  to  last,  must  em- 
body the  ways  of  thinking  and  the  character  of 
the  people ; that  the  people  of  the  thirteen  North 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


295 


American  colonies  (to  whom  revolution  and  na- 
tional independence  meant  not  the  creation  of 
freedom,  but  the  maintenance  of  liberties  already- 
possessed,  enjoyed,  and  practiced,  the  defense  of 
principles  which  had  been  to  them  like  mother’s 
milk)  were  an  essentially  different  people  from 
the  Spanish- Americans,  who  had  grown  up  under 
despotic  rule,  to  whom  liberty  was  a new  thing 
they  did  not  know  what  to  do  with,  and  who  lived 
mostly  in  a tropical  climate  where  the  sustenance 
of  animal  man  requires  but  little  ingenuity  and 
exertion,  and  where  all  the  influences  of  nature 
favor  the  development  of  indolence  and  of  the 
passions  rather  than  the  government  of  thrift, 
reason,  and  law. 

The  disappointment  was  indeed  painful,  and  he 
could  not  refrain  from  expressing  his  feelings  on 
a notable  occasion.  In  1827  Bolivar  wrote  him  a 
formal  letter  complimenting  him  “upon  his  bril- 
liant talents  and  ardent  love  of  liberty,”  adding: 
“All  America,  Colombia,  and  myself  owe  your 
excellency  our  purest  gratitude  for  the  incompar- 
able services  you  have  rendered  to  us  by  sustaining 
our  cause  with  a sublime  enthusiasm.”  Clay  an- 
swered, nearly  a year  later,  in  chilling  phrase, 
that  the  interest  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
in  the  struggles  of  South  America  had  been  in- 
spired by  the  hope  that  “along  with  its  independ- 
ence would  be  established  free  institutions,  insur- 
ing all  the  blessings  of  civil  liberty,”  an  object  to 
the  accomplishment  of  which  the  people  of  the 


296 


HENRY  CLAY 


United  States  were  still  anxiously  looking.  But, 
lest  Bolivar  might  fail  in  making  a practical  ap- 
plication of  these  words,  Clay  added:  “I  should 
be  unworthy  of  the  consideration  with  which  your 
excellency  honors  me,  if  I did  not  on  this  occasion 
state  that  ambitious  designs  have  been  attributed 
by  your  enemies  to  your  excellency,  which  have 
created  in  my  mind  great  solicitude.  They  have 
cited  late  events  in  Colombia  as  proofs  of  these 
designs.  But  I cannot  allow  myself  to  believe 
that  your  excellency  will  abandon  the  bright  and 
glorious  path  which  lies  plainly  before  you,  for 
the  bloody  road  on  which  the  vulgar  crowd  of 
tyrants  and  military  despots  have  so  often  trodden. 
I will  not  doubt  that  your  excellency  will  in  due 
time  render  a satisfactory  explanation  to  Colombia 
and  to  the  world  of  the  parts  of  your  public  con- 
duct which  have  excited  any  distrust,”  and  so  on. 
The  lecture  thus  administered  by  the  American 
statesman  to  the  South  American  dictator  was  the 
voice  of  sadly  disappointed  expectations.  Clay 
was  probably  aware  that  Bolivar’s  ambitions  were 
by  no  means  the  greatest  difficulty  threatening  the 
Spanish-Ameriean  republics. 

Another  disappointment  he  suffered  in  the  fail- 
ure of  an  effort  to  remedy  what  he  considered  the 
great  defect  in  the  Spanish  treaty  of  1819.  In 
March,  1827,  he  instructed  Poinsett,  the  Ameri- 
can minister  to  Mexico,  to  propose  the  purchase 
of  Texas.  But  the  attempt  came  to  nothing. 

In  his  commercial  diplomacy  Clay  followed  the 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


297 


ideas  of  reciprocity  generally  accepted  at  the  time, 
which  not  only  awarded  favor  for  favor,  but  also 
set  restriction  against  restriction.  This  practice 
of  fighting  restriction  with  equal  or  greater  re- 
striction was  apt  to  work  well  enough  when  the 
opposite  party  was  the  one  less  able  to  endure  the 
restriction,  and  therefore  obliged  by  its  necessities 
to  give  up  the  fight  quickly.  But  when  the  re- 
strictions were  long  maintained,  the  effect  was 
simply  that  each  party  punished  its  own  commerce 
in  seeking  to  retaliate  upon  the  other.  This  prac- 
tice played  a great  part  in  the  transactions  taking 
place  in  and  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  concerning  the  colonial  trade.  The  tradi- 
tional policy  of  Great  Britain  was  to  keep  the 
trade  with  the  colonies  as  exclusively  as  possible 
in  the  hands  of  the  mother  country.  The  United 
States,  of  course,  desired  to  have  the  greatest  pos- 
sible freedom  of  trade  with  the  British  colonies, 
especially  those  in  America,  including  the  West 
India  islands.  Various  attempts  were  made  in 
that  direction,  but  without  success.  The  commer- 
cial conventions  of  1815  and  1818  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  had  concluded 
nothing  in  this  respect,  leaving  the  matter  to  be 
regulated  by  legislation  on  either  side.  The  result 
was  a confusion  of  privileges,  conditions,  and  re- 
strictions most  perplexing  and  troublesome.  The 
desirability  of  a clear  mutual  understanding  being 
keenly  felt,  negotiations  were  resumed.  In  July, 
1825,  Parliament  passed  an  act  offering  large 


298 


HENRY  CLAY 


privileges  with  regard  to  the  colonial  trade  on 
condition  of  complete  reciprocity,  the  acceptance 
of  the  conditional  offer  to  be  notified  to  the  Brit- 
ish government  within  one  year.  Congress  neg- 
lected to  take  action  on  the  offer.  Meanwhile 
Gallatin,  upon  whom  the  government  was  apt  to 
fall  back  for  difficult  diplomatic  service,  had  been 
appointed  minister  to  England  in  the  place  of 
Rufus  King,  whose  health  had  failed.  When 
Gallatin  arrived  in  London  he  was  met  by  an 
Order  in  Council  issued  on  July  27,  1826,  pro- 
hibiting all  commercial  intercourse  between  the 
United  States  and  the  British  West  Indies.  At 
the  same  time  Canning,  the  foreign  secretary, 
who  was  fond  of  treating  the  United  States  cava- 
lierly, informed  him  that  all  further  negotiation 
upon  this  subject  was  declined.  A lively  exchange 
of  notes  followed,  in  which  Gallatin  and  Clay  not 
only  had  the  best  of  the  argument,  but  excelled 
by  pointed  retorts  given  in  excellent  temper.  An- 
other session  of  Congress  having  passed  without 
action,  the  President,  in  accordance  with  an  act 
passed  in  1823,  issued  a proclamation  on  March 
17,  1827,  declaring,  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  the  prohibition  of  all  trade  and  intercourse 
with  the  ports  from  which  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States  was  excluded.  Soon  afterwards 
Canning  died.  Lord  Goderich  rose  to  the  post 
of  prime  minister,  and  Gallatin  succeeded  in  mak- 
ing a treaty  keeping  the  convention  of  1815  in- 
definitely in  force,  subject  to  one  year’s  notice. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


299 


Thus,  while  the  controversy  had  not  been  brought 
to  the  desired  conclusion,  at  least  nothing  was 
lost;  the  dignity  of  the  United  States  was  main- 
tained ; more  dangerous  complications  were  avoided ; 
and  the  way  was  prepared  for  more  satisfactory 
arrangements  in  the  future.  But  it  was,  in  popu- 
lar opinion,  a failure  after  all,  and,  the  temporary 
cutting  off  of  the  West  India  trade  being  severely 
felt,  naturally  told  against  the  administration.  It 
was  with  regard  to  this  transaction  that,  as  we 
shall  see,  Martin  Van  Buren,  when  General  Jack- 
son’s secretary  of  state,  gave  those  famous  instruc- 
tions which  cost  him  the  consent  of  the  Senate  to 
his  nomination  as  minister  to  England. 

On  the  whole,  there  was  evidence  of  a liberal, 
progressive  spirit  in  Clay’s  diplomatic  transac- 
tions; and  it  gave  him  much  pleasure  to  say  that, 
during  the  period  when  he  was  secretary  of  state, 
“more  treaties  between  the  United  States  and 
foreign  nations  had  been  actually  signed  than  had 
been  during  the  thirty-six  years  of  the  existence 
of  the  present  Constitution.”  He  concluded  trea- 
ties of  amity,  commerce,  and  navigation  with  Cen- 
tral America,  Prussia,  Denmark,  the  Hanseatic 
Republics,  Sweden  and  Norway,  and  Brazil,  and 
a boundary  treaty  with  Mexico.  With  Great 
Britain  he  was  least  successful  in  bringing  matters 
in  controversy  to  a definite  and  quite  satisfactory 
conclusion.  So  a treaty  concerning  the  disputed 
territory  on  the  northwest  coast,  the  Columbia 
country,  provided  only  for  an  extension  of  the 


300 


HENRY  CLAY 


joint  occupation  agreed  upon  in  the  treaty  of  1818, 
thus  merely  adjourning  a difficulty,  while  by  an- 
other treaty  the  northeastern  boundary  question 
was  referred  to  a friendly  sovereign  or  state,  to  be 
agreed  upon,  for  arbitration. 

The  one  disputed  question  between  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  United  States  which  he  did  bring  to 
a conclusion  was  one  left  behind  by  the  treaty 
of  Ghent,  — the  indemnity  for  slaves  carried  off 
by  the  British  forces  in  the  war  of  1812.  After 
seven  years  of  fruitless  negotiation,  the  matter 
had  been  referred  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  of 
Russia.  He  decided  in  favor  of  the  claim.  But 
the  British  government  raised  new  objections,  and 
a second  negotiation  followed.  Great  Britain  finally 
agreed  to  pay  a lump  sum  for  the  value  of  the 
slaves,  and  payment  was  made  in  1827.  Thus 
the  administration  of  J ohn  Quincy  Adams  achieved, 
diplomatically,  one  of  its  most  decided  successes 
in  a matter  in  which  its  sympathies  were  least  en- 
listed. 

But  a kindred  question  turned  up  in  another 
form  still  more  unsympathetic.  On  May  10, 1828, 
the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a resolution 
asking  the  President  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
British  government  concerning  the  surrender  of 
slaves  taking  refuge  in  Canada.  Clay  accordingly 
instructed  Gallatin  to  propose  to  the  British  gov- 
ernment a stipulation,  first,  “for  the  mutual  sur- 
render of  deserters  from  the  military  and  naval 
service  and  from  the  merchant  service  of  the  two 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


301 


countries;”  and,  second,  “for  a mutual  surrender 
of  all  persons  held  to  service  or  labor  under  the 
laws  of  one  party  who  escape  into  the  territories 
of  the  other.”  The  first  proposition  was  evidently 
to  serve  only  as  a prop  to  the  second ; for,  as  the 
instruction  argued*  while  Great  Britain  had  little 
interest  in  the  mutual  surrender  of  fugitive  slaves, 
she  had  much  interest  in  the  mutual  surrender  of 
military  or  naval  deserters.  The  British  govern- 
ment, however,  as  was  to  be  expected,  replied 
promptly  that  it  “was  utterly  impossible  for  them 
to  agree  to  a stipulation  for  the  surrender  of  fugi- 
tive slaves.” 

The  negotiation  presents  a melancholy  spectacle : 
a republic  offering  to  surrender  deserters  from  the 
army  or  navy  of  a monarchical  power,  if  that 
power  would  agree  to  surrender  slaves  escaped 
from  their  owners  in  that  republic!  And  this 
happened  under  the  administration  of  John  Quincy 
Adams;  the  instructions  were  signed  by  Henry 
Clay,  and  the  proposition  was  laid  before  the  Brit- 
ish government  by  Albert  Gallatin!  It  is  true 
that  in  Clay’s  dispatches  on  this  subject  we  find 
nothing  of  his  accustomed  strength  of  statement 
and  fervor  of  reasoning.  Neither  did  there  appear 
anything  like  zeal  in  Gallatin’s  presentation  of 
the  matter.  It  was  a mere  perfunctory  “going 
through  the  motions,”  as  if  in  expectation  of  a 
not  unwelcome  failure.  But  even  as  such,  it  is 
a sorry  page  of  history  which  we  should  gladly 
miss.  Slavery  was  a hard  taskmaster  to  the  gov- 
ernment  of  this  proud  American  republic. 


305 


HENRY  CLAY 


It  would  not  be  just  to  assume  that  a man  who 
had  grown  up  in  the  anti-slavery  school  of  the 
Revolutionary  period,  and  whose  first  effort  on  the 
political  field  was  made  in  behalf  of  emancipation, 
would  lend  himself  without  reluctance  to  such 
transactions,  unless  his  conscience  had  become 
completely  debauched  or  his  opinions  thoroughly 
changed.  Clay  had  remained  essentially  different, 
in  his  ways  of  thinking  and  feeling,  from  the  ordi- 
nary pro-slavery  man.  That  nervous,  sleepless, 
instinctive  watchfulness  for  the  safety  of  the  pecul- 
iar institution,  which  characterized  the  orthodox 
slaveholder,  was  entirely  foreign  to  him.  He  had 
to  be  told  what  the  interests  of  slavery  demanded, 
in  order  to  see  and  feel  its  needs.  The  original 
anti-slavery  spirit  would  again  and  again  inspire 
his  impulses  and  break  out  in  his  utterances.  We 
remember  how  he  praised  the  Spanish-American 
republics  for  having  abolished  slavery.  In  his 
great  “American  system”  speech  he  had  argued 
for  the  superior  claims  of  free  labor  as  against 
those  of  “servile  labor.”  He  was  scarcely  seated 
in  the  office  of  secretary  of  state,  when,  in  April, 
1825,  as  Mr.  Adams  recorded,  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  “the  independence  of  Hayti  must 
shortly  be  recognized,”  — an  idea  most  horrible  to 
the  American  slaveholder.  When  he  eagerly  ac- 
cepted the  invitation  to  the  Panama  Congress,  the 
association  with  new  states  that  had  liberated  their 
slaves,  and  counted  negroes  and  mulattoes  among 
their  generals  and  legislators,  had  nothing  alarm- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


303 


ing  to  him.  Little  more  than  a year  before  he 
instructed  Gallatin  to  ask  of  Great  Britain  the 
surrender  of  fugitive  slaves  from  Canada,  he  had 
made  one  of  the  most  striking  demonstrations  of 
his  genuine  feeling  at  a meeting  of  the  African 
Colonization  Society,  which  is  worthy  of  special 
attention. 

That  society  had  been  organized  in  1816,  with 
the  object  of  transporting  free  negroes  to  Africa 
and  of  colonizing  them  there.  It  was  in  the  main 
composed  of  two  elements, — pro  - slavery  men, 
even  of  the  extreme  type  of  John  Randolph,  who 
favored  the  removal  of  free  negroes  from  this  coun- 
try, because  they  considered  them  a dangerous 
element,  a “pest,”  in  slaveholding  communities; 
and  philanthropists,  some  of  whom  sincerely  be- 
lieved that  the  exportation  of  colored  people  on  a 
grand  scale  was  possible,  and  would  ultimately 
result  in  the  extinguishment  of  slavery,  while 
others  contented  themselves  with  a vague  impres- 
sion that  some  good  might  be  done  by  it,  and  used 
it  as  a convenient  excuse  for  not  doing  anything 
more  efficacious. 

Clay  was  one  of  the  sincere  believers  in  the 
y colonization  scheme  as  practicable  on  a grand 
, scale,  and  as  an  aid  to  gradual  emancipation.  In 
his  speech  before  the  Colonization  Society  in  Jan- 
uary, 1827,  he  tried  to  prove  — and  he  had  armed 
himself  for  the  task  with  an  arsenal  of  figures  — 
that  it  was  “not  beyond  the  ability  of  the  coun- 
try ” to  export  and  colonize  a sufficient  number  of 


304 


HENRY  CLAY 


negroes  to  effect  a gradual  reduction  of  the  colored 
population  in  this  country,  and  thus  by  degrees  to 
eradicate  slavery,  or  at  least  to  neutralize  its  dan- 
gerous effects.  We  know  now  that  these  sanguine 
N calculations  were  entirely  delusive;  neither  did  his 
prediction  come  true,  that  the  free  negro  “ pests,” 
when  colonized  in  Africa,  would  prove  the  most 
effective  missionaries  of  civilization  on  that  conti- 
nent. But  he  believed  in  all  this;  to  his  mind  the 
colonization  scheme  was  an  anti-slavery  agency, 
and  it  was  characteristic  of  his  feelings  when  he 
exclaimed : — 

“ If  I could  be  instrumental  in  eradicating  this  deep- 
est stain  upon  the  character  of  our  country,  and  remov- 
ing all  cause  of  reproach  on  account  of  it  by  foreign 
nations  ; if  I could  only  be  instrumental  in  ridding  of 
this  foul  blot  that  revered  State  which  gave  me  birth,  or 
that  not  less  beloved  State  which  kindly  adopted  me  as 
her  son,  I would  not  exchange  the  proud  satisfaction 
which  I should  enjoy  for  the  honor  of  all  the  triumphs 
ever  decreed  to  the  most  successful  conqueror.” 

We  might  almost  imagine  we  heard  the  voice  of 
an  apostle  of  “abolition  ” in  his  reply  to  the  charge 
that  the  Colonization  Society  was  “doing  mischief 
by  the  agitation  of  this  question.”  These  were 
his  words,  spoken  in  his  most  solemn  tone : — 

“ What  would  they  who  thus  reproach  us  have  done  ? 
If  they  would  repress  all  tendency  toward  liberty  and 
ultimate  emancipation,  they  must  do  more  than  put  down 
the  benevolent  efforts  of  this  society.  They  must  go 
back  to  the  era  of  our  liberty  and  independence,  and 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


305 


muzzle  the  cannon  which  thunder  its  annual  joyous  re- 
turn. They  must  revive  the  slave  trade  with  all  its 
train  of  atrocities.  They  must  suppress  the  workings  of 
British  philanthropy,  seeking  to  meliorate  the  condition 
of  the  unfortunate  West  Indian  slaves.  They  must 
arrest  the  career  of  South  American  deliverance  from 
thraldom.  They  must  blow  out  the  moral  lights  around 
us,  and  extinguish  that  greatest  torch  of  all,  which 
America  presents  to  a benighted  world,  pointing  the  way 
to  their  rights,  their  liberties,  and  their  happiness.  And 
when  they  have  achieved  all  these  purposes,  the  work 
will  yet  be  incomplete.  They  must  penetrate  the  human 
soul,  and  eradicate  the  light  of  reason  and  the  love  of 
liberty.  Then,  and  not  till  then,  when  universal  dark- 
ness and  despair  prevail,  can  you  perpetuate  slavery, 
and  repress  all  sympathies,  and  all  human  and  benevo- 
lent efforts  among  freemen,  in  behalf  of  the  unhap py 
portion  of  our  race  doomed  to  bondage.” 

This,  no  doubt,  was  Henry  Clay  the  man,  speak- 
ing the  language  of  his  heart,  and  he  spoke  it,  too, 
at  a time  when  he  must  have  known  that  the  slave- 
holding interest  was  growing  very  sensitive,  and 
that  its  distrust  and  disfavor  might  become  fatal 
to  all  his  ambitions  as  a candidate  for  the  presi- 
dency. Knowing  this,  he  said  things  which  might 
have  come  from  the  most  uncompromising  and 
defiant  enemy  of  slavery.  Yet  this  was  the  same 
man  who  had  helped  to  strengthen  the  law  for  the 
recovery  of  fugitive  slaves;  who  had  opposed  the 
exclusion  of  slavery  from  new  States;  who  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Adams  administration  had  given 
the  British  government  to  understand  that  further 


306 


HENRY  CLAY 


negotiations  for  common  action  for  the  suppression 
of  the  slave  trade  would  be  useless,  as  the  Senate 
would  not  confirm  such  treaties ; who,  after  having 
made  that  anti-slavery  speech,  would  lend  himself 
to  a negotiation  with  a foreign  government  for  the 
mutual  surrender  of  fugitive  slaves  and  military 
and  naval  deserters ; who  would,  at  a later  period, 
vehemently  denounce  the  abolitionists,  again  op- 
pose the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  new  territories, 
again  strengthen  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  while 
in  the  intervals  repeating  his  denunciations  of 
slavery,  and  again  declaring  himself  in  favor  of 
gradual  emancipation. 

This  contrast  between  expression  of  feeling  on 
the  one  side  and  action  on  the  other  was  incom- 
prehensible to  the  abolitionists,  who,  after  the 
Missouri  struggle,  began  to  make  themselves  felt 
by  agitating,  with  constantly  increasing  zeal,  the 
duty  of  instantly  overthrowing  slavery  on  moral 
grounds.  It  is  not  easily  understood  by  our  gen- 
eration, who  look  back  upon  slavery  as  a moral 
abnormity  in  this  age,  and  as  the  easily  discernible 
cause  of  great  conflicts  and  calamities,  which  it 
would  have  been  best  to  attack  and  extinguish,  the 
earlier  the  better.  We  can  only  with  difficulty 
imagine  the  thoughts  and  emotions  of  men  of  that 
period,  who,  while  at  heart  recognizing  slavery  as 
a wrong  and  a curse,  yet  had  some  of  that  feeling 
expressed  by  Patrick  Henry,  in  his  remarkable 
letter  of  1773, — who  thought  that  the  abolition 
of  the  great  evil,  while  sure  finally  to  come,  would 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


307 


still  be  impossible  for  a considerable  period,  and 
that  in  the  mean  time,  while  slavery  legally  existed, 
it  must  be  protected  in  its  rights  and  interests 
against  outside  interference,  and  especially  against 
all  commotions  which  might  disturb  the  peace  of 
the  community.  We  can  now  scarcely  appreciate 
the  dread  of  the  consequences  of  sudden  eman- 
cipation, the  constitutional  scruples,  the  nervous 
anxiety  about  the  threatened  Union,  and  the  vague 
belief  in  the  efficacy  of  compromises  and  pallia- 
tives, which  animated  statesmen  of  Clay’s  way  of 
thinking  and  feeling.  It  is  characteristic  of  that 
period,  that  even  a man  of  John  Quincy  Adams’s 
stamp,  who  was  not  under  any  pro-slavery  influ- 
ence at  home,  and  all  whose  instincts  and  impulses 
were  against  slavery,  permitted  that  negotiation 
with  Great  Britain  about  the  surrender  of  fugitive 
slaves  to  go  on  under  his  presidential  responsi- 
bility, without  mentioning  it  by  a single  word  in 
his  journal  as  a matter  of  importance.  Less  sur- 
prising appears  such  conduct  in  Clay,  who  was 
constantly  worked  upon  by  the  interests  and  anx- 
ieties of  the  slaveholding  community  in  which  he 
had  his  home,  and  who  was  a natural  compromiser, 
because  his  very  nature  was  a compromise. 

His  four  years’  service  as  secretary  of  state 
formed  on  the  whole  an  unhappy  period  in  Clay’s 
life.  Although  many  of  his  state  papers  testify 
by  their  vigor  and  brilliancy  to  the  zest  with  which 
they  were  worked  out,  — even  the  cool-headed 
Gallatin  recognized  that  Clay  had  “ vastly  im- 


308 


HENRY  CLAY 


proved  since  1814,”  — yet  the  office  labor,  with  its 
constant  confinement,  grew  irksome  to  him.  Here 
was  a lion  in  a cage.  His  health  suffered  seri- 
ously. He  seemed  to  be  in  danger  of  paralysis, 
and  several  times  he  himself  became  so  alarmed 
that  he  could  only  with  difficulty  be  persuaded  by 
President  Adams  to  remain  in  office.  It  was  be- 
lieved by  his  friends,  and  it  is  very  probable,  that 
the  war  of  vilification  waged  against  him  had 
something  to  do  with  his  physical  ailment.  There 
is  abundance  of  evidence  to  prove  that  he  felt 
deeply  the  assaults  upon  his  character.  The  mere 
fact  that  anybody  will  dare  to  represent  him  as 
capable  of  dishonorable  practices  is  a stinging 
humiliation  to  a proud  man.  There  is  refuge  in 
contempt,  but  also  the  necessity  of  despising  any 
one  is  distressing  to  a generous  nature. 

Moreover,  the  feeling  grew  upon  him  that  he 
had  after  all  made  a great  mistake  in  accepting 
the  secretaryship  of  state  in  the  Adams  adminis- 
tration. He  became  painfully  aware  that  this 
acceptance  had  given  color  to  the  “ bargain  and 
corruption  ” charge.  It  kept  him  busy  year  after 
year,  in  dreary  iteration,  at  the  humiliating  task 
of  proving  that  he  was  an  honest  man ; while,  had 
he  not  accepted,  he  might  have  remained  in  Con- 
gress, the  most  formidable  power  in  debate,  lead- 
ing a host  of  enthusiastic  friends,  and  defying  his 
enemies  to  meet  him  face  to  face.  Thus  for  the 
secretaryship  of  state  he  felt  that  he  had  given  up 
his  active  leadership  on  the  field  where  he  was 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


309 


strongest;  and  that  secretaryship,  far  from  being 
to  him  a stepping-stone  to  the  presidency,  had 
become  the  most  serious  stumbling-block  in  his 
way. 

The  most  agreeable  feature  of  Clay’s  official 
life,  aside  from  his  uncommon  popularity  with  the 
diplomatic  corps,  consisted  in  his  personal  rela- 
tions with  Mr.  Adams.  Their  daily  intercourse 
supplanted  the  prejudices,  which  formerly  had 
prevailed  between  them,  with  a constantly  growing 
esteem  and  something  like  friendship.  In  1828 
Clay  said  of  Adams,  in  a letter  to  Crawford:  44 1 
had  fears  of  Mr.  Adams’s  temper  and  disposition, 
but  I must  say  that  they  have  not  been  realized, 
and  I have  found  in  him,  since  I have  been  asso- 
ciated with  him  in  the  executive  government,  as 
little  to  censure  or  condemn  as  I could  have  ex- 
pected in  any  man.”  With  chivalrous  loyalty 
Clay  stood  by  his  chief,  and  Adams  gave  him  his 
full  confidence.  Adams’s  Diary  does  not  mention 
a single  serious  difference  of  opinion  as  having 
in  any  manner  clouded  his  relationship  with  the 
secretary  during  the  four  years  of  their  official 
connection.  On  several  occasions,  when  Clay’s  ill 
health  seemed  to  make  his  resignation  necessary, 
Adams  with  unusual  warmth  of  feeling  expressed 
the  high  value  he  put  upon  Clay’s  services,  assur- 
ing him  that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to 
fill  his  place,  and  earnestly  trying  to  dissuade  him 
from  his  purpose.  Toward  the  close  of  his  presi- 
dential term,  Adams  offered  Clay  a place  on  the 


310 


HENRY  CLAY 


bench  of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  Clay  declined. 
John  Quincy  Adams  probably  never  spoke  with 
more  fervor  of  any  public  man  than  he  spoke  of 
Clay  shortly  after  the  close  of  his  administration, 
in  answer  to  an  address  of  a committee  of  citizens 
of  New  J ersey : — 

“ Upon  him  the  foulest  slanders  have  been  showered. 
The  Department  of  State  itself  was  a station  which,  by 
its  bestowal,  could  confer  neither  profit  nor  honor  upon 
him,  but  upon  which  he  has  shed  unfading  honor  by  the 
manner  in  which  he  has  discharged  its  duties.  Preju- 
dice and  passion  have  charged  him  with  obtaining  that 
office  by  bargain  and  corruption.  Before  you,  my  fel- 
low citizens,  in  the  presence  of  our  country  and  Heaven, 
I pronounce  that  charge  totally  unfounded.  As  to  my 
motives  for  tendering  him  the  Department  of  State 
when  I did,  let  the  man  who  questions  them  come  for- 
ward. Let  him  look  around  among  the  statesmen  and 
legislators  of  the  nation  and  of  that  day.  Let  him 
then  select  and  name  the  man  whom,  by  his  preeminent 
talents,  by  his  splendid  services,  by  his  ardent  patriot- 
ism, by  his  all-embracing  public  spirit,  by  his  fervid 
eloquence  in  behalf  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  man- 
kind, by  his  long  experience  in  the  affairs  of  the  Union, 
foreign  and  domestic,  a president  of  the  United  States, 
intent  only  upon  the  honor  and  welfare  of  his  country, 
ought  to  have  preferred  to  Henry  Clay.” 

These  warm  words  did  honor  to  the  man  who 
spoke  them,  but  the  “bargain  and  corruption” 
cry  went  on  nevertheless. 

John  Quincy  Adams,  after  his  crushing  defeat, 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE 


311 


took  leave  of  the  presidency  with  the  feeling  that 
“the  sun  of  his  public  life  had  set  in  the  deepest 
gloom.”  He  thought  of  nothing  but  final  retire- 
ment, not  anticipating  that  the  most  glorious  part 
of  his  career  was  still  in  store  for  him.  Clay, 
too,  spoke  of  retirement.  But  at  the  same  time  he 
asked  Edward  Everett  of  Massachusetts  whether 
he  thought  that,  at  the  next  presidential  election, 
in  1832,  the  Eastern  States  could  be  counted  upon 
for  him,  Henry  Clay;  he  would  then  feel  sure  of 
the  Western.  Here  was  the  old  ambition,  ever 
dominant  and  restless,  bound  to  drive  him  into 
new  struggles,  and  to  bring  upon  him  new  disap- 
pointments. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 

Under  Monroe’s  presidency  the  old  Federal 
party  had  indeed  maintained  a local  organization 
here  and  there,  and  filled  a few  seats  in  Congress, 
but  it  had  even  then  become  extinct  as  a national 
organization.  The  Republicans  were  in  virtually 
undisputed  possession  of  the  government.  The 
“era  of  good  feeling”  abounded  in  personal  bick- 
erings, jealousies  of  cliques,  conflicts  of  ambition, 
and  also  controversies  on  matters  of  public  inter- 
est, but  there  was  no  gathering  of  forces  in  oppo- 
site camps  on  a great  scale.  In  the  presidential 
canvass  of  1824  all  the  candidates  were  recognized 
as  Republicans.  It  was  the  election  of  John 
Quincy  Adams  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
that  brought  about  the  first  lasting  schism  in  the 
Republican  ranks.  In  its  beginning  this  schism 
appeared  to  bear  an  essentially  personal  character. 
The  friends  of  the  defeated  candidates,  of  Jackson 
and  Crawford,  with  the  following  of  Calhoun, 
banded  together  against  the  friends  of  Adams  and 
Clay.  Their  original  rallying  cry  was  that  Jack- 
son  had  been  wronged,  and  that  the  Adams-Clay 
administration  must  be  broken  down  in  any  event, 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


313 


whatever  policy  it  might  follow.  The  division 
was  simply  between  Jackson  men  on  one  side,  and 
Adams  and  Clay  men  on  the  other. 

The  two  prominent  questions  of  the  time,  that 
of  the  tariff  and  that  of  internal  improvements, 
were  not  then  in  issue  between  them.  There  were 
strenuous  advocates  of  a high  tariff  and  of  internal 
improvements  on  both  sides.  Jackson  himself  had 
in  his  Coleman  letter  spoken  the  language  of  a 
protectionist,  and  he  had  voted  for  several  internal 
improvement  bills  while  he  was  in  the  Senate.  In 
several  States  he  had  been  voted  for  as  a firm 
friend  of  those  two  policies.  Even  during  the 
whole  of  Adams’s  administration,  while  a furious 
opposition  was  carried  on  against  it,  there  contin- 
ued to  be  much  diversity  of  opinion  among  its 
assailants  on  these  subjects.  In  fact  the  tariff  of 
1828,  the  ‘‘tariff  of  abominations,”  was  passed  by 
Congress,  and  the  strict  construction  principles 
maintained  by  Madison  and  Monroe  concerning 
internal  improvements  suffered  one  defeat  after 
another,  while  both  Houses  were  controlled  by 
majorities  hostile  to  Adams  and  Clay.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  National  Bank  was  not  touched  in  the 
campaign  of  1824,  nor  while  Adams  was  president; 
nor  was  there,  at  the  time  the  opposition  started, 
any  other  defined  principle  or  public  interest  con- 
spicuously at  issue  between  him  and  his  opponents ; 
for  the  inaugural  address,  and  the  messages  in 
which  Adams  took  such  advanced  positions  in  the 
direction  of  paternal  government,  did  not  precede, 


314 


HENRY  CLAY 


but  followed,  the  break  destined  to  become  a last- 
ing one. 

But  it  is  also  true  that,  while  the  J ackson  party, 
taken  as  a whole,  was  at  the  beginning  in  a chaotic 
state  as  to  political  principles  and  aims,  a large 
and  important  Southern  fraction  of  it  gradually 
rallied  upon  something  like  a fixed  programme. 
At  a former  period  Southern  men  had  been  among 
the  foremost  advocates  of  a protective  tariff  and 
internal  improvements.  We  have  seen  Calhoun 
almost  contesting  Clay’s  leadership  as  to  those 
objects.  The  governmental  power  required,  South- 
erners could  at  that  time  contemplate  without 
terror.  But  a great  change  of  feeling  came  over 
many  of  them.  The  struggle  about  the  admission 
of  Missouri  had  produced  no  open  and  lasting 
party  divisions,  but  it  had  left  in  the  Southern 
mind  a lurking  sense  of  danger.  The  slavehold- 
ing interest  gradually  came  to  understand  that 
the  whole  drift  of  sentiment  outside  of  the  slave- 
holding communities  was  decidedly  hostile  to  the 
peculiar  institution;  that  a wall  must  be  built 
around  slavery  for  its  protection ; that  state  sover- 
eignty and  the  strictest  construction  of  the  Consti- 
tution concerning  the  functions  and  powers  of  the 
general  government  were  the  bulwark  of  its  safety ; 
that  any  sort  of  interference  with  the  home  affairs 
of  the  slave  States,  even  in  the  way  of  internal 
improvement,  would  tend  to  undermine  that  bul- 
wark; that  the  slave  States,  owing  to  their  system 
of  labor,  must  remain  purely  agricultural  commu- 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


315 


nities ; that  anything  enhancing  the  price  of  those 
things  which  the  agriculturists  had  to  buy  would 
be  injurious  to  the  planter,  and  that,  therefore,  a 
protective  tariff  raising  the  prices  of  manufactured 
goods  must  be  rejected  as  hostile  to  the  interests 
of  the  South. 

This  was  a tangible  and  consistent  policy.  The 
spirit  animating  it  early  found  an  opportunity  for 
asserting  itself  by  a partisan  demonstration  in  the 
extreme  position  taken  by  President  Adams  in  his 
first  official  utterances  concerning  the  necessary 
functions  of  the  national  government.  These  ut- 
terances, which  gave  the  Jackson  men  a welcome 
occasion  for  raising  against  Adams  the  cry  of 
Federalism,  startled  many  old  Republicans  of  the 
Jeffersonian  school.  This  was  especially  the  case 
in  the  South.  The  reason  was  not  that  the  North 
had  been  less  attached  than  the  South  to  the  cause 
of  local  self-government.  On  the  contrary,  home 
rule  in  its  democratic  form  was  more  perfectly 
developed  and  more  heartily  cherished  in  New 
England,  with  her  town-meeting  system,  than  in 
the  South,  where  not  only  a large  part  of  the 
population,  the  negroes,  were  absolutely  excluded 
from  all  participation  in  self  - government,  but 
where  the  aristocratic  class  of  slaveholders  enjoyed 
immense  advantages  of  political  influence  over  the 
rest  of  the  whites.  But  in  New  England,  and  in 
the  North  generally,  local  self-government  was 
felt  to  be  perfectly  compatible  with  a vigorous 
national  authority,  while  at  the  South  there  was 


316 


HENRY  CLAY 


constant  fear  of  encroachment,  and  the  assertion 
of  the  home  rule  principle  was,  therefore,  mainly 
directed  against  the  national  power.  That  the 
national  government  had  a natural  tendency  hos- 
tile to  local  self-government  was  mainly  a South- 
ern idea. 

The  Southern  interest,  knowing  what  it  wanted, 
compact,  vigilant,  and  represented  by  able  politi- 
cians, was  naturally  destined  to  become  the  lead- 
ing force  in  that  aggregation  of  political  elements 
which,  beginning  in  a mere  wild  opposition  to  the 
Adams  administration,  hardened  into  a political 
party.  An  extensive  electioneering  machinery, 
which  was  skillfully  organized,  and  used  with 
great  effect  in  the  four  years’  campaign,  beginning 
with  the  election  of  John  Quincy  Adams  and  end- 
ing with  Jackson’s  election  in  1828,  continued  to 
form  one  of  its  distinguishing  features. 

The  followers  of  Adams  and  Clay  were,  by  the 
necessities  of  their  situation,  driven  to  organize  on 
their  side.  Having  been  the  regular  administra- 
tion party  during  Adams’s  presidency,  they  became 
the  regular  opposition  after  Jackson’s  inaugura- 
tion. A majority  of  those  who  favored  a liberal 
construction  of  the  constitutional  powers  of  the 
general  government  gathered  on  that  side,  inter- 
spersed, however,  with  not  a few  state-rights  men. 
Among  them  the  protective  tariff  and  the  policy 
of  internal  improvements  found  most  of  their  ad- 
vocates. 

Each  of  these  new  parties  claimed  at  first  to  be 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


317 


the  genuine,  orthodox  Republican  party,  but,  by 
way  of  distinction,  the  Jackson  men  called  them- 
selves Democratic  Republicans,  and  the  followers 
of  Clay  and  Adams  National  Republicans,  — ap- 
pellations which  a few  years  later  gave  room  to 
the  shorter  names  of  Democrats  and  Whigs. 

These  two  new  political  organizations  are  com- 
monly assumed  to  have  been  mere  revivals  of  the 
old  Federal  and  Republican  parties.  This  they 
were,  however,  only  in  a limited  sense.  It  cer- 
tainly cannot  be  said  that  the  Democrats  were  all 
old  Republicans,  and  the  Nationals  all,  or  nearly 
all,  old  Federalists.  John  Quincy  Adams  himself 
had  indeed  been  a Federalist;  but  he  had  joined 
the  Republicans  during  Jefferson’s  presidency, 
when  the  conflict  with  England  was  approaching. 
Clay  had  been  a Republican  leader  from  the  start, 
and  most  of  his  followers  came  from  the  same 
ranks.  On  the  other  hand,  many  old  Federalists, 
who  hated  Adams  on  account  of  what  they  called 
his  desertion,  joined  the  opposition  to  his  adminis- 
tration, and  then  remained  with  the  Democratic 
party,  in  which  some  of  them  rose  to  high  places. 
As  to  the  antecedents  of  their  members,  both  new 
parties  were,  therefore,  composed  of  mixed  ele- 
ments. 

They  did,  indeed,  represent  two  different  po- 
litical tendencies,  somewhat  corresponding  with 
those  which  had  divided  their  predecessors,  — one 
favoring  a more  strict,  the  other  a more  latitudi- 
narian,  construction  of  constitutional  powers.  But 


318 


HENRY  CLAY 


this,  too,  must  be  taken  with  a qualification.  The 
old  Republican  party,  before  Jefferson’s  election 
to  the  presidency,  had  been  terribly  excited  at  the 
assumptions  of  power  by  the  Federalists,  such  as 
the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws.  But  when  in  pos- 
session of  the  government,  they  went  fully  as 
far  in  that  direction  as  the  Federalists  had  done. 
Their  leaders  admitted  that  they  had  exceeded 
the  warrant  of  the  Constitution  in  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana;  and  their  embargoes,  and  the  laws 
and  executive  measures  enforcing  them,  were,  as 
encroachments  upon  local  self-government  and 
individual  rights,  hardly  less  objectionable  in  prin- 
ciple than  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws  had  been. 
But  it  must  be  admitted  that  these  things  were  not 
done  for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  the  power  of  the 
government,  and  of  encroaching  upon  home  rule 
and  individual  rights.  It  was  therefore  with  a 
self-satisfied  sense  of  consistency  that  they  con- 
tinued to  preach,  as  a matter  of  doctrine,  the  most 
careful  limitation  of  the  central  power  and  the 
largest  scope  of  local  self-government.  In  this 
respect  the  new  Democratic  party  followed  in  their 
footsteps. 

The  old  Federalists,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
openly  declared  themselves  in  favor  of  a govern- 
ment strong  enough  to  curb  the  unruly  democracy. 
The  National  Republicans,  or  Whigs,  having  in 
great  part  themselves  been  Jeffersonian  Republi- 
cans, mostly  favored  a liberal  construction  of  con- 
stitutional powers,  not  with  a view  to  curbing  the 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


319 


unruly  democracy,  but  to  other  objects,  such  as 
internal  improvements,  a protective  tariff,  and  a 
national  bank. 

In  practice,  indeed,  the  lines  thus  more  or  less 
distinctly  dividing  the  two  new  parties  were  not 
as  strictly  observed  by  the  members  of  each  as 
might  have  been  inferred  from  the  fierce  fights 
occasionally  raging  between  them.  Strict  con- 
structionists, when  in  power,  would  sometimes 
yield  to  the  temptation  of  stretching  the  Constitu- 
tion freely ; while  latitudinarians  in  opposition 
would,  when  convenient  to  themselves,  insist  upon 
the  narrowest  interpretation  of  the  fundamental 
law.  On  the  whole,  however,  the  new  Democratic 
party,  by  its  advocacy  of  the  largest  local  self- 
government  and  a strict  limitation  of  the  central 
authority,  secured  to  itself  the  prestige  of  the 
apostolic  succession  to  Jefferson.  It  placed  itself 
before  the  people  as  the  true  representative  of  the 
genuine  old  theory  of  democratic  government,  as 
the  popular  party,  and  as  the  legitimate  possessor 
of  power  in  the  nation.  This  position  it  main- 
tained until  thirty  years  later,  when  its  entangle- 
ment with  slavery  caused  its  downfall. 

The  National  Republican  or  Whig  party  was 
led  by  men  who  recognized  the  elevated  character 
of  John  Quincy  Adams’s  administration,  and  who 
sustained  it  against  partisan  assaults  and  popular 
clamor.  They  dreaded  the  rule  of  an  ignorant 
and  violent  military  chieftain  such  as  Jackson  was 
thought  to  be.  They  took  a lively  interest  in  the 


320 


HENRY  CLAY 


industrial  developments  of  the  times,  and  thought 
that  the  government,  or  rather  themselves  in  pos- 
session of  the  government,  could  give  those  devel- 
opments more  intelligent  impulse,  aid,  and  direc- 
tion than  the  people  would  do  if  let  alone.  They 
felt  themselves  called  upon  to  take  care  of  the 
people  in  a larger  sense,  in  a greater  variety  of 
ways,  than  did  statesmen  of  the  Democratic  creed. 
Thus,  while  the  Democratic  party  found  its  princi- 
pal constituency  among  the  agricultural  popula- 
tion, including  the  planters  in  the  Southern  States, 
with  all  that  depended  upon  them,  and  among  the 
poorer  and  more  ignorant  people  of  the  cities, 
the  National  Republicans,  or  Whigs,  recruited 
themselves  — of  course  not  exclusively,  but  to  a 
conspicuous  extent  — among  the  mercantile  and 
industrial  classes,  and  generally  among  the  more 
educated  and  stirring  in  other  walks  of  life.  The 
Democratic  party  successfully  asserting  itself  as 
the  legitimate  administrator  of  the  national  power, 
the  Nationals  found  themselves  consigned,  for  the 
larger  part  of  the  time,  to  the  role  of  a critical 
opposition,  always  striving  to  get  into  power,  but 
succeeding  only  occasionally  as  a temporary  cor- 
rective. Whenever  any  members  of  the  majority 
party  were  driven  into  opposition  by  its  fierce  dis- 
cipline, they  found  a ready  welcome  among  the 
Nationals,  who  could  offer  them  brilliant  company 
in  an  uncommon  array  of  men  of  talent.  The 
Whig  party  was  thus  admirably  fitted  for  the  busi- 
ness of  criticism,  and  that  criticism  was  directed 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


321 


not  only  against  the  enemy,  but  not  seldom  against 
itself,  at  the  expense  of  harmonious  cooperation. 
Its  victories  were  mostly  fruitless.  In  point  of 
drill  and  discipline  it  was  greatly  the  inferior  of 
its  antagonist ; nor  could  it  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances make  up  for  that  deficiency  by  superior 
enthusiasm.  It  had  a tendency  in  the  direction 
of  selectness,  which  gave  it  a distinguished  charac- 
ter, challenging  the  admiration  of  others  as  well 
as  exciting  its  own,  but  also  calculated  to  limit 
its  popularity. 

There  were,  then,  two  political  parties  again, 
and  at  the  same  time  two  party  leaders  whose 
equals  — it  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  — 
the  American  people  had  never  seen  before,  and 
have  never  seen  since,  excepting  Abraham  Lin- 
coln, who,  however,  was  something  more  than  a 
party  leader.  They  were,  indeed,  greatly  inferior 
to  Hamilton  in  creative  statesmanship,  and  to 
Jefferson  in  the  faculty  of  disseminating  ideas, 
and  of  organizing,  stimulating,  and  guiding  an 
agitation  from  the  closet.  But  they  were  much 
stronger  than  either  in  the  power  of  inspiring 
great  masses  of  followers  with  enthusiastic  per- 
sonal devotion,  of  inflaming  them  for  an  idea  or 
a public  measure,  of  marshaling  them  for  a con- 
flict, of  leading  them  to  victory,  or  rallying  them 
after  defeat.  But  while  each  of  them  possessed 
the  magic  of  leadership  in  the  highest  degree,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  find  two  men  more  different 
in  almost  all  other  respects. 


322 


HENRY  CLAY 


Andrew  Jackson,  when  he  became  president, 
was  a man  of  sixty -two.  A life  of  much  exposure, 
hardship,  and  excitement,  and  also  ill-health,  had 
made  him  appear  older  than  he  was.  His  great 
military  achievement  lay  fifteen  years  back  in  the 
past,  and  made  him  the  “old  hero.”  He  was  very 
ignorant.  In  his  youth  he  had  mastered  scarcely 
the  rudiments  of  education,  and  he  did  not  possess 
that  acquisitive  intellectuality  which  impels  men, 
with  or  without  preparation,  to  search  for  know- 
ledge and  to  store  it  up.  While  he  had  keen 
intuitions,  he  never  thoroughly  understood  the 
merits  of  any  question  of  politics  or  economics. 
But  his  was  in  the  highest  degree  the  instinct  of 
a superior  will,  the  genius  of  command.  If  he 
had  been  on  board  a vessel  in  extreme  danger,  he 
would  have  thundered  out  his  orders  without  know- 
ing anything  of  seamanship,  and  been  indignantly 
surprised  if  captain  and  crew  had  not  obeyed  him. 
At  a fire,  his  voice  would  have  made  bystanders 
as  well  as  firemen  promptly  do  his  will.  In  war, 
he  was  of  course  made  a general,  and  without  any 
knowledge  of  military  science  he  went  out  to  meet 
the  enemy,  made  raw  militia  fight  like  veterans, 
and  won  the  most  brilliant  victory  in  the  war  of 
1812.  He  was  not  only  brave  himself;  his  mere 
presence  infused  bravery  into  others. 

To  his  military  heroship  he  owed  that  popularity 
which  lifted  him  into  the  presidential  chair,  and 
he  carried  the  spirit  of  the  warrior  into  the  busi- 
ness of  the  government.  His  party  was  to  him 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


323 


his  army;  those  who  opposed  him,  the  enemy. 
He  knew  not  how  to  argue,  but  how  to  command; 
not  how  to  deliberate,  but  how  to  act.  He  had 
that  impulsive  energy  which  always  creates  dra- 
matic conflicts,  and  the  power  of  passion  he  put 
into  them  made  all  his  conflicts  look  tremendous. 
When  he  had  been  defeated  in  1825  by  the  influ- 
ence of  Clay,  he  made  it  appear  as  if  he  were  bat- 
tling against  all  the  powers  of  corruption  which 
were  threatening  the  life  of  the  republic.  We 
shall  see  him  fight  Nicholas  Biddle,  of  the  United 
States  Bank,  as  if  he  had  to  defend  the  American 
people  against  the  combined  money  power  of  the 
world  seeking  to  enslave  them.  In  rising  up 
against  nullification,  and  in  threatening  France 
with  war  to  make  her  pay  a debt,  we  shall  see 
him  saving  the  Union  from  deadly  peril,  and 
humiliating  to  the  dust  the  insolence  of  the  old 
world.  Thus  he  appeared  like  an  invincible  Her- 
cules constantly  meeting  terrible  monsters  danger- 
ous to  the  American  people,  and  slaying  them  all 
with  his  mighty  club. 

This  fierce  energy  was  his  nature.  It  had  a 
wonderful  fascination  for  the  popular  fancy,  which 
is  fond  of  strong  and  bold  acts.  He  became  the 
idol  of  a large  portion  of  the  people  to  a degree 
never  known  before  or  since.  Their  belief  was 
that  with  him  defeat  was  impossible ; that  all  the 
legions  of  darkness  could  not  prevail  against  him ; 
and  that,  whatever  arbitrary  powers  he  might  as- 
sume, and  whatever  way  he  might  use  them,  it 


324 


HENRY  CLAY 


would  always  be  for  the  good  of  the  country,  — 
a belief  which  he  sincerely  shared.  His  ignorance 
of  the  science  of  statesmanship,  and  the  rough 
manner  in  which  he  crossed  its  rules,  seemed  to 
endear  him  all  the  more  to  the  great  mass  of  his 
followers.  Innumerable  anecdotes  about  his  homely 
and  robust  sayings  and  doings  were  going  from 
mouth  to  mouth,  and  with  delight  the  common 
man  felt  that  this  potent  ruler  was  “one  of  us.” 
This  popularity  gave  him  an  immense  authority 
over  the  politicians  of  his  party.  He  was  a warm 
friend  and  a tremendous  foe.  By  a faithful  friend 
he  would  stand  to  the  last  extremity.  But  one 
who  seriously  differed  from  him  on  any  matter 
that  was  near  his  heart  was  in  great  danger  of 
becoming  an  object  of  his  wrath.  The  ordinary 
patriot  is  apt  to  regard  the  enemies  of  his  country 
as  his  personal  enemies.  But  Andrew  Jackson 
was  always  inclined,  with  entire  sincerity,  to  re- 
gard his  personal  opponents  as  the  enemies  of  his 
country.  He  honestly  believed  them  capable  of 
any  baseness,  and  it  was  his  solemn  conviction 
that  such  nuisances  must  be  abated  by  any  power 
available  for  that  purpose.  The  statesmen  of  his 
party  frequently  differed  from  him  on  matters  of 
public  importance;  but  they  knew  that  they  had 
to  choose  between  submission  and  his  disfavor. 
His  friends  would  sometimes  exercise  much  influ- 
ence upon  him  in  starting  his  mind  in  a certain 
direction;  but  when  once  started,  that  mind  was 
beyond  their  control.  His  personal  integrity  was 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


325 


above  the  reach  of  corruption.  He  always  meant 
to  do  right;  indeed,  he  was  always  firmly  con- 
vinced of  being  right.  His  idea  of  right  was  not 
seldom  obscured  by  ignorance  and  prejudice,  and 
in  following  it  he  would  sometimes  do  the  most 
unjust  or  dangerous  things.  But  his  friends,  and 
the  statesmen  of  his  party,  knowing  that,  when  he 
had  made  up  his  mind,  especially  on  a matter  that 
had  become  a subject  of  conflict  between  him  and 
his  “enemies,”  it  was  absolutely  useless  to  reason 
with  him,  accustomed  themselves  to  obeying  orders, 
unless  they  were  prepared  to  go  to  the  rear  or  into 
opposition.  It  was,  therefore,  not  a mere  inven- 
tion of  the  enemy,  but  sober  truth,  that,  when 
Jackson’s  administration  was  attacked,  sometimes 
the  only  answer  left  to  its  defenders,  as  well  as 
the  all-sufficient  one  with  the  Democratic  masses, 
was  simply  a “Hurrah  for  Jackson!  ” 

Henry  Clay  was,  although  in  retirement,  the 
recognized  chief  of  the  National  Republicans.  He 
was  then  fifty -two  years  old,  and  in  the  full  matur- 
ity of  his  powers.  He  had  never  been  an  arduous 
student;  but  his  uncommonly  vivacious  and  recep- 
tive mind  had  learned  much  in  the  practical  school 
of  affairs.  He  possessed  that  magnificent  confi- 
dence in  himself  which  extorts  confidence  from 
others.  He  had  a full  measure  of  the  temper 
necessary  for  leadership:  the  spirit  of  initiative; 
but  not  always  the  discretion  that  should  accom- 
pany it.  His  leadership  was  not  of  that  mean 
order  which  merely  contrives  to  organize  a per- 


326 


HENRY  CLAY 


sonal  following;  it  was  the  leadership  of  a states- 
man zealously  striving  to  promote  great  public 
interests.  Whenever  he  appeared  in  a delibera- 
tive assembly,  or  in  the  councils  of  his  party,  he 
would,  as  a matter  of  course,  take  in  his  hands 
what  important  business  was  pending,  and  deter- 
mine the  policy  to  be  followed.  His  friends,  and 
some  even  among  his  opponents,  were  so  accus- 
tomed to  yield  to  him,  that  nothing  seemed  to 
them  concluded  without  the  mark  of  his  assent; 
and  they  involuntarily  looked  to  him  for  the  deci- 
sive word  as  to  what  was  to  be  done.  Thus  he 
grew  into  a habit  of  dictation,  which  occasionally 
displayed  itself  in  a manner  of  peremptory  com- 
mand, and  an  intolerance  of  adverse  opinion  apt 
to  provoke  resentment. 

It  was  his  eloquence  that  had  first  made  him 
famous,  and  that  throughout  his  career  mainly 
sustained  his  leadership.  His  speeches  were  not 
masterpieces  of  literary  art,  nor  exhaustive  disser- 
tations. They  do  not  offer  to  the  student  any 
profound  theories  of  government  or  expositions  of 
economic  science.  They  will  not  be  quoted  as  au- 
thorities on  disputed  points.  Neither  were  they 
strings  of  witty  epigrams.  They  were  the  impas- 
sioned reasoning  of  a statesman  intensely  devoted 
to  his  country  and  to  the  cause  he  thought  right. 
There  was  no  appearance  of  artifice  in  them. 
They  made  every  listener  feel  that  the  man  who 
uttered  them  was  tremendously  in  earnest,  and 
that  the  thoughts  he  expressed  had  not  only  passed 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


327 


through  his  brain,  but  also  through  his  heart. 
They  were  the  speeches  of  a great  debater,  and, 
as  may  be  said  of  those  of  Charles  James  Fox, 
cold  print  could  never  do  them  justice.  To  be 
fully  appreciated  they  had  to  be  heard  on  the 
theatre  of  action,  in  the  hushed  senate  chamber, 
or  before  the  eagerly  upturned  faces  of  assembled 
multitudes.  To  feel  the  full  charm  of  his  lucid 
explanations,  and  his  winning  persuasiveness,  or 
the  thrill  which  was  flashed  through  the  nerves  of 
his  hearers  by  the  magnificent  sunbursts  of  his 
enthusiasm,  or  the  fierce  thunderstorms  of  his 
anger  and  scorn,  one  had  to  hear  that  musical 
voice  cajoling,  flattering,  inspiring,  overawing, 
terrifying  in  turn,  — a voice  to  the  cadences  of 
which  it  was  a physical  delight  to  listen ; one  had 
to  see  that  face,  not  handsome,  but  glowing  with 
the  fire  of  inspiration ; that  lofty  mien,  that  com- 
manding stature  constantly  growing  under  his 
words,  and  the  grand  sweep  of  his  gesture,  majes- 
tic in  its  dignity,  and  full  of  grace  and  strength, 
— the  whole  man  a superior  being  while  he  spoke. 

Survivors  of  his  time,  who  heard  him  at  his 
best,  tell  us  of  the  effects  produced  by  his  great 
appeals  in  the  House  of  Representatives  or  the 
Senate,  the  galleries  trembling  with  excitement, 
and  even  the  members  unable  to  contain  them- 
selves; or,  in  popular  assemblies,  the  multitudes 
breathlessly  listening,  and  then  breaking  out  in 
unearthly  shouts  of  enthusiasm  and  delight,  weep- 
ing and  laughing,  and  rushing  up  to  him  with 


328 


HENRY  CLAY 


overwhelming  demonstrations  of  admiring  and  af- 
fectionate rapture. 

Clay’s  oratory  sometimes  fairly  paralyzed  his 
opponents.  A story  is  told  that  Tom  Marshall, 
himself  a speaker  of  uncommon  power,  was  once 
selected  to  answer  Clay  at  a mass  meeting,  but 
that  he  was  observed,  while  Clay  was  proceeding, 
slowly  to  make  his  way  back  through  the  listening 
crowd,  apparently  anxious  to  escape.  Some  of 
his  friends  tried  to  hold  him,  saying:  “Why,  Mr. 
Marshall,  where  are  you  going?  You  must  reply 
to  Mr.  Clay.  You  can  easily  answer  all  he  has 
said.”  “Of  course,  I can  answer  every  point,” 
said  Marshall,  “but  you  must  excuse  me,  gentle- 
men; I cannot  go  up  there  and  do  it  just  now, 
after  his  speech.” 

There  was  a manly,  fearless  frankness  in  the 
avowal  of  his  opinions,  and  a knightly  spirit  in 
his  defense  of  them,  as  well  as  in  his  attacks  on 
his  opponents.  He  was  indeed,  on  the  political 
field,  the  preux  chevalier,  marshaling  his  hosts, 
sounding  his  bugle  blasts,  and  plunging  first  into 
the  fight;  and  with  proud  admiration  his  followers 
called  him  “the  gallant  Harry  of  the  West.” 

No  less  brilliant  and  attractive  was  he  in  his 
social  intercourse  with  men ; thoroughly  human  in 
his  whole  being;  full  of  high  spirits;  fond  of  en- 
joying life  and  of  seeing  others  happy;  generous 
and  hearty  in  his  sympathies;  always  courteous, 
sometimes  studiously  and  elaborately  so,  perhaps 
beyond  what  the  occasion  seemed  to  call  for,  but 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


329 


never  wounding  the  most  sensitive  by  demonstra- 
tive condescension,  because  there  was  a truly  kind 
heart  behind  his  courtesy;  possessing  a natural 
charm  of  conversation  and  manner  so  captivating 
that  neither  scholar  nor  backwoodsman  could  with- 
stand its  fascination ; making  friends  wherever  he 
appeared,  and  holding  them  — and  surely  to  no 
public  man  did  friends  ever  cling  with  more  affec- 
tionate attachment.  It  was  not  a mere  political, 
it  was  a sentimental  devotion,  — a devotion  aban- 
doning even  that  criticism  which  is  the  duty  of 
friendship,  and  forgetting  or  excusing  all  his  weak- 
nesses and  faults,  intellectual  and  moral,  — more 
than  was  good  for  him. 

Behind  him  he  had  also  the  powerful  support 
of  the  industrial  interests  of  the  country,  which 
saw  in  him  their  champion,  while  the  perfect  in- 
tegrity of  his  character  forbade  the  suspicion  that 
this  championship  was  serving  his  private  gain. 

Such  were  the  leaders  of  the  two  parties  as  they 
then  stood  before  the  country,  — individualities  so 
pronounced  and  conspicuous,  commanders  so  faith- 
fully sustained  by  their  followers,  that,  while  they 
were  facing  each  other,  the  contests  of  parties 
appeared  almost  like  a protracted  political  duel 
between  two  men.  It  was  a struggle  of  singular 
dramatic  interest. 

There  was  no  fiercer  hater  than  Andrew  Jackson, 
and  no  man  whom  he  hated  so  fiercely  as  he  did 
Henry  Clay.  That  hatred  was  the  passion  of  the 
last  twenty  years  of  his  life.  He  sincerely  deemed 


330 


HENRY  CLAY 


Clay  capable  of  any  villainy,  and  no  sooner  bad 
he  the  executive  power  in  his  hands  than  he  used 
it  to  open  hostilities.  His  cabinet  appointments 
were  determined  upon  several  days  before  his  in- 
auguration as  president.  Five  of  the  places  were 
filled  with  men  who  had  made  their  mark  as  ene- 
mies of  Clay.  Among  these  were  two  senators 
who  in  1825  had  voted  against  the  nomination  of 
Clay  for  the  secretaryship  of  state,  — Branch  of 
North  Carolina,  whom  Jackson  made  secretary  of 
the  navy,  and  Berrien,  who  became  attorney-gen- 
eral. Eaton  of  Tennessee,  whom  Jackson  selected 
as  his  secretary  of  war,  was  the  principal  author 
of  the  “ bargain  and  corruption  ” story;  and  Ing- 
ham of  Pennsylvania,  the  elect  for  the  Treasury 
Department,  had  distinguished  himself  in  his  State 
by  the  most  zealous  propagation  of  the  slander. 
Barry  of  Kentucky,  chosen  for  the  postmaster- 
generalship,  possessed  the  merit  of  having  turned 
against  Clay  in  1825,  on  account  of  the  “ bargain 
and  corruption,”  and  of  having  contested  Ken- 
tucky in  1828  as  the  anti-Clay  candidate  for  gov- 
ernor. 

But  the  most  striking  exhibition  of  animosity 
took  place  in  the  State  Department,  at  the  head 
of  which  had  stood  Clay  himself  so  long  as  John 
Quincy  Adams  was  president.  General  Jackson 
had  selected  Martin  Van  Buren  for  that  office; 
but  Van  Buren,  being  then  governor  of  New  York, 
could  not  at  once  come  to  Washington  to  enter 
upon  his  new  position.  Jackson  was  determined 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


331 


that  the  State  Department  should  not  remain  in 
any  sense  under  the  Clay  influence  for  so  much  as 
an  hour  after  he  became  president.  On  March  4, 
just  before  he  went  to  the  Capitol  to  take  the  oath 
of  office,  he  put  into  the  hands  of  Colonel  James 
A.  Hamilton  of  New  York,  his  trusted  adherent, 
a letter  running  thus : “Sir, — You  are  appointed 
to  take  charge  of  the  Department  of  State,  and  to 
perform  the  duties  of  that  office  until  Governor 
Van  Buren  arrives  in  this  city.  Your  obedient 
servant,  Andrew  Jackson.”  A strange  proceed- 
ing! Colonel  Hamilton’s  account  of  what  then 
took  place  is  characteristic : “ He  (General  J ack- 
son)  said,  6 Colonel,  you  don’t  care  to  see  me  in- 
augurated? ’ 6 Yes,  general,  I do;  I came  here 

for  that  purpose.’  ‘No;  go  to  the  State  House, 
and  as  soon  as  you  hear  the  gun  fired,  I am  presi- 
dent and  you  are  secretary.  Go  and  take  charge 
of  the  department.  ’ I do  not  state  the  reason  he 
gave  for  this  haste.”  Colonel  Hamilton  did  as 
directed,  and  the  moment  the  gun  was  fired,  the 
danger  that  Clay  might  still  exercise  any  influence 
in  the  State  Department  was  averted  from  the 
country.  The  removal  of  Clay’s  friends  who 
were  in  the  public  service  began  at  once. 

Three  days  after  Jackson’s  inauguration  Clay 
addressed  his  friends  at  a dinner  given  in  his  honor 
by  citizens  of  Washington.  He  deplored  the  elec- 
tion to  the  presidency  of  a military  hero,  entirely 
devoid  of  the  elements  of  fitness  for  so  difficult  a 
civil  position.  He  beheld  in  it  “an  awful  forebod- 


332 


HENRY  CLAY 


ing  of  the  fate  which,  at  some  future  day,  was  to 
befall  this  infant  republic.”  He  recounted  the 
military  usurpations  which  had  recently  taken  place 
in  South  and  Central  America,  and  said:  “The 
thunders  from  the  surrounding  forts  and  the  accla- 
mations of  the  multitude  on  the  Fourth,  told  us 
what  general  was  at  the  head  of  our  affairs.”  And 
he  added,  sadly:  “A  majority  of  my  fellow  citi- 
zens, it  would  seem,  do  not  perceive  the  dangers 
which  I apprehend  from  the  example.”  He  also 
mentioned  the  “ wanton,  unprovoked,  and  unatoned 
injustice  ” which  General  Jackson  had  done  him. 
Nevertheless,  Jackson  was  now  president,  and  his 
acts  were  to  be  discussed  with  decorum,  and  judged 
with  candor. 

Clay  was  mistaken  if  he  thought  that  the  well- 
used  refrain  about  the  military  chieftain  raised  to 
the  presidency  without  any  of  the  statesman’s 
qualifications  would  still  produce  any  effect  upon 
the  masses  of  the  American  people.  They  felt,  at 
that  period,  exceedingly  prosperous  and  hopeful. 
The  improved  means  of  communication  — all  the 
accessible  inland  waters  being  covered  with  steam- 
boats— had  greatly  promoted  the  material  pro- 
gress of  the  country.  Railroad  building  had  just 
begun,  and  opened  a vast  prospect  of  further  de- 
velopment. In  the  public  mind  there  was  little 
anxiety  and  plenty  of  gorgeous  expectation.  Un- 
der such  circumstances  the  generality  of  people 
did  not  feel  the  necessity  of  being  taken  care  of 
by  trained  statesmanship.  On  the  contrary,  the 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


333 


only  alarm  of  the  time  — and  that  an  artificial  and 
groundless  one  — had  been  that  the  trained  states- 
men were  in  corrupt  combination  to  curtail  in 
some  way  the  people’s  rights,  from  which  danger 
the  election  of  General  Jackson  was  supposed  to 
have  saved  them.  The  masses  saw  in  him  a man 
who  thought  as  they  thought,  who  talked  as  they 
talked,  who  was  believed  to  be  rather  fond  of 
treading  on  the  toes  of  aristocratic  pretensions, 
who  was  a living  proof  of  the  fact  that  it  did  not 
require  much  learning  to  make  a famous  general 
or  to  be  elected  president,  and  whose  example, 
therefore,  assured  them  that  every  one  of  them 
had  a chance  at  high  distinction  for  himself. 

But  President  Jackson  soon  furnished  a new 
point  of  attack.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  the  republic,  the  accession  of  a new  president 
was  followed  by  a systematic  proscription  for  opin- 
ion’s sake  in  the  public  service.  What  we  under- 
stand by  “ spoils  politics”  had,  indeed,  not  been 
unknown  before.  It  had  been  practiced  largely 
and  with  demoralizing  effect  in  the  state  politics 
of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania.  But  by  the  pa- 
triotic statesmen  who  filled  the  presidential  chair 
from  the  establishment  of  the  Constitution  down 
to  the  close  of  the  term  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
public  office  had  been  scrupulously  regarded  as  a 
public  trust.  Removals  by  wholesale  for  political 
reasons,  or  the  turning  over  of  the  public  service 
to  the  members  of  one  party  as  a reward  for  par- 
tisan services  rendered,  or  as  an  inducement  for 


334 


HENRY  CLAY 


partisan  services  to  be  rendered,  would  have  been 
thought,  during  the  first  half  century  of  the  repub- 
lic, not  only  a scandal  and  a disgrace,  but  little 
less  than  a criminal  attempt  to  overthrow  free  in- 
stitutions. Even  when,  after  a fierce  struggle, 
the  government  passed,  by  the  election  of  Jeffer- 
son, from  the  Federalists  to  the  Republicans,  and 
the  new  president  found  the  bulk  of  the  offices  in 
the  hands  of  men  whom  the  victors  considered 
inimical  to  all  they  held  dear,  — even  at  that  period 
of  intense  party  feeling,  J eff erson  made  only  thirty- 
nine  removals  in  the  eight  years  during  which  he 
occupied  the  presidential  chair.  Some  of  these 
were  made  for  cause;  others  he  justified  upon  the 
ground,  not  that  the  offices  were  patronage  which 
the  victors  could  rightly  claim,  but  that  there 
should  be  members  of  each  party  in  the  service,  to 
show  that  neither  had,  even  temporarily,  a mono- 
poly right  to  them,  and  that,  this  fair  distribution 
being  accomplished,  appointments  should  there- 
after, regardless  of  party  connection,  depend  ex- 
clusively on  the  candidate’s  integrity,  business 
fitness,  and  fidelity  to  the  Constitution.  This 
sentiment  was  so  firmly  rooted  in  the  public  mind 
that  even  Jackson,  at  the  beginning  of  Monroe’s 
administration,  advised  the  president  against  ex- 
cluding from  office  members  of  the  opposite  party. 

When  he  himself  became  president  he  announced 
in  his  inaugural  address  that  the  popular  will  had 
imposed  upon  him  “the  task  of  reform,”  which 
would  require  “ particularly  the  correction  of  those 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


335 


abuses  that  have  brought  the  patronage  of  the 
federal  government  into  conflict  with  the  freedom 
of  elections.”  Never  was  the  word  “reform”  ut- 
tered with  a more  sinister  meaning.  An  immense 
multitude  had  assembled  in  Washington  to  see 
their  party  chief  invested  with  the  executive  power, 
and  to  claim  their  rewards  for  the  services  they 
had  rendered  him.  It  was  as  if  a victorious  army 
had  come  to  take  possession  of  a conquered  coun- 
try, expecting  their  general  to  distribute  among 
them  the  spoil  of  the  land.  A spectacle  was 
enacted  never  before  known  in  the  capital  of  the 
republic. 

Jackson  had  not  that  reason  for  making  partisan 
changes  which  had  existed  in  Jefferson’s  days. 
For  when  Jackson  became  president  the  civil  ser- 
vice was  teeming  with  his  adherents,  whom  John 
Quincy  Adams’s  scrupulous  observance  of  the  tra- 
ditional principle  had  left  undisturbed  in  their 
places.  There  was,  therefore,  no  party  monopoly 
in  the  public  service  to  be  broken  up.  Yet  now 
removals  and  appointments  were  made  with  the 
avowed  object  of  rewarding  friends  and  punishing 
opponents,  to  the  end  of  establishing,  as  to  the 
offices  of  the  government,  a monopoly  in  favor 
of  the  president’s  partisans.  Washington,  John 
Adams,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  John  Quincy 
Adams  had  made  in  all  seventy -four  removals,  all 
but  a few  for  cause,  during  the  forty  years  of  their 
aggregate  presidential  terms.  In  one  year,  the 
first  of  his  administration,  Jackson  removed  four 


336 


HENRY  CLAY 


hundred  and  ninety-one  postmasters  and  two  hun- 
dred and  thirty-nine  other  officers,  and,  since  the 
new  men  appointed  new  clerks  and  other  subordi- 
nates, the  sum  total  of  changes  in  that  year  was 
reckoned  at  more  than  two  thousand.  The  first 
arbitrary  dismissals  of  meritorious  men  indicated 
what  was  to  come,  and  threw  the  service  into  the 
utmost  consternation.  “ Among  the  official  corps 
here,”  wrote  Clay  on  March  12,  the  day  before 
his  departure  from  Washington,  “ there  is  the 
greatest  solicitude  and  apprehension.  The  mem- 
bers of  it  feel  something  like  the  inhabitants  of 
Cairo  when  the  plague  breaks  out : no  one  knows 
who  is  next  to  encounter  the  stroke  of  death,  or, 
which  with  many  of  them  is  the  same  thing,  to  be 
dismissed  from  office.  You  have  no  conception 
of  the  moral  tyranny  which  prevails  here  over 
those  in  employment.”  Bad  as  this  appeared,  it 
was  not  the  worst  of  it.  The  “ spoils  system,” 
full  fledged,  had  taken  possession  of  the  national 
government,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  its  most  baneful 
effects  were  soon  to  appear. 

Clay  foresaw  the  consequences  clearly,  and,  at 
a great  public  feast  given  to  him  by  his  neighbors 
upon  his  arrival  at  his  home,  he  promptly  raised 
his  voice  against  the  noxious  innovation.  This 
principle  he  laid  down  as  his  starting-point : “ Gov- 
ernment is  a trust,  and  the  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment are  trustees;  and  both  the  trust  and  the 
trustees  are  created  for  the  benefit  of  the  people.” 
In  solemn  words  of  prophecy  he  painted  the  effects 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


337 


which  the  systematic  violation  of  this  principle, 
inaugurated  by  Jackson,  must  inevitably  bring 
about : political  contests  turned  into  scrambles  for 
plunder;  a “ system  of  universal  rapacity”  substi- 
tuted for  a system  of  responsibility;  favoritism 
for  fitness;  “Congress  corrupted,  the  press  cor- 
rupted, general  corruption;  until,  the  substance 
of  free  government  having  disappeared,  some  pre- 
torian  band  would  arise,  and,  with  the  general 
concurrence  of  a distracted  people,  put  an  end  to 
useless  forms.”  This  was  the  protest  of  the  good 
old  order  of  things  against  the  new  disorder. 
Such  warnings,  however,  were  in  vain.  They 
might  move  impartially  thinking  men  to  serious 
reflections.  But  Jackson  was  convinced  that  the 
political  opponents  he  dismissed  from  office  were 
really  very  dangerous  persons,  whom  it  was  a 
patriotic  duty  to  render  harmless;  and  the  Demo- 
cratic masses  thought  that  Jackson  could  do  no 
wrong.  Many  of  them  found  something  peculiarly 
flattering  in  this  new  conception  of  democratic 
government,  that  neither  high  character  nor  special 
ability,  but  only  political  opinions  of  the  right 
kind,  should  be  required  to  fit  an  American  citi- 
zen for  the  service  of  his  country;  that,  while 
none  but  a good  accountant  would  be  accepted  to 
keep  the  books  of  a dry-goods  shop,  anybody 
might  keep  the  books  of  the  United  States  Trea- 
sury ; that,  while  nobody  would  think  of  taking  as 
manager  of  an  importing  business  a man  who  did 
not  know  something  of  merchandise,  anybody 


338 


HENRY  CLAY 


was  good  enough  to  be  an  appraiser  in  a custom- 
house. 

Indeed,  the  manner  in  which  Jackson  selected 
his  cabinet  was  characteristic  of  the  ruling  idea. 
Colonel  James  A.  Hamilton,  one  of  his  confiden- 
tial friends  at  that  time,  tells  us  in  his  “ Reminis- 
cences:” “In  this  important  work  by  President 
Jackson,  no  thought  appeared  to  be  given  as  to 
the  fitness  of  the  persons  for  their  places.  I am 
sure  I never  heard  one  word  in  relation  thereto, 
and  I certainly  had  repeated  conversations  with 
him  in  regard  to  these  appointments.”  To  be  a 
good  hater  of  Henry  Clay  was  considered  a greater 
requisite  for  a cabinet  place  than  statesmanlike 
ability  and  experience.  In  this  way  Jackson  col- 
lected in  his  executive  chamber,  with  the  exception 
of  one  or  two,  a rare  assortment  of  mediocrities; 
and  nothing  could  have  been  more  characteristic 
than  that  the  matter  which  most  distracted  this 
high  council  of  statesmen  was  a difference  of  opin- 
ion concerning  — not  some  important  public  ques- 
tion, but  the  virtue  of  Secretary  Eaton’s  wife. 
The  principle  that  the  fitness  of  a man  for  a place, 
in  point  of  character  and  acquirements,  had  nothing 
to  do  with  his  appointment  to  that  place,  was  at 
once  recognized  and  exemplified  above  and  below ; 
and  thus  a virus  was  infused  into  the  politics  of 
the  nation,  destined  to  test  to  the  utmost  the  native 
robustness  of  the  American  character. 

Clay  was  nominally  in  retirement.  When,  after 
his  return  from  Washington,  the  representative  of 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


339 


his  district  in  Congress  offered  to  vacate  the  seat 
in  order  that  he  might  succeed  to  it,  he  declined. 
Neither  would  he  accept  a place  in  the  legislature 
of  Kentucky.  For  a while  he  heartily  enjoyed 
the  quiet  life  of  the  farmer.  He  delighted  in 
raising  fine  animals,  — horses,  blood  cattle,  mules, 
pigs,  and  sheep.  He  corresponded  with  his  friends 
about  a lot  of  “ fifty  full-blooded  merino  ewes,” 
which  he  had  bought  in  Pennsylvania.  His  dairy 
was  profitably  managed  by  his  excellent  wife. 
He  raised  good  crops  of  hemp  and  corn.  But, 
after  all,  the  larger  part  of  his  correspondence 
ran  on  congressional  elections,  the  prospects  of  his 
party,  and  the  doings  of  President  Jackson.  He 
thought  that  Jackson  could  not  possibly  hold  his 
following  together.  Jackson’s  friends  in  Congress 
“must  decide  on  certain  leading  measures  of  pol- 
icy;” if  he  came  out  for  the  tariff,  the  South 
would  leave  him ; if  against  the  tariff,  there  would 
be  “such  an  opposition  to  him  in  the  tariff  States 
as  must  prevent  his  reelection,”  — in  all  which 
prophesyings  the  prophet  proved  mistaken.  He 
also  believed  that  the  great  majority  at  the  last 
election  was  directed  rather  against  Mr.  Adams 
than  against  himself,  and  that  his  own  public  posi- 
tion was  improving  from  day  to  day. 

After  the  great  defeat  of  1828  the  plaudits  of 
the  multitude  were  especially  sweet  to  him.  On 
his  way  from  Washington  to  Lexington  in  March, 
he  had  been  received  everywhere  by  crowds  of 
enthusiastic  admirers.  With  profound  compla- 


340 


HENRY  CLAY 


cency  he  wrote  to  a friend:  “My  journey  has  been 
marked  by  every  token  of  attachment  and  heartfelt 
demonstrations.  I never  experienced  more  testi- 
monies of  respect  and  confidence,  nor  more  enthu- 
siasm, — dinners,  suppers,  balls,  etc.  I have  had 
literally  a free  passage.  Taverns,  stages,  toll- 
gates,  have  been  generally  thrown  open  to  me, 
free  from  all  charge.  Monarchs  might  be  proud 
of  the  reception  with  which  I have  everywhere 
been  honored.” 

After  a short  period  of  rest  at  Ashland,  he  could 
not  withhold  himself  from  fresh  contact  with  the 
people.  During  the  autumn  of  1829  he  visited 
several  places  in  Kentucky;  and  in  January,  1830, 
he  went  to  New  Orleans  and  the  principal  towns 
on  the  Mississippi,  where  he  had  one  ovation  after 
another.  In  the  spring  he  wrote  to  his  friends 
again  about  the  delights  of  his  rural  occupations, 
— how  he  was  almost  “prepared  to  renounce  for- 
ever the  strifes  of  public  life,”  and  how  he  thought 
he  would  make  “a  better  farmer  than  statesman.” 
But  in  the  summer  of  the  same  year  we  find  him 
at  Columbus,  Cincinnati,  and  other  places  in  Ohio, 
being  “received”  and  feasted,  and  speaking  as  he 
went.  It  was  “private  business”  that  led  him 
there,  but  private  business  well  seasoned  with 
politics,  and  accompanied  with  brass  bands  and 
thundering  cannon.  In  an  elaborate  speech  on 
the  questions  of  the  day,  which  he  delivered  at 
Cincinnati  in  August,  1830,  he  could  not  refrain 
from  describing  his  experiences. 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


341 


“ Throughout  my  journey  (he  said),  undertaken  solely 
for  private  purposes,  there  has  been  a constant  effort  on 
my  side  to  repress,  and  on  that  of  my  fellow  citizens  of 
Ohio  to  exhibit,  public  manifestations  of  their  affection 
and  confidence.  It  has  been  marked  by  a succession  of 
civil  triumphs.  I have  been  escorted  from  village  to 
village,  and  have  everywhere  found  myself  surrounded 
by  large  concourses  of  my  fellow  citizens,  often  of  both 
sexes,  greeting  and  welcoming  me.,, 

No  wonder  that  his  sanguine  nature  was  inspired 
with  new  hope,  and  that  he  felt  himself  to  be  the 
man  who  could  rally  the  defeated  hosts,  and  over- 
throw the  “ military  chieftain”  with  all  his  “ pre- 
tor  ian  bands.” 

He  was  certainly  not  alone  in  thinking  so.  It 
began  to  be  looked  upon  as  a matter  of  course 
among  the  National  Republicans  that  Clay  would 
be  their  candidate  against  Jackson  in  1832.  On 
May  29,  1830,  Daniel  Webster  wrote  to  him: 
“You  are  necessarily  at  the  head  of  one  party, 
and  General  J ackson  will  be,  if  he  is  not  already, 
identified  with  the  other.  The  question  will  be 
put  to  the  country.  Let  the  country  decide  it.” 
But  in  the  mean  time  a curious  movement  had 
sprung  up,  dividing  the  opposition  of  which  Clay 
was  the  head.  It  wTas  the  Anti-Masonic  move- 
ment. In  1826  one  Captain  William  Morgan,  a 
bricklayer  living  at  Batavia,  in  western  New  York, 
undertook  to  write  a book  revealing  the  secrets  of 
Freemasonry.  Some  Freemasons  of  the  neighbor- 
hood sought  to  persuade  and  then  to  force  him,  by 


342 


HENRY  CLAY 


all  sorts  of  chicanery,  to  give  up  his  design,  but 
without  success.  He  was  then  abducted,  and,  as 
was  widely  believed,  murdered.  The  crime  was 
charged  upon  some  fanatical  Freemasons;  but  the 
whole  order  was  accused  of  countenancing  it,  and 
was  held  responsible  for  obstructing  the  course  of 
justice  on  the  occasion  of  the  investigations  and 
trials  which  followed.  The  excitement  springing 
from  these  occurrences,  at  first  confined  to  one  or 
two  counties  in  western  New  York,  gradually 
spread,  and  grew  into  a crusade  against  secret 
societies  bound  together  by  oaths.  In  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  leading  politicians  to  restrain  it,  — for 
they  feared  its  disorganizing  influence,  — it  soon 
assumed  a political  character,  and  then  some  of 
them  vigorously  turned  it  to  their  advantage.  Be- 
ginning with  a few  country  towns  where  the  citi- 
zens organized  for  the  exclusion  of  all  Freemasons 
from  office,  the  “ Anti -Masons  ” rapidly  extended 
their  organizations  over  the  western  half  of  the 
State.  Committees  were  formed,  conventions  were 
held,  and  not  a few  men  of  standing  and  influence 
took  an  active  part  in  the  movement.  In  1828, 
when  Adams  and  Jackson  were  the  presidential 
candidates,  the  Anti-Masons  were  mostly  on  the 
side  of  Adams;  while  the  Masons  generally  rallied 
under  Jackson’s  flag,  who  was  himself  a Mason. 
The  Anti-Masons,  however,  refusing  to  support 
the  candidate  of  the  National  Republicans  for  the 
governorship  of  New  York,  made  a nomination  of 
their  own  for  that  office.  The  result  was  the  elec- 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


343 


tion  of  the  Jackson  candidate,  Martin  Van  Buren. 
But  from  the  large  vote  polled  by  the  Anti-Masons 
it  appeared  that  in  the  state  election  the  balance 
of  power  had  been  in  their  hands.  They  also 
elected  many  members  of  the  legislature,  and  se- 
cured a representation  in  Congress.  Thus  encour- 
aged, the  movement  invaded  the  Western  Reserve 
of  Ohio,  and  won  many  adherents  in  Vermont, 
Pennsylvania,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and 
Indiana.  It  had  its  newspaper  organs  and  a 
“ Review,”  and  presently  it  was  prepared  to  con- 
test a presidential  election  as  a “ party.” 

Clay  had  many  friends  among  the  Anti-Masons 
who  would  have  been  glad  to  obtain  from  him 
some  declaration  of  sentiment  favorable  to  their 
cause,  in  order  to  make  possible  a union  of  forces. 
But  he  gave  them  no  encouragement.  To  the 
many  private  entreaties  addressed  to  him  he  uni- 
formly  replied  that  he  did  not  desire  to  make 
himself  a party  to  that  dispute ; that,  although  he 
had  been  initiated  in  the  order,  he  had  long  ceased 
to  be  a member  of  any  lodge ; that  he  had  never 
acted,  either  in  private  or  in  public  life,  under 
any  Masonic  influence,  but  that  Masonry  or  Anti- 
Masonry  had  in  his  opinion  nothing  to  do  with 
politics. 

He  believed  that,  if  the  Anti-Masons  were  seri- 
ously thinking  of  nominating  a candidate  of  their 
own  for  the  presidency,  they  would  not  find  a man 
of  weight  willing  to  stand,  and  that  the  bulk  of 
the  Anti-Masonic  forces  would  drift  over  to  him- 


344 


HENRY  CLAY 


self.  In  this  expectation  he  was  disappointed. 
The  Anti-Masons  held  a national  convention  at 
Baltimore  in  September,  1831,  which  nominated 
for  the  presidency  William  Wirt,  late  attorney- 
general  under  Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams; 
and  for  the  vice-presidency,  Amos  Ellmaker  of 
Pennsylvania.  Wirt  was  at  heart  in  favor  of 
Clay’s  election,  but,  having  once  accepted  the 
Anti-Masonic  nomination,  he  found  it  impossible 
to  withdraw  from  the  field.  Some  of  the  leading 
Anti-Masons  indulged  in  the  hope  that  Clay  him- 
self might  be  prevailed  upon  to  give  up  his  can- 
didacy, and  permit  the  whole  opposition  to  the 
Jackson  regime  to  be  united  under  Anti-Masonic 
auspices.  Far  from  entertaining  such  a proposi- 
tion, he  declared,  with  sharp  emphasis,  in  a public 
letter  to  a committee  of  citizens  of  Indiana,  that 
the  Constitution  did  not  give  the  general  govern- 
ment the  slightest  power  to  interfere  with  the 
subject  of  Freemasonry,  and  that  he  thought  the 
presidential  office  should  be  filled  by  one  who  was 
capable,  “unswayed  by  sectarian  feelings  or  pas- 
sions, of  administering  its  high  duties  impartially 
towards  the  whole  people,  however  divided  into 
religious,  social,  benevolent,  or  literary  associa- 
tions.” 

He  felt  so  strongly  on  this  point  that  he  wrote 
to  his  friend  Brooke:  “If  the  alternative  be  be- 
tween Andrew  Jackson  and  an  Anti -Masonic  can- 
didate, with  his  exclusive  proscriptive  principles, 
I should  be  embarrassed  in  the  choice.  I am  not 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


315 


sure  that  the  old  tyranny  is  not  better  than  the 
new.”  It  is  not  surprising  that  he,  with  many 
others,  should  have  underestimated  the  strength 
of  the  movement.  We  find  it  now  hard  to  believe 
that  men  of  good  sense  should  have  seriously 
thought  of  making  the  question  of  Freemasonry 
the  principal  issue  of  a national  contest  upon 
which  the  American  people  were  to  divide.  But 
we  meet  among  those  who  were  prominently  en- 
gaged in  that  enterprise  such  names  as  William 
H.  Seward,  Thurlow  Weed,  Francis  Granger, 
Thaddeus  Stevens,  Richard  Rush,  and  William 
Wirt,  two  of  Clay’s  colleagues  in  Adams’s  cabi- 
net, and  even  John  Quincy  Adams  himself.  In- 
deed, while  Clay  would  have  been  loath  to  choose 
between  Jackson  and  an  Anti-Masonic  candidate, 
Adams  gravely  wrote  in  his  Diary:  “The  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Masonic  institution  in  the  United 
States  I believe  to  be  really  more  important  to  us 
and  our  posterity  than  the  question  whether  Mr. 
Clay  or  General  Jackson  shall  be  the  president 
chosen  at  the  next  election.”  The  Anti-Masonic 
movement  furnished  a curious  example  of  mental 
contagion.  But  odd  as  it  was,  it  kept  the  opposi- 
tion to  Jackson  divided. 

Many  things  had  in  the  mean  time  occurred 
which  created  a loud  demand  for  Clay’s  personal 
presence  and  leadership  on  the  theatre  of  action  at 
the  national  capital.  President  Jackson,  treating 
the  members  of  his  cabinet  more  as  executive 
clerks  than  as  political  advisers,  and  dispensing 


346 


HENRY  CLAY 


with  regular  cabinet  meetings,  had  surrounded 
himself  with  the  famous  “ kitchen  cabinet,”  a 
little  coterie  of  intimates,  from  whom  he  largely 
received  his  political  inspirations  and  advice,  — 
a secret  council  of  state,  withdrawn  entirely  from 
public  responsibility,  consisting  of  able,  crafty, 
personally  honest  men,  skillful  politicians,  cour- 
ageous to  audacity,  and  thoroughly  devoted  to 
General  Jackson.  The  members  of  this  secret 
council  were  William  B.  Lewis  from  Tennessee, 
one  of  Jackson’s  warmest  home  friends;  Isaac 
Hill  of  New  Hampshire;  Amos  Kendall,  who  was 
employed  in  the  Treasury;  and  Duff  Green,  the 
editor  of  Jackson’s  first  newspaper  organ.  He 
fell  from  grace  as  being  a friend  of  Calhoun,  and 
was  supplanted  by  Francis  P.  Blair.  Kendall 
and  Blair  had  been  journalists  in  Kentucky,  and 
near  friends  of  Henry  Clay,  but  had  turned  against 
him  mainly  in  consequence  of  the  so-called  “re- 
lief” movement  in  that  State,  which,  as  already 
mentioned,  was  one  of  those  epidemic  infatuations 
which  make  people  believe  that  they  can  get  rid 
of  their  debts  and  become  rich  by  legislative  tricks 
and  the  issue  of  promises  to  pay.  The  movement 
developed  intense  hostility  to  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States.  There  had  been  personal  disputes, 
too,  between  Clay  and  Kendall,  engendering  much 
ill  feeling.  The  existence  and  known  influence 
of  the  kitchen  cabinet  kept  the  political  world  in 
constantly  strained  expectation  as  to  what  would 
turn  up  next. 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


347 


The  “Globe”  newspaper  had  been  established, 
with  Francis  P.  Blair  in  the  editorial  chair,  as 
President  Jackson’s  organ,  to  direct  and  discipline 
his  own  party,  and  to  castigate  its  opponents. 

In  his  first  message  to  Congress,  in  December, 
1829,  President  Jackson  had  thrown  out  threaten- 
ing hints  as  to  the  policy  of  re-chartering  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  the  charter  of  which  would 
expire  in  1836 ; and  in  the  message  of  1830  those 
threats  were  repeated.  The  approaching  extinc- 
tion of  the  national  debt  rendering  a reduction  of 
the  revenue  necessary,  there  was  much  apprehen- 
sion as  to  what  the  fate  of  the  protective  tariff 
would  be.  Large  meetings  of  free-traders  as  well 
as  of  protectionists  were  held  to  influence  legisla- 
tion. 

President  Jackson  had  vetoed  the  “Marysville 
Road  Bill,”  and  thereby  declared  his  hostility  to 
the  policy  of  internal  improvements.  With  regard 
to  the  proceedings  of  the  State  of  Georgia  against 
the  Cherokees,  President  Jackson  had  submitted 
to  the  extreme  state-sovereignty  pretensions  of  the 
State,  in  disregard  — it  might  be  said,  in  defiance 
— of  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States. 

A great  commotion  had  arisen  in  South  Caro- 
lina against  the  tariff  laws,  leading  to  the  promul- 
gation of  the  doctrine  that  any  single  State  had 
the  power  to  declare  a law  of  the  United  States 
unconstitutional,  void,  and  not  binding,  — the  so- 
called  nullification  theory.  Webster  had  thrilled 


348 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  country  with  his  celebrated  plea  for  Liberty 
and  Union  in  his  reply  to  Hayne,  winning  a 
“noble  triumph,”  as  Clay  called  it  in  a letter. 
Jackson  had,  at  a banquet  on  Jefferson’s  birthday, 
in  April,  1830,  given  an  indication  of  the  spirit 
aroused  in  him,  by  offering  the  famous  toast, 
“Our  Federal  Union:  it  must  be  preserved.” 

Jackson  had  declared  hostilities  against  Vice- 
President  Calhoun  in  consequence  of  the  discovery 
that  Calhoun,  as  a member  of  Monroe’s  cabinet, 
had  condemned  Jackson’s  proceedings  in  the  Sem- 
inole war  of  1818.  In  June,  1831,  the  whole 
cabinet  had  resigned,  or  rather  been  compelled  to 
resign,  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating  from 
the  administration  Calhoun’s  friends,  and  a new 
cabinet  had  been  appointed,  in  which  Edward 
Livingston  was  secretary  of  state ; Louis  McLane 
of  Delaware,  secretary  of  the  treasury ; Roger  B. 
Taney,  attorney -general;  and  Levi  Woodbury, 
secretary  of  the  navy ; the  Post  Office  Department 
remaining  in  Barry’s  hands. 

The  kitchen  cabinet  had  elicited  demonstra- 
tions from  the  legislature  of  Pennsylvania,  subse- 
quently indorsed  by  that  of  New  York,  calling 
upon  General  J ackson  to  stand  for  a second  term, 
notwithstanding  his  previous  declarations  in  favor 
of  the  one-term  principle,  and  it  was  generally  un- 
derstood that  he  would  do  so. 

All  these  occurrences,  added  to  the  impression 
that  in  the  President  and  his  confidential  advisers 
there  was  to  be  dealt  with  a force  yet  undefined 


THE  PARTY  CHIEFS 


349 


and  beyond  the  ordinary  rules  of  calculation,  pro- 
duced among  the  opposition  party  a singular  feel- 
ing of  insecurity.  They  looked  for  a strong  man 
to  lead  them;  they  wanted  to  hear  Clay’s  voice 
in  Congress;  and  it  is  characteristic  that  Daniel 
Webster,  who  had  just  then  reached  the  zenith  of 
his  glory,  and  was  by  far  the  first  man  in  the  Sen- 
ate, should  have  given  the  most  emphatic  expres- 
sion to  that  anxiety  for  energetic  leadership.  “ You 
must  be  aware,”  he  wrote  to  Clay  from  Boston  on 
October  5,  1831,  “of  the  strong  desire  manifested 
in  many  parts  of  the  country  that  you  should  come 
into  the  Senate:  the  wish  is  entertained  here  as 
earnestly  as  anywhere.  We  are  to  have  an  inter- 
esting and  arduous  session.  Everything  is  to  be 
attacked.  An  array  is  preparing  much  more  for- 
midable than  has  ever  yet  assaulted  what  we  think 
the  leading  and  important  public  interests.  Not 
only  the  tariff,  but  the  Constitution  itself,  in  its 
elementary  and  fundamental  provisions,  will  be 
assailed  with  talent,  vigor,  and  union.  Every- 
thing is  to  be  debated  as  if  nothing  had  ever  been 
settled.  It  would  be  an  infinite  gratification  to 
me  to  have  your  aid,  or  rather  your  lead.  I know 
nothing  so  likely  to  be  useful.  Everything  valu- 
able in  the  government  is  to  be  fought  for,  and 
we  need  your  arm  in  the  fight.” 

Clay  was  reluctant  to  yield  to  these  entreaties. 
His  instinct  probably  told  him  that  for  a presi- 
dential candidate  the  Senate  is  not  a safe  place, 
especially  while  the  canvass  is  going  on.  But  he 


350 


HENRY  CLAY 


obeyed  the  call  of  his  friends,  which  at  the  same 
time  appeared  to  be  the  call  of  the  public  interest. 
When  it  became  known  that  he  would  be  a candi- 
date for  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  before  the 
Kentucky  legislature,  the  Washington  “ Globe,” 
President  Jackson’s  organ,  opened  its  batteries 
with  characteristic  fury.  Commenting  upon  the 
fact  that  Clay  attended  the  legislature  in  person, 
and  forgetting  that  his  competitor,  Richard  M. 
Johnson,  the  Jackson  candidate,  did  the  same,  the 
“ Globe  ” spoke  thus : — 

“ If  under  these  circumstances  Mr.  Clay  should  come 
to  the  Senate,  he  will  but  consummate  his  ruin.  He  will 
stand  in  that  body,  not  as  the  representative  of  Ken- 
tucky, but  of  a few  base  men  rendered  infamous  in  elect- 
ing him.  He  will  no  longer  represent  his  countrymen  ; 
but,  like  an  Irish  patriot,  become  an  English  pensioner, 
he  will  represent  an  odious  oligarchy,  and,  owing  his  sta- 
tion altogether  to  chicane  and  management,  he  will  be 
stripped  of  the  dignity  of  his  character,  and  gradually 
sink  into  insignificance.” 

Nevertheless  Clay  was  elected,  but  only  by  a 
small  majority.  Thus  he  entered  upon  his  senato- 
rial career,  more  heartily  welcomed  by  his  friends, 
and  more  bitterly  hated  by  his  enemies,  than  ever 
before. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 

Henry  Clay  appeared  in  Washington  at  the 
opening  of  Congress  in  December,  1831,  in  the 
double  character  of  senator  and  candidate  for  the 
presidency.  It  was  at  that  period  that  the  method 
of  putting  presidential  candidates  in  the  field  by 
national  conventions  of  party  delegates  found  gen- 
eral adoption.  The  Anti-Masons  had  held  their 
national  convention  in  September.  The  National 
Republicans  were  to  follow  on  December  12.  That 
Henry  Clay  would  be  their  candidate  for  the 
presidency  was  a foregone  conclusion.  Nobody 
appeared  as  a competitor  for  the  honor.  But  it 
remained  still  to  be  determined  what  issues  should 
be  put  prominently  forward  in  the  canvass.  On 
this  point  the  opinion  of  the  recognized  leader  was 
naturally  decisive.  As  a matter  of  course,  a pro- 
tective tariff  and  internal  improvements,  and  an 
emphatic  condemnation  of  the  “ spoils  system,” 
would  form  important  parts  of  his  programme. 
But  a grave  question  turned  up,  on  the  treatment 
of  which  his  friends  seriously  differed  in  opinion. 
It  was  that  of  the  National  Bank.  The  existing 
Bank  of  the  United  States  had  been  created,  with 


352 


HENRY  CLAY 


Clay’s  help,  in  1816.  Its  charter  was  to  run  for 
twenty  years,  and  would  therefore  expire  in  1836. 
In  order  to  understand  how  the  re -chartering  of 
that  bank  became  a burning  question  in  1831,  a 
short  retrospect  is  necessary. 

When  President  Jackson  came  into  office  the 
country  was  in  a prosperous  condition.  There  was 
little  speculation,  but  business  in  all  directions 
showed  a healthy  activity,  and  yielded  good  re- 
turns. The  currency  troubles,  which  had  long 
been  disturbing  the  country,  especially  the  South 
and  West,  were  over.  The  “circulating  medium  ” 
was  more  uniform  and  trustworthy,  and,  on  the 
whole,  in  a more  satisfactory  condition  than  it 
ever  had  been  before.  The  agency  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  in  bringing  about  these  re- 
sults was  generally  recognized.  In  the  first  two 
years  after  its  establishment  the  bank  had  been 
badly  managed.  But  Langdon  Cheves,  appointed 
its  president  in  1819,  put  the  conduct  of  its  busi- 
ness upon  a solid  footing,  and  thereafter  it  con- 
tinued steadily  to  grow  in  the  confidence  of  the 
business  community.  No  serious  difficulty  was 
therefore  anticipated  as  to  the  re-chartering;  and 
as  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  final  action  on 
that  matter  until  1836,  three  years  after  the  expi- 
ration of  General  Jackson’s  first  presidential  term, 
the  public  generally  expected  that  any  question 
about  it  would  be  permitted  to  rest  at  least  until 
after  the  election  of  1832. 

Great  was  therefore  the  surprise  when,  in  his 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


353 


very  first  message  to  Congress,  in  December, 
1829,  President  Jackson  said  that,  although  the 
charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  would 
not  expire  until  1836,  it  was  time  to  take  up  that 
subject  for  grave  consideration;  that  “both  the 
constitutionality  and  the  expediency  of  the  law 
creating  the  bank  were  well  questioned  by  a large 
number  of  our  fellow  citizens ; and  that  it  must  be 
admitted  by  all  to  have  failed  in  the  great  end  of 
establishing  a uniform  and  sound  currency.”  Then 
he  submitted  to  the  wisdom  of  the  legislature 
whether  a “national  bank,  founded  upon  the  credit 
of  the  government  and  its  revenue,  might  not  be 
devised.”  What  did  all  this  mean?  People  asked 
themselves  whether  the  president  knew  something 
about  the  condition  of  the  bank  that  the  public 
did  not  know,  and  the  bank  shares  suffered  at  once 
a serious  decline  at  the  Exchange. 

The  true  reasons  for  this  hostile  demonstration 
became  known  afterwards.  Benton’s  assertion  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding,  Jackson  had  no  in- 
tention to  overthrow  the  United  States  Bank  when 
he  came  to  Washington.  His  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  Ingham,  complimented  the  bank  on  the 
valuable  services  it  rendered,  several  months  after 
the  beginning  of  the  administration.  The  origin 
of  the  trouble  was  characteristic.  Complaint  came 
from  New  Hampshire,  through  Levi  Woodbury, 
a senator  from  that  State  and  a zealous  Jackson 
Democrat,  and  through  Isaac  Hill,  a member  of 
the  “kitchen  cabinet,”  that  Jeremiah  Mason,  a 


354 


HENRY  CLAY 


Federalist  and  a friend  of  Daniel  Webster,  had 
been  made  president  of  the  branch  of  the  United 
States  Bank  at  Portsmouth,  and  that  he  was  an 
unaccommodating  person  very  objectionable  to  the 
people.  A correspondence  concerning  this  case 
sprang  up  between  Secretary  Ingham  and  Nicholas 
Biddle,  the  president  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  a man  of  much  literary  ability,  who  was 
rather  fond  of  an  argument,  and  liked  to  say 
clever  things.  No  impartial  man  can  read  the 
letters  which  passed  to  and  fro  without  coming  to 
the  conclusion  that  influential  men  in  the  Jackson 
party  desired  to  use  the  bank  and  its  branches  for 
political  purposes ; that  Biddle  wished  to  maintain 
the  political  independence  of  the  institution,  and 
that  his  refusal  to  do  the  bidding  of  politicians 
with  regard  to  Jeremiah  Mason  was  bitterly  re- 
sented. It  appears,  also,  from  an  abundance  of 
testimony,  of  which  Ingham’s  confession,  published 
after  he  had  ceased  to  be  secretary  of  the  treasury, 
forms  part,  that  the  members  of  the  “ kitchen 
cabinet”  told  Jackson  all  sorts  of  stories  about 
efforts  of  the  bank  to  use  its  power  in  controlling 
elections  in  a manner  hostile  to  him ; that  he  trust- 
ingly listened  to  all  the  allegations  against  it  which 
reached  his  ears,  and  that  he  at  last  honestly  be- 
lieved the  bank  to  be  a power  of  evil,  corrupt  and 
corrupting,  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people 
and  to  the  existence  of  the  republic. 

The  first  message  did  not  produce  on  Congress 
the  desired  effect.  The  President’s  own  party 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


355 


failed  to  stand  by  him.  In  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means 
made  a report,  affirming,  what  was  well  known, 
that  the  constitutionality  of  the  bank  had  been 
recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  it  was  a 
useful  institution,  and  that  the  establishment  of 
a bank  such  as  that  suggested  in  the  message 
would  be  a dangerous  experiment.  A similar  re- 
port was  made  in  the  Senate.  In  the  House,  reso- 
lutions against  re-chartering  the  bank,  and  calling 
for  a comprehensive  report  upon  its  doings,  were 
defeated  by  considerable  majorities.  Bank  stock 
went  up  again. 

In  his  second  message,  in  December,  1830, 
President  Jackson  said  that  nothing  had  occurred 
“to  lessen  in  any  degree  the  dangers  ” which  many 
citizens  apprehended  from  the  United  States  Bank 
as  actually  organized.  He  then  suggested  the  or- 
ganization of  “a  bank,  with  the  necessary  officers, 
as  a branch  of  the  Treasury  Department.”  Con- 
gress did  not  take  action  on  the  matter,  but  Benton 
made  his  first  attack  in  the  Senate  on  the  United 
States  Bank,  not  to  produce  any  immediate  effect 
in  Congress,  but  to  stir  up  the  people. 

In  his  third  message,  in  December,  1831,  Presi- 
dent Jackson  simply  said  that  on  previous  occa- 
sions he  had  performed  his  duty  of  bringing  the 
bank  question  to  the  attention  of  the  people,  and 
that  there  he  would  “for  the  present”  leave  it. 
At  the  same  time  the  secretary  of  the  treasury, 
McLane,  submitted  in  his  report  to  Congress  an 


356 


HENRY  CLAY 


elaborate  argument  in  favor  of  the  United  States 
Bank.  There  is  much  reason  for  believing  that 
Jackson  at  that  period  was  inclined  to  accept 
some  accommodation  or  compromise  concerning 
the  bank  question,  or  at  least  not  to  force  a fight 
just  then.  Thurlow  Weed,  in  his  “ Autobiogra- 
phy,” gives  an  account  of  a conference  between 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury  and  the  president  of 
the  bank,  in  which  the  assent  of  the  administration 
to  the  re-charter  was  offered  on  condition  of  certain 
modifications  of  the  charter.  It  is  further  reported 
that  the  officers  of  the  bank  were  strongly  in  favor 
of  accepting  the  proposition,  but  that,  when  they 
consulted  Clay  and  Webster  on  the  matter,  they 
found  determined  resistance,  to  which  they  yielded. 

The  officers  and  the  most  discreet  friends  of  the 
United  States  Bank  felt  keenly  that  a great  finan- 
cial institution,  whose  operations  and  interests 
were  closely  interwoven  with  the  general  business 
of  the  country,  should  not  become  identified  with 
a political  party  in  all  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune, 
and  should  never  permit  itself  to  be  made  the  foot- 
ball of  political  ambitions.  They  were  strongly 
inclined  not  to  press  the  re-chartering  of  the  bank 
until  it  should  be  necessary,  and  thus  to  keep  the 
question  out  of  the  presidential  campaign. 

Clay  thought  otherwise.  As  to  the  time  when 
the  renewal  of  the  charter  should  be  asked  for,  he 
maintained  that  the  present  time  was  the  best. 
There  were  undoubted  majorities  favorable  to  the 
bank  in  both  Houses.  If  the  President  should 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


357 


defeat  the  renewal  with  his  veto,  he  would  only  ruin 
himself.  He  had  already  greatly  weakened  his 
popularity  by  attacking  the  bank.  It  had  many 
friends  in  the  Jackson  party  who  would  stand  by 
it  rather  than  by  the  President.  Being  located  in 
Philadelphia,  the  bank  wielded  great  power  and 
enjoyed  great  popularity  in  Pennsylvania,  the  hot- 
bed of  Jacksonism.  Losing  that  State,  Jackson 
would  lose  the  election.  Moreover,  the  bank  had 
a strong  hold  upon  the  business  interests  of  the 
country  everywhere,  and  everywhere  those  inter- 
ests would  support  the  bank  in  a decisive  strug- 
gle. The  bank  issue  was  therefore  the  strongest 
which  the  National  Republicans  could  put  forward. 
That  issue  should  be  made  as  sharp  as  possible, 
and  to  give  it  a practical  shape,  the  renewal  of 
the  charter  should  be  applied  for  at  the  present 
session  of  Congress.  Such  was  Clay’s  reasoning 
and  advice,  or  rather  his  command ; and  both  the 
bank  and  the  party  obeyed. 

On  December  12,  1831,  the  convention  of  the 
National  Republicans  was  held  at  Baltimore.  Clay 
was  nominated  unanimously,  and  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm,  for  the  presidency.  The  nomination 
for  the  vice-presidency  fell  to  John  Sergeant  of 
Pennsylvania,  a man  of  excellent  character,  whom 
we  remember  to  have  met,  at  the  time  of  the 
struggle  about  the  admission  of  Missouri,  as  one  of 
the  strongest  advocates  of  the  exclusion  of  slavery. 
The  convention  also  issued  an  address  to  the  peo- 
ple, which  eulogized  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 


358 


HENRY  CLAY 


denounced  the  attack  made  upon  it  by  President 
Jackson  in  his  messages,  and  declared  that,  “if 
the  President  be  reelected,  it  may  be  considered 
certain  that  the  bank  will  be  abolished.”  Thus 
the  issue  was  made  up : J ackson  must  be  defeated 
if  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  to  be  saved. 
The  memorial  of  the  bank,  praying  for  a renewal 
of  its  charter,  was  presented  in  the  Senate  early 
in  January,  1832,  to  the  end  of  forcing  Congress 
and  the  President  to  act  without  delay.  If  it  was 
Clay’s  object  to  make  the  bank  question  the  most 
prominent  one  in  the  canvass,  he  succeeded  be- 
yond expectation ; and  if  he  had  cast  about  for  the 
greatest  blunder  possible  under  the  circumstances, 
he  could  not  have  found  a more  brilliant  one. 
This  we  shall  appreciate  when,  at  a later  period  of 
the  session,  we  hear  both  sides  speak. 

The  first  subject  which  Clay  took  up  for  discus- 
sion in  the  Senate  was  the  tariff.  Two  circum- 
stances of  unusual  moment  had  brought  this  topic 
into  the  foreground : one  was  the  excitement  pro- 
duced by  the  tariff  of  1828,  “the  tariff  of  abomi- 
nations,” in  the  planting  States,  and  especially  in 
South  Carolina,  where  it  had  assumed  the  threat- 
ening form  of  the  nullification  movement;  and 
the  other  was  the  fact  that  the  revenue  furnished 
by  the  existing  tariff  largely  exceeded  the  current 
expenditures,  and  would,  after  the  extinguishment 
of  the  national  debt,  which  was  rapidly  going  for- 
ward, bring  on  that  bane  of  good  government  in 
a free  country,  a heavy  surplus  in  the  treasury, 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


359 


without  legitimate  employment.  A reduction  of 
the  revenue  was  therefore  necessary,  and  lively 
discussions  were  going  on  among  the  people  as  to 
how  it  should  be  effected.  In  September  and 
October  large  popular  conventions  of  free-traders 
had  been  held.  One  of  their  principal  spokesmen 
was  the  venerable  Albert  Gallatin,  who  insisted 
on  lower  rates  of  duties  throughout.  The  protec- 
tionists, fearing  lest  the  reduction  of  the  revenue 
should  injure  the  protective  system,  were  equally 
vigorous  in  their  demonstrations. 

Jackson’s  views  with  regard  to  the  tariff  had 
undergone  progressive  changes.  When  first  a can- 
didate for  the  presidency,  in  1824,  he  had  pro- 
nounced himself  substantially  a protectionist.  In 
his  first  message  to  Congress,  in  1829,  he  recom- 
mended duties  which  would  place  our  own  manu- 
factures “in  fair  competition  with  those  of  foreign 
countries,  while,  with  regard  to  those  of  prime 
necessity  in  time  of  war,”  we  might  even  “ advance 
a step  beyond  that  point.”  He  also  advocated  the 
distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  among  the 
States  “ according  to  the  ratio  of  representation” 
in  Congress,  and  a reduction  of  duties  on  articles 
“ which  cannot  come  into  competition  with  our 
own  production.”  This  meant  a protective  tariff. 
In  his  second  message,  December,  1830,  he  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  “ objects  of  national  im- 
portance alone  ought  to  be  protected;  of  these  the 
productions  of  our  soil,  our  mines,  and  our  work- 
shops, essential  to  national  defense,  occupy  the  first 


360 


HENRY  CLAY 


rank.”  In  his  third  message,  December,  1831,  he 
invited  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  public  debt 
would  be  extinguished  before  the  expiration  of  his 
term,  and  that,  therefore,  “a  modification  of  the 
tariff,  which  shall  produce  a reduction  of  the  reve- 
nue to  the  wants  of  the  government,”  was  very- 
advisable.  He  added  that,  in  justice  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  merchant  as  well  as  the  manufacturer, 
the  reduction  should  be  prospective,  and  that  the 
duties  should  be  adjusted  with  a view  “to  the 
counteraction  of  foreign  policy,  so  far  as  it  may  be 
injurious  to  our  national  interests.”  This  meant 
a revenue  tariff  with  incidental  retaliation.  He 
had  thus  arrived  at  a sensible  plan  to  avoid  the 
accumulation  of  a surplus. 

Clay  took  the  matter  in  hand  in  the  Senate,  or 
rather  in  Congress,  for  he  held  a meeting  of  friends 
of  protection  among  senators  and  representatives 
to  bring  about  harmony  of  action  in  the  two 
houses.  At  that  meeting  he  laid  down  the  law 
for  his  party  in  a manner,  as  John  Quincy  Adams 
records,  courteous,  but  “exceedingly  peremptory 
and  dogmatical.”  He  recognized  the  necessity  of 
reducing  the  revenue,  but  he  would  reduce  the 
revenue  without  reducing  protective  duties.  The 
“American  system”  should  not  suffer.  It  must, 
therefore,  not  be  done  in  the  manner  proposed  by 
Jackson.  He  insisted  upon  confining  the  reduc- 
tion to  duties  on  articles  not  coming  into  compe- 
tition with  American  products.  He  would  not 
make  the  reductions  prospective,  to  begin  after  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


361 


public  debt  was  extinguished,  but  immediate,  as  he 
was  not  in  favor  of  a rapid  extinguishment  of  the 
debt.  Instead  of  abolishing  protective  duties,  he 
would  rather  reduce  the  revenue  by  making  some 
of  them  prohibitory.  He  also  insisted  upon  “home 
valuation”  — i.  e.  valuation  at  the  port  of  entry 
— of  goods  subject  to  ad  valorem  duties,  and  upon 
reducing  the  credits  allowed  for  their  payment. 
When  objection  was  made  that  this  would  be  a 
defiance  of  the  South,  of  the  President,  and  of  the 
whole  administration  party,  he  replied,  as  Adams 
reports,  that  “to  preserve,  maintain,  and  strengthen 
the  American  system,  he  would  defy  the  South, 
the  President,  and  the  devil.” 

He  introduced  a resolution  in  the  Senate  “that 
the  existing  duties  upon  articles  imported  from 
foreign  countries,  and  not  coming  into  competition 
with  similar  articles  made  or  produced  within  the 
United  States,  ought  to  be  forthwith  abolished, 
except  the  duties  upon  wines  and  silks,  and  that 
those  ought  to  be  reduced ; and  that  the  Commit- 
tee on  Finance  be  instructed  to  report  a bill 
accordingly.”  On  this  resolution,  which  led  to 
a general  debate  upon  the  tariff,  he  made  two 
speeches,  one  of  which  took  rank  among  his  great- 
est efforts.  Its  eloquent  presentation  of  the  well- 
known  arguments  in  favor  of  protection  excited 
great  admiration  at  the  time,  and  served  the  pro- 
tectionists as  a text-book  for  many  years.  He  de- 
clared himself  strongly  against  the  preservation  of 
existing  duties  “in  order  to  accumulate  a surplus 


362 


HENRY  CLAY 


in  the  treasury,  for  the  purpose  of  subsequent  dis- 
tribution among  the  several  States.”  To  collect 
revenue  “from  one  portion  of  the  people  and  give 
it  to  another  ” he  pronounced  unjust.  If  the  reve- 
nue were  to  be  distributed  for  use  by  the  States 
in  their  public  expenditure,  he  knew  of  no  princi- 
ple in  the  Constitution  “that  authorized  the  federal 
government  to  become  such  a collector  for  the 
States,  nor  of  any  principle  of  safety  or  propriety 
which  admitted  of  the  States  becoming  such  recip- 
ients of  gratuity  from  the  general  government.” 
He  thought,  however,  that  the  proceeds  of  the 
sales  of  public  lands  should  be  devoted  to  internal 
improvements.  He  called  free  trade  the  “British 
colonial  system  ” in  contradistinction  to  the  protec- 
tive “American  system,”  two  names  which  them- 
selves did  the  duty  of  arguments.  He  contrasted 
the  effects  of  the  two  systems,  using  as  an  illustra- 
tion the  seven  years  of  distress  preceding,  and  the 
seven  years  of  prosperity  following,  the  enactment 
of  the  tariff  of  1824,  — which  drew  from  Southern 
senators  the  answer  that  the  picture  of  prosperity 
fitted  the  North,  but  by  no  means  the  South.  He 
discussed  the  effect  of  the  tariff  on  the  South  in 
a kindlier  tone  than  that  in  which  he  had  spoken 
in  the  meeting  of  his  friends,  but  he  denounced  in 
strong  terms  the  threats  of  nullification  and  dis- 
union. He  said : — 

“ The  great  principle,  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of 
all  free  government,  is  that  the  majority  must  govern, 
from  which  there  can  be  no  appeal  but  the  sword.  That 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


363 


majority  ought  to  govern  wisely,  equitably,  moderately, 
and  constitutionally ; but  govern  it  must,  subject  only  to 
that  terrible  appeal.  If  ever  one  or  several  States,  being 
a minority,  can,  by  menacing  a dissolution  of  the  Union, 
succeed  in  forcing  an  abandonment  of  great  measures 
deemed  essential  to  the  interests  and  prosperity  of  the 
whole,  the  Union  from  that  moment  is  practically  gone. 
It  may  linger  on  in  form  and  name,  but  its  vital  spirit 
has  fled  forever.” 

This  seemed  to  exclude  every  thought  of  com- 
promise. 

The  efforts  of  the  free-traders  to  discredit  the 
“ American  system,”  by  resolutions,  addresses, 
and  pamphlets  against  the  tariff,  annoyed  him 
greatly;  and  nothing  seems  to  have  stung  him 
more  than  a calmly  argumentative  memorial  from 
the  pen  of  Albert  Gallatin.  Only  the  deepest 
irritation  can  explain  the  most  ungenerous  attack 
he  made  upon  that  venerable  statesman  in  his 
great  speech.  This  is  the  language  he  applied  to 
him:  — 

“ The  gentleman  to  whom  I am  about  to  allude,  al- 
though long  a resident  in  this  country,  has  no  feelings, 
no  attachments,  no  sympathies,  no  principles,  in  common 
with  our  people.  Nearly  fifty  years  ago  Pennsylvania 
took  him  to  her  bosom,  and  warmed,  and  cherished,  and 
honored  him ; and  how  does  he  manifest  his  gratitude  ? 
By  aiming  a vital  blow  at  a system  endeared  to  her  by 
a thorough  conviction  that  it  is  indispensable  to  her 
prosperity.  He  has  filled,  at  home  and  abroad,  some  of 
the  highest  offices  under  this  government,  during  thirty 
years,  and  he  is  still  at  heart  an  alien.  The  authority 


364 


HENRY  CLAY 


of  his  name  has  been  invoked,  and  the  labors  of  his  pen 
in  the  form  of  a memorial  to  Congress,  have  been  en- 
gaged, to  overthrow  the  American  system,  and  to  substi- 
tute the  foreign.  Go  home  to  your  native  Europe,  and 
there  inculcate  upon  her  sovereigns  your  Utopian  doc- 
trines of  free  trade  ; and  when  you  have  prevailed  upon 
them  to  unseal  their  ports,  and  freely  to  admit  the  pro- 
duce of  Pennsylvania  and  other  States,  come  back,  and 
we  shall  be  prepared  to  become  converts  and  to  adopt 
your  faith.” 

This  assault  was  an  astonishing  performance. 
Gallatin  had  come  to  America  a very  young  man. 
Under  the  presidency  of  the  first  Adams  he  had 
been  intellectually  the  leader  of  the  Republicans 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.  He  had  been 
a member  of  that  famous  triumvirate,  Jefferson, 
Madison,  Gallatin.  Jefferson  had  made  him  sec- 
retary of  the  treasury;  and  Madison,  equally  sen- 
sible of  his  merits,  had  kept  him  in  that  most 
important  position.  His  services  had  put  his  name 
in  the  first  line  of  the  great  American  finance 
ministers.  Clay  had  met  him  as  one  of  his  col- 
leagues at  Ghent,  and  he  would  hardly  have  denied 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
owing  more  to  Gallatin’s  prudence,  skill,  and 
good  temper,  than  to  his  own  efforts.  As  minis- 
ter to  France  under  Monroe,  Gallatin  had  added 
to  his  distinguished  services  by  his  patriotism  and 
rare  diplomatic  ability.  When  Clay,  as  secretary 
of  state,  needed  a man  of  peculiar  wisdom  and 
trustworthiness  to  whom  to  confide  the  interests 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832  365 

of  this  republic,  he  had  thought  first  of  Gallatin. 
It  was  Gallatin  whom  he  had  selected  first  for  the 
most  American  of  American  missions,  that  to  the 
Panama  Congress.  It  was  Gallatin  whom  he  had 
sent  to  England  after  the  retirement  of  Rufus 
King,  to  protect  American  interests  amid  uncom- 
monly tangled  circumstances.  But  now,  suddenly, 
the  same  American  statesman,  not  present  and 
unable  to  answer,  was  denounced  by  him  in  the 
Senate  as  one  who  had  “no  feelings,  no  sympa- 
thies, no  principles,  in  common  with  our  people,” 
as  “an  alien  at  heart,”  who  should  “go  home  to 
Europe;  ” and  all  this  because  Clay  found  it  trou- 
blesome to  answer  Gallatin’s  arguments  on  the 
tariff. 

Gallatin,  during  his  long  career,  had  much  to 
suffer  on  account  of  his  foreign  birth.  The  same 
persons  who  had  praised  him  as  a great  statesman 
and  a profound  thinker,  when  he  happened  to 
agree  with  their  views  and  to  serve  their  purposes, 
had  not  unfrequently,  so  soon  as  he  expressed 
opinions  they  disliked,  denounced  him  as  an  imper- 
tinent foreigner  who  should  “go  home.”  He  was 
accustomed  to  such  treatment  from  small  politi- 
cians. But  to  see  one  of  the  great  men  of  the 
republic,  and  an  old  friend  too,  descend  so  far, 
could  not  fail  to  pain  the  septuagenarian  deeply. 

But  the  irony  of  fate  furnished  a biting  com- 
mentary on  Clay’s  conduct.  Scarcely  a year  after 
he  had  so  fiercely  denounced  Gallatin  as  “an  alien 
at  heart”  for  having  recommended  a gradual  re- 


366 


HENRY  CLAY 


duction  of  tariff  duties  to  a level  of  about  twenty- 
five  per  cent.,  Clay  himself,  as  we  shall  see,  pro- 
posed and  carried  a gradual  reduction  of  duties  to 
a maximum  of  twenty  per  cent.,  all  the  while  feel- 
ing himself  to  be  a thorough  American  “at  heart.” 

After  a long  debate  Clay’s  tariff  resolution  was'N 
adopted,  and  in  June,  1832,  a bill  substantially 
in  accord  with  it  passed  both  Houses,  known  as 
the  tariff  act  of  1832.  It  reduced  or  abolished 
the  duties  on  many  of  the  unprotected  articles, 
but  left  the  protective  system  without  material 
change.  As  a reduction  of  the  revenue  it  effected 
very  little.  The  income  of  the  government  for  the 
year  was  about  thirty  millions;  its  expenditures, 
exclusive  of  the  public  debt,  somewhat  over  thir- 
teen millions;  the  prospective  surplus,  after  the 
payment  of  the  debt,  more  than  sixteen  millions. 
The  reduction  proposed  by  Clay,  according  to  his 
own  estimate,  was  not  over  seven  millions;  the 
reduction  really  effected  by  the  new  tariff  law 
scarcely  exceeded  three  millions.  Clay  had  saved 
the  American  system  at  the  expense  of  the  very 
object  contemplated  by  the  measure.  It  was  ex- 
tremely short-sighted  statesmanship.  The  surplus 
was  as  threatening  as  ever,  and  the  dissatisfaction 
in  the  South  grew  from  day  to  day. 

One  of  the  important  incidents  of  the  session 
was  the  rejection  by  the  Senate  of  the  nomination 
of  Martin  Van  Buren  as  minister  to  England. 
Van  Buren  was  one  of  Jackson’s  favorites.  He 
had  stood  by  Jackson  when  other  members  of  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


367 


cabinet  refused  to  take  the  presidential  view  of 
Mrs.  Eaton’s  virtue.  He  had  greatly  facilitated 
that  dissolution  of  the  cabinet  which  Jackson  had 
much  at  heart.  When  he  ceased  to  be  secretary 
of  state,  Jackson  gave  him  the  mission  to  England, 
holding  in  reserve  higher  honors  for  him.  In  the 
Senate,  however,  the  nomination  encountered  strong 
opposition.  With  many  senators  it  was  a matter 
of  party  politics.  The  strongest  reason  avowed 
was  that,  as  secretary  of  state,  Van  Buren  had  in- 
structed the  American  minister  to  England  to 
abandon  the  claim,  urged  by  the  late  administra- 
tion, of  a right  to  the  colonial  trade,  on  the  express 
ground  that  those  who  had  asserted  that  right  had 
been  condemned  at  the  last  presidential  election 
by  the  popular  judgment.  The  opponents  of  Van 
Buren  denounced  his  conduct  as  a wanton  humilia- 
tion of  this  republic,  and  a violation  of  the  princi- 
ple that,  in  its  foreign  relations,  the  vicissitudes 
of  party  contests  should  not  be  paraded  as  reasons 
for  a change  of  policy. 

Clay,  leading  the  opposition  to  Van  Buren,  found 
it  not  difficult  to  show  that  the  policy  followed  by 
the  administration  of  J ohn  Quincy  Adams  in  this 
respect  was  substantially  identical  with  that  of 
Madison  and  Monroe,  and  that,  by  officially  rep- 
resenting that  policy  as  condemned  by  the  people, 
Van  Buren  had  cast  discredit  upon  the  conduct 
of  this  republic  in  its  intercourse  with  a foreign 
power.  But  he  had  still  another  objection  to  Van 
Buren ’s  appointment.  He  said : — 


368 


HENRY  CLAY 


“ I believe,  upon  circumstances  which  satisfy  my  mind, 
that  to  this  gentleman  is  principally  to  be  ascribed  the 
introduction  of  the  odious  system  of  proscription  for  the 
exercise  of  the  elective  franchise  in  the  government  of 
the  United  States.  I understand  that  it  is  the  system 
upon  which  the  party  in  his  own  State,  of  which  he  is 
the  reputed  head,  constantly  acts.  It  is  a detestable 
system,  drawn  from  the  worst  periods  of  the  Roman 
Republic ; and  if  it  were  to  be  perpetuated,  — if  the 
offices,  honors,  and  dignities  of  the  people  were  to  be 
put  up  to  a scramble,  and  to  be  decided  by  the  result  of 
every  presidential  election,  — our  government  and  in- 
stitutions would  finally  end  in  a despotism  as  inexorable 
as  that  at  Constantinople.” 

That  Van  Buren  was  a “ spoils  politician”  is 
undoubtedly  true.  But  that  to  him  “the  intro- 
duction of  the  odious  system  ” in  the  general  gov- 
ernment was  “ principally  to  be  ascribed,”  is  not 
correct.  Jackson  was  already  vigorously  at  work 
“ rewarding  his  friends  and  punishing  his  enemies,” 
when,  a few  weeks  after  the  beginning  of  the  ad- 
ministration, Van  Buren  arrived  at  Washington. 
Jackson  would  doubtless  have  introduced  the  “ spoils 
system,”  with  all  its  characteristic  features,  had 
Van  Buren  never  been  a member  of  his  cabinet. 
In  the  Senate,  however,  Van  Buren’s  friends  did 
not  defend  him  on  that  ground.  It  was  in  reply 
to  Clay’s  speech  that  Marcy,  speaking  for  the 
politicians  of  New  York,  proclaimed  that  they  saw 
“nothing  wrong  in  the  rule  that  to  the  victors  be- 
long the  spoils  of  the  enemy.” 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


369 


The  rejection  of  Van  Buren’s  nomination  was 
accomplished  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent, Calhoun,  who  thought  that  after  such  a de- 
feat Van  Buren  would  “ never  kick  again.”  Clay 
wrote  to  his  friend  Brooke : “ The  attempt  to  excite 
public  sympathy  in  behalf  of  the  ‘ little  magician  ’ 
has  totally  failed;  and  I sincerely  wish  that  he 
may  be  nominated  as  vice-president.  That  is  ex- 
actly the  point  to  which  I wish  to  see  matters 
brought.”  Clay’s  wish  was  to  be  gratified.  The 
rejection  of  Van  Buren  made  it  one  of  the  darling 
objects  of  Jackson’s  heart  to  revenge  him  upon  his 
enemies.  He  employed  his  whole  power  to  secure 
Van  Buren’s  election  to  the  vice-presidency  first, 
and  to  the  presidency  four  years  later.  Both  Clay 
and  Calhoun  had  yet  to  learn  what  that  power  was. 

The  dangers  to  which  a candidate  for  the  presi- 
dency is  exposed,  when  a member  of  the  Senate, 
were  strikingly  exemplified  by  a curious  trick  re- 
sorted to  by  Clay’s  opponents.  They  managed 
to  refer  the  question  of  reducing  the  price  of  the 
public  lands  to  the  Committee  on  Manufactures, 
of  which  Clay  was  the  leading  member,  an  ar- 
rangement on  its  very  face  unnatural.  Clay  un- 
derstood at  once  the  object  of  this  unusual  proceed- 
ing. “ Whatever  emanated  from  the  committee,” 
he  said,  in  a speech  on  the  subject,  “was  likely 
to  be  ascribed  to  me.  If  the  committee  should 
propose  a measure  of  great  liberality  toward  the 
new  States,  the  old  States  might  complain.  If 
the  measure  should  lean  toward  the  old  States, 


370 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  new  might  be  dissatisfied.  And  if  it  inclined 
to  neither  class,  but  recommended  a plan  accord- 
ing to  which  there  would  be  distributed  impartial 
justice  among  all  the  States,  it  was  far  from  cer- 
tain that  any  would  be  pleased.”  However,  he 
undertook  the  task,  and  the  result  was  his  report 
on  the  public  lands,  the  principles  of  which  became 
for  many  years  a part  of  the  Whig  platform. 

In  1820  the  price  of  public  lands,  which  had 
been  82.00  an  acre  on  credit  and  81.64  for  cash, 
was  fixed  at  81*25  in  cash.  The  settlement  of  the 
new  States  and  territories  had  indeed  been  rapid, 
but  various  plans  were  devised  to  accelerate  it  still 
more.  One  was,  that  the  public  lands  should  be 
given  to  the  States;  another,  that  they  should  be 
sold  to  the  States  at  a price  merely  nominal; 
another,  that  they  should  be  sold  to  settlers  at 
graduated  prices,  — those  which  had  been  in  the 
market  a certain  time  without  finding  a purchaser 
to  be  considered  “ refuse”  lands,  and  to  be  sold  at 
greatly  reduced  rates.  These  propositions  were 
advanced  by  some  in  good  faith  for  the  benefit  of 
the  settlers,  but  by  others  for  speculative  ends. 
Benton  was  the  principal  advocate  of  cheap  lands, 
for  reasons  no  doubt  honest.  J ackson  had  never 
put  forth  any  definite  scheme  of  land  policy ; but 
McLane,  his  secretary  of  the  treasury,  recom- 
mended in  his  report  of  December,  1831,  that  the 
public  lands  should  be  turned  over  at  fair  rates  to 
the  several  States  in  which  they  were  situated, 
the  proceeds  to  be  distributed  among  all  the  States. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


371 


Under  such  circumstances,  the  subject  was  re- 
ferred to  Clay’s  Committee  on  Manufactures.  He 
reported  that  the  general  government  should  not 
give  up  its  control  of  the  public  lands;  that  it 
would  be  unjust  to  the  old  States  if  the  public 
lands  were  disposed  of  exclusively  for  the  benefit 
of  the  new  States;  that  the  price  should  not  be 
reduced;  and  that  the  proceeds  of  the  sales,  ex- 
cepting ten  per  cent,  set  apart  for  the  new  States, 
should  be  distributed  among  all  the  States  accord- 
ing to  their  federal  representative  population,  to 
be  applied  to  the  promotion  of  education,  to  in- 
ternal improvements,  or  to  the  redemption  of  any 
debt  contracted  for  internal  improvements,  or  to 
the  colonization  of  free  negroes,  as  each  State 
might  see  fit,  — such  distribution  to  take  place 
only  in  time  of  peace,  while  in  time  of  war  the 
public  land  should  again  become  a source  of  reve- 
nue to  the  general  government.  While  condemn- 
ing the  principle  of  the  distribution  of  surplus 
revenue  arising  from  taxation,  he  defended  the 
distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  public  land  sales, 
on  the  ground  that  Congress  had  authority  to  stop 
revenue  from  taxation,  but  not,  without  the  exer- 
cise of  arbitrary  power,  the  revenue  from  the  pub- 
lic lands. 

No  sooner  had  Clay  submitted  his  report  than 
it  was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands, 
where  the  whole  subject  should  have  gone  origi- 
nally. That  committee,  under  the  inspiration  of 
Benton,  made  a counter-report,  setting  forth  that 


372 


HENRY  CLAY 


the  net  proceeds  of  the  land  sales  could  be  arrived 
at  only  by  deducting  from  the  gross  proceeds 
the  whole  cost  of  the  administration  of  the  land 
department,  inclusive  of  surveying;  that  such  a 
deduction  would  leave  little  to  be  distributed;  and 
that,  if  distribution  were  made  of  the  gross  pro- 
ceeds, it  would  be  equivalent  to  taking  so  much 
from  the  customs  revenue  to  divide  among  the 
States  under  the  name  of  proceeds  of  land  sales, 
— a scheme  against  which  Clay  himself  had  loudly 
protested  as  utterly  unwarranted  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. This  criticism  was  undoubtedly  correct,  and 
Clay  could  not  controvert  it.  The  Land  Commit- 
tee further  recommended  a reduction  of  the  price 
of  land  from  81*25  to  81.00  per  acre;  the  offering 
of  lands  remaining  unsold  for  five  years  after 
having  been  offered  once,  at  fifty  cents  per  acre; 
fifteen  per  cent,  of  the  proceeds  of  land  sales  to  be 
set  apart  for  the  benefit  of  the  new  States. 

A debate  followed,  in  the  course  of  which  Clay 
made  some  predictions  proving  how  little  a mind 
even  so  large  as  his,  and  so  intent  upon  grasping 
the  proportions  of  the  rapid  growth  of  this  repub- 
lic, was  able  to  form  a just  estimate  of  future  de- 
velopments. He  said : “ Long  after  w^e  shall  cease 
to  be  agitated  by  the  tariff,  ages  after  our  manu- 
factures shall  have  acquired  a stability  and  perfec- 
tion which  will  enable  them  successfully  to  cope 
with  the  manufactures  of  any  other  country,  the 
public  lands  will  remain  a subject  of  deep  and 
enduring  interest.  We  may  safely  anticipate  that 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


373 


long,  if  not  centuries,  after  the  present  day,  the 
representatives  of  our  children’s  children  may  be 
deliberating  in  the  halls  of  Congress  on  laws  relat- 
ing to  the  public  lands.”  He  did  not  foresee  — 
as  probably  nobody  did  at  that  period  — that,  fifty- 
five  years  after  he  spoke  thus,  the  protected  indus- 
tries, having  for  twenty -five  consecutive  years  en- 
joyed an  “American  system ’’far  more  protective 
than  his,  would  still  be  demanding  more,  and 
bidding  fair  to  continue  doing  so  for  an  indefinite 
time;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  public  lands 
still  under  the  control  of  the  government  would 
have  shrunk  to  a comparatively  poor  remnant  in 
quantity  and  quality,  likely  to  be  in  private  hands 
in  another  generation,  except  perhaps  some  deserts, 
and  some  forest  reserves  in  mountainous  regions. 

His  bill  passed  the  Senate,  but  failed  to  be  acted 
upon  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  It  did, 
however,  not  fail,  as  some  of  those  who  forced  the 
subject  upon  him  had  foreseen,  seriously  to  injure 
the  candidate  for  the  presidency  in  the  Western 
States,  as  being  an  opponent  of  “cheap  lands.” 

But  the  principal,  and  the  most  ominous,  strug- 
gle of  the  session  was  still  to  come  — the  struggle 
concerning  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  As 
we  have  seen,  the  memorial  of  the  bank  praying 
for  a renewal  of  its  charter  was  presented  to  Con- 
gress in  January.  The  committees  in  the  two 
houses,  to  which  the  memorial  was  referred,  re- 
ported favorably,  recommending  the  renewal  of 
the  charter  with  some  modifications.  It  was  well 


374 


HENRY  CLAY 


known  that  good  majorities  in  both  Houses  were 
ready  to  vote  for  the  renewal. 

The  enemies  of  the  bank,  or  rather  President 
Jackson’s  nearest  friends,  under  Benton’s  leader- 
ship, then  rushed  to  the  attack.  Several  serious 
charges  against  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
drawn  up  by  Benton,  were  made  in  the  House, 
with  a demand  for  an  investigation  by  committee. 
The  majority  of  the  committee  was  composed  of 
known  opponents  of  the  bank ; among  the  minority, 
probably  the  most  conscientiously  impartial  man 
of  all,  was  John  Quincy  Adams,  then  in  the  first 
year  of  his  distinguished  career  as  a member  of 
the  House  of  Representatives.  An  exposition  of 
the  charges  and  specifications,  and  of  the  findings 
of  the  committee  in  detail,  will  not  be  undertaken 
here.  The  reader  will  find  an  eminently  clear  and 
complete  presentation  of  the  case  in  Professor  W. 
G.  Sumner’s  “Andrew  Jackson.”  John  Quincy 
Adams  made  a separate  report,  which  was  of  espe- 
cial value.  The  majority  of  the  committee  de- 
clared that  the  bank  was  unsound,  and  recom- 
mended that  it  should  not  be  re-chartered;  the 
minority  said  that  it  was  safe  and  useful,  and 
ought  to  be  re-chartered;  in  this  latter  view  John 
Quincy  Adams  substantially  concurred.  One 
member  of  the  majority  declared  that  he  had  seen 
nothing  in  the  conduct  of  the  president  and  di- 
rectors “inconsistent  with  the  purest  honor  and 
integrity;  ” but,  being  a warm  friend  of  General 
Jackson,  he  consented  to  sign  the  majority  report. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


375 


Jackson  himself  honestly  believed  all  the  charges, 
whether  proved  or  disproved.  On  the  whole,  the 
result  of  the  investigation  was  regarded  as  favor- 
able to  the  bank.  The  bill  to  renew  the  charter 
passed  the  Senate  June  11,  1832,  by  28  to  20, 
and  the  House  July  3,  by  109  to  76.  It  looked 
like  a great  victory ; it  was  only  the  prelude  to  a 
crushing  defeat. 

If  Jackson  had  ever  been  inclined  to  drop  his 
attack  on  the  bank,  that  inclination  vanished  the 
moment  the  National  Republican  Convention  made 
the  bank  question  an  issue  in  the  presidential 
canvass.  From  that  hour  he  saw  in  the  bank  his 
personal  enemy  — that  is  to  say,  an  enemy  of  the 
country,  whose  destruction  was  one  of  the  duties 
he  had  to  perform.  His  combativeness  became 
aroused  to  its  highest  energy.  But  there  was  his 
cabinet  divided,  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  hav- 
ing in  his  official  report  made  an  elaborate  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  bank;  there  was  his  party 
divided,  some  of  its  leading  men  in  and  out  of 
Congress  being  warm  friends  of  the  bank;  there 
was  his  faithful  Pennsylvania,  the  seat  of  the 
bank,  and  more  than  any  other  State  under  its 
influence,  likely  to  be  turned  away  from  him  by 
that  influence;  there  was  Congress,  with  Demo- 
cratic majorities  in  both  houses,  yet  both  houses 
having  emphatically  declared  for  re-chartering  the 
bank.  Could  he,  in  the  face  of  these  facts,  con- 
tinue the  fight?  He  did  not  hesitate  a moment. 
The  bill  to  renew  the  bank  charter,  as  passed  by 


376 


HENRY  CLAY 


both  houses,  was  presented  to  him  on  July  4, 
1832,  and  on  July  10  came  his  veto. 

As  a legal,  financial,  and  historical  argument, 
that  veto  presented  many  vulnerable  points;  but 
as  a campaign  document  it  was  a masterpiece. 
No  more  powerful  stump  speech  was  ever  deliv- 
ered. In  ingenious  variations  of  light  and  color, 
it  exhibited  the  bank  before  the  eyes  of  the  people 
as  an  odious  monopoly;  a monopoly  granted  to 
favored  individuals  without  any  fair  equivalent; 
a monopoly  that  exercised  a despotic  sway  over 
the  business  of  the  country;  a monopoly  itself 
controlled  by  a few  persons;  a monopoly  giving 
dangerous  advantages  to  foreigners  as  stockhold- 
ers ; a monopoly  the  renewal  of  which  would  put 
millions  into  the  pockets  of  a few  men;  a mo- 
nopoly in  its  very  nature  unconstitutional,  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  notwithstanding;  a 
monopoly  mismanaging  its  business  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  people,  and  using  its  power  for  cor- 
rupt purposes;  a monopoly  tending  to  make  the 
rich  richer  and  the  poor  poorer. 

This  was  in  substance  Jackson’s  veto  message. 
There  was  one  bitter  pill  in  it  intended  for  Clay’s 
special  enjoyment.  As  to  the  constitutionality  of 
the  bank,  Jackson  simply  repeated  the  argument 
which  Clay  had  used  in  1811,  when  opposing  the 
re-chartering  of  the  first  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
The  Supreme  Court,  Jackson  argued,  had  decided 
the  charter  to  be  constitutional  on  the  ground  that 
the  Constitution  gave  Congress  power  “to  pass 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


377 


all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for 
carrying  these  powers  [the  granted  powers]  into 
execution.”  Chartering  a bank  might  have  been 
necessary  and  proper  then,  but  the  President  was 
sure  that  it  was  not  at  all  necessary  and  proper 
now.  Just  so  Clay  had  reasoned  in  1811.  It  was 
in  overruling  the  Supreme  Court  that  Jackson 
in  the  veto  uttered  the  famous  sentence:  “Each 
public  officer  who  takes  an  oath  to  support  the 
Constitution  swears  that  he  will  support  it  as 
he  understands  it,  and  not  as  it  is  understood  by 
others.” 

The  arrival  of  the  veto  in  the  Senate  was  the 
signal  for  a grand  explosion  of  oratory.  Webster 
opened  the  debate  with  his  heaviest  artillery  of 
argument;  Clay,  Ewing,  and  Clayton  spoke,  thun- 
dering magnificently  against  the  veto  and  its  au- 
thor. With  great  force  it  was  argued  that  the 
bank  denounced  by  Jackson  as  an  unconstitutional 
and  tyrannical  monopoly  was,  in  all  essential  fea- 
tures, the  bank  established  under  Washington  and 
sanctioned  by  him ; that  the  privileges  it  enjoyed 
were  far  outweighed  by  the  services  it  rendered  to 
the  country;  that  the  holding  of  bank  stock  by 
foreigners,  who  were  excluded  from  taking  part 
in  its  management,  was  as  little  dangerous  to  the 
country  as  the  holding  by  foreigners  of  United 
States  bonds;  that,  according  to  the  doctrine  of 
President  Jackson,  a law  held  to  be  constitutional 
by  the  Supreme  Court  was  not  binding  upon  him 
if  he  saw  fit  to  deny  its  constitutionality ; that,  if 


378 


HENRY  CLAY 


such  a doctrine  prevailed,  there  was  an  end  of  all 
law  and  judicial  authority,  and  the  President  was 
an  autocrat  like  Louis  XIV. ; and  finally,  that 
the  overthrow  of  the  bank  would  plunge  all  busi- 
ness interests  into  confusion,  and  the  whole  coun- 
try into  disaster  and  distress.  Clay  urged  with 
especial  warmth  a proposition,  which  thencefor- 
ward formed  part  of  his  political  programme,  — 
that  the  veto  power,  “ though  tolerated  by  the 
Constitution,  was  not  expected  by  the  convention 
to  be  used  in  ordinary  cases;  ” that  it  was  designed 
for  “ instances  of  precipitate  legislation  in  un- 
guarded moments;  ” that  the  principle  upon  which 
it  rested  was  “ hardly  reconcilable  with  the  genius 
of  representative  government,”  and,  indeed,  “ to- 
tally irreconcilable  with  it,  if  it  was  to  be  fre- 
quently employed  in  respect  to  the  expediency  of 
measures  as  well  as  their  constitutionality.” 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  characteristic  and 
significant  than  the  manner  in  which  Jackson’s 
spokesman,  Benton,  defended  the  veto  and  raised 
the  war-cry  against  the  opposition.  “The  bank 
is  in  the  field  as  a combatant,”  he  said,  uand  a 
fearful  and  tremendous  one,  in  the  presidential 
election.  If  she  succeeds,  there  is  an  end  of 
American  liberty,  — an  end  of  the  republic.”  He 
described  how  the  bank,  by  increasing  and  by 
withdrawing  its  loans  and  accommodations,  sought 
alternately  to  bribe  and  to  coerce  the  people  to 
support  it.  Then  he  whipped  the  Democrats  into 
line,  exclaiming : — 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


379 


“ You  may  continue  to  be  for  a bank  and  for  Jackson, 
but  you  cannot  be  for  this  bank  and  for  Jackson.  The 
bank  is  now  the  open,  as  it  has  long  been  the  secret, 
enemy  of  Jackson.  The  war  is  now  upon  Jackson,  and 
if  he  is  defeated  all  the  rest  will  fall  an  easy  prey. 
What  individual  could  stand  in  the  States  against  the 
power  of  that  bank,  and  that  bank  flushed  with  a vic- 
tory over  the  conqueror  of  the  conquerors  of  Bonaparte  ? 
The  whole  government  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
moneyed  power.  An  oligarchy  would  be  immediately 
established,  and  that  oligarchy  in  a few  generations 
would  ripen  into  a monarchy.” 

He  declared  that  this  republic  deserved  a more 
glorious  death,  and  he  preferred  that  she  should 
end  in  “a  great  immortal  battle,  where  heroes  and 
patriots  could  die  with  the  liberty  they  scorned  to 
survive.” 

After  a wild  wrangle  between  Benton  and  Clay 
about  a street  fight  between  the  Benton  brothers 
and  Jackson,  which  had  occurred  years  ago,  — for 
the  debate  degenerated  into  bitter  personalities,  — 
the  vote  was  taken,  and  the  bill,  the  President’s 
objections  notwithstanding,  received  22  against 
19  votes,  not  the  necessary  two  thirds.  Thus  the 
veto  was  sustained. 

Clay  and  his  friends  were  still  in  good  spirits. 
The  veto,  they  thought,  would  severely  shock  the 
sober  sense  of  the  people,  and,  in  effect,  be  Jack- 
son’s death-warrant.  Nicholas  Biddle  wrote  to 
Clay  that  he  was  “delighted  with  it.”  Anti-Jack- 
son newspapers  found  the  veto  message  “beneath 


380 


HENRY  CLAY 


contempt,”  and  advised  that  it  be  given  the  widest 
possible  publicity.  So  it  was,  and  with  a startling 
result. 

The  Democratic  National  Convention  had  been 
held  in  May,  while  the  struggle  in  Congress  was 
still  going  on.  That  Jackson  would  be  a candi- 
date for  reelection  had  been  taken  for  granted 
since  the  first  year  of  his  administration.  He  had 
no  competitor.  The  formality  of  a nomination 
was  therefore  in  his  case  deemed  unnecessary. 
The  convention  was  called  merely  to  designate  a 
candidate  for  the  vice-presidency.  That  candi- 
date, too,  had  been  selected  by  Jackson, — Van 
Buren,  endeared  to  him  by  the  enmity  of  his  own 
enemies.  The  national  convention  had  only  to 
ratify  the  decree.  Eaton,  Jackson’s  first  secretary 
of  war,  was  inclined,  as  a member  of  the  conven- 
tion, to  vote  agairist  Van  Buren.  But  he  received 
a warning  not  to  do  so,  “ unless  he  was  prepared 
to  quarrel  with  the  general.” 

The  National  Republicans  hoped  that  the  veto 
would  disgust  the  many  supporters  of  the  bank 
among  the  Democrats,  and  thus  demoralize  and 
scatter  Jackson’s  following.  It  had  the  opposite 
effect.  The  bank  Democrats  found  that  there  was 
a man  at  the  head  of  their  party  whose  resolution 
no  opposition  could  stagger,  and  who  had  a will 
much  stronger  than  theirs ; to  that  will  they  bowed. 
The  secretary  of  the  treasury,  who  had  made  a 
report  in  favor  of  the  bank,  did  not  resign.  The 
Democratic  politicians,  who  had  been  at  the  same 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


381 


time  friends  of  the  bank  and  friends  of  Jackson, 
soon  discovered  that  the  cry  against  the  great 
monopoly  was  the  popular  cry  and  would  win. 
Many  of  them  had  to  “turn  very  sharp  corners,” 
but  they  turned  them  with  alacrity.  Members  of 
Congress,  who  had  voted  for  the  renewal  of  the 
bank  charter,  took  part  in  the  anti-bank  meetings, 
apologized  for  what  they  had  done,  and  then  lus- 
tily joined  in  the  outcry  against  the  “monster.” 
Having  once  changed  their  position  on  a question 
they  had  considered  highly  important,  simply  be- 
cause Jackson  would  have  it  so,  they  found  no 
further  difficulty  in  surrendering  their  will  com- 
pletely to  him.  The  effect  of  the  veto  had  there- 
fore been,  not  to  scatter  Jackson’s  following,  but 
actually  to  consolidate  his  party,  giving  it  more 
cohesion  and  discipline  than  it  had  ever  had  be- 
fore, and  strengthening  it  numerically  too,  for, 
although  there  were  a few  defections,  the  war 
against  the  bank  drew  crowds  of  recruits  to  its 
ranks. 

The  cholera  appeared  that  summer  in  the  United 
States,  but  it  checked  only  for  a moment  the  ani- 
mation of  the  campaign.  The  Clay  party  remained 
hopeful  to  the  end.  In  May  a convention  of 
“young  men”  had  met  at  Washington,  represent- 
ing almost  every  State,  to  ratify  Clay’s  nomination 
for  the  presidency.  William  Pitt  Fessenden  of 
Maine  was  one  of  its  vice-presidents,  and  there 
were  not  a few  among  its  members  who  became 
distinguished  men  in  later  days.  The  Democrats 


382 


HENRY  CLAY 


dubbed  the  meeting  “ Clay’s  infant  school,”  but  it 
encouraged  him  in  the  belief  that  he  had  the 
youth  of  the  country  on  his  side.  The  National 
Republicans,  having  great  strength  among  the 
merchants,  manufacturers,  and  professional  men, 
and  commanding  a large  proportion  of  the  talent 
of  the  country,  sought  to  make  a campaign  of 
argument,  and  flooded  the  country  with  addresses, 
pamphlets,  and  printed  campaign  matter  of  all 
kinds.  The  United  States  Bank  itself  did  its 
share  of  the  work.  But  this  kind  of  effort  failed 
to  reach  the  large  class  of  voters,  then  much 
larger  than  now,  who  were  not  “reading  people.” 
The  J ackson  party  trusted  more  to  speeches,  meet- 
ings, and  processions.  The  figure  of  the  “old 
hero,”  grown  to  greater  proportions  than  ever 
since  he  was  engaged  in  his  struggle  against  the 
“monster  monopoly,”  exercised  a wonderful  charm 
over  the  popular  imagination,  — a charm  against 
which  all  the  learned  arguments  about  the  useful- 
ness of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its 
constitutionality,  and  the  abuse  of  the  veto  power, 
availed  nothing.  Before  the  eyes  of  the  masses 
Jackson  appeared  as  a St.  George  killing  the 
dragon,  and  as  the  invincible  champion  of  “hard 
cash,”  of  the  “yellow  boys,”  driving  out  “Old 
Nick’s  money”  and  “Clay’s  rags.”  Further,  the 
country  was  made  to  ring  with  the  old  “bargain 
and  corruption  ” charge,  revived  to  do  new  service. 

At  a late  period  of  the  campaign  the  hopes  of 
the  Clay  party  were  highly  excited  by  the  defec- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


383 


tion  of  the  New  York  “ Courier  and  Enquirer,” 
under  James  Watson  Webb,  and  of  several  other 
newspapers  which  turned  from  Jackson  to  Clay. 
The  National  Republicans  became  extremely  san- 
guine of  success.  So  much  the  more  terrible  was 
their  disappointment  when  the  returns  of  the  elec- 
tion came  in.  Of  the  288  electoral  votes  Jackson 
had  won  219,  Clay  only  49,  those  of  Massachu- 
setts, Rhode  Island,  Maryland,  Delaware,  and 
Kentucky.  Wirt,  the  candidate  of  the  Anti-Ma- 
sons, had  carried  Vermont;  South  Carolina  gave 
her  vote  to  John  Floyd  of  Virginia.  It  was  a 
stunning  defeat.  Clay  and  his  friends  stood  won- 
dering how  it  could  have  happened. 

Clay  had  committed  two  grave  blunders  in  states- 
manship, and  one  equally  grave  in  political  tactics. 

The  South  was  in  a dangerous  ferment  against 
the  tariff.  The  impending  extinguishment  of  the 
public  debt  made  a large  reduction  of  the  revenue 
necessary.  Clay  might,  therefore,  in  recognition 
of  the  necessity  for  reducing  the  revenue,  have 
proposed  a reduction  of  tariff  duties  sufficient  to 
take  off  the  edge  of  the  Southern  discontent,  with- 
out the  least  appearance  of  yielding  to  Southern 
threats.  The  measure  he  did  propose  reduced  the 
revenue  very  little,  and,  by  maintaining  the  high 
protective  duties,  exasperated  the  South  still  more. 
This  was  the  first  blunder  in  statesmanship. 

The  other  was  that,  instead  of  advising  the 
United  States  Bank  to  keep  clear  of  politics  and 
to  accede  to  any  reasonable  modification  of  its 


384 


HENRY  CLAY 


charter  that  might  avert  the  opposition  of  Jack- 
son,  he  forced  the  fight,  and  made  the  question  of 
the  bank  a party  question ; thus  involving  in  the 
changing  fortunes  of  party  warfare  the  most  im- 
portant financial  institution  of  the  country,  whose 
solvency,  credit,  and  political  impartiality  were  of 
the  highest  concern  to  the  business  community. 

The  blunder  in  political  tactics  was  that  he  be- 
lieved he  could  excite  the  enthusiasm  of  the  masses 
for  a great  moneyed  corporation  in  its  contest 
against  a popular  hero  like  Jackson, — a most 
amazing  infatuation ; and  thus  he  made  the  bank 
question  the  leading  issue  in  the  presidential  cam- 
paign. 

Without  these  blunders  he  would,  probably,  not 
have  been  victorious;  but  with  them  his  defeat 
became  certain  and  overwhelming. 


(ftfoe  Iftitoersibe 

CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS  U.  S.  A. 
ELECTROTYPED  AND  PRINTED  BY 
H.  O.  HOUGHTON  AND  CO. 


